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Introduction
The initial point of this thesis was the working paper of the Norwegian diplomat
Sverre Jervell who, writing in 2003, suggested that the Norwegian foreign and se-
curity policy should finally recognise the changed conditions for national security
policy since the end of the Cold War and choose Germany as its European strate-
gic partner.1 This indicates that Germany has become a more important actor in
Europe, a topic thoroughly debated over the last two decades. It has, however,
hardly been analysed from a Nordic point of view. The aim of the thesis is thus
to further the understanding of the possibilities and impediments of Germany
in Europe. Why is Germany important, and how important is Germany, to the
strategic challenges and opportunities facing the foreign policies of Norway and
Sweden? What limitations exist in regards to Germany’s role in Northern Eu-
rope? The conclusions reached on Germany’s importance to Norway and Sweden
are also an evaluation of German foreign policy as well as recommendations on
the further development of German policy in northern Europe. In an even larger
context, this should also highlight the EU’s role in northern Europe as the foreign
policy direction of Germany is decisive for the overall European developments. A
foreign perspective on German foreign policy will hopefully give new arguments
to the discussion on Germany’s role in Europe and ultimately new insights on
European cooperation.
The first question coming up is thus where to search for Germany’s importance,
in the bilateral relations or in the larger context of the challenges and opportu-
nities of Norwegian and Swedish foreign policies? Good bilateral relations are
rather the reason why Germany is considered in the first place, in addition to
Germany’s economic power and leading role in the EU. A comparison of the
strategic challenges and opportunities of these small, peripheral and very similar
1 Jervell (2003).
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and closely related European neighbours, who are quite distinct when it comes
to foreign and security policy, should lead to an identification of the factors of
importance to their foreign policies. Do these factors, decisive for good foreign
policy solutions, differ due to different geographic areas of interest, foreign policy
traditions, institutional frames of foreign policy, i.e. the European Union (EU)
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), or is the larger context
of Nordic security the decisive factor? When it is obvious where to search for
Germany’s importance, the question is what theoretical implications this has for
the further analysis. Finally, what influence does Germany have on the factors
decisive for the two countries’ strategic challenges and opportunities? This is
both a question of what a potential there is for such an influence, and of whether
Germany’s potential opportunities are fully utilised or not. If this is not the case,
the question is moreover why this is so and what policy direction in different is-
sue areas are desirable. Finally, Germany’s importance is also a question of how
northern Europe is prioritised by German politics and how Germany’s power is
defined.
The factors decisive for both Nordic countries’ foreign policy challenges and op-
portunities are Russia, international law, regional cooperation and US presence
in Europe. A legal based international order and multilateral cooperation is of
particular importance to Norway and Sweden in questions concerning war, peace,
environmental survival, trade and economic capitalisation of natural resources.
This conclusion of part I leads to move the theoretical analysis of part II beyond
pure power politics, and the theory suitable to guide the following empirical anal-
ysis is derived from the English School, the advocate of a theory of international
society which recovered an older European stream of thinking which recognised
the habit of cooperation and the importance of law in the practice of interna-
tional relations. This implies that German policy must be tested in regards to
its ability to find the least common denominator between the actors decisive for
Norway’s and Sweden’s strategic situation and moreover to broaden their com-
mon agenda. However, it must also be tested in regards to Germany’s role as a
European leader. Hence, consensus, legitimacy and independence are key terms
of part III, and the most interesting situations of the analysis are connected to
the legitimacy of the chosen foreign policy means when there is a conflict be-
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tween order and justice. Sometimes even legitimacy is not sufficient to make the
necessary policy solutions, which rather demands a will to make choices when
a consensus is missing. Different principles of “good international citizenship”
derived from the study of Linklater and Suganami (2006) are used to evaluate
German policy in the case studies undertaken. The issue areas of the case studies
were singled out due to the criteria of topical representativeness and dissimilarity
in regards to the applicability of the theoretical guidelines of part II. The case
studies focus on the regional contexts of Norwegian and Swedish foreign policy
which include the sub-contexts of the Nordic power triangle, i.e. the Russian, Eu-
ropean and transatlantic triangle. Germany’s compatibility with the principles of
good international citizenship is compared between issue areas in order to assess
the overall importance of Germany to Norway and Sweden and also to recognise
the mechanisms which limit Germany’s potential as a good international citizen
in northern Europe. The conclusion is finally made that Germany’s potential for
northern Europe is great. However, there is a lot of room for improvements of
the policy conducted. German policy in certain areas is still an open question
or is deliberately ignored. German policy on Russia and its neighbours needs to
move in a solidarist direction in order to advance Russia’s integration in Europe.
In order to be able to do so, Germany needs the EU and its member states as
team players in order to be able to use its power. However, in order to prevent
Germany from becoming too powerful due to its increasing impact on the EU, the
power in the EU has to be defined, i.e. basic principles created, in order to have
the necessary fundamental preconditions. Otherwise today’s situation continues
which implies that the EU can not agree on the substance. Russia is the best
example in this regard.
The conclusion can also be formulated in regards to Germany’s role in Europe
that its experience leads to great opportunities as a foreign policy actor, and
Germany’s importance is found in what it really is and not what it sometimes
pretends to be. To a larger extent than before, Germany can make its own choices
of direction. The political self-confidence is, however, still lacking.
Norwegian, Swedish and German quotations are translated to English in order to
broaden the understanding. Some exceptions are made in regards to German, as
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it is a quite acquainted language. As the interviewees are concerned, the original
quotations are rendered in footnotes.
Part I.
Nordic Security

1. General conditions of Nordic security
The end of the Cold War reintroduced, with certain modifications, the relevance
of the traditional power triangle to the Nordic region. The Swedish historian
and political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922) wrote that the Nordic countries
were trapped in a power triangle which at the time included Russia, Germany and
England. Today, the power triangle is comprised of Russia, the EU and the US.
The most constant factor of the power triangle around the Nordic region is the
US dominating position as a sea power. The world economy increasingly depends
on the US superior strategic position and ability to secure their own and other
countries’ communications at sea. The US also guarantees the stability in the
central energy production areas and along the most important energy transport
routes from the Middle East to Asia, America and Europe.
Today’s Russia is a challenge both to the US and to Europe. According to
former German foreign minister (FM) Joschka Fischer, both America and Europe
continue to put off the question as to which role Russia will have in the new
European order of states. Is it to be treated as a difficult partner or a strategic
opponent?1 The conflicts between the US and Europe on the one hand and
Russia on the other are several. First, the question is how far NATO will move
forward on previous Soviet territory. Moreover, the possible NATO memberships
of the Ukraine and Georgia have large conflict potential. Furthermore, the plans
initiated by the Bush administration to build an anti-missile defence in Poland
and the Czech Republic against nuclear missiles from Iran also led to very strong
objections from Russia. President Obama redesigned the anti-missile defence
plans but it is still a difficult topic. Also other topics contribute to the difficult
relationship: In Aserbajdjan there is a strong US commitment to bring the oil on
the world market without going through the Russian pipeline network. As Kosovo
1 Fischer (2009).
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was acknowledged as a sovereign state in 2008 by most Western states, Moscow
expressed strong objections. Since the war in Kosovo in 1999, the US-Russia
relationship increasingly worsened.
The changed security situation after the end of the Cold War is also visible in the
Arctic. After having receded into the background of Western attention, climate
change has led to growing attention on Arctic security, not least because of the
possible access to off-shore petroleum fields and other resources as well as the
possibility of new Arctic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in three passages
- the Northwest Passage, the Northeast Passage and directly across the Polar
Basin. The three corners of the power triangle are relevant to the Arctic as well.
Stability and prosperity in the High North, as well as in the Baltic Sea Region
(BSR), can only be achieved with Russia’s active and positive participation. If
Russia is to be perceived as a strategic opponent, the West has to fundamentally
change its agenda according to Fischer. Russia is still a great power in Europe
and Asia, and the West needs to cooperate with Russia in order to solve regional
conflicts and global challenges. This will be difficult with a strategic confrontation
with Russia. The question is how severe the Russian threat really is. As Russia’s
geopolitical location and potential will stay a strategic factor, it is in the interest
both of the EU and the US to include Russia in a strategic partnership.2
The dilemmas concerning the European-Russian relations will here be exemplified
with energy relations. In a working paper of the European Council on Foreign
Relations (ECFR), Leonard and Popescu draw a picture of an EU divided between
those states that view Russia as a potential partner that can be drawn into the
EU’s orbit through a process of “creeping integration”, and those that see and treat
Russia as a threat.3 The authors furthermore characterise Russia’s predominance
in the relationship with the EU as surprising because it is actually the EU that
outranges Russia both in regards to soft and hard power indicators. As energy
is concerned, Russia’s share of EU gas imports declined from 50 per cent to 40
per cent between 2000 and 2005 whereas 70 per cent of Russia’s sales went to
the EU. As long as there are no pipelines to China, Russia in the medium term
2 Fischer (2009).
3 Leonard/ Popescu (2007).
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has no alternative to the EU market.4 Moreover, the EU’s population is three
and a half times the size of Russia’s, military spending is ten times bigger and
its economy 15 times the size of the Russian economy. Nonetheless, the EU is
wasting the most effective power tool over Russia: its unity. Hence, Russia is
able to build its relationship with the EU on different bilateral relations with the
different EU members and to set the agenda in the EU-Russia relationship. As
a centralised state, Russia deals with autonomous foreign policies. Russia has
thus been able to top its influence on the EU whereas Europe has turned weaker,
unable to use its power potential.5 Hence, if power is defined as “the ability to
achieve objectives rather than as the resources a country commends”, Russia is in
the better position, using its power to weaken the EU because it is able to split it.6
According to Fischer, “Moscow will understand every signal of divergence and the
weakness of the Western camp as an encouragement to return to great-Russian
power policy.”7
This policy has been well known during the presidencies of both Putin and
Medvedev. The gas-supply conflict of Russia and the Ukraine of January 2009
to a large extent hit EU-countries.
“Moscow apparently wants to use the cold winter to convince the Euro-
peans of the gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea. If the EU finally would
create a common gas market, with which the pipelines also run from West
to East, the situation would look completely different to Moscow and Kiev.
Europe would be in a considerably stronger position.”8
The 1200 kilometer Nord Stream pipeline to Germany is above all of strategic
importance to the Russian Gazprom9 as the existing pipelines go through transit
states, e.g. Poland and the Ukraine. With the new pipeline, Gazprom can dictate
the conditions. Russia, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands
supported the Nord Stream pipeline project, whereas Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Belarus and the Ukraine were against it. Should Latvia and Lithua-
nia wish to connect to the pipeline, they would not necessarily be allowed to
4 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 8.
5 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), pp. 9-10.
6 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 10.
7 Fischer (2009).
8 Fischer (2009).
9The companies participating in the pipeline project are the Russian Gazprom and German
Eon and BASF.
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do so. The former Russian gas network passed through Belarus, the Ukraine
and Moldova, whereas the Nord Stream pipeline bypasses them (as well as the
Baltic states) and enables Russia to turn off the tap of other pipelines with-
out risking their exports to Western Europe.10 Hence, the pipeline will enhance
Russia’s power over the gas tap to Poland, the Ukraine, Belarus and to some
extent to the Baltic states. It is also possible that a leg will be built to Kalin-
ingrad, which would enable Russia to supply its exclave and weaken Lithuania’s
leverage on Kaliningrad11 at the same time. Gazprom owns 51 per cent of the
pipeline, whereas German BASF/Wintershall and E.ON/Ruhrgas own 24,5 per
cent each.12
Russia decided to prioritise natural gas deliveries to Europe instead of Liquefied
Natural Gas (LNG) deliveries to the US. The strategic energy dialogue between
Russia and the EU is strongly attached to deliveries from the Russian fields
on shore and, in the near future, from West Siberia through the Nord Stream
gas pipeline. As far as the Barents Sea is concerned, pipeline-transported gas
capabilities from this area can easily be developed towards Europe depending on
the market development. The Nord Stream pipeline system could be coupled to
the resources in the the Barents Sea through new pipelines on shore from the
Murmansk area to Vyborg at the Gulf of Finland whenever needed.13
New oil and gas areas close to the US and European markets will be of great
economic and security interest. With its proximity to these markets, great ex-
pectations are attached to the Barents Sea as a future “Atlantic energy basin”.
Estimations made by the U.S. Geological Survey (UGS) suggest that a high per-
centage of the world’s undiscovered resources of oil and gas are situated in the
Arctic. The survey of July 2008 estimates the petroleum reserves north of the Arc-
tic Circle could amount to 13 per cent of the total undiscovered oil and about 30
per cent of the undiscovered natural gas. Arctic fields already under exploration
make up approximately 10 percent of the world’s known petroleum resources.
However, the numbers are not based on comprehensive geological surveys of the
10See also figure I.2 on page 80.
11Kaliningrad’s need of energy imports is to a large part satisfied through the Lithuanian
nuclear power plant Ignalina. However, as Ignalina will be closed down due to EU requirements,
Lithuania will become completely dependent on importing natural gas from Russia.
12 Larsson (2006b), p. 17.
13 Barlindhaug (2005a), p. 8.
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Figure I.1.: Russia’s energy resources in the Barents Sea. (Source: Sherpa
Konsult)
areas involved, and approximately 84 percent of the oil and gas is located off-
shore.14 As Holtsmark and Smith-Windsor remark, some of the most promising
fields are situated within the littoral states’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs)15,
i.e. in undisputed areas. There is no assurance that the potential new or the
already identified fields will be exploited. The first precondition is a consistently
high petroleum price.16 Moreover, the assumption that
“there may be huge undiscovered petroleum reserves in the ’Arctic’ (...)
leads to the apparent conclusion that in view of expected scarcity of energy,
there is a significant potential for violent conflict. The argument, of course,
builds on the unspoken assumption that the expected new petroleum re-
sources are in disputed areas. This, as a matter of fact, is hardly the case.
The real situation is the direct opposite - the major share of the predicted
recoverable oil and gas resources lie well within the Arctic Ocean states’
undisputed ... EEZs.”17
Offerdal also argues “that development hinges upon industry interest in the region,
14U.S. Geological Survey (2008): Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscov-
ered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/.
15A coastal state’s economic zone is a special maritime zone that is outside but contiguous
with its territorial sea. The EEZ is not part of the state’s territory and subject to its sovereignty,
unlike the territorial sea which is an ocean area contiguous with its land territory and internal
waters.
16 Holtsmark/ Smith-Windsor (2009), p. 14.
17 Holtsmark/ Smith-Windsor (2009), p. 14.
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and that this is more fragile than what certain policy statements rest upon.”18
The littoral states’, i.e. Russia, the US, Denmark, Canada and Norway, economic
interest in the area is nonetheless obvious, and most of the interesting areas are
Russian.
The Russian development is moreover characterised by a high degree of unpre-
dictability. The interconnection between the Russian state and the energy sector
has to be mentioned as Russia’s energy exports have partly substituted, partly
complemented the other power policy tools, particularly in a regional context.19
The energy policy in Russia also aims at ‘energy security’, which implies a se-
cure access to the consumer markets as well as a diversification of these markets.
Moreover, a reduction of the transit routes over third-state territory and a vital
infrastructure under state control are other elements of this security thinking.20
Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020, approved of by president Medvedev
on 12 May 2009, also stresses the role of energy security. Russia’s energy reserves
are thus decisive for Russia’s international position, and a “pragmatic policy and
political use of its natural resources” has increased the country’s influence in the
world.21
Since 1991, Russia has in a broad sense pursued a tough price policy, supply
interruptions or threatened with such interruptions in approximately fifty cases.
The states involved have been the Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus,
Moldavia or Georgia. The underlying and interconnected driving forces have
been to force concessions in ongoing negotiations, to enable a Russian takeover
of infrastructure, to force economic advantages or to send political signals. This
behaviour to a large extent takes place in the grey zone between politics and
market.22 However, Russia has in general been a credible supplier of energy to
Western Europe. The tough price policy occurred both under Jeltsin and Putin,
whereas the supply interruptions were almost reduced by one half under Putin.
Russia has in principle had a legitimate explanation in all the cases of supply
interruptions. However, the way Russia is pursuing this policy, the topical con-
18 Offerdal (2009), p. 178.
19 Larsson (2006a), p. 11.
20 Larsson (2006b), pp. 48-49.
21Cited in Zysk (2009).
22 Larsson (2006a), p. 13.
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text, the time of action as well as the presented demands or comments testify
to political interconnections, that according to Larsson were very obvious in over
thirty cases. Moreover, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and for-
mer Eastern European states in particular, have experienced a dramatic increase
in Russian takeovers of infrastructure and energy companies. Most of the states
involved, including Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, are taking
the Russian actions seriously and have for the most part classified energy imports
as a security question.23 Russia’s imperialistic policy does, however, not have any
impact on the West’s willingness to import Russia’s energy, although the EU has
stressed the necessity of imports diversification as a guiding principle.24
The developments prior to the financial crisis show that Russia wanted to increase
its influence and owner shares at the expense of foreign companies that own
oil and gas fields in Russia.25 Gazprom, which within a few years has been
transformed from a company with a private stock majority to a political tool,
is almost always behind these decisions. Secondly, the income from the oil and
gas production is the precondition for the improvement of the Russian economy,
which again is the precondition for the strengthening of the Kremlin’s political
power. The increased state control with Russia’s energy resources also raises
questions of what direction the economic-political system in Russia is heading.
The financial crisis hit Russia hard with low oil prices and is challenging Putin’s
energy doctrine, which does not seem to work in bad times. In order to develop its
energy resources, Russia will have to attract foreign capital investments. In early
April 2012 the Russian Economic Development Ministry lowered its forecast for
the country’s 2012 GDP growth from 3,7 to 3,4 per cent.26 Before the financial
crisis, the Russian economy was growing at more than 7 per cent per year. The
reliance on oil revenues makes it vulnerable to a slowdown in economic growth
and a sudden drop in commodity prices. The global crisis thus put an end to
23 Larsson (2006a), p. 13.
24European Commission (2006): Green Paper - A European Strategy for Sustainable, Com-
petitive and Secure Energy, http://eur-lex.europa.eu (accessed 18 January 2009). Caspian en-
ergy and Turkey as an energy hub could be alternatives to some European countries.
25This has affected e.g. Shell, which cooperates with Japanese companies, the French Total
and the Norwegian Hydro that together own and conduct a field in Siberia, as well as British
Petroleum which has emphasised cooperation with Russian interests through the company
TKN-BP.
26http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-04/18/c_131533631.htm
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economic growth in Russia, and its post-crisis economic performance has been
disappointing with only moderate growh and high inflation.27 In the National
Security Strategy (2009), the Russian economy’s dependence on exports of raw
materials is recognised as a security threat. Foreign involvement in the national
economy is, however, also characterised as such.28 Despite enormous gas reserves,
Russia falls short in both production capability and means of supply. Exploiting
and developing new resources have been sacrifised in order to control the energy
production.
Whereas energy relations to a large extent exemplify the European-Russian chal-
lenges, the core challenge in Western-Russian relations is NATO, which still is
a tool for US anti-Russian policy. Putin on the other hand has apparently not
realised that an aggressive Russian foreign policy is the best and most efficient
life insurance for NATO. Russia has suggested negotiations over a new European
security order. In this regard, Fischer has some very interesting thoughts, build-
ing on the conclusion that Russia has to be the West’s difficult partner and not
a strategic opponent:
The West should not repudiate the Russian desire for new negotiations.
It should use it as a chance to finally answer the key question of Russia’s role
in Europe. In doing so, NATO will have to play the pivotal role because it is
indispensable to the very large majority of Europeans as well as for America.
The balance of interests could consist in the unmodified existence of the
principles and institutions of the European order of states. In return, Russia
would become a fundamentally expanded role inside NATO, including the
outlook of a full membership. (...) Why not consider to rebuild NATO to an
efficient European security system, including Russia? (...) Admittedly, this
proposal postulates two things that are not presently given: first a common
transatlantic exposure to Russia, second a significantly more united and
hence stronger EU.”29
Also Russia’s new national security strategy comments on the weakness of the
current global and regional security order, as it is favouring NATO. It still opposes
the eastern enlargement closer to the Russian borders and a global function of
NATO. On the other hand, the strategy expresses preparedness for negotiations
and developing relations with NATO if the prerequisites of equality and respect
27IMF Survey Magazine (2011) “Russia Should Leverage Commodity Boom to Boost
Growth”, 27 September at http://www.imf.org (accessed 30 September 2011).
28Cited in Zysk (2009).
29 Fischer (2009) [author’s translation].
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for Russia’s interests are accounted for.30
The Russian challenge to the West is the overall essential factor to Nordic se-
curity. The following chapters will analyse the different Norwegian and Swedish
challenges in this regard.
30Cited in Zysk (2009).

2. Germany as a strategic partner?
To determine how to proceed with the assessment of Germany’s importance to
Norway and Sweden, the possibility of a strategic partnership will be examined
in the case of Norway as suggested by Jervell.31
In 1999, the Norwegian government launched the so called “Strategy on Ger-
many”. The strategy has been followed up by subsequent governments, i.e. is the
responsibility of the State Department, and was revised in October 2007 as a re-
sult of Germany’s economic and political importance to Norway, being Norway’s
third largest export market and second largest trade partner. The content of the
strategy will be analysed in order to draw a picture of Norway’s existing policy
on their German partner. Moreover, in order to examine what ambitions Norway
really has in regards to its relationship with Germany, and what the reactions
are on the German side, in-depth elite interviews have been conducted with main
primary sources, i.e. persons vital to the German-Norwegian relationship. These
interviewees are persons with a large amount of expertise on the subject, however,
the number of experts on both sides is considered to be very limited:
The Norwegian politician Bjørn Tore Godal from the Labour Party was Minister
of Trade and Shipping from 1991 to 1994, then Minister of foreign Affairs 1994
to 1997, and Minister of Defence 2000 to 2001. From 2001 to 2007 he was the
Norwegian ambassador to Germany. From 2007 he has acted as special adviser
to the Norwegian State Department in international energy- and climate issues.
Further, Inge Lønning is a long standing parliamentarian from the Conservative
Party (Høyre), president of the “German-Norwegian Society” and the laureate of
the Willy-Brandt-Award in 2009.32 Major Odd Haugdahl is a former representa-
31See the introduction.
32The Willy-Brandt-award is handed out by the “Willy-Brandt-Foundation”, a Norwegian-
German initiative to further mutual knowledge of both countries’ society, culture and language
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tive of the Norwegian army at the German-Dutch corps in Münster (Germany).
An interview in the Norwegian State Department has also contributed to illumi-
nate Norwegian policy thinking, but did not allow for citation. On the German
side, the contact person for the economic service at the Federal Republic of Ger-
many’s embassy in Oslo, Alfred Grannas, has been the interviewee.33
Germany is an important market for Norwegian natural gas, fish and auto parts,
and the largest market for Norwegian tourism.34 Cooperation in economy, tech-
nology, research, science, defence etc. is extensive, and Germany has also become
“one of Norway’s closest cooperation partners” in questions concerning foreign, se-
curity and defence policy.35 Germany is also one of Norway’s closest cooperation
partners within NATO and the EU.
“As closely linked to the EU, but without membership, Norway has a spe-
cial need to advance its interests bilaterally toward the single EU countries.
Because of its size, location and political culture, Germany is a particularly
important partner to Norway in the EU.”36
Moreover, Norwegian governments have realised that “there is today not a satis-
factory connection between Germany’s importance to Norway and the conscious-
ness Norwegians have of Germany’s importance.”37 This may indeed be an ob-
stacle to a strategic partnership with Germany, although the problem is at least
recognised by Norwegian authorities. Furthermore, it is stated that it is of par-
ticular importance
“to build up networks and personal contacts on all levels in such an im-
portant EU country as Germany. Because of this, the Strategy on Germany
not only discusses the official Norwegian relations with Germany but also
the role of political parties, cultural and research institutions, organisations
of economy etc.”38
and to strengthen the cooperation and contact between different groups in the Norwegian and
German societies. The award goes to persons or institutions rendering outstanding efforts to
develop the Norwegian-German connections.
33According to the embassy, only two persons here are well versed in the topic of this thesis.
34Yearly, 450 000 German tourists visit Norway.
35Strategy on Germany part I at http://www.regjeringen.no/nn/dokumentarkiv/Regjeringa-
Stoltenberg-II/Utanriksdepartementet/423153/2003/tysklandsstrategi/1.html?id=448603 (ac-
cessed 10 October 2008). In the following cited as Strategy on Germany part I.
36Strategy on Germany part I. Author’s translation.
37Strategy on Germany part I. Author’s translation.
38Strategy on Germany part I. Author’s translation.
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In the first phase of the strategy, actions were implemented in order to increase
Norway’s accessibility in Germany39, to increase the knowledge of German cir-
cumstances in Norway40 and to further mutual knowledge of each other in Norway
and Germany.41 The overall purposes of the “Strategy on Germany” are to
• “Strengthen the consciousness in Norway of Germany’s importance for the
development of our country, both on the economic, political and cultural
field.”
• “Establish Norwegian competence on the German language and German
affairs.”
• “To intensify the bilateral contacts with Germany because of the country’s
understanding of Norwegian considerations and interests and the country’s
great importance in the EU.”42
How the Norwegian government is going to achieve the aims of strengthened con-
sciousness of Germany’s importance and establish more Norwegian competence
on the German language is questionable. Reports from the Norwegian school
show that German is disappearing as a foreign language. Hence, the develop-
ment went in the opposite direction of what was expected when the Berlin wall
fell and Germany again appeared as the most important and central country in
Europe. Moreover, despite the fact that Germany is Norway’s most important
cooperation partner within the EU’s programs for research and technological de-
velopment, a decreasing number of Norwegian students go to study in Germany:
20 years ago, the number was 4000, in 2008 it was 207, of which only ten were
studying economics.43 According to Jørgen Fodstad at the Norwegian-German
chamber of commerce, many of the Norwegian leaders of companies and enter-
prises today are fluent in German and know the German culture. However, when
they retire, this could have consequences for Norwegian-German trade.44 The
German ambassador to Oslo, Mauch, has stated the following:
“Germany appears to be reduced to the “Elbtunnel” to many [Norwe-
gians], at the end of which the sun of the south appears. German is
rarely taught as a second foreign language in the Norwegian school any-
39The “norwegen - die offizielle Seite in Deutschland” site at www.norwegen.no was estab-
lished.
40The national resource center for German at the University of Oslo was established in 2001.
41The Norwegian-German Willy Brandt foundation was founded in 2000.
42Strategy on Germany part I. Author’s translation.
43 Aftenposten Temautgivelser (2008), p. 22.
44Cited in Aftenposten Temautgivelser (2008), p. 22.
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more. Among business people English is increasingly used as a compromise
language between German and Norwegian. The consequence is that an
immediate understanding is difficult, misunderstandings could even con-
strain further contacts. The language makes it possible to get to know and
understand the neighbour and the neighbouring country in a better way.”45
The centre-left Stoltenberg government has abandoned the demand of two com-
pulsive foreign languages in the Norwegian junior high school or “ungdsomsskolen”
(levels 8-10). Norway is the only country in Europe with only one compulsory
foreign language. Thus, the intentions of the Norwegian government, regardless of
the “Strategy on Germany”, do not seem to have a long-term perspective. Such a
strategy can not be successful unless the overall government policy aims at achiev-
ing the purposes of the strategy listed above. Godal comments the government’s
second language decision as follows:
“I don’t agree with the decision made, but it was not directed at German
in particular, but rather at teaching a second foreign language in general.
But the effect was indeed that it weakened the opportunities for German
to thrive. But it is sad, and we have to make amends with whatever means
we can. The Oslo schools have been very active on Germany. An exam-
ple is the City Council of Oslo’s councillor of education who is committed
to Norwegian-German relations, and has provided exchange programs be-
tween Oslo and Berlin. This is an example to be followed. (...) However,
other countries have become more attractive destinations for a university
education.”46
Lønning on the other hand remarks that it has been a shortfall of Norwegian
school policy for several decades:
“The perception that if you have a tolerably good grasp of the English
language, then all problems are solved is a simplification of how the world
really works. (...) We have in a way viewed this as a lost cause, and there
is no longer any good-will capital which can be activated. And then it is
assumed that as long as there are a few people here or there who have some
particular reasons to learn German, it is enough.”47
45Cited at http://www.oslo.diplo.de/Vertretung/oslo/de/02/Galleri_Ambassadorer_Seite.
html (accessed 9 April 2009) [author’s translation].
46Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. State-
ment in Norwegian: “Jeg er ikke enig i beslutningen, men den var jo ikke rettet mot tysk, men
mot et annet fremmedspråk. Men effekten var jo at den svekket tyskens muligheter. Men det
er trist, og vi må ta igjen det vi kan. Oslo-skolen har f.eks. vært veldig aktiv på Tyskland.
Skole-byråden i Oslo har et engasjement på Tyskland og har sørget for utvekslingsordninger
mellom Oslo og Berlin som er et eksempel til etterfølgelse. (...) Men andre land er blitt mer
attraktive universitetsmål.”
47Inge Lønning, interview with author, 17 June 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statement
in Norwegian: “forestillingen om at hvis man behersker engelsk sånn noelunde så er alle prob-
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At the top political level, German-Norwegian relations are close. Germany gets
an excellent testimony from the former FM, DM and ambassador Godal:
“My experience is that the Germans were the most important to com-
municate well with, both during the EEA and the EU negotiations, which
I followed closely first as Minister of Commerce with the responsibility for
the EEA agreement, and later as a foreign minister. And there was no
doubt that the German leadership felt it was important to include Norway,
for Pan-European reasons. They see the European map as incomplete if
Norway is not a member. And then everyone can make their own opinion
in that regard, but it is clear that it is a benefit to us politically which we
have used when needing support from Germany in issues like, for instance,
the salmon case.48 There have not been many conflicts with the EU dur-
ing these years, but this is one example, and I experience Germany as an
ally.”49
Whereas Americans, the British and the French have hardly sent a top-ranking
politician to Norway in a generation50, Merkel’s visit to Norway in April 2008
was the fifth visit of a German chancellor to Norway in less than eight years.
FM Steinmeier has visited Norway several times, Svalbard included. Former
Norwegian PM Bondevik visited Germany six times during his terms of office.51
PM Stoltenberg has also made several visits to Berlin and decided to meet Angela
Merkel for talks, with Russia as the main topic, only one week before he went on
an official visit to Moscow in May 2009 to meet both president Medvedev and
PM Putin.52
lemer løst. Og det er klart at så enkel er verden ikke. (...) Man har på en måte ansett dette
som et tapt slag, og der ligger det ikke lenger noen kapital som det er mulig å aktivere. Og så
har man gitt seg med at bare det finnes en håndfull mennesker her eller der som av litt sære
interessegrunner lærer seg tysk, så er det nok.”
48In January 2006 the EU Commission introduced a minimum price on salmon imported
from Norway, after Scottish salmon farmers claimed that Norwegian salmon was sold to EU
nations at prices below production cost. Norway rejected the accuse of subsidising the salmon
industry and that salmon is sold at dumping prices on the EU market. The dispute was brought
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
49Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. State-
ment in Norwegian: “Min erfaring er at det var det landet det var viktigst å kommunisere med,
både under EØS- og EU-forhandlingene, som jeg fulgte tett både som handelsminister med
ansvar for EØS-avtalen og siden som utenriksminsiter. Og det var ingen tvil om at lederskapet
på tysk side syntes det var viktig å ha Norge med, av alleuropeiske grunner. De ser på eu-
ropakartet som ufullstendig hvis ikke Norge er med. Og så kan man mene hva man vil om det,
men det er klart at det er en kapital for oss politisk som vi også har brukt når vi har trengt
støtte fra Tyskland i spørsmål som i laksesaken for eksempel. Og det er ikke mange konflikter
vi har hatt med EU i disse årene, men dette er et eksempel på det, og Tyskland opplever jeg
som en støttespiller.”
50The exception was Bill Clintons visit in 1999.
51Cited in Udgaard (2008).
52 Udgaard (2009).
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In October 2007, Norway’s King Harald V stated in a Berlin speech that “Ger-
many is Norway’s most important partner in Europe.”53 As Udgaard remarks,
the words were noted in Oslo’s diplomatic environment, as the king’s speeches
are created in close contact with the government. Another sign of the increased
Norwegian emphasis on Germany was the reopening of the consulate general in
Hamburg, whereas others have been closed.54 Although the Norwegian public is
not aware of how close Norway’s relations with Germany have become, politicians
obviously are. In January 2008, a “Norwegian-German friendship group” was cre-
ated consisting of 35 members of the Norwegian parliament. Such a move is not
common in the Storting, which until then only had a “Friends of Israel” group.
A part of the group has already visited the parliamentarians and government
departments in Berlin.55
The main obstacle to a strategic partnership with Germany seems to be, in ad-
dition to the lack of knowledge of the German language and vice versa of course
the lack of knowledge of the Norwegian language, the term “strategic partnership”
itself. It is hardly used by any Norwegian politician to describe the relationship
with Germany.
“I don’t think the foreign minister or others have used the term strategic
partnership. But in reality it is close to being just that. At least I think
so, but if you use the term strategic partnership in this case, then why not
with the countries x, y, z. Then you get in a hopeless situation, and that
is probably why it is not used. But I would think that the cooperation
with Germany is a pillar of Norwegian foreign policy, and it is the large
EU-country that is closest to us - politically, economically and culturally.
That does not diminish the importance of others, but times have shown,
with the exceptions of the two world wars, that there is a dimension in the
Norwegian-German cooperation that is much closer than what many now
realise.”56
53Cited in Udgaard (2008).
54 Udgaard (2008).
55 Udgaard (2008).
56Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. State-
ment in Norwegian: “Jeg tror ikke utenriksministeren eller andre har brukt uttrykket strategisk
partneskap. Men i realiteten er det jo meget nær å være det. Men hvis man først bruker ordet
strategisk partnerskap, hvorfor da ikke med land x, y, z. Da kommer du inn i en håpløs situ-
asjon, og det er vel derfor det ikke er brukt. Men jeg vil mene at samarbeidet med Tyskland
er en bærebjelke i norsk utenrikspolitikk, og det er det av de store EU-landene som står oss
nærmest, politisk, økonomisk og kulturelt, men det er ikke til forkleinelse for andre. Det har
vist seg gjennom tidene med unntak av de to verdenskrigene at det er en slags dimensjon i det
norsk-tyske samarbeidet som er mye nærere enn mange nå er klar over.”
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A strategic partnership is in Norway perceived to be something the EU can have
with Russia, or Germany with Russia and France, and other great powers can
have with whom they may chose. It is, however, nothing the Norwegian State
Department wants to be official Norwegian policy, because, among other things,
this might give the impression that other states are less important. In most
cases they are, but that does not have to be spoken out loudly. Norway also
has “country strategies” on France, Russia, and the US. The “northern areas
dialogues” are also conducted with many states in addition to Germany. Despite
the German helpfulness and the open doors to Norwegian concerns, the concept of
a strategic partnership is not suitable for the Norwegian policy makers and is also
not mentioned in the “Strategy on Germany”. Could it be though, that Norway
practically has a strategic partnership with Germany on a high level but without
the foundation of the Norwegian population? Godal answers the following:
“I think that creates a false sense of conflict. I don’t like the term because
it is very selective. Out of the large EU countries, Germany is the closest
to us, and we have to develop that further. I would not call it strategic
partnership, because that would be to think categorically. Is France sud-
denly not so important anymore? This is why I do not use the word to
anyone. (...) And even less so would I say that we have this on a top level
but not amongst people. That would be to trivialise it. I would rather
say that we have, firstly, a close and tight relationship with Germany, and
secondly, that it is important to further develop the connections between
the Norwegian and German people. That is why the Strategy on Germany
describes measures to realise this.” 57
There is reason to believe that Godal’s objections to the term “strategic part-
nership” explain why the FM is not using it either. In the terminology of the
State Department, Norway has a bilateral strategy on Germany, not a strategic
partnership with Germany. Then PM Bondevik from the Christian Democratic
Party suggested a strategic partnership between Norway and Germany in Berlin
in 1999: “We have to build on what we have achieved through many years of com-
57Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. State-
ment in Norwegian: “Jeg synes det er en kunstig motsetning. Jeg er ikke så glad i uttrykket
fordi det er veldig selektivt. Tyskland er det av de store EU-landene som står oss nærmest,
og det må vi utvikle videre. Jeg vil ikke kalle det strategisk partnerskap, for det blir å tenke i
bokser. Er plutselig ikke Frankrike så viktig lenger? Det er derfor jeg ikke bruker ordet overfor
noen. (...) Og enda mindre vil jeg si at vi har det på toppnivå men ikke blant folk. Det blir en
banalisering av det, men jeg vil heller si 1. vi har et tett og nært naboskapsforhold til Tyskland,
og 2. å utvikle og gjøre de folkelige kontaktene bedre er også viktig, og der har vi mye å hente.
Det er derfor Tyskland-strategien beskriver tiltak for å få det til.”
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mon history and should (...) look forward and move toward a strategic partnership
between Norway and Germany.”58 However, this idea has not been supported by
the overall political and diplomatic elite in Norway, as nobody has seized the
suggestion posed by Bondevik. Lønning shares a similar opinion to Godal’s on
the term “strategic partnership”. If Norway would become a member of the EU,
the isolated perspective Norway - Germany would be left behind, according to
Lønning,
“then we would face a more complicated situation where we would have
to relate to all the member countries of the EU in the capacity of being
an EU member (...) That is also something which to a minor degree hap-
pens today through the EEA agreement, of course, but ... that is where
Norwegian diplomacy has to find the right balance, because if you, for
instance, demonstratively and at every opportunity would join bilateral
alliances directed toward others inside the EU-system, forces would imme-
diately activate to counteract. So you can not have a one-sided focus on a
bilateral partnership between Norway and Germany.”59
Lønning also thinks the term is inappropriate when it is used to describe the
relationship between two countries, whose sizes differ to such a great amount.60
Grannas on the other hand thinks such an argument is rather an excuse in order
to keep options open.
“The important thing is that both countries have something to offer each
other. It does not have to be directed against others. It is German policy
to involve as many countries as possible. The substance [of the German-
Norwegian relations] is available, it does not matter how it is named.”61
According to Grannas, it is thus rather German policy to listen to all small and
middle-sized countries and then forming an opinion. Further, a Norwegian mem-
58Kjell Magne Bondevik, speech at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Berlin, 29 November
1999. Cited in Jervell (2003), p. 93 [author’s translation.]
59Inge Lønning, interview with author, 17 June 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statement
in Norwegian: “for da går vi plutselig inn i et mer komplisert bilde hvor vi skal forholde oss til
alle EUs medlemskapsland i egenskap av EU-medlemskap. Det gjør man jo i mindre målesktokk
i dag og gjennom EØS-avtalen, selvfølgelig, men, og det er jo der naturligvis norsk diplomati
må balansere, for hvis man demonstrativt og i tide og utide liksom inngår bilaterale allianser
rettet mot andre innenfor EU-systemet, for eksempel, så vil det jo straks utløse motkrefter
innlysende nok. Sånn at du kan ikke satse ensidig på et bilateralt partnerskap mellom Norge
og Tyskland.”
60Inge Lønning, interview with author, 17 June 2009, Oslo.
61Alfred Grannas, interview with author, 7 July 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. The
statement in German: “Beide müssen etwas zu geben haben. Es muss sich nicht gegen andere
richten. Es ist die Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, so viele wie möglich einzubinden.
Die Substanz ist da, wie man sie bezeichnet, ist egal.”
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bership in the EU would increase the degree of integration, and the possibilities
for cooperation would be deepened. Furthermore, there would be a great poten-
tial for creating alliances, as the approaches in Norway and Germany are very
similar in regards to the definition of a problem and how it is to be solved. A
very significant example are the nuclear disarmament initiatives in NATO.62
The Norwegian reluctance to use the term “strategic partnership”, was met with
some surprise from a German point of view.
“Practically, it is a strategic partnership. We do not have any problem
characterising it as such. When you look at the substance, the relationship
[with Germany] is the closest.”63
Grannas agrees that the description of Norwegian-German relations as a strategic
partnership on a high level but without the foundation in the respective popula-
tions is appropriate.
“The Norwegian-German partnership is an elite project, just as the
German-French partnership. It is operated from above as a project of the
political, cultural and economic elites. It is a partnership that results from
several interests and has similar effects as a project. What does not take
place, is that [in the case of Germany and Norway] the substance does not
go beyond the circle of the persons concerned. They are countries that are
important to each other but take little notice of each other.”64
An interesting part in this regard is the network establishments. One aim of
the “Strategy on Germany” is e.g. to develop a German-Norwegian network of
young, active people who can be expected to capture important positions in the
societies of both countries in the future.65 A relative new network is the “German
Norwegian Network” (GNN), established for young leaders in politics, diplomacy
and economy aiming at both informal and professional connections to develop
62Alfred Grannas, interview with author, 7 July 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation.
63Alfred Grannas, interview with author, 7 July 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statement
in German: “In der Praxis ist es eine strategische Partnerschaft. Wir haben keine Probleme,
das Verhältnis so zu bezeichnen. Wenn man die Substanz anschaut, ist die Beziehung [mit
Deutschland] am dichtesten.”
64Alfred Grannas, interview with author, 7 July 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. The state-
ment in German: “Die norwegisch-deutsche Partnerschaft ist ein Elitenprojekt, genau wie die
Deutsch-Französische Partnerschaft. Sie wird von oben getrieben als ein Projekt der politischen,
kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Eliten. Es ist eine Partnerschaft, die sich aus verschiedenen
Interessen ergibt, die ähnliche Wirkungen wie ein Projekt haben. Was nicht stattfindet ist, dass
die Substanz [der Norwegisch-Deutschen Beziehungen] aus dem Kreis der Befassten herausgeht.
Sie sind Länder, die wichtig füreinander sind, die aber wenig voneinander wahrnehmen.”
65Strategy on Germany part I. Author’s translation.
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Flow of Goods
Value Share in Total
Norway Sweden Norway Sweden
Imports to Germany 22 251 14 182 2,72 % 1,73 %
Exports from Germany 7 647 20 648 0,77 % 2,08 %
Trade Balance -14 604 6 466 - -
Table I.1.: Trade balance of Germany with Norway and Sweden (in million EUR)
2008.
German-Norwegian links in a larger perspective.66 However, the close cooper-
ation, as it is also commented in the strategy on Germany, is little known in
Norway, and according to Godal, he would like to see more content on Germany
in Norwegian media and communication channels. Only three Norwegian news-
papers regularly report on German matters. This is the most important factor
in German-Norwegian relations that should be improved.67
Economic cooperation is an important part of the German-Norwegian partner-
ship, and energy is again the most important part of that. The relevance of
the bilateral relationship to energy companies is e.g. apparent through sponsor-
ing of students, especially from the German side. The sponsors of the yearly
German-Norwegian youth forum are moreover StatoilHydro and E.on Ruhrgas.
“ ‘I often experienced that German industry leaders felt there were few
Norwegians sufficiently fluent in German for jobs they wanted to fill. I think
it is a commendable and praiseworthy effort when they attempt to promote
German skills and recruit Norwegians to Germany and vice versa.”68
As table I.169 shows, it is not a very equal economic relationship between the two
66GNN, that has chosen an English name, has 100 members, of which 30 are active. “GNN’s
purpose is to bring together young decision takers and to expand the contact net and to lift
the level of knowledge of our members, all to the pleasure and use for our work within the
German-Norwegian cooperation” according to their vice president, Christoph Morck. Cited
in Aftenposten Temautgivelser (2008), p.17.
67Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation.
68Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation.
Statemenet in German: “Jeg opplevde ofte at tyske industriledere syntes det var for lite tilfang
av nordmenn som kunne tysk til jobber som de ville besette. Jeg mener at det er et aktverdig
og prisverdig formål at de forsøker å fremme tysk kunnskap og rekruttering av nordmenn til
Tyskland og gjerne omvendt.”
69Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2009) Außenhandel. Rangfolge der Handelspartner im
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parts, which thus, can be improved. Germany’s trade with Sweden on the other
hand is more balanced. In 2008, Norway had the 14th position on the German
ranking list of trade partners in regards to imports to Germany and the 28th in
regards to exports from Germany, whereas Sweden took the positions 18 and 14
respectively.70
“30 per cent of the gas market in Germany is supplied by Norway, whereas
the Russians have 40 percent. Our market share increase, while the Rus-
sians’ decrease. So to the Germans, it is important to have Norway as a
trustworthy, long term supplier. We are interesting to them, but they are
also paying a high price for the resources, even though the price goes up
and down. And ... we are of course interested in getting more on equal
terms in our relationship with Germany, because we profit much more from
the Germans than they do from us. (...) I think it is important to get
the Germans as partners in the value creation process happening on the
Norwegian side, it is good for the bilateral relations, I think. And fortu-
nately we see that German oil companies start taking an interest in the
North Sea. (...) There is no German tradition for offshore activity except
for special equipment and technique, freezing techniques and other things
that are being used at Melkøya71 and other places, but the companies have
had little activity on the Norwegian shelf. Now, however, they are coming,
and RWE, Wintershall and Verbundnetz are on their way and have small,
increasing shares of ownership.”72
As table I.273 shows, the Norwegian proportion of Germany’s imports of natural
gas has increased to a large extent from 1993 to 2008, whereas the dutch share
has decreased and Russia has been and still is a very solid energy supplier to
Germany. It is, however, also a German interest to participate in the exploration
of oil and gas:
Außenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2008. Wiesbaden.
70Statistisches Bundesamt (2009) Außenhandel. Rangfolge der Handelspartner im Außen-
handel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2008. Wiesbaden.
71The world’s largest natural gas liquefaction plant is outside the Norwegian town of Ham-
merfest.
72Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. State-
ment in Norwegian: “30 prosent av gassmarkedet i Tyskland er norsk, russerne har 40 prosent,
vi øker, russerne minsker. Så for dem er det viktig å ha Norge som en troverdig, langsiktig
leverandør. Vi er interessante for dem, men de betaler også dyrt for de ressursene. Selv om
prisen går opp og ned. Og ... vi er jo interessert i å få litt mer likeverd inn i relasjonen til
Tyskland, for vi tjener mye mer på tyskerne enn de tjener på oss. (...) Det å få tyskerne med
på verdiskapning på norsk side mener jeg er bra for de bilaterale forbindelsene. Og heldigvis ser
vi nå at tyske oljeselskaper begynner å utvise interesse for Nordsjøen. (...) Det er ingen tysk
tradisjon for offshore-aktivitet bortsett fra spesielt utstyr og teknikk, fryseteknikk og annet som
brukes på Melkøya og andre steder, men selskapene har vært lite aktive på norsk sokkel. Men
nå begynner de å komme, og både RWE, Wintershall, Verbundnetz Gas er nå alle på vei og har
små, økende eierandaler.”
73The table is based on data from Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technolo-
gie (2009) Zahlen und Fakten. Energiedaten. Nationale und Internationale Entwicklung,
http://www.bmwi.de/Navigation/Technologie-und-Energie/Energiepolitik/energiedaten.html
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1993 1998 2003 2008
Netherlands 39 % 27 % 20 % 19 %
Norway 17 % 25 % 31 % 33 %
Russia 42 % 44 % 44 % 44 %
Other 2 % 3 % 5 % 4 %
Table I.2.: Share of natural gas imports to Germany for selected years.
“In order to preserve our interest of secure energy supply from countries
like Russia, we have to participate more intensely in the exploration and
extraction of new sources. In order to get into this production business,
Germany needs Global Players strong on investments that can cooperate
with the firms in the producing countries.”74
An example of German-Norwegian energy relations is the cooperation between
StatoilHydro und Linde AG on the LNG liquefaction plant of the island Melkøya
near the town of Hammerfest. The plant receives natural gas through a 150
km long pipeline from the gas field Snøhvit in the Barents Sea. It is important
to include Germany and other countries in order for them to pay attention to
the developments on the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea, and in order to
include an important European importing country and outbalance the influence
that Russia might have on Norwegian policy. According to Jervell, an integra-
tion of Norwegian companies with German companies would make an important
foundation for a strategic partnership. The possible advantages of such an inte-
gration might lead to increased support from German energy companies. Such a
support could e.g. have been valuable in the case of the energy directive75, which
will be referred to in chapter 3.4. In addition to a Norwegian membership in
the EU, Grannas mentions Norwegian-German-Russian cooperation as another
opportunity to deepen the relations between Norway and Germany. Norway and
Germany have very similar approaches to Russia. Common projects on energy,
environment and climate would thus be very interesting.76 However, this seems
to be an idea not yet considered by Norwegian authorities.
74Cited in Der Spiegel (2007) [author’s translation].
75 Jervell (2003), p. 92.
76Alfred Grannas, interview with author, 7 July 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation.
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Norway’s national budget and economy is strongly dependent on the energy busi-
ness, and the gas business makes up an increasig part of the petroleum industry.
The Norwegian gas export accounts for approximately 20 per cent of the Euro-
pean consumption, and the Norwegian Oil and Energy Ministry expects the the
gas sales to reach a level of between 105 and 130 billion Sm377 in 2020.78 The
bilateral relationship is strongly shaped by the energy relations, and the assess-
ment of these can not be solely positive from an economic point of view. The
infrastructure for gas-fired power plants is given in Germany, which also leads to
a reduction of CO2 emission. However German energy companies are bleeding
because of expensive long-term gas contracts with Norway and Russia whereas
the Norwegian oil and energy minister Borten Moe aims at German guarantees
for Germany’s willingness to buy more Norwegian gas. After the financial crisis
the electricity prices in Europe have been so low that the natural gas distributors
in e.g. Germany get difficulties as electricity produced by Norwegian gas has
become very costly. The long term contracts have a level above the market price
and thus impede the importers as the German VNG (Verbundnetz Gas). VNG
thus negotiates with both Statoil (Norway) and Gazprom (Russia) in order to
adjust the gas agreements. According to the German company, the future of the
Norwegian gas adventure is dependent on a Norwegian adjustment to the market
situation.79 Michael Ludwig, board member of VNG and executive chair of VNG
Norway, assesses the Norwegian-German energy cooperation in the following way:
“Norway has lately at several opportunities expressed the wish that the
German government committs itself to buying natural gas. That will not
happen under these circumstances. (...) German authorities have on sev-
eral occasions lately expressed themselves positiviely in regards to natural
gas. To secure that the sale of Norwegian natural gas will continue to
be successful in Germany, it does not take more than what was given in
the early 1990s. Then there were competitive prices and an excellent sales
structure which made gas the winner (...). Natural gas will continue to have
an important role in the German energy supply for several years ahead. It
is the perfect partner for renewable energy both in the market for heating
but also in the electricity market where the natural gas can play a larger
77Normally, oil is measured in million standard cubic metres (MSm3) and gas in million
standard cubic metres (GSm3). 1MSm3 = 1 000 000 Sm3; 1GSm3 = 1 000 000 000 Sm3.
Standard cubic metre indicates how many cubic metres there is of a substance when it has a
temperature of 15◦C and a pressure of 1,01325 bar pressure (standard air pressure).
78Cited in Helgesen (2012), p. 40.
79 Helgesen (2012), p. 40.
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role since Germany has chosen to shut down the nuclear power plants.”.80
In the field of energy cooperation there are thus diverging interests between Nor-
way and Germany, which at the same time are very interested in a continuation
of a successful history of cooperation. The point made by Jervell, who launched
the idea of a strategic partnership, was that through a strategic partnership with
Germany, which in practice would mean that Berlin is considered with special
care in Oslo in a way that Norway regularly considers how Norwegian diplomatic
output is functioning in regards to Berlin, Norway would improve its possibility
to gain support in difficult questions like the (by now settled) delineation dispute
with Russia or over Svalbard.81 The Norwegian State Department on the other
hand regard the current cooperation forms as sufficient and there is no strategy
aiming at gaining German support in difficult questions. As Grannas remarks,
“support must also be asked for.”82
In matters of defence, the Netherlands is a favoured cooperation partner of Nor-
way and seems to be the easiest choice for Norway to make as they are easy to
cooperate with. However, it is important to stress that military cooperation with
the Netherlands is not possible without involving Germany, as the two neigh-
bours have, to a large extent, an integrated military cooperation. This fact is
often ignored in Norway.83 Godal answers the following when asked if Germany
is important to Norwegian defence and security policy:
“We stand together in Afghanistan, a very close cooperation. We had
a special assisting military attaché in Berlin who kept in contact with the
headquarters for German operations abroad. We have had many officers
trained at the Führungsakademie in Hamburg. So there has been a connec-
tion for many years, which is important. And it complements the British
and American dimension in the NATO defence. It is important to foreign
affairs and security policy to have close contact with a large continental
country in NATO as Germany.”84
80Cited in Helgesen (2012), p. 40.
81 Jervell (2003), p. 92.
82Alfred Grannas, interview with author, 7 July 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statement
in German: “Unterstützung muss auch nachgefragt werden.”
83Major Odd Haugdahl, interview with author, 5 May 2004, Greven.
84Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. State-
ment in Norwegian: “Vi står sammen i Afghanistan, et veldig nært samarbeid. Vi hadde en egen
assisterende forsvarsattaché i Berlin som holdt kontakten med det tyske hovedkvarteret for tyske
utenlandske operasjoner. Vi har hatt mange norske offisersutdannede fra Führungsakademie
i Hamburg. Så det har vært en forbindelse i mange år som er viktig. Og den utfyller den
britiske og amerikanske dimensjonen i NATO-forsvaret. Det å ha en tett kontakt med et stort
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Germany has a significant maritime capacity which is trained in Norwegian
coastal waters. However, German combat forces lack an amphibious capacity
which is relevant for operations in Norway. Nonetheless, the German marine is
about to develop the ability to operate far from home and is capable of con-
tributing significantly to support operations connected to intervention or expedi-
tion operations initiated from the sea. German naval forces will thus be relevant
in relation to US, British and Dutch forces that are deployed in the Norwegian
area. When asked whether Germany has the capacity to cooperate on defence in
Norway’s proximate areas Godal answers yes,
“we have already for several years had exercises in northern Norway with
both Germany and other NATO allies participating, and this is likely to
continue. The number of exercises have been reduced but this is not linked
to Germany in particular, the whole exercise pattern has decreased in gen-
eral, and will eventually stabilise at a relatively low level.”85
This chapter shows that Germany is perceived to be very important in Norway
and even constitutes a “pillar of Norwegian foreign policy” as stated by Godal.
The reasons for its importance are the following:
1. size, location and political culture;
2. the economic strength;
3. the great importance in the EU;
4. the proximity to Norway (politically, economically and culturally);
5. a great understanding of Norwegian considerations and interests.
6. good Norwegian experiences with Germany as a political ally.
These factors are in fact preconditions for an assessment of Germany’s impor-
tance. If they were not given, it would be less interesting to analyse Germany’s
importance at all. In order to assess this, the strategic challenges and opportu-
nities of Norway’s foreign policy must be the starting point. The term strategic
partnership is, as shown, not the proper description of the Norwegian-German
kontinentalt land i NATO som Tyskland, det er viktig utenrikspolitisk og sikkerhetspolitisk.”
85Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. State-
ment in Norwegian: “Vi har i mange år allerede hatt øvelser i Nord-Norge med både Tyskland
og andre NATO-allierte, og det kommer sikkert til å fortsette. Mengden på de øvelsene er
avtatt, men det er ikke spesielt med Tyskland, hele øvelsesmønsteret er gått nedover og flater
vel etterhvert helt ut.”
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relations. The conclusion must thus be drawn that Germany’s importance to
Norway is not found in a strategic partnership, although Germany is a preferred
cooperation partner of Norway and Norway is an important energy partner of
Germany. Political, economic as well as military cooperation are important areas
of mutual interest but do not indicate why Germany is of particular importance
to the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the foreign policy of Norway.
It is not even given that the bilateral relations are particularly important when it
comes to Germany’s importance to Nordic security. A comparison with Sweden
will thus be added in order to identify the factors that are decisive for the as-
sessment of Germany’s importance. Do Norway’s challenges differ from Sweden’s
and do they necessitate other solutions? Do the different institutional contexts of
their foreign policies contribute to different needs in international relations? Do
the different regional frames of their foreign policies make a difference in regards
to German importance to their strategic challenges and opportunities? These are
the questions that must be answered in order to proceed with the assessment of
Germany’s importance.
3. The foreign policies of Norway and
Sweden
The Kingdom of Norway has an area of 385 199 km2, an extensive coastline along
the North Atlantic Ocean and borders Sweden, Finland and Russia. Its popula-
tion amounts to 4 799 300 (2009). This makes a population per km2 of 12,5.86
The state church is Evangelical Lutheran. Further, Norway is a constitutional
monarchy with a parliamentarian regime. The “Storting” is a unicameral, semi-
circular national assembly and can be characterised as a “working parliament”
directed towards decision-making. The specialist standing committees thereby
play a central part and their work emphasises the parliamentarian’s role as an
expert.87
Archer’s description of what features Norway has in common with other European
states, and of what differences exist, is applicable also to the comparison with
neighbour Sweden:
“The sameness can be summed up in the phrases (. . . ) Western, demo-
cratic, rich, European. (...) A brief examination of the Norwegian econ-
omy shows it to be as service-based and export-dependent as those of many
West European states, and growth, inflation and unemployment to be fairly
similar, though with all three veering to the lower end of the scale. The
economy has been as touched by globalisation as that of its neighbours.
The differences can be seen in the current conditions, but more so in the
history of the country. It is richer than other West European states, with
only Luxembourg and Switzerland challenging this happy position. It has
a smaller immigrant share of the population than most West European
nations, though this has been rapidly changing. It is an oil producer and
exporter in a way that outstrips other North Sea states, and is more global
in its petroleum, shipping and fisheries sectors. With its possession of Sval-
bard, it is the most northern of European states outside Russia (...), and
86Store norske leksikon, http://www.snl.no/Norge
87 Arter (1999), p. 221.
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Figure I.1.: Norway and Sweden. (Source: sitesatlas.com)
with its long coastline is perhaps one of the most Atlantic.”88
The Kingdom of Sweden is 449 964 km2 with coastlines both to the Baltic Sea in
the east and the North Sea in the west and borders Norway and Finland. Sweden
has 9 263 900 inhabitants (2009), which makes a population per km2 of 20,6.89
85 per cent live in the southern part of Sweden, in particular in the urban areas
(82 per cent). The state church is Evangelical Lutheran, but Sweden has large
minorities of Moslems and Catholics.90 Moreover, Sweden is a constitutional
monarchy with a parliamentarian regime. The “Riksdag” is a unicameral, semi-
circular national assembly and a “working parliament”.
Norway and Sweden are thus fairly similar, although Sweden has almost twice
as many inhabitants and a history as a regional power. Few nations have a
closer relationship than Norwegians and Swedes, who trade and invest together,
get married with each other, have a common electricity market and a good tone
when politicians meet. Nevertheless, politicians from the two states have less
88 Archer (2005), p. 193.
89Store norske leksikon, http://www.snl.no/Sverige
90http://www.landguiden.se
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and less significant topics to talk about. Hardly any European countries will
have a weaker developed cooperation on security political questions than Norway
and Sweden. Norway is solely a NATO member, Sweden solely member of the
EU. Thus the two countries do not meet on these two basic arenas for politics,
security and development in Europe. A Nordic defence cooperation is in the
making, but the Norwegian choice of the US Joint Strike Fighter over the Swedish
produced Gripen in 2008, as Norway’s F-16s are looking to be replaced, showed
that although a closer Nordic defence cooperation is stressed, it is not important
enough to abandon the close ties to the US. Sweden’s Prime Minister (PM) has
furthermore often been the first to dismiss Norway’s claims in European Economic
Area (EEA) negotiations. Furthermore, although the common border is long,
their relationships to their proximate areas differ a lot. Whereas 30 per cent of
Sweden’s population live north of Stockholm, 50 per cent of Norway’s population
live north of Oslo. Where the settlement in the north stops, Swedish interests
abate. Where the Norwegian settlement stops, important Norwegian interests
begin. Whereas Norwegian interests are to the north, Swedish interests are to
the south - in the Baltic Sea Region. Sweden wants to advance its political and
economic interests along the Baltic Sea’s southern coast.
These obvious similarities and differences make Norway and Sweden suitable for
a comparison with respect to Germany’s importance for the respective strategic
challenges and opportunities facing their foreign policies.
3.1. Historical developments
Norway became an independent state as late as 1905 when the union with Sweden
was dissolved. There were three formative eras in independent Norway’s foreign
relations until 1949. The first period lasted from 1905 to the First World War
and was formed by “classic” neutralism or isolationism. However, the neutralist
policy had confidence in an automatic protection, i.e. British support in the case
of war.91 With the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union, the validity of a
treaty from 1885, whereby the western Great Powers guaranteed Sweden and Nor-
91The British naval power facilitated Norway’s foreign trade and merchant shipping.
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way protection against Russian aggression, was uncertain. Hence Norway sought
a new security guarantee, and in 1907 an ‘Integrity Treaty’ was agreed between
Norway and the Great Powers. The triple purpose of the treaty was, firstly, to
demonstrate Norway’s intention to preserve neutrality in any future conflict in
Northern Europe, secondly to declare the intention of the Great Powers to leave
Norway in peace and, thirdly, to enable Norway to call on British assistance if
this intention should be “overtaken by circumstances”.92 Publicly declared neu-
tralism and an implicit British guarantee thus characterised Norwegian foreign
policy after 1905.
Further, Norway defined its foreign relations as economic. The Norwegian For-
eign Service was to a large extent “the handmaiden of trade and shipping.”93
Here Udgaard sees a parallel in current Norwegian debate on the EEA agree-
ment. It enables Norway to regulate literally all economic questions94 with the
rest of Europe. At the same time it allows the Norwegians to stay out of the
diplomatic fight concerning the European diplomatic order. There is no current
Norwegian debate on what political interests Norway has in Europe and how
these are affected by different concepts of Europe’s future.
The second formative period until 1949 was the inter-war period when Norway
moralistically advocated international law in the League of Nations. Foreign
policy was ignored by the Norwegian elite and Norway’s security policy in the
1930s was intransigent. Internal budgetary and political needs were prioritised at
the expense of external requirements. This naivety did not fade until the Second
World War approached. The Storting debated security policy for the first time
in 1937 and Norway lacked experienced diplomats and a capable leadership when
the country was occupied by Nazi Germany in April 1940.
92 Riste (2005), p. 80.
93 Riste (2005), p. 77. A descriptive example from 1906 was a proposal from the Conser-
vative Party of an alternative foreign budget. Its aim was to abolish the division of diplomacy
and consular envoys in order to underline the primacy of economic interests. The party’s
spokesman thus favoured a major reduction of diplomatic envoys and a corresponding increase
of the overseas envoys.
The first Norwegian budget for the Foreign Service allowed for only eight diplomatic envoys:
In Stockholm, Copenhagen, London, Berlin, Paris, St. Petersburg, Washington D.C., and
Buenos Aires. Consular envoys numbered 14, assigned to ports of particular importance for
Norwegian shipping, including Shanghai, Hong Kong, Yokohama and New York. Riste (2005),
p. 81.
94The exceptions are agricultural goods and, in part, fish.
I.3.1. Historical developments - 37 -
Finally the the third formative period (1940 to 1949) was characterised by an
active internationalism. Exile Foreign Minister (FM) Lie formulated the Atlantic
policy during the first years of war in London. Thus the Second World War and
the following NATO membership of 1949 shaped a new Norwegian diplomatic
tradition, which stressed security policy.
Swedish foreign policy has on the other hand been associated with neutrality.
Since 1945, Sweden has officially pursued a non-alignment policy aiming at neu-
trality in case of war. It is thus not of the legal (Swiss) type backed by inter-
national guarantees in the event of war. Today, the Swedish neutrality tradition
seems inseparable from the Swedish national identity and
“Sweden’s unique track record, above all during the Second World War,
has made it virtually impossible for any Swedish government to think in
terms of anything but a continuation of this singularly brilliant formula.
Herein lies both strength and weakness.”95
The Swedish neutrality policy’s history of origins started 200 years ago with the
changes in Europe after the defeat of Napoleon, and Sweden has not been at
war since 1814. Sweden lost most of its possessions on the eastern and southern
shores of the Baltic Sea during the Napoleonic wars. From being an important
European power Sweden had become rather insignificant, a view that the annex-
ation of Norway did not affect. King Karl Johan’s strategic plan for the Kingdom
of Sweden and Norway aimed for a balanced position between major European
powers. Swedish foreign policy tried to escape from political engagement and al-
liances that could have led to the country getting involved in great power conflicts.
From being an ad-hoc strategy, neutrality became a long term policy.
Sweden’s neutrality kept it out of wars throughout the 19th century, and this
status was strengthened as the neutrality survived the two world wars. Until the
Second World War, Swedish neutrality was not even based on adequate national
forces. Unlike Norway, however, Sweden preserved its neutrality despite of poor
and inefficient armed forces. On the other hand, Sweden approached the Sec-
ond World War with a policy of economic defence while considering military and
civilian needs.96 Swedish foreign policy towards Germany before the outbreak of
95 Huldt (2003), p. 46.
96 Arter (1999), p. 271.
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war was also very much influenced by the fear of Soviet Russian dominance in the
Baltic Sea.97 During the Second World War, Sweden practised a “friendly-minded
neutrality” towards Germany. It was impossible for Sweden to act perfectly neu-
tral as it was dependent on the United Kingdom for metal goods, chemicals and
oil and on Germany for coal. Moreover, after the Weserübung98
As opposed to Sweden’s neutrality policy, Norway signed the North Atlantic
Treaty (NAT) on 4 April 1949. The reliance on support from a Western power
should from now on be rooted in a formal and explicit guarantee (Article 5 NAT)
instead of assumptions. External pressure contributed to form a relative interest
oriented Norwegian foreign policy. Norway bordered one of the Soviet Union’s
largest military concentrations but had to struggle to get NATO to take the
defence of its northern flank seriously. The Northern Region was important to
the US as a base for early warning, intelligence, communication and navigation
but had otherwise a relatively low priority to the Americans, especially during
the 1970s. Despite some new and more mobile allied force elements that made
the Alliance more visible in the high north in the 1960s,99 Soviet naval build-up
in the north in the late 1960s100 demonstrated Norway’s vulnerability and a lack
of an allied capability to successfully defend Norwegian territory against a Soviet
attack.101 The development of the Soviet Northern Fleet was put on speed in the
1970s and was already at this point of time used by the Norwegian government
to pursue a strategy of US engagement and military involvement in the north.102
It was an important part of Norwegian defence strategy to involve the Americans
directly and as early as possible. The Norwegian-US relationship with its several
bilateral agreements has been characterised as an “alliance in the alliance” as
Norway’s NATO membership emerged more and more as a frame for a bilateral
military relationship with the US. Norway emerged as one of the US’ most loyal
97Finland was attacked by the Soviet Union in 1939.
98The German occupation of Denmark and Norway in April 1940.
99Such elements were the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Mobile Force, which was estab-
lished in 1960 and started to train in Norway in 1964, and the Standing Naval Force Atlantic
which was set up in 1967 and included frigates and destroyers from a number of NATO navies,
including the Norwegian. Further, NATO’s Allied Command Baltic Approaches was created in
1961 and brought the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) more into the defence of the Baltic
Straits “which represented the ‘soft underbelly’ of Norway”. Archer/Sogner (1998), p. 103.
100As regards the build-up of the Soviet Northern Fleet and the militarisation of the Mur-
mansk area with the expansion of the Kola bases, see Archer/Sogner (1998), pp. 101-102.
101 Archer/Sogner (1998), pp. 101-102.
102See Archer/Sogner (1998), pp. 104-105.
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allies in Europe in the 1980s and the Norwegian Atlantic line had clear ideological
traits.103 Jervell even states that those who fundamentally questioned it risked
being shut out of Norwegian foreign policy’s “good company” or were deprived of
information.104
Most importantly, the security gain was indeed huge and the close cooperation
with the US was not perceived as a sacrifice. However, the Reagan administra-
tion’s new strategy was built on a “horizontal escalation”. Here the thought was
that if the Soviets pushed vital US interests in an area where the Americans had
difficulties answering, they would instead threaten Soviet resources e.g. on the
Kola peninsula. This challenged the vital Norwegian strategy of preserving the
balance between involvement in NATO defence arrangements and the retention
of the Nordic region as an area of comparatively low tension.
Britain’s role as Norway’s partner and protector after 1814105 and 1905 is the
element of continuity in Norwegian foreign relations which Riste considers to
be the most important one. According to Archer, the Atlantic policy line also
“demonstrates the physical separateness from Continental affairs”. In fact, Nor-
wegian policy makers had considered the maritime factor of the defence realm
to be the decisive one already from 1905. Norwegian interests were considered
to be shared with the UK and the United States of America (US).106 The At-
lantic policy line almost completely ignored the Continental powers, which was
understandable in war but increasingly unproportional to the political and eco-
nomic “normalisation” in Europe after 1945. On the other hand, Riste notes that
the 1990s were another formative period of Norwegian foreign policy as economy
displaced national security as Norwegian foreign relations’ principal determinant.
As a result of this “primacy of economic concerns”, Germany rivals the UK to
be Norway’s principal partner in Europe - a tendency noticeable already in the
103 Jervell (2003), p. 20.
104 Jervell (2003), p. 23.
105In the springtime of 1814, Norwegian men chose the representatives of a constitutional as-
sembly, which again unanimously resolved upon the Constitution of 17 May 1814. The Eidsvold
assembly further chose the Danish heir apparent, Christian Frederik, to King of Norway. As
a result Denmark and Sweden were at war fighting over Norway for approximately two weeks.
On 4 November, the Storting enacted the new constitution for a union between Sweden and
Norway.
106 Archer (2005), p. 32.
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1970s.107 Today, Germany is “Norway’s most important partner in Europe”, as
stated by both Norway’s King Harald and FM Gahr Støre, however, not solely
because of economic concerns.
In his analysis of Norway’s foreign relations, Riste concludes that current Nor-
wegian foreign policy is characterised by a difficult balance between the elements
that constituted the formative periods of early Norwegian foreign and security
policy:
“As long as the Cold War lasted, Norway’s security needs meant that par-
ticipation in power politics through NATO had the upper hand. Since the
1990s, however, this trend has been checked by a neutralist desire to keep
out of the EU, combined with the awkward prospect of having to choose be-
tween an American and a European security guarantee. Unwilling to make
that choice, and deeply divided on the issue of membership of the EU, Nor-
way has instead chosen to emphasise the one foreign policy issue on which
all parties can agree: the ‘missionary impulse’ towards profiling the country
as the champion of peace, human rights, and development aid.”108
The mixed experience from the war led to a period of new thinking on Swedish
security as well in the second half of the 1940s. A Swedish initiative on a Nordic
defence union appeared, but failed. Sweden decided to join the United Nations
(UN) and Swedish neutrality entered a new phase. National defence forces were
upgraded and a strong and national independent defence industry was developed.
As late as in the 1990s, almost 65 per cent of Swedish defence material were
products of the national industry.109 Strong Swedish armed forces, which included
one of Europe’s strongest air forces, were also an important contribution to the
defence of the Nordic area. The goal of the neutrality policy was to be kept out
of the East-West block construction and to have good relations with the Western
bloc without ignoring Soviet sentiments.
The technological cooperation with the US and NATO made it possible for Swe-
den to develop a defence industry of a high technical level, e.g. with SAAB
fighters from “Draken” to “Gripen”.110 Moreover, although Sweden emphasised
the UN and later the CSCE (Conference for Security and Co-operation in Eu-
107 Riste (2005), p. 286.
108 Riste (2005), p. 275.
109 Wegge (2003a), p. 99.
110 Rudberg/Ring/Jeppsson (2001), p. 251.
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rope) as an international platform, and official Swedish foreign policy focused on
playing a role as a bridge between East and West during the hole Cold War, there
was never any doubt that Sweden was a Western country in every way. Sweden
needed to be a part of the West in order to trade and receive technical support.
A potential military threat would have come from the Soviet Union. Whereas
official policy was strictly neutral, a secret cooperation began with Norway, the
UK and the US which included exchange of military intelligence, Swedish access
to technology and preparations to receive Western support in case an attack on
Sweden would occur.111
Thus neutrality was first and foremost attached to the official part of Sweden’s
foreign policy. Sweden held a high neutral profile on the rhetoric level, and
by the 1970s Swedish neutrality had achieved doctrinal status as it had become
tantamount to official ideology. Although Sweden accepted the obligation to back
UN Security Council resolutions, it viewed the voting system as a guarantee that
military sanctions would never in practice be required of Sweden.112 Furthermore,
an active Swedish foreign policy for Europe and the Nordic area was lacking.
Instead, Sweden, especially under Palme, raised interest in the Third World, and
Swedish foreign policy focused mainly on countries like Nicaragua, South Africa,
Vietnam and Chile.
The predictability of Swedish foreign policy was emphasised, and Swedish security
policy was supported by all political parties. On the other hand, politics accepted
that a secret military cooperation with NATO was taking place. In comparison,
Finland was perceived to be swinging more to the east through “finlandisation”,
which in short was the Soviet influence on Finnish foreign policy.113 Today,
however, the picture seems to be that Finland was rather the real neutral country
111 Rudberg/Ring/Jeppsson (2001), p. 250.
112 Arter (1999), p. 274.
113For a detailed analysis on the Finlandisation of Finland under Kekkonen, see Arter
(1999), p. 288-297. The expression “Finlandisation” originally emerged in Austria in the 1950s
but became a part of the vocabulary in international politics mainly as a result of critical
evaluations in the FRG during the early 1970s. When Willy Brandt became German chancellor
in 1969, his political opponents and particularly the Christian Democrats, supported by the
newspapers Die Welt and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, used the expression to describe a
threatening situation in West Germany as a result of Brandt’s Ostpolitik. CSU leader Franz
Josef Strauss even “claimed that Finlandisation signaled nothing less than the destruction of
Western Europe as a political force.” Arter (1999), p. 289.
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of the two.114 Vaahtoranta and Forsberg sum up the most interesting aspects
and questions regarding Sweden’s neutrality policy during the Cold War from a
contemporary point of view:
“It now seems that the Swedish neutrality applied only to peacetime.
Officially Sweden was non-aligned in peacetime in order to stay neutral at
war, but in reality she seems to have pursued the policy of neutrality in
peacetime aiming at aligning herself had war broken out. This conclusion
raises two related questions. To what extent did neutrality form the basis
of Sweden’s security? Why did Sweden pursue the policy of neutrality
in the first place? As for the first question, much depends on what the
Soviet Union knew about the cooperation between Sweden and NATO. If
she did not know, neutrality was crucial for Sweden’s security. However,
if the Soviet Union knew about the NATO cooperation, as is claimed, the
Swedish neutrality would have had a more narrow peacetime significance
of a political nature aiming at keeping the tension low in Northern Europe
by maintaining the “Nordic balance”. A major reason for Sweden staying
outside NATO would have been the concern for Finland. In case Sweden
had joined NATO, the Soviet Union may have strengthened its hold on
Finland. These steps could have increased the level of tension in Northern
Europe and perhaps lowered the threshold of open hostilities between the
military blocs. Of course, Sweden’s aim at strengthening her own security
helped Finland stay independent.”115
In the following, the question is raised whether Sweden’s neutrality/ non-
alignment policy line is compatible with Sweden’s strategic situation today.
3.2. Security and defence cooperation
3.2.1. Norway
The challenge of Norwegian security and defence policy after the Cold War has
been to find an appropriate form of defence structure and an appropriate frame-
work for security policy. Norway was one of the last countries to accept NATO’s
new strategic concept of 1991, and the success of Norwegian security policy dur-
ing the last period of the Cold War meant that Norway was only able to respond
slowly to the changes of 1989 - 1991. Norway even had an ambivalent attitude
to the ending of the East-West conflict. The political leadership was sceptical
114See Vaahtoranta/Forsberg (2000), pp. 111-113.
115 Vaahtoranta/Forsberg (2000), pp. 12-13.
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as the new situation of international relations implied less interest in the Nordic
region. Another point was the more independent role of the EU in European
security policy. Norway feared that this would reduce the US interest in Europe
and leave Norway more vulnerable to possible pressure from Russia.116 A report
from the Norwegian Defence Commission from 1990 expressed that “Europe must
under no circumstances send signals that might reduce NATO’s role or weaken
the basis for the US engagement in the Alliance.”117 During the first half of the
1990s, Norway continued to stress territorial defence and NATO. However, the US
interest in Norway decreased,118 the NATO command structure was reorganised
and Norway’s only NATO command, the command North at Kolsås (near Oslo),
was abolished. Finally, the US required changes in the support arrangements
with Norway that covered support to Norway in a crisis situation. For example,
US military pre-stockings in Norway were closed. Norwegian resources were on
the other hand invested to change the US decisions and plans.119 A Norwegian
success in this respect was the establishment of a lower NATO command, the
European Joint Warfare Centre in Jåttå, Stavanger, in 2003. Norway’s “alliance
in the alliance” with the US inside NATO has nevertheless come to an end.
Finally, Norwegian governments reacted to the changed conditions of the interna-
tional environment and established the ‘Telemark Battalion’ for NATO’s Imme-
diate Reaction Forces. However, territorial defence continued to be given priority,
and Norway stressed collective defence as NATO’s main task and was reluctant to
embrace the new NATO and its Combined Joint Task Forces and Partnership for
Peace (PfP) programme. The perception of the military as a political instrument
met little understanding in Norway in the early 1990s. Adjustments to the new
international situation were, however, undertaken by the Norwegian government
116 Rieker (2001), p. 9.
117Cited in Rieker (2001), p. 9.
118The Forward Maritime Strategy was adjusted in the autumn of 1990. The airport at
Brønnøysund and other support-installations were abolished. In 1992, the US Congress decided
to cut grants to the Norwegian secret services which led to a loss of financing of one third of
the positions. It was the most important security policy resource the Norwegians had offered
the US which suddenly had become less interesting.( Jervell (2003), p. 24.)
119Minister of Defence Holst went to the USA several times to collect US support for a
reconsideration in Congress. He had long conversations with US politicians and military leaders
in order to keep as many US installations in Norway as possible. However, Congress did not
change the decision and Norwegian authorities decided to take over the responsibility for a part
of the US-financed Norwegian secret service positions. On the other hand, Holst succeeded in
reducing the extent of the closing of US arrangements in Norway. In return, Norway had to
take over a larger part of the expenses. ( Jervell (2003), pp. 67-68.)
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in regards to ‘soft’ security initiatives, supporting the establishment of the Coun-
cil of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992 and the Barents cooperation in 1993.
The latter, a Norwegian initiative, was seen as more important to Norway due
to the strategic importance of the Barents Sea.120 But for all that, this scheme
of cooperation was met with considerable resistance among the Atlantic oriented
parts of the civil servants in the Norwegian State Department. The military plan-
ning also continued to concentrate on an eventual Russian invasion at the same
time as the Barents cooperation was developed.121
The strong Atlantic line in Norwegian foreign and security policy after the Sec-
ond World War entailed an underdeveloped European dimension. The European
element of Norway’s defence was placed in the NATO context. The re-emergence
of the Western European Union (WEU) during the 1980s allowed for discussions
on Western European defence issues, but at this point of time Norway was not
allowed to participate, and neither was it wished for. Norway participated in the
CSCE122 process with its consideration of a wider definition of security, although
as a part of the NATO grouping. Further, the country supported the diplomatic
initiatives of the European Community (EC) countries in the European Political
Cooperation (EPC). The fear was that a decreased US commitment to Europe,
with Norway being outside the EC, would lead to a marginalisation and isola-
tion of Norway. This led to the EC membership application in 1992, but the
electorate did not see security as a salient issue when it rejected membership in
the referendum of November 1994. Norway thereafter sought close cooperation
both with the WEU and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The
importance of the EU was increasingly recognised in Norway as the European
integration process moved on.123 However, the EU was perceived to be impor-
tant to the general foreign policy, and to complement NATO on the soft security
side, rather than to national security. Norwegian foreign policy tends to separate
foreign and security policy on the one hand and defence policy on the other.124
120The Barents Region Initiative led to the establishment of the Barents Council. It followed
the logic of the CBSS, with emphasis on civilian problems and representatives from different
European countries and the European Commission. The purpose was to promote cooperation
between the northwestern parts of Russia and the Nordic states north of the Arctic Circle.
121 Jervell (2003), p. 68.
122The CSCE preceded the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
123See Archer (2005) and Rieker (2001).
124 Knutsen (2000), p. 21.
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A Norwegian tactic of denial prevailed shortly after the Treaty of Amsterdam,
which included the WEU in the EU. However, the British-French meeting in
Saint-Malo in the autumn of 1998 forced Norway to change its policy.125 Norway
hereafter explicitly supported the ESDP process and recognised the need for a
transformation of the defence forces.126 The ESDP process was something the
Norwegian political leadership did not wish for but had to support in order to
avoid a total marginalisation. Norway continued to discuss ESDP matters with
the EU at all levels but could only obtain minimal attention. “Its interaction
with the EU has been a matter of exchanging information rather than of consul-
tation”.127 Altogether, despite Norway’s lack of influence on the ESDP process,
the role of the EU in European security policy has contributed to a greater Nor-
wegian acceptance of the EU as an important security factor and a recognition of
the EU as a political factor in general, stronger focus on international crisis man-
agement as well as a review of the traditional understanding of national security
by the political leadership in Norway.128
In the late 1990s, Norwegian policy makers were interested in full participation in
the security and crisis management arrangements developed in the EU. Then FM
Vollebæk emphasised that participation in the ESDP was important in regards
to Norwegian influence in NATO.129 After the European Council in Helsinki of
December 1999 it became clear, however, that non-EU European countries would
have difficulties becoming a part of the decision-making structure of the ESDP in
the way they had been as WEU associate members. Thus the lacking Norwegian
EU membership is both a problem to Norway’s relations with the EU as well as
to Norway’s role inside NATO. Fact is that the EU plays an increasingly central
role in the European part of the transatlantic dialogue. The debate initiated by
125In front of the Amsterdam EU summit in 1997, the merger of the WEU into the EU was
dismissed by the UK. The about-turn came in 1998 at the French-British summit in St. Malo
when Britain agreed to develop a European defence. Thus the real integration of the WEU into
the EU began, as did the ESDP.
126The support even came from a coalition government of parties all opposing an EU mem-
bership.
127 Archer (2005), p. 150.
128 Rieker (2001), p. 17.
129In 1999, FM Vollebæk prepared a pro memorandum for the European Council in Helsinki.
He wanted Norwegian participation in EU-led crisis response operations to be based on full
participation in the decision-shaping process. (Vollebæk’s pro memorandum to all NATO and
EU states, cited in Archer (2005), p. 146.) As a non-member, however, the participation in
the planning of these operations was impossible.
- 46 - I.3. The strategic challenges and opportunities...
Gerhard Schröder on the future of NATO through a speech performed by his Min-
ister of Defence Struck at the 2005 security conference in Munich further clarified
the Norwegian dilemma and caused deep worries in Norway. Schröder claimed
that NATO “is no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss
and coordinate strategies.”130 NATO has, according to Schröder, not adapted
to the new international realities as the EU should have a more central role in
the relationship between the US and Europe. Such a development would mean
that even more central questions are transferred from NATO to an organisation
of which Norway is not a member. The leadership in the NATO-friendly country
Germany questioned for the first time NATO’s central position in European pol-
itics. The four NATO countries not included by the axis Washington - Brussels,
Norway, Canada, Iceland and Turkey, thus only have a limited impact on the
transatlantic cooperation. However, not even this incident brought about a new
debate on the EU in Norway. The pro-EU parties, the Conservative party and the
Labour party, have been in government from 2000 until today, but in coalitions
with smaller parties all opposing a Norwegian EU membership. Thus they have
not been able to promote it.
In November 2004, Norway was requested to participate in the EU Battle-
groups.131 FM Petersen thereon declared that Norway was prepared to contribute
200 soldiers to a battlegroup under a Swedish command in which also Finland
would participate.132 This again led to a debate in Norway as to how far the
country should participate with soldiers in an organisation it is not a member of.
How and where the battlegroups are deployed is up to the EU alone to decide.
Norway’s preparedness to participate was one of many examples of trying to get
into the EU through the back-door. Norway has no influence on the political
process concerning the use of military power in the EU, i.e. before the forces are
deployed.
Norwegian diplomatic activity and military involvement in multinational opera-
tions are thus aiming at minimising Norway’s international marginalisation. How-
ever, the country does not have enough resources for an involvement in too many
130 Schröder (2005).
131The EU defence ministers initiated 13 small and mobile multinational battlegroups. These
groups should be deployed worldwide in crisis regions on behalf of the UN.
132 Fischer (2004).
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activities, and so a choice has to be made in regards to Norway’s preferences for
NATO, UN and EU activities. The cases of Afghanistan and Libya show that
NATO operations have been prioritised, hanging on to the maritime tradition
with its North Sea neighbours and prioritising its links with the US and the UN.
Only limited resources remain for the EU.133 Half-hearted attempts to get access
to the EU through the back-door only conceals Norway’s difficult position in Eu-
ropean security policy. In other words, influence is not gained through troops
alone but necessitates an EU membership. Norway’s problem is how to be sure
that allied countries will be interested enough in Norway in a given situation with
provocations in the north.
3.2.2. Sweden
Whereas the end of the East-West conflict did not imply immediate changes in
Norwegian security policy, it did enable Sweden to approach the EC/ EU as a
membership of the Union was no longer incompatible with the neutral policy
line. Sweden applied for membership in the EC in 1991 and became a member
of the EU in 1995. This, in turn, generated further changes in Swedish security
policy as the neutrality concept behind the policy was moderated in order to
be compatible with the EU membership. The European approach was started
with an economic initial point as the Swedish government chose to focus on the
broader socio-economic challenges and minimise the issue of foreign and security
policy.
After the EC application, the “Riksdag” stated that a membership would not
change the Swedish security policy as the EU was not a collective defence alliance
and Sweden would remain a military non-aligned country.134 Finally, however,
the Maastricht Treaty and the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy),
“[which] shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including
133The conservative-centrist Bondevik II government (2001-2005) stressed the orientation
towards the US and contributed in Iraq after the UN mandate was secured, whereas the centre-
left Stoltenberg government (2005- ) withdrew Norwegian NATO officers from Iraq and decided
not to expand its Afghanistan engagement to the south. Norwegian forces have on the other
hand been participating in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the
maritime EU NAVFOR Somalia - Operation “Atalanta” in the Gulf of Aden.
134 Rudberg/Ring/Jeppsson (2001), p. 252.
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the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to
a common defence”,135 and increasing European integration made it difficult for
Sweden to hold on to the neutrality concept, as Swedish policy had to be re-
lated to the CFSP. Sweden’s formulation of its security policy, “non-alignment in
peace, aiming at neutrality in the event of war”, was at this point of time some-
what corrected. “Non-aligned” was changed to “military non-aligned” and “aiming
at neutrality in the event of war” to “be able to stay neutral in the case of war
in the vicinity.”136 Hence, neutrality was being suppressed in official usage and
replaced by “military non-alignment”, first used by the non-socialist Bildt Gov-
ernment (1991-94), referring strictly to defence issues in military terms.137 The
security policy doctrine was in this way redefined to fit into the EU. The Maas-
tricht Treaty was accepted without exceptions and Sweden committed herself to
coordinate her foreign and security policy with e.g. atomic powers like France
and Britain. However, the Maastricht Treaty’s emphasis on the long-term goal of
a common defence continued to be problematic for Sweden, as did the WEU. The
Swedish government stated that an observer status in the WEU was considered to
be compatible with Sweden’s non-alignment policy.138 Sweden feared a militari-
sation of the EU as a result of the Mastricht Treaty’s formulation of a common
defence. This fear was shared by Finland, and both countries together initiated
the suggestion of including the “Petersberg tasks”139 in the Amsterdam Treaty.
This turnaround of the EU’s security dimension was perceived as a diplomatic
success in Stockholm and Helsinki as the development toward a common defence
was led toward crisis management instead, which was more compatible with their
non-aligned status.140
The changes in Swedish security policy also demonstrated a will “to actively
support or even shape developments in the Baltic-Nordic area. Such an active
135Treaty on European Union Title V, Art. J 4/1.
136 Vaahtoranta/Forsberg (2000), p. 252.
137The term “non-allied” is to a large extent used in Sweden instead of “non-alignment” but
will not be pursued here.
138 Rieker (2002), p. 31.
139The WEU Ministerial Council adopted the Petersberg Declaration, which defined the
WEU’s operational role, on 19 June 1992. This resulted in what has later been referred to
as the “Petersberg tasks” which include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
140 Rieker (2002), p. 22.
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Swedish foreign policy had not been seen since Napoleonic times.”141 In 1996,
several Swedish initiatives were taken by the new social democratic government
of PM Persson in the Baltic region through the Swedish chairmanship of the
CBSS. They were to a large extent based on the “soft security” concept and were
thus compatible with retaining military non-alignment. PM Persson furthermore
stated his support of Baltic NATO membership in case the three Baltic states
should favour this.142 Some observers, e.g. former British FM Douglas Hurd
and Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick from the RAND Corporation in-
dicated another solution to Baltic security, with greater obligations for Sweden
and Finland to Baltic security.143 Rudberg, Ring and Jeppsson indicate that the
Swedish attempt of not giving the impression of taking a leading role in the Baltic
area or to offer the Baltic States a security guarantee, i.e. the Swedish focus on
“soft security” concepts, led US president Clinton to visit Copenhagen instead of
Stockholm on his 1996 visit to Scandinavia as Danish policy toward the Baltic
states was of a “firmer” character.144
Despite the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty, the devel-
opment was still hard to swallow. Sweden thus frequently joined Britain during
the 1990s as they shared the scepticism of an extended and supranational se-
curity cooperation in the EU. At the same time, Sweden made its support of a
continued US engagement in Europe more visible and stressed the importance
of the transatlantic link for the stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, which indeed
was a considerable change of policy compared to the criticism of US dominance
in Europe from the Palme era.145 Interestingly, the decision to participate in
NATO’s PfP programme did not cause any controversy in Sweden as opposed
to debates in the fellow neutral countries Austria and Switzerland. Launched in
January 1994, the programme enabled Sweden to participate in NATO’s peace-
keeping operations and to extend military support to the Baltic states. The PfP
programme was closely identified with both Sweden’s CSCE policy and its peace-
keeping tradition.146 However, Sweden has not yet announced the aim of giving
141 Rudberg/Ring/Jeppsson (2001), p. 254.
142 Rudberg/Ring/Jeppsson (2001), p. 253.
143Cited in Rudberg/Ring/Jeppsson (2001), p. 253.
144 Rudberg/Ring/Jeppsson (2001), p. 254.
145 Wegge (2003a), p. 60.
146 Rieker (2002), p. 18.
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up military non-alignment and to join NATO, or to accept European security
guarantees through the WEU.
After the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, Sweden’s security policy was once again
reformulated, from “military non-alignment aiming at be[ing] able to stay neutral
in the event of war in the vicinity” to military non-alignment “with the possibility
of neutrality in the event of conflicts in our vicinity.”147 Further formal and
informal changes after the Amsterdam Treaty were also taking place in Swedish
security policy. This is particularly obvious in the realm of defence. International
military cooperation becomes commonplace in Swedish politics, the territorial
defence looses its dominant position in Swedish defence strategy and the ability
of participating militarily in international operations becomes priority with an
increased focus on “interoperability”. Further, the strategy of self-help regarding
armament acquisitions is abandoned and new political consensus is created for an
international armament industrial cooperation.148 The most important change of
the post Amsterdam Swedish security policy is according to Wegge the EU as
the new “centre of gravity”. The ESDP has become a great influence on the
Swedish security strategy, and Sweden, to some degree reluctantly, integrates in
the hierarchy of European security policy. Security policy has to a larger extent
become a “legitimate object for discussion and new thinking”149, and the decision
makers in Swedish politics face new demands in regards to the reaction time to
security developments.150 The UK, France and Germany are accordingly about
to have a greater influence on Swedish security policy as a result of their leading
roles as the ESDP and the European Capability Action Plan are concerned. Some
dominance has been exerted, particularly by France and Britain, leading to a
certain frustration being expressed. This dominance is especially present through
strong preferences on the practical ESDP cooperation combined with the use of
short time limits.151
Hence, Sweden participates actively in the decision making within the Union,
cooperates with and creates interoperability with NATO and adjusts its mili-
147Cited in Wegge (2003a), p. 62.
148 Wegge (2003a), p. 62.
149 Wegge (2003a), p. 63 [author’s translation].
150 Wegge (2003a), p. 63.
151 Wegge (2003a), p. 71-72.
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tary forces to face increased cooperation on crisis management. Nevertheless,
Sweden remains militarily non-aligned, and despite the fact that both Sweden
and Finland have a positive view of NATO, they have not been willing to join
it. The option of joining NATO in the future is, on the other hand, kept open,
and Sweden participates in NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In
the beginning of 2007, FM Bildt clearly stated “no” to the question if Sweden is
still a neutral country, “but we are still a militarily non-aligned country”.152 The
Swedish population is still passionate about neutrality, a fact which was shown
e.g. in the referendum on the euro in 2003 and the Swedish attitude toward “fed-
eralism” and “supranationalism” in the EU. On the other hand, Sweden generally
supports a stronger role of the EU in international security and it is unlikely that
Sweden would be neutral in case of an attack on an EU country.
With the Baltic States’ NATO memberships of 2004, US influence increased in
the Baltic region and possibly also affected Sweden’s ability to act independently
in the region. Among the non-socialist Swedish political parties, many favour
a NATO membership. Quite stable electorate figures, however, tend to show a
clear majority against it. According to Huldt, the question is ‘why NATO now?’
for Sweden.153 FM Bildt states that
“[w]e are non-aligned as long as we want to, but I don’t see an urgent need
to change that. I now do not see any military threats directed to Sweden,
e.g. is the Baltic Sea a far less militarised area than 25 years ago”.154
What might lead to a reconsidering of the Swedish security position? A major
international crisis and a negative development of Russia’s relations with the
West are according to Huldt no such reason as Sweden’s traditional
“way to respond to such crisis is to dig in where we stand - not to engage
in innovations. Sweden’s armed forces are today designed to fit into a
NATO-led operational framework. All forms of co-operation, schooling and
training are involved - it is difficult to see what immediate added value in
an acute crisis could be produced by NATO membership. The advantages
of the latter would most likely be in the longer term.”155
152Cited in Syvertsen (2007) [author’s translation].
153 Huldt (2003), pp. 49-50.
154Cited in Syvertsen (2007) [author’s translation].
155 Huldt (2003), p. 50.
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Accordingly, the international environment does not seem to have much influence
on the formulation of Swedish security policy. Rather, a gradual realisation that
the current non-alignment is not sufficient, as the good reasons for staying outside
are evanescent, might lead to the end of non-alignment. This would, however,
depend on how NATO develops. A reconsideration could follow if Swedish influ-
ence and international leverage would be perceived to fall dramatically.156 The
increased prioritisation of the ESDP compared to NATO in the Swedish State De-
partment and the Ministry of Defence characterises a situation where the former
predominates.157 The results of Wegge’s research indicate that the ESDP has
taken over PfP’s role and now predominates Sweden’s cooperation on security
policy.158
3.3. National defence structure and budget
3.3.1. Norway
The general conditions superior to Norwegian defence planning is the overall
NATO development. The US carries the economic burden of the transatlantic
defence cooperation almost on their own, contributing 698 billion $ annually to
the US defence (2010) which accounts for 3/4 of NATO’s total expenses.159 The
US message to the Europeans is to take responsibility and contribute with their
part. Increasing European military budgets is however implausible as long as the
euro crisis prevails. At the NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012 it was exactly
money which was the focal point of the discussions. “Smart defence‘” is thus the
apparent solution, i.e. more bang for each dollar, euro - and kroner.
According to former Supreme Commander of Norway’s Armed Forces, general
Diesen, it is politically accepted that small nations like Norway can not carry the
costs of a complete military defence alone anymore. Hence, long-term strategic
cooperation with other small states will have to be the answer in order to be
156 Huldt (2003), p. 50.
157See Wegge (2003a), pp. 71-72.
158 Wegge (2003a), p. 72.
159Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2011) Background paper on SIPRI mili-
tary expenditure data, 2010 at http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/factsheet2010
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able to bear the costs of military forces and capacities. Such a profound de-
fence integration is firstly a matter of Nordic cooperation, i.e. with Sweden and
Finland. As NATO will finally include almost 30 nations all over Europe with
different strategic interests and no common, existential threats, the substance
of the collective security guarantee will be weakened according to Diesen. The
Nordic countries’ strategic interest community becomes a more important fac-
tor than different formal affiliations of alliances.160 Thus, a standardised Nordic
battalion, common educational institutions, common exercises, common staffs,
common assertion of sovereignty at sea and airspace, all within the frames of the
EU and NATO, might become reality. However, the question has to be posed
whether a defence cooperation without mutual security guarantees really gives
security, or if the result will be reduced freedom of action and priority conflicts.
“Is Sweden willing to guarantee the eastern borders of Norway and Fin-
land? Are Finland and Sweden willing to guarantee Norwegian security or
Danish interests in the northern areas? Hardly! The Danes have realised
it. That is why Denmark is outside [the Nordic defence cooperation].”161
The new strategic defence concept of 2005 and the long term defence propo-
sition also stressed the so called “North Sea Strategy”, a Norwegian initiative
on systemising the bilateral cooperation with the particularly close allies the UK,
Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark in order to create a more comprehensive
framework for military cooperation.162 The operational capabilities of the par-
ticipating states should be increased through more cost-effective solutions. The
initiative also aims at strengthening important allies’ competence on operations
in an arctic climate and holding military presence in Norway on a high level.
According to former defence minsiter Krohn Devold163, one of the defence reforms’
aims was to “scale down the non-operational parts of Norway’s Armed Forces
to a volume and structure that is sufficient to serve a smaller but more agile
operational structure.”164 The ability to participate in multinational operations
abroad and the threat of international terrorism have been the formative factors of
160 Diesen (2008).
161 Steiro (2009) [author’s translation].
162 Norwegian Ministry of Defence (2005).
163Kristin Krohn Devold (Conservative Party) was minister of defence from 2001 - 2005.
164 Krohn Devold (2004).
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the Norwegian armed forces in the last decade, not a regular military attack. It is,
however, problematic when the dismantling of the Norwegian defence forces have
been justified by the existence of NATO and its collective security guarantee,
which weakened substance is now the main reason for the necessity of Nordic
defence cooperation. There has been substantive efforts to increase the number
of the armed forces since around 2005.165
The following 2012 assessment describes the Norwegian situation in regards to
defence spending:
“The Norwegian defence budget has been increasing since 2005; however,
with average annual increases either under or marginally over the rate of
inflation, this has not translated into a real-terms rise in defence spending.
Such a small rise in the budget means that any increase to the spending
power of the Ministry of Defence ... is negligible. Whilst the increase in
spending is limited, the fact that the budget has not been subjected to
cuts goes against the current trend in Western Europe. Furthermore the
Ministry of Defence has been able to make efficiency savings to ensure that
despite a small overall rise in the spending, the budget for the Army, Navy
and Air Force has been increased.”166
The Norwegian armed forces counted 15 800 personnel in 2009, of which 6700
were in the army, 4100 in the navy and 5000 in the airforce.167 According to
the estimates made by IHS Jane’s, Norway’s total strength (2012) is made up of
9538 conscripts serving their National Service and 549 are civilian staff which is
a “relatively small force considering their oversees operational commitment and
desire to maintain a territorial defence capability.”168
Resources are limited, also in the airforce. During the Cold War, the traditional
Norwegian concept of ‘national balanced forces’ was questioned within NATO
by facts such as that the Norwegian airforce had too few aircrafts and too few
experienced pilots and thus difficulties providing adequate command and control
for allied air operations.169 As the F-16s will end their life cycle around 2015,
the Norwegian government decided that the new generation of combat aircrafts
165http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-Western-
Europe/Defence-budget-Norway.html (assessed 1 May 2012).
166http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-Western-
Europe/Defence-budget-Norway.html (assessed 1 May 2012
167 Norwegian Ministry of Defence (2009), p. 32.
168http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-Western-
Europe/Defence-budget-Norway.html (assessed 1 May 2012).
169 Archer/Sogner (1998), p. 109.
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will be 48 F-35 Lightning II, that will be delivered by the US producer JSF. The
Swedish JAS Gripen (SAAB) and Eurofighter were the other competitors of the
contract. Eurofighter pulled out of the competition with the explanation there
was no real competition, i.e. the Norwegian choice would anyway be JSF. The
choice has produced many critical voices, above all the argument that the costs
will not be easy to estimate. One of the Norwegian government’s most important
arguments was the lack of ‘stealth’ abilities of the Gripen aircrafts, which means
that the aircraft is hard to detect on a radar. These abilities are stressed by the
development of JSF. Norway has thus emphasised abilities that enable combat
from a long distance from the airbase. Thirdly, Norway demanded an aircraft
with large and heavy weapons aiming at targets on the ground, in addition to
full equipment for self defence. As the stealth technology is concerned, Robert
Hewson170 comments that this is very important to the US and can be used
offensively to invade countries like Iran, Iraq and maybe China. However, a small
country like Norway pays an enormous charge for a product it does not need.
Furthermore, stealth and all other technology is top secret and will be completely
controlled by the US. Thus, Norway does not even get the same aircraft as the US.
When JSF at some point of time is produced, it will be good - but expensive and
delayed, according to Hewson’s predictions.171 In addition to Nordic cooperation,
the aircraft decision for JSF shows the importance ascribed to the US as Norway’s
most important ally.
Critic Steiro remarks that whereas Finland, with a defence budget of somewhat
above half of Norway’s, is able to mobilise an army of 260 000 soldiers, Norway
has trouble sustaining a little brigade of 3300 soldiers.172 500 army personnel
were serving in Afghanistan alone in 2008. The average Norwegian contribution
to international operations abroad was about 650 personnel in 2008.173 The
Norwegian millitary presence will be carried to an end by 2014. The army has
170Robert Hewson is editor of the the military journal “Jane’s”.
171Cited in Spence (2008).
172 Steiro (2009).
173 Norwegian Ministry of Defence (2009), pp. 38-39. With the high number of soldiers
in Afghanistan, the army is according to the chairman of the Norwegian Officers Association,
Moe, practically without an operative capability. “Not until the necessary national capability
is available do we have enough forces to live up to our international commitments.” At the
current point of time though, the operative capability of the army is too little and the total
defence forces too weak. Moe (2006).
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no territorial responsibility or countrywide presence, a task which is overtaken by
the Home Guard.174
The consequence of the defence reforms from 2000 onwards was a highly tech-
nological defence, expensive in purchasing and even more expensive to operate.
The volume is so small that it is close to the lower limit of what is necessary to
keep the competence upright and of what is militarily sensible. The government
concentrates the fields of activity geographically so that the military presence in
vulnerable parts of the country becomes strongly reduced. The thought that the
defence forces will combat with allies is the answer to this policy and thus implies
that there will not emerge situations where the Norwegian defence in shorter or
longer periods would have to manage on their own.175
3.3.2. Sweden
The Swedish concept of “Total Defence”176 is still effective today. The disagree-
ment in regards to defence reforms after the end of the East-West conflict was
significant among both military personnel and politicians, also because the strong
territorial defence and the neutrality concept were closely tied to the Swedish se-
curity identity.177 Thus a permanent defence commission, the Swedish Defence
Commission (Försvarsberedningen) was created in 1994 in order to obtain na-
tional consensus and assigned the task to prepare major defence resolutions on
defence programmes by publishing a series of reports which again are a basis
for government bills to the Riksdag.178 A Defence Commission report from 1995
indicated a first, real change as it stressed Swedish international commitments
rather than national defence. This led to certain changes, but substantial defence
reforms were not initiated until the period 1997-2002. The decision to undertake
174The 2008 Home Guard consisted of 45 000 soldiers.
175Defence reform critic Børresen also remarked positive tendencies in the Norwegian defence
reform. The defence forces’ main task is again to prevent war; a clear connection between
the tasks and the superior aims is established; a strengthening of the bilateral connections
to the US is stressed; a further allied participation in training and exercises in Norway is
emphasised; the strengthening of the defence forces’ operative units and a de-escalation of the
overdimensioned non-operational organisation are focused; the retention of conscription is still
fundamental. Børresen (2004).
176The term is used for the military and civilian parts of the defence altogether.
177 Wegge (2003b), p. 40.
178 Rieker (2002), p. 34.
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a major reform of the Swedish defence forces was not taken by the Riksdag un-
til 1999. The government proposal 1999-2000, “Det nya försvaret” (“The new
Defence”) represented a clear change from territorial defence toward smaller, flex-
ible forces. A significant quantitative reduction was to be followed by a thorough
modernisation of the remaining forces, aiming at a significantly higher quality.
Further, the forces were to be divided into “deployable forces” for use in Swe-
den and abroad, and “national protection forces” related to the Home Guard.179
The Home Guard consists of around 30 000 men and women and constitutes the
greater part of Sweden’s territorial defence forces.180
The Defence Commission emphasised that military planning and structure had
to be directed toward international crisis management to a larger extent and that
the military activity should be coordinated with other EU countries. Moreover,
in the late 1990s Sweden joined the West European Armament Group. Because
of its significant armament research and industry, Sweden was furthermore em-
braced in a group of six nations ( Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and
Sweden) for integration, coordination and harmonisation of Europe’s armament
industry. This cooperation strengthened Sweden’s influence in military analysis
and development but at the same time increased the European great powers’
influence on Swedish priorities.181
Over the last decade, successive reductions have been made in the capability
required of the Swedish armed forces, and the operational organisation has been
slimmed down. “The reason for this is that the Parliament, the Government and
the Military all share the view that the risk of an armed attack on Sweden in a
medium term perspective is very remote.”182 Between 2000 and 2008, Swedish
defence spending fell by almost 20 per cent, and the 2009 budget amounted to
3,5 billion euro. Correspondingly, the Swedish armed forces will continue to
decrease, from 63 700 soldiers in 2009 to 49 000 in 2014, a projected cut of 23 per
cent.183 Counting soldiers is not the only way of describing a modern defence,
but the changes undertaken in Sweden become quite distinct when considering
179 Wegge (2003b), p. 41.
180 Swedish Armed Forces (2009), p. 15.
181 Wegge (2003b), p. 46.
182 Swedisch Armed Forces (2007).
183 Keller (2011), p. 5.
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Sweden’s ability of mobilising 700 000 soldiers in 1990. Moreover, the Swedish
parliament decided to abolish the conscription, which became effective in 2011.
Contrary to Sweden, Finland has to a large extent retained its territorial defence
and, according to former Finnish president Halonen, Finland “is situated in such
a geostrategic situation that we can not do like the Swedes and leave it to the
neighbours to take care of the defence.”184 In September 2007, Sweden’s minister
of defence Odenberg resigned as a result of the Swedish government’s plan to
reduce the budget for defence equipment by several million SEK within a few
years. JAS 39 Gripen, a multi-role combat aircraft, is the attribute of the Swedish
defence industry. According to some observers, the Swedish armed forces have
functioned as the defence industry’s “milk cow”. For example, 204 Jas-planes were
ordered even if the Swedish forces needed only about half of them.185 Sweden has
165 combat aircrafts and thus the Nordic region’s greatest air combat capacity,
whereas Norway only has 52 combat aircrafts.186
As the number of soldiers is decreasing, the level of participation in international
operations is increasing. Hence, due to the same logic underlying the Norwegian
defence reforms, the Swedish armed forces are transformed from an invasion de-
fence to a so called deployment defence with international operations as its main
task. Sweden has been a supporter of international peace operations since the
1950s but the “strategic posture” has widened over the last two decades. Swedish
soldiers are participating in EU, UN and NATO operations, of which the largest
contributions are in Afghanistan (NATO, ISAF) with approximately 500 persons.
The country also contributed with eight fighter jets to NATO’s Operation Unified
Protector in Libya. Within the framework of the EU, Sweden is the main contrib-
utor to the Nordic Battle Group.187 The restructuring of the Swedish forces aims
at around seven modular maneuver battalions, including artillery, air defence, and
engineering units supported by its navy and air force. This should allow for both
independent and multinational operations, and by 2014 virtually all of Sweden’s
forces should be deployable as opposed to only around 60 per cent in 2009.188 In
184Cited in Width, Henrik (2004) “Nordiske naboer i utakt”, Aftenposten 11 October. Au-
thor’s translation.
185 Brors (2004).
186 Tjønn (2009a).
187 Keller (2011), p. 5.
188 Keller (2011), p. 5.
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regards to military materiel, almost all core capabilities will be sustained, and the
number of new helicopters will increase successively.189 According to Keller, Swe-
den demonstrates the value of highly professional niche capabilities, in particular
in cooperation with other and stronger EU partners. “Hence, Sweden is a good
example of the possible benefits from further EU defense integration because of
the increased capabilities Sweden gains from such cooperation and, in turn, the
capabilities it can offer to others.”190 Furthermore, the weighting of armament
“shows that Sweden, beyond participation in international missions, is
hedging against conflict in its immediate neighbourhood, especially the
Baltic Sea. It is no accident that in a March 2009 press release by the
ministry of defense, ’the war in Georgia’ was named as a reference point for
future risks and developments. Accordingly, Sweden is one of the driving
forces behind the increased Nordic defense cooperation. It is doubtful, how-
ever, that the Swedish model of streamlined forces and sustained armament
will prevail under increasing budgetary pressure.”191
The cooperation with other and stronger EU partners is anyhow a necessity to
Sweden, and the Bundeswehr reform are thus also of great relevance, not least be-
cause Germany’s geographical position makes it the most relevant of the stronger
EU partners to Swedish defence aims. The Bundeswehr and its reforms will be
more thoroughly analysed in chapter 1.3.7 of part III. The European defence per-
spective is obviously very important, and Keller’s conclusion points at the real
need for reform:
“In practice ... every country plans and acts for itself. There are two
dozen national defense transformations and reforms underway in Europe,
but hardly any truly European reform. Unless a greater degree of coop-
eration and comon planning develops among at least a few of the major
European powers, the national militaries are doomed to kludge.”192
Another consequence of the Swedish defence reforms is that the cooperation with
NATO has become a cornerstone of the Swedish defence and Swedish security
policy. The development from an invasion to a deployment defence has thus taken
189The number of Gripen fighter jets will remain at or above 100; artillery and antiaircraft
capabilities will not be reduced, and the five submarines will be retained. Some of the tracked
armoured vehicles will be transferred to reserve units, while five additional corvettes will be
procured. Fifteen Black Hawk (UH-60M) helicopters were procured in May 2011. Keller
(2011), p. 5.
190 Keller (2011), p. 5.
191 Keller (2011), p. 5.
192 Keller (2011), p. 7.
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place parallel to the Swedish cooperation with NATO, and NATO’s standards and
demands have become the norm for the Swedish armed forces deployed abroad,
and furthermore of the total Swedish Defence as it is difficult to adapt only
the forces in international operations.193 Further, Sweden participates in about
30 exercises with NATO or single NATO states every year, which all have to
be approved by the Swedish government. Sweden and Finland are moreover
praised for their contributions to NATO operations, and both countries have
led a multinational brigade in Kosovo. From 2006, Sweden also led a NATO
mission in the north of Afghanistan. The Liberal Party is the only political
party in parliament that favours a Swedish NATO membership.194 The only
limitation to the close cooperation with NATO for the former Social Democratic
government was common defence guarantees. In his report made on behalf of
the five Nordic foreign ministers on the options of future Nordic cooperation
on foreign and security policy, former Norwegian FM Thorvald Stoltenberg also
suggests a common Nordic solidarity declaration:
“Nordic governments should draw up a mutual security political decla-
ration of solidarity where they in a compulsive manner clarify how they
will react if a Nordic country is being exposed to an external attack or to
improper pressure.”195
Before this, then-Swedish minister of defence Sten Tolgfors stated the following:
“It is very difficult to foresee a situation where Sweden should leave an-
other Nordic country or EU-country alone to meet an impairment of secu-
rity policy. To the contrary, Sweden’s security is built together with our
neighbours. It is not possible to see a situation where a military conflict
in the proximity should solely affect one of our [Nordic] countries, without
having essential consequences for the others, or which one country should
have to meet alone.”196
Also, all parties of the Riksdag supported a 2007 declaration of the Swedish
Defence Commission that stated: “Sweden will not be acting passively if a catas-
trophe or an attack should hit another member country [of the EU] or Nordic
country. We expect that these countries act the same way if Sweden gets hit.”197
193 Albons (2006b).
194 Albons (2006b).
195 Stoltenberg (2009) [author’s translation].
196 Tolgfors (2008) [author’s translation].
197Cited in Bergström (2008) [author’s translation].
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The road could thus be paved for Nordic defence cooperation both in the BSR
and in the High North. However, it is questionable if e.g. Norway and Sweden
have the same interest in defending both the Baltic states on the one hand, and
the Barents region on the other. Stoltenberg states that the Nordic countries’
ability to defend themselves would become larger through a defence community
than it would by the sum of the single states’ contributions. At the same time
the defence capability of each country can become reduced from an isolated point
of view.198 Nordic cooperation would therefore have to go off without a hitch.
It is in this context not a good sign of smooth cooperation when Sweden’s then-
minister of defence Tolgfors, the day after Stoltenberg’s report was made public,
stated to Swedish television that “Norway miscalculated when they decided what
aircraft to go for, and that mistake will now make it more difficult for us to sell our
aircrafts.”199 The Swedes were clearly annoyed, but the Norwegian-Swedish ar-
mament cooperation has already changed for the better as Norway buys Swedish
materiel amounting to over 1,3 billion euro in 2012: new combat vehicles (CV90)
will be built in Sweden, whereas the old will be upgraded. Sweden is also using
this armoured vehicle which enables the countries to exercise together and to
conjointly upgrading the vehicles. Another Norwegian investment in Sweden is
the Arthur Artillery Hunting Radar, a cooperation project between the two coun-
tries.200 “Our [armement] industry is dependent on exports. That is why this is a
double stroke of luck. Our production can further strenthen our cooperation” says
Swedish minsiter of defence Karin Enström.201 Nevertheless, Norway’s choice for
a US aircraft at a price of 8 billion euro (end price estimates are speculative) only
shows what alliance really matters the most: the bilateral relations with the US.
198 Stoltenberg (2009).
199Cited at http://www.hegnar.no/nyhetsoversikt/article359539.ece (accessed 11 February
2009. Author’s translation.)
200 Nordli (2012).
201Cited in Nordli (2012).
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3.4. European policy
3.4.1. Norway
Norway’s relation to European integration can be described as ambivalent: Nor-
way aims at maintaining its autonomy and increasing its influence at the same
time. The country two times rejected a membership in the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the European Community (EC) in 1972 and 1994 respec-
tively. Norway’s relations to the EU are above all shaped by the EEA (European
Economic Area) agreement, but also the Schengen agreement and agreements
on immigration, security and defence policy, regional and regional development
policy and several other areas. Norway participates in the most important EU
programmes on research, innovation, social dialogue, culture etc. and is asso-
ciated with 26 EU-bureaus. Norway is unilaterally adapting to the EU e.g. in
regards to the immigation policy. Norway has often been the initiator of inhanced
cooperation with the EU. Norway’s correlations to the CFSP have been analysed
above. Here, the EU’s importance to Norway and Norway’s handling of the sit-
uation of being “outside and inside” the EU at the same time, which is the title
of a Norwegian report on the country’s agreements with the EU ordered by the
Norwegian state department, presented in January 2012.202
Norway’s first step towards European integration was in 1960 when the UK and
the Scandinavian countries, Portugal and the neutrals Switzerland and Austria
formed the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The British applications
of 1961, 1967 and 1969 to the EEC were all followed up by Norway.203 According
to Riste, the most remarkable thing about the 1972 referendum on a Norwegian
membership in the EEC is not the majority rejection, but that the majority was
very narrow - 53,5 against and 46,5 in favour.204 Whereas the 1972 decision was
more a choice of identity, the 1994 referendum was rather a policy choice of the
exact relation between Norway and the institutions of European integration.205
202 Sejersted et al.(2012).
203de Gaulle’s vetoes against British membership twice put an end to the negotiation process,
but Norwegian reservations and requests for special arrangements would have made it difficult
to achieve compromises anyhow.
204 Riste (2005), p. 244.
205 Archer (2005), p. 2.
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Here focus will not be laid on why Norway two times rejected a membership
but on the consequences of not being fully integrated. Since 1994, Norway has
become more like most European states in a number of ways, including impor-
tant societal elements such as increased immigration. Notwithstanding, Norway
remains richer than its neighbours to the south and it has only partial access to
the EU institutions through the EEA.
Since 1 January 1994, Norway’s commercial relationship with the EU has been
based on the EEA agreement. From January 1995, however, the EFTA side of
the EEA was reduced as Austria, Finland and Sweden206 became new members
of the EU.207 The EEA was maintained so that the three remaining countries
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein were able to participate in the internal mar-
ket. Thus they benefit from the EC’s four economic freedoms of movement of
goods, services, labour and capital.208 The EEA agreement excludes agriculture
and fisheries, which are included only to a very limited extent. In 2004 and 2007
the EEA was enlarged at the same time as the EU in order not to disturb the
functioning of the internal market. This implied a ten-fold increase in the fi-
nancial contributions of the EEA-EFTA states to social and economic cohesion
in the internal market. Norway in fact contributes more per capita to the new
states than any other EU or EEA-EFTA country. From 2004 to 2009, Norway,
Iceland and Liechtenstein paid about 1,307 billion euro to 15 recipient countries.
Norway’s part of the EEA grants is of 10 billion nkr, or 1,2 billion euro.209 The
Lisbon Treaty has so far not implicated the need for a revision of the EEA or
any of the other agreements Norway has with the EU. However the treaty has
substantially influenced Norway’s relation with the EU in many ways.
The EEA agreement gives the EEA-EFTA states the right to be consulted by
the Commission during the formulation of EC legislation, but not the right to
206Switzerland decided not to participate in the EEA.
207The EEA Agreement was negotiated between the EC and the then seven member countries
of the EFTA and was signed in Oporto on 2 May 1992.
208In addition to accepting the community acquis in the fields of the four freedoms, the
agreement allows for cooperation between the EU and the EEA-EFTA countries in regards to
research and technological development, information services, environment, education, social
policy, consumer protection, small and medium-sized enterprises, tourism, the audio-visual
sector and civil protection.
209Europaportalen (2009) “EØS-midlene”, http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/sub/europaportal-
en/eos-midlene.html?id=115262 (accessed 11 February 2009).
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a voice in decision-making. The EEA institutions are based on the willingness
by the EFTA states to adapt EC legislation on competition law whereas the
EC will not apply anti-dumping measures to EFTA exports.210 The agreement
is implemented through institutional arrangements.211 For instance, the EFTA
Court hears appeals against the action of the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA)
and deals with disputes involving EFTA states. This court, however, bases itself
on the EU courts supranational legal practice.
A challenge in principle for Norway is that the Lisbon Treaty cancelled the former
pillar structure which formally parted EU cooperation in three different parts
(the EC, the CFSP, and the cooperation in the realm justice- and home affairs).
This might present a problem to Norway because the Norwegian agreements
with the EU still are based on the pillar structure. The EEA only applies to the
subject matters of the first pillar, whereas Norway also has agreements within the
former second and third pillars.212 Also, the institutional changes in the EU with
the strengthening of the European Council and the European Parliament (EP)
as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, constitute a change of reality for Norwegian
European policy makers. These are institutions which Norwegian authorities
might have larger difficulties to interact with compared to the Commission and
the Council. Furthermore the EU established a new common European External
Action Service (EEAS) which has led to certain changes in the way the EU
handles its relationship with Norway, and to anxiety on the Norwegian side that
the EU could “downgrade” it. The most important long-term challenge to Norway
is however according to the Norwegian report on the EU that the Union is about
to develop a foreign political instrument which should contribute to a stronger
coordination of the EU member states’ foreign policies.213 Norway’s relationship
with the EU is both foreign policy and home affairs. As a whole, the accords with
the EU are Norway’s most important foreign policy agreement, which not only
regulates the relationship with the Union but also with the 27 member states
210 Archer (2005), p. 71.
211The Single European Market was about being created when the EEA agreement was being
negotiated. It was to be part of a future EU rather then the existing EC with which the EFTA
states were negotiating. The EEA agreement accordingly refers to the Treaty of Rome rather
than to the Maastricht treaty.
212 Sejersted et al.(2012), p. 83.
213 Sejersted et al.(2012), p. 83.
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which to an increasing extent coordinate their foreign policies. The EEA is thus
also Norway’s most important Nordic cooperation agreement.214
In fact, some of the legislation formerly carried out by the Norwegian parliament
now comes from the EU. Through the EEA agreement, Norway is practically
copying EU legislation for the internal market. This weakens the role of the
Storting, and the EEA process is easily treated as an element of foreign policy
rather than as legislation. Whereas Norway’s relationship with the EC/ EU has
been the most controversial single issue in Norwegian politics for the last fourty
years and still might be so, the content of the continuing EU adaption is not very
disputed. Whereas the EU has fragmented Norwegian politics, the EEA has had a
uniting effect. In the period 1992 to 2011 Norway has adopted over 6000 new EU
legal acts through the EEA, wheras the right to veto, which is inherent, has only
been seriously discussed in 17 cases. According to the Norwegian constitution, the
Storting must give a special approval every time Norway accepts new obligations
of particular importance. In the period 1992 to 2011 the Storting has voted in
287 cases of this kind; 265 of them were decided unanimously, and the rest were
basically decided with a large majority.215
According to Archer, a “Europeanisation” of the central administration has taken
place in Norway through the EEA process.216 Nevertheless, the Norwegian state
administration’s EEA related work has room for improvement, as shown by a re-
port conducted by the office of the Auditor General of Norway on the Norwegian
state administration’s work with the forming of EEA relevant rules and regula-
tions. The report, presented in November 2005, concluded that the Norwegian
state administration, and first and foremost ministries such as the ministry of the
environment, the ministry of trade and industry and the ministry of petroleum
and energy, does not take the work with the EEA seriously: The ministries do
not as presumed participate in the administration’s coordination on top level.217
214 Sejersted et al.(2012), p. 17.
215 Sejersted et al.(2012), p. 20.
216 Archer (2005), p. 94.
217Oral and general instructions are standard practice as signals to the Norwegian members
of the EU working groups that elaborate the legislation which is being imposed on Norway as
an EEA country. Furthermore, of the hundreds of directive drafts about EEA cases which are
elaborated by Norwegian ministries, 63 per cent are about cases already adopted by the EU.
Only 32 per cent allude to cases which are still in the decision making stage. (Riksrevisjonen
(2005) Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av forvaltningens arbeid med utformingen av EØS-relevant
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All of the current 17 government ministries are more or less preoccupied with
EU/EEA matters, and the same is the case with most of the government agen-
cies and all of the 429 municipalities which experience that EEA related questions
have a great role in workaday life. Of about 600 Norwegian laws about 170 of
them comprise EU law to a greater or lesser extent. This also applies to around
thousand Norwegian directives.218
The Europeanisation of Norway, both of the state administration and society, in
the period 1992 to 2011 has not been a public topic, and few politicians have
an interest in highlighting this matter. Also, no political party wants to initiate
a new membership discussion in the nearest future. This is also a result of the
European economic crisis. In this regard former FM Godal expresses the situation
with a Groucho Marx citation: “I do not want to belong to a club that would
accept me as a member.”219 Educational books are almost completely silent
in regards to the EEA and Europeanisation of Norway. “There are not many
other spheres of Norwegian democracy in modern times where so many have
known so little about so much as in the European policy.”220 The democratic
problem Norway has in regards to the EU has been the main argument of the
EEA oponents. There are definitely structural tensions and problems in the EEA
construct, and it has obvious democratic deficits. At the same time however it has
functioned seemingly well for almost 20 years and has created a predictable frame
for both Norway’s relations with the EU, its closest neighbouring states and most
important economic partners. The EU itself has been through several ups and
downs from 1992 to 2011, but the frames of Norway’s affiliation have been stable
on the one hand and flexible enough on the other hand to bear the changes. The
cooperation with the EU is also gaining momentum, and seems to be without
regelverk. Riksrevisjonens administrative rapport no. 2, http://www.riksrevisjonen.no (ac-
cessed 30 November 2006), pp. 7-8.) The picture drawn by the report is that Norwegian
governments and the state administration have resigned and are attuned to only executing a
function of a formal authoriser in the interrelation with the EU. A statement from the MFA
mentions the reasons for this picture to be the EU’s enlargement and a significantly smaller
EFTA side, treaty changes in the EU with expanded fields of cooperation, the Lisbon strat-
egy, new working methods and new EU agencies which do not have its counterparts on the
EFTA side and with which Norway has to negotiate special arrangements in order to be as-
sociated. Cited in Riksrevisjonen (2005) Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av forvaltningens arbeid
med utformingen av EØS-relevant regelverk. Riksrevisjonens administrative rapport no. 2,
http://www.riksrevisjonen.no (accessed 30 November 2006), p. 50.
218 Sejersted et al.(2012), p. 18.
219 Godal (2012).
220 Sejersted et al.(2012), p. 20.
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limits, because it is politically safe as the decision is taken not to apply for a
membership. Also the political parties opposing a membership are getting used
to a new proximity, and the same could be the case with the Norwegian people.221
Former EU ambassador to Norway, Gerhard Sabathil, stated in 2004 that through
the EEA agreement, Norway is to 60-70 per cent already a member of the EU.222
Norway has in fact adopted 3/4 of EU law compared to those member states
which participate fully, and has implemented it more efficiently than many other
countries. From the EU’s point of view, Norway is the third country which is the
closest attached to the Union. The EEAS writes that “Norway is as integrated
in European policy and economy as any non-member State can be”.223 The
major disadvantage of the EEA to Norway is the limited amount of influence on
policy-making and the undermining of parliamentary authority. The EU became
increasingly aware of the lack of democratic ruling in the EU after the French
and Dutch denials of the European Constitution draft. As a result, the EU
commission now sends all its suggestions and surveys directly to the national
parliaments. This, however, does not apply for the Norwegian parliament.
Archer (2005) examined the relationship between Norway and the EU on the ba-
sis of the EEA. His first conclusion is that this has been “remarkably successful
for Norway in general economic terms.” However, it is impossible to say whether
or not Norway would have fared economically better had it been a full EU mem-
ber.224 Through the EEA, Norway has the autonomy to control and regulate
certain sectors of the economy, i.e. agriculture and fisheries and to some extent
energy, which it would not have had as a full member. Norway’s system of agri-
cultural support, and with it the rural areas, may benefit from being “outside”.
Norway’s right to regulate fisheries in order to conserve the stocks has further-
more been a clear advantage as the Common Fishery Policy “has been seen to
be a miserable failure, even on the Commission’s own admission.”225 Then-FM
Godal signed the EEA Treaty on behalf of Norway twenty years ago. Today he
points at one important weakness: The EEA does not give full access to the EU’s
221In regards to the Stoltenberg government’s European policy, see the Parliament report no.
15 (2008-2009) Interesser, ansvar og muligheter. Hovedlinjer i norsk utenrikspolitikk.
222Cited in Udgaard (2004).
223Cited in Sejersted et al.(2012), p. 838.
224 Archer (2005), p. 128.
225 Archer (2005), p. 128.
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internal market for all Norwegian fishery products.226 The EU is Norway’s most
important market for fishery products. Norway’s relations with the EU in this
realm is coplex and comprehensive.227
Archer’s case studies also demonstrated where Norway has been able to exert a
certain autonomy and influence in the EEA and where not. In areas of great im-
portance to the country, such as gas, regional aid and fisheries, expectations that
Norway would have greater success proved to be wrong. The case studies rather
show that even if Norway might expend more political efforts on these important
areas, the assertiveness is likely to depend on the importance attached to these
issues by the EU and certain key member states.228 One case Archer examined
was the Gas Market Directive, which started through the EU decision-making
process in 1997 and was adopted in summer 1998. By the autumn of 1998 the
EEA-EFTA states had been invited to adopt it. Until the gas directive came, the
EU had not been able to fully liberalise the gas market. Given Norway’s domi-
nant position in the ownership of European energy and its growing importance
to the Continental gas market,229 in addition to a traditional intrusive position
of the government in the Norwegian oil and gas business, Norway’s position in
negotiations with the EU on natural gas was assumed to be strong. However,
it proved not to be. In 2001, the Commission sent a ‘Statement of Objections’
for breaking the rules of competition to all the companies that sold gas from the
Norwegian offshore fields. This was a direct challenge to the policy of the Nor-
wegian government, especially that of supporting its Gas Negotiating Committee
(GNC). The GNC managed the task of concluding contracts for the sale of Nor-
wegian offshore gas, preferably long term contracts with preferred buyers, thus
providing stability and profitability. This cartel activity of Norwegian gas sales
came to an end as the GNC ceased its activities from 1 January 2002 due to the
intervention of the Commission and ESA. On the other hand, the Commission
dropped a case against Norwegian gas companies.230
“Some seven years after Norway had failed to join the EU, its government
226 Godal (2012).
227See for further details Sejersted et al.(2012), pp. 666-685.
228 Archer (2005), p. 131.
229See chapter 4 of part I.
230 Archer (2005), p. 109.
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had accepted lock, stock and barrel EU regulations on one of its major
export industries and a central part of its economy. (...) It seems that
in such an important activity Norway had exercised very little influence
(compared with the potential muscle provided by such gas resources) and
had lost a great deal of autonomy to market forces and to the EU as their
regulator.”231
An interesting point is that the oil gave Norway “the economic capacity for society
to wait” in the referendum of 1994 instead of “rushing” into the EU.232 The state
defended the Norwegian petroleum industry during the EC membership negoti-
ations in the early 1990s.233 In this period the EU tried to regulate the energy
sector. This policy was however not compatible with the Norwegian petroleum
regime. As Archer has shown in the case of gas, it is now Brussels and not Oslo
that regulates important parts of the energy market. This means that at least
the gas part of the Norwegian energy industry is affected by a certain Europeani-
sation.234 Furthermore, the EU is moving towards a common energy policy as a
result of a growing “resource nationalism”, rising prices and decreasing reserves
worldwide. Whereas the main responsibility for energy still lies with the mem-
ber countries, competition will at the same time increase through a dissolution
and opening of the monopolies and mains. Norway thus has to clarify where its
energy interests lie, not only economically but also politically. Despite the very
important energy relations between Norway and the EU, there has been a ten-
dency in Norway of ignoring the EU’s importance. On the other hand, Norway is
rarely mentioned by the EU or its members states when they discuss energy. The
country is remarkably aloof in the debate and is probably taken for granted. The
Commission presented the Energy Roadmap 2050 on 15 December 2012 which
considers different energy mixes in a long-term perspective in order to achieve
the Low Carbon Society. Early in the report’s making, natural gas was not a
focal point and this distressed Norwegian authorities. In the final version gas
is however defined as critical to the transformation of the energy system. The
vision is that gas will replace coal in a short to medium-term period but also for
a long period of time. From 2030 it is however necessary with carbon capture
and storage in order to secure the long-term position of natural gas in the Eu-
231 Archer (2005), p. 109..
232 Ingebritsen (1998), p. 139.
233 Ingebritsen (1998), p. 140.
234 Archer (2005), p. 113.
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ropean energy mix.235. It is difficult to assess what this document will mean to
the future of Norwegian gas, but the EU’s importance as an export market is
crucial and thus the European energy policy is vital. The Norwegian delegation
to the EU have reported in a letter to the Oil and Energy ministry that there is
a large disagreement on the report and thus not very probable that the energy
efficiency directive will be as ambitious as the proposal of the Commission. The
Commission’s suggestion e.g. presupposes over 1000 billion euro of investments
in the energy sector prior to 2020, whereof 200 billion euro in power grids and
pipes. In the current financial situation this is thus very ambitious.236
According to parliament report no. 15 on Norwegian foreign policy (2008/2009),
the most comprehensive cooperation arrangements with the EU are the Schen-
gen agreement, the CFSP and the maintenance of fish stocks.237 The original
Schengen cooperation took place outside the EU’s institutions.238 Norway signed
agreements with the Schengen countries on 19 December 1996 (Schengen I) that
were ratified by Norway in 1997. Originally, Schengen was only open to full
membership by EU states, which excluded e.g. Norway and Iceland. The coop-
eration on legal matters within the EU and the inclusion of Sweden, Finland and
Denmark would have posed problems for Norway, but the separation of Schengen
from the EU allowed some latitude and made a joint Nordic approach possible.239
235The European Commission (2011) Power Perspectives 2030. On the road to a decar-
bonised power sector, p. 64 at http://www.roadmap2050.eu/attachments/files/ PowerPerspec-
tives2030_FullReport.pdf
236Cited in Helgesen (2012), p. 43.
237Parliament report no. 15 (2008-2009) Interesser, ansvar og muligheter. Hovedlinjer i norsk
utenrikspolitikk, p. 52.
238On 15 June 1985, representatives from Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and Germany signed an agreement in the Luxembourgian town Schengen aiming at abolishing
border control of persons between these countries. This was later on followed up by the Schengen
convention of 19 June 1990. The cooperation formally started on 26 March 1995 and was later
on joined by Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and
Sweden. 19 of the EU’s 25 members are a part of the cooperation. The UK and Ireland have
chosen not to participate in the part of the cooperation which implies an abolishment of border
control. Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania do not yet participate in the Schengen cooperation.
Switzerland has also accepted the Schengen rules.
239The Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have for more than
40 years had a common regulation of passport and free traveling, in short the Nordic passport
union. Nordic citizens have thus been allowed to travel to (persons from outside the Nordic
region included) and stay in another Nordic country without a passport for several decades.
The future of the passport union was suddenly uncertain as Denmark, Finland and Sweden
wanted to join the Schengen cooperation. Thus common Nordic negotiations were started
with the Schengen countries on a cooperation agreement with Iceland and Norway. The Nordic
situation before Schengen I was one EU member with an opt-out from justice issues (Denmark),
two new EU members with no such opt-out (Finland and Sweden) and two non-EU but EEA
members (Iceland and Norway).
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Despite of the Schengen agreement, the EU keeps Norway out of important parts
of the justice and police cooperation. The Amsterdam treaty decided that the
Schengen cooperation would become a part of the EU. The Amsterdam treaty,
effective from 1 May 1999, implies that former Schengen questions now are being
treated by the EU’s ministers of justice as the system was transferred to the
Community-based Pillar I.240 Thus Norway is kept out of and is not allowed
to join the policy shaping process of this realm. The moving of the Schengen
treaty into the Treaty of Amsterdam meant that Norway’s relationship with the
Schengen system had changed. In order not to create a border between three
Nordic EU states and two Nordic non-EU states, a new Schengen II agreement
between the EU and Norway and Iceland was necessary and agreed on. Norway
and Iceland joined Schengen II on 25 March 2001.
“Though the Schengen structure reached into the heart of sovereignty, it
did not cover so many aspects of socio-economic activity as the EEA. The
agreement reached did not provide for any supranational authority over
Norway and also meant that Norway could be bound only by laws which it
had accepted.”241
From 1999 to 2011 the Schengen agreement has been extended by 158 legal acts
of totally about 300. This has not created much political debate in Norway
despite both principal and sensitive questions, and a political consensus on both
Schengen and the other agreements on judicial policy with the EU prevails in the
Storting.242
Norway cooperates on justice matters within forums such as the Council of Eu-
rope, Interpol, Nordic cooperation and the CBSS but the cooperation within the
EU is considered to be broader and more integrated. Norway was the first non-
EU state to sign an agreement with Europol in May 2001 which allowed practical
participation through a Norwegian liaison officer based in the organisation’s head-
240The cooperation on civil right and certain parts of the cooperation on asylum and immi-
gration were transferred to pillar I and subordinated the procedure of codetermination with
the EP. A European Council decision of 2004 transferred the remaining part of the cooper-
ation on visa, asylum and immigration to this procedure. The exceptions were the rules on
legal immigration which are still to be agreed on unanimously. As regards the cooperation on
criminal law and police (pillar III), changes were made through the Amsterdam treaty. For
instance, the European Commission became the right to initiate legislation next to the member
states. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006), p. 20.
241 Archer (2005), p. 161.
242 Sejersted et al.(2012), p. 691.
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quarters in the Hague. Norway also takes part as an observer in Eurojust meetings
and cooperates with the European police academy and a convention on criminal
law. Nevertheless, the Norwegian parliament proposition no. 23 (2005/2006) on
European policy referred to the experience of being kept out of the EU police
cooperation, even though Norwegian governments explicitly want to participate,
as one of Norway’s big challenges in its relations with the EU.243 The report
further states that the EU and Norway on several occasions have disagreed on
what should be regarded as Schengen-relevant. Further, the EU’s interpretation
of the Schengen agreement is characterised by the Norwegian government as a
consequent and restrictive approach.244 This situation makes it hard to ignore
the arguments that favour a full Norwegian integration in the EU. Altogether,
the global character of the challenges of violence, terror, crime and the change
in the nature of migration makes the national level insufficient to handle these
matters. The increasing overlap between justice and home affairs matters. The
“European Security Strategy”, adopted by the EU in December 2003 and updated
in 2008, calls for “better action between external action and Justice and Home
Affairs policies” in the EU.245 This makes the situation even more to the dislike
of Norway. The EU’s conditions of agreeing on a broader political approach have
improved with the Lisbon Treaty. The EU thus acts on a basis which is more
integrated because the rules of decision making are more congruent. The foreign
and security policy is still intergovernmental but the coordination is strengthened
through the EEAS. The need of coordination is articulated in the overriding EU
strategy documents which are resolved upon by the heads of governments in the
European Council. Norway does not have access to the European Council, and
none of Norway’s agreements with the EU give access to the processes leading to
the concrete action plans elaborated by the Commission.246 Norway’s agreements
with the EU are thus only tied to certain elements of European cooperation, and
these elements are not coordinated in a way which secures Norwegian participa-
tion in integrated cooperation measures. EU activities towards third countries
in regards to migration is one example of only a partial Norwegian connection
243 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006), p. 25.
244 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006), p. 21.
245Cited in Archer (2005), p. 167.
246 Sejersted et al.(2012), p. 690.
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through Schengen and Dublin.247 Another example is the agreements with the
US in order to exchange information on terrorism and other crimes which might
have direct influence on Norwegian matters.248
As shown in this chapter and elsewhere, Norway’s strategy of maintaining its
autonomy, and at the same time increasing its influence, has not been very suc-
cessful. Overall, the links between Norway and the EU must furthermore be char-
acterised as complicated. The EU is brought into the country’s internal space
as far as the political and interest elites are concerned. As the wider population
is concerned, Norway’s part in European integration has affected what they can
buy and when, their terms of employment, their security and how freely they can
travel abroad. Astonishing in this context is the lack of attention paid to this
relationship both in the Norwegian parliament and in the public.249
New EU enlargements, which could concern the Ukraine, Turkey, the Balkan
and Caucasus, would possibly furthermore affect the EEA agreement. German
chancellor Merkel’s party fellow Matthias Wissmann, chairman of the Bundestag’s
Committee on the Affairs of the European Union from 2002 to 2007, published an
article on graduated forms of EU membership as a solution to the difficult matters
of further enlargements. Accordingly, the “graduated membership” that currently
exists for Switzerland and Norway might also be a good solution for countries like
the Ukraine, Moldova and, possibly also at some point of time, for Belarus.250
Merkel has also pointed to this as a possible solution. Norway on her part has
no influence on this process. The probability that Iceland becomes a member of
the EU has also increased with the financial crisis and the following membership
application, which was delivered to the Swedish presidency in Stockholm on 23
July 2009. With Iceland as an EU-member, the EEA-EFTA countries would
be Norway and Liechtenstein. In this case, the future of the EEA agreement
seems very doubtful. And should the EEA agreement be broadened to include
a solution for large countries in the East, Norway would have to go to Kiev and
Minsk to defend its EEA interests. The possibility that the EEA agreement will
247The so called Dublin cooperation regulates how an asylum application should be treated
if it is applied for in more than one country.
248 Sejersted et al.(2012), p. 691.
249 Archer (2005), p. 189.
250 Wissmann (2006), pp. 64-68.
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be jeopardised in the future is getting increasingly probable. The question is
what the Norwegian reaction would be.
3.4.2. Sweden
Unlike Norway, Sweden is a full member of the EU since 1995. This necessitates
a deeper examination, beyond Swedish European policy, which includes many
aspects of Sweden being in the EU. Miles has examined Sweden in the EU from
a fusion perspective and argues in particular that Sweden’s policy-making is fast
becoming fused with that of the EU and hence, Swedish policy-making has be-
come further supranationally oriented. Although Norway also has had to adapt
to the EU, the missing membership keeps it out of EU polity. In the case of Swe-
den on the other hand, Miles’ fusion perspective seems suitable for examining
Sweden’s Europeanisation as an EU member.
According to the fusion theory’s originator, Wolfgang Wessels, fusion explains
the process of European integration “by which national and community actors
increasingly merge resources in joint institutions and complex procedures”.251 On
this basis, Miles applies a micro-level fusion perspective consisting of the ele-
ments performance fusion, political fusion and compound fusion, which are three
different but complementary ways that national policy-makers view European
integration.252 As performance fusion is concerned, the point from a micro-level
fusion perspective is that most national policy-makers are predominantly prag-
matic and view European integration through performance-related criteria. EU
governments need a positive output, i.e. a welfare gain, from EU policy in order
to obtain popular support for the Union. As a full EU member, the Union’s
success is an “infused” part of a state’s national interest.253 Thus it is in Sweden’s
national interest that the EU stays successful, which is an important difference
to Norway’s situation.
Further, political fusion constitutes “the vitally important, if often vague, political
viewpoint of the governing elite of a respective state towards the desirability of
251 Wessels (2001), p. 199.
252 Miles (2005), p. 30.
253 Miles (2005), pp. 32-33.
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differing options covering the future direction of the evolving EU system.”254 Ac-
cordingly, most European countries regard integration as a ‘third way’ between
intergovernmentalism and federalism, most elites being pro-supranational inte-
gration but federo-sceptic. Federalism is disliked as a result of its constitutional
character. Moreover, political fusion is ongoing as national adaption continues
regardless of public EU scepticism, which can only influence the pace of the pro-
cess.255
Finally, compound fusion is about the EU being regarded by national EU policy-
makers as a compound polity, i.e. “a state-like politico-administrative system
that works in conjunction with the existing nation states rather than serving to
replace the latter.”256 Compound fusion thus emphasises both to what extent na-
tional administrative principles have extended into the EU as well as the changes
in national procedures as a result of participation in EU committees. Hence,
federal models are politically sensitive because they attempt to make an explicit
cut between the national and EU levels. Compound fusion on the other hand
does not. It is furthermore increasingly difficult to reverse the fusion trends em-
anating from the member states’ participation in the EU compound polity. The
alternative seems to be leaving the Union altogether.257
Domestic debates concerning aspects of compound fusion are usually concerned
with the negative democratic implications emanating from the lack of public
accountability as public resources are merged across governmental levels and re-
sponsibilities are diffused. Compound fusion should, however, result in a decline
of opposition to EU-membership, starting with the elite level and perhaps be-
come extended to the public level. The process of Europeanisation thus lock the
member states into the process and may even enable them to move to the EU’s
inner core.258 Opinion polls show that the support for the EU is rather increas-
ing in Swedish opinion after the outbreak of the financial crisis, and the Swedish
turnout of the 2009 EP elections 2009 was over the EU-average and far above the
2004 result.259 Moreover, an increase of obligations and commitments takes place
254 Miles (2005), p. 34.
255 Miles (2005), pp. 34-37.
256 Miles (2005), p. 38.
257 Miles (2005), p. 41.
258 Miles (2005), pp. 42-43.
259The Swedish turnout was 45,53 per cent compared to the overall 43 per cent. In 2004,
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simultaneously with a Europeanisation of the national political elite. The term
Europeanisation is in this context defined in two different but not mutually ex-
clusive ways. The first considers a shift of attention by national policy makers as
the EU’s growing importance to their work is recognised, and more involvement
in the EU policy cycle leads to a positive orientation towards EU governance.
At least, a large amount of time is invested by national policy-makers to deal
with EU policies and legislation. The second definition concerns the procedural
character of Europeanisation as national procedures are reformed to meet the
demands of EU obligations, resulting in institutional adaption and altering of the
domestic rules.260
Miles shows that Sweden has sophisticated mechanisms at the domestic level
of formulating political consensus behind national EU policy.261 The domestic
level is furthermore connected to the projection of Swedish policy interests and
the Swedish government’s ability to influence the EU’s agenda.262 According
to Börzel, an effective national EU strategy needs to “upload” national policy
arrangements to the EU level for three reasons: firstly, to reduce the need for
legal and administrative adaptation in “downloading” EU policies into national
policy structures. This may imply financial and political costs. Secondly, to
prevent competitive disadvantages appearing for domestic industry and finally,
to enable national governments to address problems that preoccupy domestic
constituencies but can not be dealt with effectively at the domestic level.263 Here,
a comparison must be made between Norway and Sweden because this is the
largest difference between being inside the EU (Sweden) and being both inside
and outside the EU (Norway). The report on Norway’s relations with the Union
264 states that Norway might be able to exercise a certain influence on EU decision
making, or achieve particular exemptions, through an active European policy.
Norway however is not represented in the European decision making institutions
and is thus outside the decisive processes whereas the country at the same time
the turnouts were 37,85 per cent (Sweden) and 45,47 per cent (EU). See http://www.eu-
roparl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/sweden_en.html#ancre4 (accessed 13
August 2009).
260 Miles (2005), pp. 45-46.
261See Miles (2005), pp. 52-175.
262See Miles (2005), p. 177.
263 Börzel (2002), p. 196.
264 Sejersted et al.(2012)
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has committed itself to implement large parts of the EU policy and legal acts.
The formal sovereignty is thus an illusion.265 The possibility of influence from
the outside through e.g. lobbying is very limited. Norway’s affiliation with the
EU has thus been both depoliticizing and increasingly technocratic because the
combination of being outside the EU and political compromising result in few
incentives for political engagement. Rather, power is displaced in favour of the
civil service.266
As opposed to its neighbour, Sweden is able to pursue different policy priorities
within EU policy, and Miles has identified different categories of policy priorities:
Championed Policy Priorities, Normative Policy Priorities and Policy Dilemmas.
Börzel’s three ways in which EU states have responded to Europeanisation in both
the decision-making and implementation stages of the policy process - by pace-
setting267, foot-dragging268 and fence-sitting269, is embedded in Miles’ model.270
Championed policy priorities (pace-setting) thus identify issues which are cham-
pioned by the Swedish governments within the EU policy-making process. Most
of those are related to
1. “Swedish desires to improve the democratic credentials of the Union, such as
greater EU openness and transparency”,
2. “those policy areas where the Swedes are usually perceived to be market lead-
ers, such as, in the environmental and societal policy spheres” and
3. “those aspects of the EU external relations portfolio that Swedish policy-makers
believe (if developed) will reinforce existing foreign policy priorities, such as in
the Baltic Sea Region and/or European crisis management.”271 Here, Swedish
standards and policy lines are being projected on the EU, Sweden acts proactive
and usually favours extensive supranationalism. The Swedish policy priorities
during its 2009 presidency were, in relation to this, economy and employment
265 Sejersted et al.(2012), p. 827.
266 Sejersted et al.(2012), p. 828.
267The pace-setters try to “shape European policies according to their domestic preferences
and priorities”. Börzel (2002), p. 197.
268Foot-dragging is aimed at preventing other states from “uploading” their domestic policies
to the EU level or trying to obtain “some compensation in the form of side-payments or package
deals”. Börzel (2002), p. 203.
269Fence-sitting implies “taking an indifferent and neutral position” or building coalitions with
pace-setters and foot-draggers. Börzel (2002), p. 206.
270 Börzel (2002), pp. 194-195.
271See Miles (2005), p. 178.
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and climate. A further priority was the Stockholm programme, which shows a
proactive Swedish attitude in regards to EU cooperation on legal and domestic
questions in order to assure cross-border legal certainty. Important aspects of
the Stockholm programme are the strengthening of human rights in EU law, as
well as the implementation of procedures in the common migration policy. The
programme also continues the effort of improving the exchange of information
between national authorities and the EU in the realm of judiciary policy. For
instance, the EU is about to implement a system for direct access to reaction
registers in member states, and a similar system for access to police registers in
the different countries is also considered. Common rules on the collecting and
exchange of passanger data are also being considered, and none of these sugges-
tions will be EEA or Schengen relevant.272 Other important policy priorities of
the 2009 Swedish presidency were the EU’s Baltic Sea Strategy, “the EU, the
proximate areas and the world” as well as “new parliament, new commission and
the Lisbon Treaty”.273
Sweden’s normative policy priorities (fence-sitting) of Miles’s second classifica-
tion category are reflected in the desire to be perceived as a mainstream member
state and a ‘good European’. These issues are not so openly championed, but
political and/or economic advantages are anticipated. Research and economic
development and Schengen cooperation are examples of such activity where Swe-
den is acting more neutral. However, supranational cooperation has usually been
favoured by Sweden in regards to normative priorities, and here Swedish attitudes
have altered progressively.274
As the final classification of policy dilemmas (foot-dragging) is concerned, the pri-
ority of the Swedish government is to openly defend and usually protect Swedish
interests, which might result in a peripheral position to the EU development.
Here, intergovernmental solutions, at least the avoidance of supranational ar-
rangements, are favoured. Examples of Swedish policy dilemmas are the protec-
tion of Swedish alcohol monopolies and to a lesser extent the attitudes towards
EU monetary integration. Such ‘foot-dragging’ is in very few cases able to prevent
272 Sejersted et al.(2012), p. 688.
273http://www.se2009.eu/sv/ordforandeskapet/ arbetsprogram/arbetsprogram_for_det_s-
venska_ ordforandeskapet_i_eu (accessed 13 August 2009).
274See Miles (2005), pp. 178-180.
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problematic policies but can result in some compensation, for example opt-outs,
that may enable Sweden to stay outside the disputed policy field.275
Miles’ next move in describing Swedish policy dynamics regarding the EU is to
connect this policy typology with fusion.276 In this case he outlines the optimistic
type of scenario (interpretation 1),277 the balanced type of scenario (interpretation
2)278 and the pessimistic type of scenario (interpretation 3).279
Miles (2005) further classifies Sweden’s full membership into four distinct, inter-
linked periods for convenient reasons. This historiography is a basis for consid-
ering further aspects of Swedish European policy and Sweden’s role in the EU.
The first period, period A, is termed “reactive shock” and applies to the period
1995-97. Championed policy priorities (pace-setting) of period A were openness/
transparency, environment, employment and enlargement. Normative policy pri-
orities (fence-sitting) were EU research and EU crisis management, as well as
continued Swedish participation in the Single European Market, whereas policy
dilemmas (foot-dragging) were the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the
EU defence dimension and Schengen cooperation.280
The years 1997-99 are period B in Mile’s history of Swedish governmental EU
policy positions. At this point of time, anti-membership attitudes were marginal
275See Miles (2005), pp. 180-181.
276Here, Ekengren’s and Sundelius’ distinction between the Swedish state and Swedish society
in terms of Europeanisation/ EU-isation is embedded in the description of the three different
scenarios of Swedish policy towards the EU. See Ekengren/ Sundelius (1997).
277An optimistic scenario would occur if “ (a)there is already a large and stable number of
issues that can be classified as championed policy priorities (1) or; (b) if there is a sizeable
number of issues moving upwards from Classification (2) - normative policy priorities - to Clas-
sification (1), then Sweden is already a leading and fully Europeanised state.” Miles (2005), p.
183.
278“If we see more issues that are moving from Classification (3) - so that there are fewer
policy dilemmas for the Swedes - to Classification (2) and/or (1), then we can assume that the
Swedish government is becoming accustomed to working in the Union, but that the average
Swede is not fully Europeanised. (...) The results of the survey would suggest that there is
still a delicate balance, with the Swedish state (the political elite and governmental apparatus)
being fully Europeanised and acting as the protectors of full membership status, whilst Swedish
society remains more sceptical.” Miles (2005), pp. 185-186.
279“If a large number of important policy areas can be detected as policy dilemmas (Clas-
sification 3) then we can interpret this as meaning that there are still substantial domestic
constraints affecting Swedish policy toward the Union. Sweden has some way to go before
becoming comfortable with its full membership status”. Here, even a withdrawal from the EU
stays a real possibility as large parts of Swedish society are disillusioned with the membership.
Few championed policy priorities , minimal normative priorities and plenty of policy dilemmas
would further be the reality of the third scenario. Miles (2005), p. 187.
280 Miles (2005), Table 5.4, p. 189.
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within the mainstream political parties and thus gave the government more el-
bowroom. One explanation for the positive development was the successful advo-
cating of the abovementioned championed issues as they were incorporated into
the Amsterdam Treaty.281 In regards to Mile’s policy typology, crisis manage-
ment was upgraded to become a championed priority in this period. In addition,
Swedish concerns relating to certain aspects of the third pillar and Schengen in
particular became more subdued, and supranational solutions were increasingly
accepted here. Miles thus sees a “slight increase” in the number of normative
policy priorities. The prospects of EU enlargement furthermore enabled Sweden
to pursue new policy issues in order to make the EU more acceptable to the
Swedish population. It was also increasingly realised that Sweden’s political fu-
ture was closely connected with EU ambitions.282 The most crucial questions of
this period, the EMU and the EU defence dimension, were disputed in Sweden
and showed that Sweden’s federo-scepticism puts limits on Sweden’s ability to en-
gage in “first-rate integration”. Miles places Sweden within the balanced scenario
during this period.
Then, period C from 1999-2000 is characterised by “positive adjustment” and
a more proactive European policy. External and structural pressures283 made it
necessary for Sweden to improve its image in the EU. Both the EU defence dimen-
sion284 and the euro were promoted by the Persson government, and the political
elite had taken a leading role on domestic debate on European integration. Swe-
den accepted, among other things, the supranational Schengen arrangement in
order to preserve the Nordic Passport Union. This however did not mean that
intergovernmentalism and the policy dilemmas were abandoned.285
Finally, period D, i.e. the Swedish EU Council Presidency 2001, is the last period
examined by Miles. The championed policy priorities set to form the Presidency
were enlargement, employment and environment, whereas the aim of the Swedish
281As mentioned in chapter 3.2, Sweden and Finland were successful including the Petersberg
tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty.
282 Miles (2005), p. 193.
283These were the launch of the EMU Third Stage in January 1999, the debates on a new
EU Treaty and preparation for Sweden’s EU Council presidency.
284The prior separation of the CFSP into civil/ foreign policy on the one hand and military
and security components on the other hand was played down.
285 Miles (2005), pp. 195-198.
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Presidency in regards to enlargement was to fulfill the Nice obligations, which
were not very high and therefore a key to success.286 Miles attaches the great-
est significance to the achievement of making progress on the target date for
the accession of the leading candidate countries and in that way ensuring that
the high-speed enlargement was made irrevocable.287 The Swedish strategy was
result-oriented and Swedish policy-makers accordingly de facto performance fu-
sionists, especially highlighting the relationship between the processes of economic
transition and EU accession. In contrast, Sweden wanted to avoid a general de-
bate on the future of Europe.288 As stated by Sweden’s then-FM Anna Lindh in
a speech on the Swedish Presidency: “I do not believe in a big bang reform of
the EU or in an United States of Europe ... I believe in a step-by-step approach
- realising differences between countries.”289
Ojanen stated in 2000 that Sweden (and Finland) is “in many ways on the border-
line in questions of European integration.”290 First, the geographic location is an
important factor which also has implications for Sweden’s national interests and
makes the Union’s external policies and its frontier regimes particularly impor-
tant to Sweden. Second, Sweden is on the borderline in regards to “the ideology
and tradition of European integration” due to not being one of the core countries
in the process of European integration.291 Swedish federo-scepticism was also
clearly shown in the reactions to former German FM Fischer’s widely discussed
keynote address of May 2000 on the future of the EU, which both Swedish PM
Persson and FM Lindh officially criticised.292 The opinions in Sweden about a
European constitution treaty showed, when compared to Finland, a larger scep-
ticism towards federal aspects of European integration. The Left Party and the
Green Party were the parties most negative about the Constitution and the only
parties supporting a referendum. Although being minor parties of the Riksdag,
the majority of the Swedish population tended to support their view on both
286The ‘road map’ to accession had been agreed on at the Nice European Council Summit in
December 2000.
287 Miles (2005), pp. 205-206. It was formally recognised that negotiations should be con-
cluded before the end of 2002 for the leading candidates in order to achieve accession in 2004.
288 Miles (2005), p. 207.
289Cited in Miles (2005), p. 210.
290 Ojanen (2000), p. 1.
291 Ojanen (2000), p. 1.
292Mr. Fischer later modified his position, not least because of the perspective of Turkish
membership in the EU.
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a petition for a referendum and the views on a European Constitution as such,
which was a somewhat unhappy name as the emphasis on the maintenance of
sovereignty in EU affairs is pivotal to the Swedish electorate.293 This also explains
the federo-scepticism of all Swedish political parties. What seems to rather unite
the Swedish public opinion and the Swedish political elite is a policy of seeking
substantial changes to the way the EU operates. The Swedes are apparently also
very aware of the fact that they are one of the primary net payers in the EU.294
Furthermore, all Swedish political parties represented in the Riksdag supported
the enlargement process of the EU and all parties agreed that the Copenhagen
criteria should be the basis for further enlargements.295 Both political camps em-
phasised the policy areas environment, foreign policy and security, i.e. favoured
more substance similar to the policy line of the European Commission, and both
thus supported the results achieved by the German presidency in June 2007.296
PM Reinfeldt was able to support chancellor Merkel with the ratification process
of a reformed constitution treaty, gathering praise in Berlin.297
That Sweden today, after yet another two EU enlargements, is still perceived as a
borderline country or “on the margins of Europe” is not so evident anymore. Swe-
den has for example been one of the strongest advocates for a continued eastern
enlargement of the EU. Furthermore, Sweden shows “a much stronger commit-
ment to policy initiation at the EU level and to supranational policy-making in
general than one would expect from a country widely labeled as EU-sceptic”.298
Another point is that the country, in addition to its geographic location and
lacking ideological traditions of European integration, is a small to middle-sized
European country. This fact did however not always prevent Sweden from join-
ing the large EU countries in regards to European integration. One example was
former PM Persson’s support for a French proposal regarding the European Con-
stitution in 2003. The proposal was to introduce a president for the European
Council, which by most minor EU member states was conceived to be a strength-
ening of the Council at the cost of the European Commission, and therefore also
293 Herolf (2005).
294 Herolf (2005).
295 Seeger (2007).
296 Seeger (2007).
297 Lewenhagen (2007).
298 Miles (2005), p. 211.
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of the small member states as the rotation of presidencies could be abolished
and substituted by a permanent president. Some Swedish experts thus deemed it
necessary to remind Persson of the fact that Sweden is not a great power in Eu-
rope, a notion which was “obviously present” and thus accordingly risked Swedish
interests. A good point here is that Persson could hardly have achieved a target
date for the accession if he had not been in the chairman position.299 Sweden’s
support could further have minimised the opportunity of coalition building with
the other minor member states, which almost unanimously opposed the French
proposal, and Sweden was temporarily excluded from meetings where the EU’s
minor member states discussed the strategy for the continuing reform process.
The real ability of influence in the EU depends on expertise in factual issues,
alliances with other participants, structural power resources and access to the
EU presidency position.300
Sweden rejected the euro through a referendum in September 2003, and the mone-
tary union remains the main policy dilemma and the last reason for some to claim
that Sweden is an EU-reluctant country. However, should Sweden’s neighbours
Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania become euro-countries in the near fu-
ture, Sweden’s attitude might change. The financial crisis in 2008 raised the voices
of those arguing for Sweden to join the monetary union, as its export-led econ-
omy had been hit hard by the crisis.301 Comparisons with Finland, whose EMU
economy performed better than the Swedish through the financial crisis, con-
tributed to the debate. According to an opinion poll undertaken for the Swedish
Liberal Party (Folkpartiet), the support of the euro as currency was larger than
the opposition in August 2009: 47 percent favoured this whereas 44 percent were
against.302 As late as 2008, the numbers were the opposite: about 38 percent
were in favour and 50 against the euro as currency, whereas Swedish scepticism
against the euro has reached new heights with the euro crisis (about 80 per cent
against).303 The question is whether this would be a good thing for Sweden to
299 Olsen/ Tallberg/ Mörth/ Petterson (2003).
300 Olsen/ Tallberg/ Mörth/ Petterson (2003).
301The relative number of unemployment was 9,8 per cent in June 2009. The GNP in the
second quarter 2009 was -6,2 per cent compared to second quarter 2008. See Statistics Sweden,
http://www.scb.se/ (accessed 6 August 2009).
302http://www.folkpartiet.se/ImageVault/Images/id_5826/ImageVaultHandler.aspx (ac-
cessed 6 August 2009).
303Sveriges Riksdag (2012) “Sverige sa nej till euron”, EU-upplysningen 12 January at
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do.
As opposed to Denmark and the UK, Sweden has no formal exception from adopt-
ing the euro. This implies that Sweden according to the EU Treaty will implement
the currency when the country fulfils the EU convergence criterions. In the latest
hearing of May 2010 Sweden did not fulfil the criterions of price stability and
a stable exhcange-rate. The latter has never been fulfiled because Sweden has
chosen not to participate in the optional exchange-rate mechanism ERM2 which
premises that one’s currency is tied to the euro. Sweden does not participate
in the monetery union and does thus not join the ministers of finance from the
euro countries when they meet in the euro group. Sweden does however partici-
pate in the other parts of the EMU. This implies that Sweden participates in the
EU’s stability and growth pact and that Sweden follows the EU’s procedures on
a coordination of the member states’ economic policy.304
Scandinavia’s biggest economy will see growth slow to less than one per cent
in 2012, down from 4,5 per cent in 2011, according to the National Institute of
Economic Research.305 It is even claimed that Sweden has some lessons for the
rest of Europe when it comes to economic policy:
“The value of monetary independence is the first and most important
Swedish lesson. Sweden stayed out of the euro system when the currency
was introduced in 1999, and in the past several years, the government has
used this monetary flexibility to the full. (...) [In the 1990s] budget deficits
widened and national consensus formed around the need to curb govern-
ment spending and stabilize the public finances. Sweden’s subsequent suc-
cess in doing that is nothing less than remarkable. Hence, Sweden’s second
lesson: Fiscal stimulus isn’t a necessary condition for economic recovery.
Through the course of the recent recession, the government’s cyclically ad-
justed budget stayed in surplus. As a result, Swedish government debt
stands at less than 40 percent of gross domestic product, among the lowest
of any rich country. (...) Fiscal policy still helped to cushion the recession
and support a recovery (...). Should others follow this example? For one
grouop, the answer is plainly yes. Members of the EU that have not yet
adopted the euro are nonetheless committed in principle to doing so. (...)
Sweden proves, if further proof were needed, that euro membership is a
mistake. (...) Sweden is better placed than most to deal with the further
economic setbacks the EU seems determined to dispense. More interest-
http://www.eu-upplysningen.se/Sverige-i-EU/Sverige-sa-nej-till-euron/
304Sveriges Riksdag (2012) “Sverige sa nej till euron”, EU-upplysningen 12 January at
http://www.eu-upplysningen.se/Sverige-i-EU/Sverige-sa-nej-till-euron/
305Cited in Bloombeg (eds.) “Sweden shows Europe how to Cut Debt, Weather the Recession:
View”, 4 January.
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rate cuts and a shift to budget stimulus, if needed, are options that few
other rich economies have.”306
It is thus interesting to see how Swedish politicians are attuned to the euro in
times of the European debt crisis. Former PM Persson has the effects of the
current euro crisis in mind when he favours a Swedish membership also in the
monetary union. A future deepened cooperation in the euro zone and a new com-
mon tax are accordingly predicted by Persson, as the euro countries apparently
are adjusting the early mistakes of the monetary union. It is further “impor-
tant to Sweden” that the monetary union is “fixed”. He also believes that the
deepened cooperation will have consequences for Sweden. Just like Switzerland
which was forced to tie the swiss franc to the euro, Sweden has not a very open
economy. When currencies rise a lot, an export dependent country like Sweden
is very vulnerable.307 “I will definitely not exclude that a Swedish membership
is quite close” Persson estimates.308 There are thus both political and economic
reasons that favour a Swedish membership. Former Swedish PM and current FM
Bildt supports the view of Persson and points at the “storms on the currency
markets” in the beginning of the 1990s ”which sooner or later would have torn
apart the Common Market”309 Bildt admits that Sweden has benefited from stay-
ing outside the euro cooperation, but at the same time Sweden has been favoured
a lot by the existence of the euro.310 The Swedish government is furthermore
distressed by the the fact that Sweden is kept out of the elaboration of the future
EU structure. Bildt above all criticised the direction which French then-president
Sarkozy represented, i.e. a partition of the EU in two of which one consists of the
euro states whereas the rest is more or less marginalised.311 Finally also German
chancellor Merkel stated that she supports a two-speed EU, with a core group in
the euro implementing deeper integration than the others.312
306Cited in Bloombeg (eds.) “Sweden shows Europe how to Cut Debt, Weather the Recession:
View”, 4 January.
307Cited in Larsson (2011).
308Cited in Larsson (2011). Author’s translation.
309Cited in Ollevik (2011).
310Cited in Ollevik (2011).
311Cited in Ollevik (2011).
312 Buergin (2012).
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3.5. Other aspects of Norwegian and Swedish
foreign policy
3.5.1. Norway
Another important aspect of Norwegian foreign policy is the strong support of
the United Nations (UN), the OSCE, the Norwegian development aid policy and
peace diplomacy. The moralistic tradition of the inter-war period was followed by
a missionary tendency in Norwegian foreign policy in the 1960s, with development
aid as the most important factor in the country’s global engagement. Norway’s
self-perception today is linked to being an exponent of international activism
and engagement, i.e. ’little country saves the world’. The standard expert view
in Norway in regards to the country’s foreign relations after the Second World
War, is that these have been swinging like a pendulum between “the will to
secure the state and its territory and the will to represent a global cosmopolitan
spirituality.”313 This coincides with the traditional realism-idealism dichotomy
within the studies of international relations. This dichotomy is a “dominant
theoretical ingredient in most current analyses of Norwegian foreign policy, and
is a favoured perspective from which politicians celebrate Norway’s post-cold war
role on the international scene.”314
The goal of this policy is above all the international recognition it is assumed to
bring. Thus, the main importance is the visibility of the accomplished actions
and not the actual achievements. The policy’s success is decided by its degree of
attention. A good example is the withdrawal of the Norwegian forces in Bosnia in
1999 to facilitate the Kosovo operation which, compared to Bosnia, had a higher
profile in the international public.315 After the EU referendum in 1994, Norway
has been engaged in Guatemala, Sudan, southern Africa, the Middle East, Sri
Lanka, the Philippines, former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan in order to gain in-
fluence internationally. According to Thune and Ulriksen, who describe Norway
as an “allied activist” aiming at “prestige and penance through peace”, the Nor-
313 Thune/ Ulriksen (2002), p. 3.
314 Thune/ Ulriksen (2002), p. 3.
315 Thune/ Ulriksen (2002), p. 7.
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wegian state would have had “a serious image problem” if it had not been for the
massive engagement in peace promotion and development assistance.316 This for-
eign policy profile is justified in different ways. One rationale is that Norwegian
humanitarian engagement makes Norway a valuable label, gives foreign policy
capital to use when the country is negotiating commercial terms, seeking coop-
eration or wanting guarantees from larger powers. It is, however, not possible to
extract any such direct foreign policy capital as a result of Norway’s engagement
for peace and development, and the “soft power” of Norway has a scant basis.
Moreover, both the “Oslo process” between Israelis and Palestinians and the UN
mediator role of former FM Stoltenberg in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s showed
the lack of “power and influence required to convert a temporary truce into a
sustainable peace.”317 This conclusion can be also be applied to e.g. Sri Lanka.
Schmutzler’s dissertation analyses the different groups of actors, their functions
and relations to each other in the “Norwegian model” of international peace diplo-
macy. It concludes that the “Norwegian model” is offering an efficient method of
establishing contacts with the conflicting parties and for the gathering in official
negotiations. The problem lies at the negotiating stage, in which Norway has to
rely on more powerful states or international organisations because of problems
related to power and influence.318
Norway’s first step of a bilateral aid programme was the Indian - Norwegian
fisheries project started up in 1952. In addition to the person-to-person char-
acter of this project, the fact that Norway was the first non-colonial country
to engage in bilateral development aid was according to Rise a major public
relations coup for the country.319 Another Norwegian “peace effort” was the ex-
tensive participation in military or semi-military UN peacekeeping missions. At
the beginning of 2005, over 50 000 Norwegian military personnel had partici-
pated in 31 UN or UN-mandated peacekeeping operations since 1947. The main
effort has been the Middle East where 33 000 Norwegian soldiers served in the
UNIFIL force in Lebanon from 1978 to 1998.320 From 1976 to 1998, the focus of
the “un-securitised” Norwegian foreign policy was also on the Middle East, with
316 Thune/ Ulriksen (2002), p. 16.
317 Riste (2005), p. 272.
318 Schmutzler (2009), p. 227.
319 Riste (2005), p. 257.
320 Riste (2005), p. 266.
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the climax being the Oslo agreement between Israel and the Palestine Libera-
tion Organisation (PLO) in 1993. In the 1990s, however, it became increasingly
problematic to make a distinction between the “realistic” and “idealistic” parts of
Norwegian policy, as the policy arenas converged and humanitarian values were
supported and enforced by military means in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Crisis
management previously handled by the UN was now partly taken over by NATO.
Norway’s participation in the NATO act of war in Kosovo from 24 March to 10
June 1999 reflected a new mindset in Norwegian foreign policy “that justice is not
always served by strict adherence to international law.”321 Furthermore, the main
dilemma confronting the Norwegian decision-makers has been finding the right
balance in order to satisfy close allies on the one hand, and the US in particular,
and the Norwegian national self-perception on the other hand.322 Unlike Norway,
Sweden abdicated its role as a global model and great power of the UN diplomacy
after the end of the Cold War. The attention was directed towards the Baltic Sea
instead and the Swedish foreign ministry was accordingly reorganised.323
It is said about Norway’s current FM, Gahr Støre, that he takes foreign policy
back to the country and the proximate areas. On the other hand, the Norwegian
foreign policy elite is described as “liberal idealists” or “internationalists” who
“dream of a united world led by the UN.”324 Altogether, NATO, the EU and
the UN are the important cornerstones of Norwegian foreign policy. NATO is
important, but has an uncertain future. The European debt crisis might in the
end lead to a political union whereas Norway still refuses to make a choice which
enables it to take the responsibility of its affiliation with Europe. Thus the UN
would still be Norway’s main venue but is again too loosely organised to make
any difference.
321 Riste (2005), p. 273.
322 Thune/ Ulriksen (2002), p. 7.
323 Steiro (2005).
324 Kvalvik (2006).
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3.5.2. Sweden
A significant aspect of Swedish foreign and security policy is the defence indus-
try policy,325 because the Swedish state, as a part of its non-alignment policy,
has traditionally pursued a policy of self-sufficiency in the production of defence
equipment. The change in Swedish defence policy becomes clear when considering
the defence industry policy, which today is focused on international collaboration,
European cooperation and exports. Another interesting aspect is the Swedish em-
phasis on soft security in the ESDP whereas the country at the same time is a
significant European exporter of weapons. In 2011, Sweden exported defence ma-
terial to 63 countries, and the sale to totalitarian regimes is increasing. Swedish
weapon exports have experienced a triple increase in ten years. Sweden sold mil-
itary equipment for 1,57 billion euro in 2011. More than one half of the exports
went to countries outside Europe, wheras EU countries, the US and Canada used
to be the largest customers. Now, Thailand, Saudi-Arabia, India and Pakistan
are, in this order, Sweden’s largest customers.326 The current production of the
very ambitious JAS Gripen fighter is an example of the successful Swedish in-
dependent defence industry policy which was prioritised after the Second World
War. In June 1995, British Aerospace and Saab signed an agreement to jointly
market the Gripen fighter abroad. The Swedish Air Forces have ordered 204
planes rather than the intended 350-400. Gripen’s two great competitors are The
Joint Strike Fighter developed by the United States and the Eurofighter Typhoon.
The Swedish defence industry has been characterised by three developments.
Firstly, compared to other countries with a similar size, population and defence
political ambitions, Sweden has a great defence industrial breadth as a result
of the non-alignment security policy doctrine. Secondly, it has a high level of
competence. Only a few states have a defence industry with the high level of
technology and competence as Sweden. Thirdly, the Swedish defence companies
are small by international standards, although thirteen Swedish defence industry
companies have been merged into eight over the last 25 years.327
325Defence industry policy is according to Britz found in an intersection of several policy areas
as defence policy, industry policy, regional policy and technology policy. Britz (2004), p. 6.
326Cited in Skjaevesland (2012).
327 Enheten för Strategisk Utveckling (SIF) (2003), pp. 12-13.
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Today, Sweden’s defence industry policy is going through a process of Europeani-
sation that begun in the late 1990s. Defence equipment supply first became a
political issue in Sweden in the mid 1990s as it became clear that the domestic
defence industry would change both in regards to the actual products and the
industrial structure. As Britz has shown, self-sufficiency was to a lesser and lesser
extent seen as an option in Sweden. Closer collaboration with other states was
soon pointed out as necessary, but issues based on fear of dependence on other
countries were raised.328 The international ownership in the Swedish defence in-
dustry today is significant. Hence, Swedish defence industry is not just a Swedish
interest but to a large extent also an object of European and transatlantic inter-
est.329
Sweden with its significant defence industry never seriously considered to stay
out of the European industrial cooperation that developed among Europe’s great
producers in the late 1990s.330 The eventual limited award in respect to Swedish
security would not have been worth the economic consequences,331 and economic
reasons led to exporting of defence equipment, as the internal market was not big
enough anymore for the Swedish defence industry to survive. In order to keep
the industry’s competence, capacity and competitiveness, exports and interna-
tional collaboration were needed. Thus exports were also seen to have a strategic
importance, because it helped keeping the production volumes up and creating a
long-term base for technology supply.332
The domestic aspect thus seems to disappear in Swedish defence industry, which
is internationalised at the same time Sweden’s armed forces are active both in a
national and international frame. The question is if Swedish defence industry has
328 Britz (2004), p. 9.
329Volvo Aero and Ericsson Microwave Systems are completely Swedish owned. Saab has
a Swedish major owner whereas British BAE Systems owns 35 per cent. Among the other
companies, foreign owners prevail and Sweden’s defence industry has been internationalised in
a short period of time. Enheten för Strategisk Utveckling (SIF) (2003), p. 15. All of
the larger, former national companies have assumed a transnational character and have fused
with, or become bought up by foreign investors. A sector integration of the former rather
national oriented industry has taken place.
330Shrinking defence budgets in most European countries combined with a great technology
development, increase in material costs and harder competition from the US made obvious that
European weapon producers had to undertake serious measures in order to survive. Enlarged
cooperation and fusions of establishments across the European borders had to take place.
331 Wegge (2003a), p. 66.
332 Britz (2004), p. 16.
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to become more forward-looking. Defence equipment include complex systems
which it takes five to 15 years to develop, in addition to the operative lifetime of
15 to 30 years. Defence decisions on the other hand, have a three-year perspec-
tive whereas the equipment supply process demands a longer decision horizon
in order to develop optimally. It is thus the question if large scale attacks on
Swedish territory should be completely ignored in the defence equipment plan-
ning. The development of Swedish defence industry policy further underlines the
unwillingness to raise questions of whether non-alignment still serves Swedish se-
curity. Non-alignment blocks solid arguments that favour another direction. It is
comparable with the Norwegian paranoia in regards to a membership in the EU.
3.6. Conclusions
Table I.2 shows the development lines in Norwegian foreign policy. The arrows
show similarities between the three formative periods until 1949 and current Nor-
wegian policy. Although the elements of the formative periods do not necessarily
have a direct influence on the developments after 1949, there seems to be a certain
recurrence. A new element which has emerged is Germany’s increased importance
to Norway relative to the UK. The problematic aspects of the country’s current
policy will be examined further in the next chapter, when Norway’s strategic
situation is analysed. Udgaard’s description of current Norwegian policy sums
up the core of the problem: Norway is “quietly and peacefully sliding back to
non-committal in-between positions. We are happy to share a little wealth with
others, but otherwise we are better off alone.”333
Figure I.3 shows the development lines from the beginning of Swedish neutrality
policy until today. As shown, the main change to modern Swedish foreign policy
did not take place until the 1990s. Although there is a certain continuity from the
older periods of neutrality to the current Europeanised foreign and security policy
of Sweden, there are fundamentally new directions which can not automatically
be derived from the Swedish neutrality tradition. The aspects of developing a
European policy, more engagement in the BSR and increasing international en-
333 Udgaard (2005) [author’s translation].
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1. Neutralism/ isolationism: 1905 - 1914 
  Publicly declared neutralism
  Britain as partner and protector
  Economic definition of foreign relations
1905 - 1949 1949 -  
3. Active internationalism: 1940 - 1949 
  Exile government's formulation of new 
Atlantic policy line
2. Moral approach: The inter-war period 
  Advocating international law (League of Nations)
  Intransigent security policy
  Prioritising internal needs
  Neglecting external requirements
1. Ambigous relations with Europe 
  Economy displaces security (1990s) 
  Germany rivals UK as principal partner 
(1970s - ) 
  Neutralist desire to keep out of EU (1990s -)
  Neglecting new European realities of 
security policy (late 1990s - ) 
  "Missionary impulses" as common 
denominator (1990s - ) 
2. "Missionary impulses" 
  Anti colonialism, development aid, UN 
peacekeeping (1945-1970) 
  Focus on the Middle East 
  Environmental engagement  
3. The Atlantic policy line 
  New Norwegian diplomatic tradition 
  Emphasis on security policy 
  External pressure leading to interest-
oriented foreign policy 
 Ignorance of the Continental powers
Figure I.2.: Development lines in Norwegian foreign policy.
gagement and cooperation on security policy have resulted in changing definitions
of neutrality/ non-alignment. However, certain aspects, like the emphasis on soft
security and federo-scepticism, are influenced by elements of the neutrality tra-
dition, although the main difference is the predominating Swedish pragmatism
as opposed to the, at least official, idealistic tendencies in the post-war period.
The latest example of pragmatism predominating idealism is the political tur-
moil that resulted in the resignment of defence minister Sten Tolgfors in March
2012 because Sweden has contributed to the building of an arms factory in Saudi
Arabia. According to former chief executive at the research institute of the Total
Defence, which was strongly involved in the weapons project, a military cooper-
ation agreement with Saudi Arabia was created whereas the real aim of Swedish
governments has been to help Saab3 and Ericsson4 selling the radar system Erieye
to Saudi Arabia. If the Saudis would buy Erieye, the Swedes would contribute
with a weapon research cooperation.334
Finally, a concluding comparison can be made between Norway’s and Sweden’s
policies on Europe. Norway has not been able to make any choice at all in regards
334Cited in Claussen (2012).
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1. Neutrality as ad-hoch strategy: 1814- ca. 1900
  FP aiming at balanced position between major 
European powers
  Little political engagement in foreign affairs
1814 - 1990 1990 -  
3. Idealistic and normative tendencies: 1945-1990
  Joining the UN
  Upgrading of national defence forces
  Independent national defence industry
  Complex network of bilateral relations with the 
US (1960s)
  Official focus on bridge-building role between 
East and West
  “Non-alignment in peace, aiming at neutrality in 
the event of war”
  Emphasis on UN and CSSE
  Unofficial cooperation with NATO in order to 
secure Western support
  Neutrality achieves doctrinal status (1970s)
  Great interest in the Third World, lack of 
European or Nordic policy
2. Neutrality as long term policy: ca. 1900-1945 
  Non-attendance in the two World Wars
  No adequate national armed forces
  Fear of Soviet dominance of the Baltic Sea
  “Friendly-minded neutrality” towards Germany 
during the 2. WW
1. European approach with economic starting 
point (1990 - 19997) 
   Application for EU membership (1991) 
  Member of the EU (1995) 
  Adaption to CFSP development: “neutrality” 
replaced by “military non-alignment” 
  Scepticism toward supranational security 
cooperation, emphasis on soft security 
  Support for continued US engagement in 
Europe 
  Participation in the PfP programme 
2. Post-Amsterdam development (1997 - ) 
  “Military non-alignment with the possibility 
of neutrality in the event of conflicts in our 
vicinity” 
  Increased international military cooperation 
  International armament industrial 
cooperation 
  EU as new “centre of gravity” of Sweden's 
security strategy  
  Swedish “no” to the EMU (2003)  
  Comparatively progressive European policy  
  Scepticism towards federalism and 
supranationalism  
  Proactive attitude towards the enlargement 
process of the EU  
  Participation in NATO operations in Kosovo 
and Afghanistan  
Figure I.3.: Development lines in Swedish foreign policy.
to the country’s affiliation with the EU. It does not dare to stay inside, and does
not dare to stay outside. The EEA seems like a well-functioning agreement in
many ways but contributes to undermine democracy. It would thus be better to
stay completely out of the EU and take the consequences, or to join the EU and
take the consequences. Not to choose is the worst possible solution because those
consequences are of a more substantial nature. Sweden has taken this choice, and
has become a well-integrated, successful EU-member. However, as the Swedish
euro debate shows, their motives of joining or not joining the monetary union are
dubious. Sweden is cautious in its approach to Europe and rather joins in when
the coast is clear. When the circumstances change, Sweden probably goes with
the tide. It is a simple calculation of economic and political interests. What is
the quality of European cooperation if every member state thinks similarly? How
is it possible for small countries to have a say in the EU? For both Norway and
Sweden it is important to see the whole picture, and not only what they want to
see, in order to make the right choices. That however also applies to the EU by
itself.

4. Strategic challenges and
opportunities
4.1. Norway
Norway’s strategic situation is dependent on the strategic relevance of Norwegian
sea and land areas. The country keeps a territory of great geostrategic impor-
tance dominated by naval military conditions. The sea areas are of particularly
great strategic importance, because they are of vital relevance to Norway’s econ-
omy and security situation, and thus related to national survival. These offshore
areas are also of great interest to foreign powers in regards to military strategy,
economy and energy supply. Moreover, most of the Norwegian economic zone,
and one third of the mainland’s coastline, is situated north of the Arctic Circle.
Norwegian offshore areas comprise areas with sovereign Norwegian rights: the
Norwegian continental shelf and hereunder the Norwegian EEZ around the Nor-
wegian mainland,335 the Fishery zone around the Jan Mayen Island336 and the
Fishery protection zone around the Svalbard archipelago.337 Norway has thus
established three zones of 200 nautical miles (see figure I.1). Further, abutting
sea areas in the Kattegat, the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea, the Greenland Sea
and the Barents Sea are also strategically decisive for Norway. Above all, the
Barents Sea is of great strategic relevance, as it is rich on resources and of great
geopolitical interest to Europe, the US and meanwhile also China. The Barents
Sea area amounts to more than three times the Norwegian shelf south of the 62nd
335The Norwegian EEZ is 878 575 km2.
336The fishery zone around Jan Mayen is 296 611 km2; Jan Mayen Island is 55 km long and
375 km2 large situated in the Arctic Ocean, 600 km north of Iceland, 500 km east of Greenland
and 1000 km west of the Norwegian mainland.
337The Fishery protection zone is 803 993 km2. This is a special case as regards Norwegian
rights and will be discussed later in this chapter.
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Figure I.1.: Norwegian offshore areas. (Source: Norway’s official site for informa-
tion about seafood safety, fisheries and aquaculture management)
degree of latitude.338
The strategic opportunities facing Norway’s foreign policy are thus related to
the country’s enormous natural resources, above all oil and gas, and the power
potential this entails. The strategic challenges of the foreign policy are the fac-
tors that challenge Norwegian interests, be it other states’ conflictive interests,
environmental threats, the security policy situation, unsettled matters in regards
to international law, Russia as a transcontinental great power neighbour or the
geopolitics of oil and gas in general. The common denominator for both Norway’s
opportunities and challenges is Europe’s High North.
About half of Europe’s oil and gas reserves are located on Norwegian territory.
From here, 20 per cent of Europe’s gas demand is covered. The Norwegian
pipeline network extends from the Norwegian basin in the North Sea to Eng-
land, Germany, Belgium and France,339 where Norwegian gas makes up between
338 Barlindhaug (2005a), p. 5.
339Norway is the largest operator of underwater pipelines worldwide.
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20 and 35 per cent of the total usage.340 At the pipeline level, only Norwegian
gas can compete with the Russian. Nevertheless, Europe is, and will continue
to be, dependent on deliveries from Russia, now supplying about 30 per cent of
Europe’s gas. It is easy to couple new pipelines to the large established pipeline
systems for natural gas from Norway and Russia to Europe, and political stability
is another asset of the area. Today, no offshore petroleum activity exists in the
Russian part of the Barents Sea. The gas field “Snøhvit” is found and has re-
cently been completed in the Norwegian part. In addition to the ´‘Goliat‘” field,
“Snøhvit” is the biggest Barents Sea oil and gas field next to the huge Russian
Shtokman field.341 However, this alone is not very impressive. The Stoltenberg
government has opened up the possibility of initiating oil activity outside Jan
Mayen in the Norwegian Sea and has signalled a green light to complete the “Go-
liat” field, which would be the first oil field in the Barents Sea to be developed.342
According to Øystein Michelsen, Statoil’s executive vice president of development
and production in Norway, says the Barents Sea region could produce about 400
000 to 500 000 barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2020, more than four times
what Statoil gets from “Snøhvit” today. Success in the Barents Sea also opens
further possibilities even farther north.343 The arguments that disfavour such an
active strategy are of an environmental nature.
A key factor is the security of supply, to Europe in particular. This is a great
strategic opportunity facing Norway. The EU will need more natural gas over
the next decades, which will have to come from currently unexploited production
areas.344 The current level of Norwegian gas exports can only be maintained until
2025, and the Barents Sea345 is the only realistic resource area which gives Norway
340 Helgesen (2012), p. 40.
341The gas of the “Snøhvit” field amounts to almost a quarter of the total discovered gas
resources in the Barents Sea of 770 billion MSm3 gas. Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
(2003), p. 54.
342Norwegian Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (2009) “Goliat - an important part of the
development in the High North”, Press release no. 60, 8 May.
343Cited in Reed (2012).
344The identified resource basis is higher in the Norwegian Sea than in the Barents Sea. The
Norwegian oil directorate estimates the total resources in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea
south of Bjørnøya (the southernmost part of Svalbard in the southern part of the Barents Sea,
approximately halfway between Spitzbergen and the North Cape.) to be about 1220 MSm3 oil
equivalents (o.e.). About 3
4
of the resources on the Norwegian side is expected to be gas, of
which again 3
4
is unidentified. Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2003), p. 54.
345The UGS reported that the total exploitable resources in the Russian part of the Barents
Sea amount to about 24,359 MSm3, whereof 97% is gas and about 86% of the total resources
is still undiscovered. Cited in Barlindhaug (2005a), p. 10.
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the possibility to continue its role as an important gas exporter to the EU beyond
2050.346 Norway’s competitive advantage is the security of the supply, as Russia
at times has proved to be an unpredictable supplier to its neighbours Belarus,
Georgia and the Ukraine, with negative effects also for EU states. The Nord
Stream pipeline through the Baltic Sea is capable of transporting 27,5 billion m3
natural gas per year directly to the West European market.347 This is about
half of the entire Norwegian gas export and might influence Norway in terms of
pricing pressure, and perhaps even lower market shares.
The Norwegian attitude of depoliticising energy exports has been a successful
strategy, but new developments show the outline of a Norwegian oil and gas strat-
egy in the north as an integrated part of Norwegian foreign policy.348 Although
the oil companies have chosen to see gas pipelines as commercial investments in
a new transport capacity, they have always been vital “geopolitical tools” for the
states concerned. Norway, Russia and the EU - with Germany and the UK as
the leading nations - are the geopolitical main actors, whereas Statoil (Norway)
and Gazprom (Russia) have the leading parts on the commercial side, in addi-
tion to French Total and the gas importers in Germany and the UK.349 The gas
companies in Germany and the UK are negotiating on future gas deliveries from
Norway and are interested in as low prices as possible.350 Both Germany and the
UK have traditionally related such contracts with the domestic security of supply.
Thus the influence of the governments is large. If the price is too high, gas will
be to expensive for the energy competition on the domestic markets. If the price
is too low, it will not be economically sustainable to extend the pipelines to the
Barents Sea.351 Without an exporting gaspipeline it will not be commercially
interesting to search for natural gas in the Barents Sea. Russia on the other hand
is the most important actor in the Arctic and wants to strengthen its geopolitical
position by developing the offshore infrastructure in the Barents Sea.352
346 Barlindhaug (2012), p. 59.
347http://www.nord-stream.com/de/ueber-uns/
348 Barlindhaug (2012), p. 59.
349 Barlindhaug (2012), pp. 60-61.
350See chapter 2 of this part.
351An analysis shows that there will be a need for a $4.4 billion pipeline to connect the Barens
Sea deposits with the existing facilities in the Norwegian Sea by 2020. Cited in Reed (2012).
352 Barlindhaug (2012), pp. 61-62.
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“Given the prevailing situation it is obvious that Norway’s future oil
and gas strategy in the Barents Sea is closely related to Germany’s and
England’s long-term energy policy. Norway has to appear as a long-dated
and trustworthy supplier of gas to Europe the next 40 to 50 years, and
Germany and England will have to be willing to pay for this security of
supply.”. Barlindhaug (2012), p. 62.
Thus, Norway’s strategic possibilities in being a future main actor in the Arctic
geopolitical development is thus decisively dependent on Norway’s relations with
the EU. It is thus a paradox that Norway has refused to make a choice in regards to
its political affiliation with Europe, as shown in chapter 3.4 of this part. Energy is
the single most important motive for the increased interest for the Arctic. Energy
is also Norway’s most important footprint in the EU, and Norway also supports
the EU’s application for a status as a permanent observer in the Arctic Council
(AC).353
The unresolved delineation question of the Barents Sea between the economic
zones of Norway and Russia was Norway’s most delicate strategic challenge but
was finally solved after 40 years of negotiations in April 2010, during the presi-
dency of then-president Medvedev.354 The treaty definesa single maritime bound-
ary that divides the states’ continental shelves and EEZs in the Barents Sea and
the Arctic Ocean. It furthermore obliges the states to continue their cooperationin
the sphere of fisheries and contains provisions on the coordinated exploitation
of transboundary hydrocarbon resources. “It is almost unbelievable” as stated
by Norwegian commentator Dragnes.355 The Russian leadership is not famous
of compromising but in this case they must have assessed the time to be ripe.
Medvedev noted that this will have consequences also for European security.356
In the 1970s, Norway and the Soviet Union could not agree on the principles of
delineation, which resulted in the establishment of a temporary “grey zone” in
1978 to protect the fishery in the area.357 According to maritime law, treaties
on the delineation of economic zones in the ocean are to build on the sources of
international law in order to establish an equitable solution. Also, according to
353 Knutsen (2012), p. 7. The Arctic Council was established in 1996 by Russia, the US,
Canada, and the five Nordic countries.
354Negotiations started in 1974.
355Cited in Dragnes (2010).
356Cited in Dragnes (2010).
357The grey zone was approximately double the size of the German federal state Northrhine-
Westphalia.
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continental shelf law, the main way of accomplishing this is a treaty.358 How-
ever, in the absence of a treaty the mid-line counts, unless another delineation
can be justified due to particular circumstances. Norway’s position in the delin-
eation question favoured the mid-line, which implied that the border is drawn
directly between the two states’ territory, whereas Russia claimed an exception
and wanted a sector-line solution, which implied that the sea border is drawn in
a straight line from the border point on shore to the North Pole. The final result
was a compromise between the mid-line and a sector-line.
The formerly disputed area is probably where the largest occurrences of hydro-
carbons in the Barents Sea are, a fact that complicated the negotiations.359 Ac-
cording to estimations made by Statoil, the formerly disputed area could contain
about 12 billion barrels of oil and gas.360 The Russians made seismological and
other geophysical explorations in the formerly disputed area until 1992 and found
very surprising structures. In fact, 40-50 million years ago, the ocean bed of the
Barents Sea started to ascend, and so the seepages began. This uplift hit the
Norwegian part the hardest and the part that today belongs to Russia to a lesser
extent. The borderline between the uplifted area and the not-uplifted is probably
somewhere in the formerly disputed area. This is where the most accessible re-
sources in the northernmost part of Northern Norway, that could secure activity
in the north, are situated.361
The delineation agreement between Norway and Russia officially came into effect
on 7 July 2011 and includes maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents
Sea and the polar sea which implies that the formerly disputed area of 175 000
km2 is parted in two approximately equal parts. The solution solved the most
important bilateral question between Norway and Russia and is a good basis
for the further development of Norwegian-Russian cooperation. The agreement
should furthermore be related to the superior changes in regards to security policy,
economy, international law and climate changes which apply to the Arctic.362
Climate change and ice melting have led to speculations of a security political
358The legislation on economic zones does not incorporate the shelf.
359 Aale (2005a).
360Cited in Dragnes (2005).
361 Ask (2005).
362 Knutsen (2012), p. 5.
I.4.1. Norway - 101 -
and economic race toward the High North. Hence, it would be of advantage both
to Norway and Russia if the rules wold be clear before this eventually happens.
The solution to the delineation question in the Barents Sea was necessary in order
to further develop the regional cooperation between Russia and Norway. Accord-
ing to Norwegian FM Gahr Støre, the Norwegian-Russian cooperation “has prob-
ably never been better and more comprehensive” and includes prople-to-preople
cooperation, culture, energy, economy, research and education.363 The evolving
Norwegian-Russian energy cooperation in the north is of particular interest be-
cause it involves a Russian engagement by president Putin. The cooperation
between Gazprom, Statoil and Total in developing the Shtokman field has been
difficult because it was originally thought as a LNG project, but US shale gas
discoveries reduce the cost effectiveness of such a project. Statoil, which is 67
percent-owned by the Norwegian government, has been criticised off the record
by Gazprom for “not beeing able to agree on anything without being able to
explain why.” Investment decisions have been postponed several times because
of high costs. This even led to a meeting between Statoil boss Helge Lund and
Vladimir Putin in May 2012.364 Lund met Putin also on another occasion in May
2012 when Norway and Russia made a historical deal on a mutual access to both
countries oil areas in the Barents Sea. Without the delineation agreement, this
would not have been possible. However, Norway’s cooperation with Russia will
always be an uncertain undertaking as long as corruption is such a great part
of Russian economic life. President Putin himself is the cooperation agreement’s
political guarantor, but nobody knows at this point of time if his presidency will
last for six or twelve years.
Norway’s biggest strategic challenge is the jurisdiction of the sea areas around
Svalbard. The Svalbard Treaty of 1920 gave Norway sovereignty over the
archipelago, although with certain restrictions: All of the signature states got
the same right to exploit Svalbard’s natural resources. The enormous sea areas
outside Svalbard were not part of the negotiations. In 1965, Norway gained major
parts of the ocean bed in the North Sea, and in the 1970s the UN maritime law
conference lay the legal basis for 200 nautical miles (370 km) economic zones. The
363 Gahr Støre (2012), p. 16.
364Cited in Dyrnes (2012). Author’s translation.
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question was how this new international law should be applied on Svalbard and
thus how the right to regulate fishery outside Svalbard’s territorial water should
be applied. As no agreement was achieved, the solution applied was that Norway
introduced the so called “Fishery protection zone” in 1977.365 Norway adminis-
ters the zone, allocates fishery quotas to other countries and intervenes when the
quota limit is exceeded.366 The disagreement today over the Fishery protection
zone around Svalbard is both real and potential, and the issue is more difficult
than the delineation question was, as there are more than two parties involved.
Most countries comply with the Norwegian view without accepting it officially,
whereas Russia does not think Norway has any legal basis to capture Russian
ships in the Fishery protection zone.367 Episodes including Russian trawlers oc-
curred in 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2011. All four incidents demanded diplomatic
skill to resolve and damaged Norwegian-Russian fishery relations for a while, or
resulted in a Russian ban on imports of Norwegian salmon. The incident of Oc-
tober 2005 when the Russian fishing trawler ‘Elektron’ fled from the Norwegian
Coast Guard with two Norwegian inspectors as hostages, is a significant exam-
ple. As the oil production moves north, the conflict may become even more acute.
The question is thus what Norway does the day a Russian, or a European ship
for that matter, starts drilling on the sea bed around Svalbard. In 2007 the US
asked the Norwegian state department to answer several questions in regards to
the basic conditions of foreign oil companies on the continental shelf surrounding
Svalbard.368The US has rather sat back in the international dispute over sovereign
rights outside Svalbard and has not yet given its opinion on whether to support
Norway’s demand of full sovereignty over the natural resources or to invoke the
conditions set by the Svalbard Treaty. This inarticulate position which is neither
in favour nor against the Norwegian view is still valid. “We can live with that”,
states Norway’s FM Støre.369 The question is however what happens if Norway
should open up the area to oil drilling, or if the conflict level in the fishery pro-
365See figure I.1.
366The Fishery protection zone is a special regulation without any international parallel. Prac-
tically, Norway has largely regulated and controlled the fishery here after the same principles
as in the Norwegian economic zone.
367The Norwegian coast guard examines the fishing boats but does not apply measures beyond
a written warning in the case of violations.
368Both the questions and the answers appear in documents from the US embassy in Oslo
which were leaked to Wikileaks and Aftenposten. See Pedersen (2011).
369Stated in Pedersen (2011). Author’s translation.
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tection zone should rise again. The US would possibly have to change its policy
and comment on the Svalbard question, and the conclusion does not necessarily
have to be in Norway’s favour.
What is probably harder to live with for the Norwegian FM is an EU report on
Svalbard from 2011 elaborated by then-vice president of the EP, Diana Wallis,
which presents concrete suggestions on how to challenge Norway’s sovereignty on
Svalbard. The report is however not official EU policy on the matter. The report
e.g. suggests that Norway’s sovereignty should be renegotiated in regards to the
surroung sea areas. Moreover, collective control measures should be established
which secure the interests of all EU member states, and existing mechanisms of
maritime zones as well as the right to search for and use resources consistently
with the Law of the Sea should be developed and strengthened. It is also stated
that the EU should play an important role in the Svalbard question in order to
assure that the treaty is being followed up.370 The EU’s ambassador to Norway
however quickly denied that there is any EU pressure on Norway in the Svalbard
question and referred to the official EU position confirmed by top EU officials
“who repeated that the EU has no plans to raise questions about various legal
interpretations regardting the maritime areas in the region.”371 Even though this
was simply a report, there is reason to be alarmed for Norwegian governments,
and there seems to be a certain pressure from the UK in particular. At an earlier
point of time the EU has been very clear in its criticism of the Fishery protection
zone which is only tolerated, not approved of. Allegations of illegal fishing only
show the peak of disagreement between Norway and the EU, Russia, Iceland, the
Faroe Islands and other active nations of the protection zone. Thus the potential
for a downfall of Norway’s ambitions is considerable. Norway is in the middle of
a triangle of interests consisting of Russia, the EU and the US.
The Norwegian shelf’s external border on the international ocean bed has been
part of a process in the UN on continental shelf delineations.372 The Norwegian
view claimed that the Norwegian continental shelf is continuing past Svalbard,
370Cited in Aale (2011).
371Cited in Berglund, Nina (2011) “Svalbard sovereignty not under threat” 28 October at
http://www.newsinenglish.no (accessed 29 October 2009).
372Russia, Canada and Denmark (Greenland) already have or are about to finalise demands
on enlarged northern borders of their continental shelves.
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both to the west and to the east and as far as 85◦north, which implies that the
archipelago does not have a shelf of its own but rests on the Norwegian shelf.
This view indicated that the Svalbard treaty’s decisions about equal rights to
exploitation of natural resources are not valid as the continental shelf around
Svalbard is concerned but only applies to the archipelago and the surrounding
territorial water. Accordingly, all of the shallow waters from mainland Norway to
beyond Svalbard would be the cohesive Norwegian shelf. Norway thus has a shelf
area six times larger than its land area. The Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS) finally entitled Norway to its claims, and the Norwegian
continental shelf was enlarged.373 Thus Russia also accepted Norway’s claims on
the continental shelf. This fact, in addition to the delineation agreement of 2010,
lead to the assessment of Holten Jørgensen who states that Russia has never been
closer to an actual recognition of Norway’s sovereignty in the Fishery protection
zone.374 Norway’s FM Gahr Støre comments on the decision of the CLCS:
“This establishes a clear division of responsibility and creates predictable
conditions for activities in the High North. It confirms that Norway has
substantial rights and responsibilities in maritime areas of some 235 000
square kilometres. The recommendation is therefore of historic significance
for Norway”.375
Jensen, a Norwegian researcher on the Law of the Sea, comments on the CLCS
decision that it is not up to a commission in New York to decide whether Svalbard
has a continental shelf of its own or not:
“The Svalbard question is thus not solved. The discussion on Svalbard
has never been a question of geological conditions on the seabed. (...) When
other states claim that Svalbard has a shelf ’of its own’, they have not meant
’own’ in the way that there is a physical break in the shelf between mainland
Norway and Svalbard. They have meant that Norwegian governance around
the island group should be subject to the limitations following the Svalbard
Treaty of 1920 (...). This has little to do with the determination of the limits
of the continental shelf.”
The Arctic is the second area in the world beside the waters around Svalbard with
373The new continental shelf reaches from the Ekofisk field in the south to a point almost
half the way between Svalbard and the North Pole. Norway’s shelf is thus one of the world’s
largest.
374 Holten Jørgensen (2011).
375Cited in Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009) “Extent of Norway’s continental
shelf in the High North clarified”, Press release no. 025, 15 April.
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uncertain legal conditions. From Svalbard the discussion can thus be stretched
to the Arctic as a whole, and EU interests in the region. The white paper “The
High North: visions and strategies” (2011)376 published by the Norwegian Foreign
Ministry states that “The High North is Norway’s number one foreign policy
priority”. It furthermore outlines seven development lines which will shape the
Norwegian efforts and priorities in the “northern areas” policy.377 Diana Wallis
again presents an EU perspective on a matter concerning the High North and
states that Norway has to find a way of dealing with both a growing awareness
and commitment to the region, demonstrated by the queue of those wishing to
join the AC as permanent observers.378 Wallis and Stewart criticize the white
paper’s ignorance of the EU’s importance to the High North:
“Suddenly, like it or not, what is happening in the Arctic and how it is
dealt with becomes everyone’s business. This is an issue which Norway and
other Arctic states have to accommodate - a growing number of players
have a legitimate interest in what happens in the Arctic and therefore in
the ’governance’ regime there. It is unlikely, and probably not appropriate,
that mere Permanent Observer status will be sufficient to satisfy this de-
mand and there may have to be a whole scale overhaul of Arctic Council
structures. (...) Norway is to be congratulated on its management of fish
stocks (...). It should also be born in mind that the EU as a whole is the
biggest market for Norwegian fish (...). The point is that the customer in
terms of the EU has a huge potential to say how fish are caught and the
industry managed, so the Arctic fisheries are unable to escape neither EU
involvement or regulation. The same is true of energy (...), as with fish,
the EU and its Member States are the key market. This means that they
have the potential to have a say about where and how, and indeed one
might even add if, energy supplies should be exploited from Arctic. (...)
The sense of the need for a more protective regime for the Arctic was ar-
ticulated already as the European Commission looks at the EU wide safety
rules for offshore oil drilling.”379
The global interest in the Arctic is thus a huge strategic challenge to Norway. Wal-
lis and Stewart also criticised the Ilulissat Declaration made by the five littoral
Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the US), which claimed
their special responsibility for the Arctic.380 In many ways Russia has more
interests in common with Norway than what the latter has with the EU. The
376http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Nordområdene/UD_nordomrodene_innmat_EN_web.pdf
377See also Gahr Støre (2012), pp. 12-18.
378 Wallis/Arnold (2012), p. 20.
379 Wallis/Arnold (2012), pp. 23-24.
380See http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat _Declaration.pdf. See also chap-
ter 2.1.1 of part III.
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common interests of the five littoral Arctic states are moreover affiliated with
the Law of the Sea. Norway however needs to take European annoyance very
seriously, especially because of the EEA agreement. European interests in the
Arctic are obvious, and official Norwegian politics has the tendency of ignoring
them. This again shows the seriousness of Norway’s refusal to make a choice on
its political affiliation with the EU. Norway is dependent on the Union regardless
of its influence in the AC, but it has no political influence in Europe. Norwe-
gian politicians should thus reconsider whether they are comfortable with this
situation.
The EU aims at an observer status in the AC but fails to achieve this due to
Canadian objections because of the EU ban on trade with products of arctic
sealing. Norway on the other hand prevents China from becoming a permanent
observer status due to the impaired Chinese-Norwegian relations resulting from
Chinese reactions to the Norwegian Nobel Committee’s decision to award Liu
Xiaobo in 2010. China shows an increasing interest in the Arctic and has already
had several expeditions with the icebreaker Xuelong and pursues examiniations
also in regards to an oil and natural gas business and the extraction of miner-
als. Norway’s FM Gahr Støre openly states that China has to pursue an open
and transparent political dialogue with all member states in the AC, Norway in-
cluded, in order to become a permanent observer.381 International law has made
it possible for Norway to shape the political cooperation in the north with other
vital actors, i.e. the Arctic littoral states.
4.1.1. Economic and security interests
Norway has a “global interest portfolio.” In addition to its very important role as
an energy producer and supplier, the country is also the world’s second largest
fish exporter after Thailand, and one of the world’s ten largest fishery nations.
Norway’s importance as a global food provider has increased, and the significance
of its merchant fleet, which today is the world’s third largest, has grown. Norway
has also gained market shares vis-à-vis the world’s cargo markets, being an impor-
tant cargo shipper of raw materials. The country is also a significant public and
381Stated in Dragnes (2012a).
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private capital investor. The role as an energy producer leads Norway to become
a “banking nation”, which implies that investment management is an important
branch of the economy, and carries a diplomatic potential as well. Both the energy
production and the merchant fleet are dependent on the world’s energy markets
and the political development in important production areas. Any changes in the
relations between energy producers and energy consumers, and of the producers’
and consumers’ inner relations, will immediately have consequences for Norway.
In line with the strategic challenges and opportunities analysed above, Børresen’s
disposition of Norway’s interests is suitable to arrange the Norwegian economic
and security interests, however with some modifications. Accordingly, Norway’s
“interest portfolio” can be graded into three different groups: “vital interests”,
“very important interests” and “important interests”.382 The vital Norwegian
interests are
to protect Norway against political and military pressure and aggression,
to sustain the Norwegian ocean domain and
to avoid a breakdown of the world’s central trade and finance systems or
commodity markets.383
As to the first point, Norway has a lot to defend but it is not particularly clear
against who it has to defend itself. As Russia is concerned, the official Norwegian
position is that Russia does not represent any threat at all. The absence of a
threat from the east has been the basis for the reorganisation of the Norwegian
armed forces. However, in regards to the development in Russia in relation to the
northern areas, the minister of defence stated in the beginning of 2007 that “the
development might take another direction than what we wish for and expect.”384
The official position is furthermore being increasingly challenged. In an analysis
made by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (2006) of the threat
scenarios facing Norway, Russia is again identified as a military threat to Norway
- not through an invasion, but from a limited, military action.385 The report was
an important basis for the premises of the defence forces in the period 2009-2012.
382 Børresen (2005a), p. 11.
383 Børresen (2005a), p. 11.
384Strøm-Erichsen, Anne Grete (2007)Verdier å verne. Speech at Oslo Military Society on 8
January, http://www.regjeringen.no (accessed 15 January 2007), author’s translation.
385 Johansen (2006).
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Regardless of if or to what extent Russia might put political or military pressure
on Norway, it is vital to contribute to a continued low tension between the great
powers in the region’s sensitive sea areas. Norway can not protect itself against
pressure and aggression alone and therefore needs political and military allies and
a multilateral frame for its security policy. The question is if a NATO membership
is sufficient or if an additional EU membership would strengthen the country’s
situation.
To an even larger extent than the first point, the second point has to be dealt
with by national governments, because it is of minor interest to Norway’s al-
lies to sustain the Norwegian ocean domain. In order to do so, it is vital to
preserve sovereign rights at sea by controlling the activity both politically and
economically. In fact, the current Norwegian strategy in the north seems to be
“activity strengthens sovereignty”. The government declaration of 2005 defined
the northern areas as “Norway’s main strategic interest” and indicated a strength-
ened presence of the defence forces and the exertion of sovereignty there.386 The
military component has until now been rare in Norwegian security policy. The
Stoltenberg government, a centre-left coalition, signalled a strategy with emphasis
on the use of power and influence in the northern areas in order to secure Norway
complete control and most of the sovereignty over Svalbard and the huge zones
around the archipelago. The logic of the strategy is that the strong geopolitical
interests in Europe’s high north necessitate a high Norwegian activity level. This
serves the interests of the states with the strongest interests in the Barents Sea
in order to assert the Norwegian sovereignty of its northern areas. As Svalbard
is concerned, too low activity from the Norwegian side could be an incentive for
some nations to challenge Norway’s position.387
Moreover, Norway is responsible for the maintenance of living resources in Eu-
rope’s largest economic zone of about six times mainland-Norway and possesses
over 30% of Europe’s continental shelf. The basis for this resource wealth is,
as shown above, international law. Norway’s fortunate situation thus also im-
plies that Norway has commitments to secure other nations’ interests in the High
North. The environmental aspect is of course a vital part of sustaining the Norwe-
386 Norwegian Government (2005), pp. 6-7.
387 Barlindhaug (2005a), p. 11.
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gian ocean domain and furthermore the reason why the petroleum development
in the Barents Sea is a very disputed subject in Norwegian politics, the cur-
rent government inclusive, and in the Norwegian population generally. Minimum
standards and rules have still not been established for the economic activity in
the north. What the oil companies want to exploit are sensitive areas that are
not yet opened to petroleum activities. The delineation agreement has however
led to new drilling activities in the Barents Sea. If Norway’s maintenance role
in the high north is going to be operable, it needs the acceptance from Russia,
the US and the most important EU states. This may be difficult to achieve if
Norway claims ‘petroleum free zones.’ Thus it is in Norway’s interest to combine
the petroleum activity with a sustainable environmental development. Whether
this is possible, is still a disputed question. However, there is reason to believe
that the more Norway controls the development itself, the more environmental
considerations will be taken into account.
As the latter point of Norway’s vital interests is concerned, to avoid a breakdown
of the trade and finance systems, this is solely a strategic challenge on a global
level. However, it is a national matter how the Government Pension Fund388
is managed. Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, the world’s third largest, lost 633
billion kroner ($90,5 billion) in 2008, wiping out the accumulated gains of the
fund since started investing the country’s oil revenue 12 years ago. The Pension
Fund - Global’s investments fell 23 percent in 2008 as measured by a basket of
foreign currencies. The fund, worth 2,28 trillion Norwegian kroner, lost 41 per
cent on stocks and 0,5 percent on bonds.389
Further, “very important Norwegian interests” are the following:
1. To maintain and develop a strong UN, which implies
• to work for continued respect for the international law of war as it is
put down in the UN charta and the Geneva Convention,
• to work for a further development and strengthening of maritime in-
ternational law as it is codified in the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and
388Norway, the world’s fifth largest oil exporter and the third largest gas exporter, set up the
fund to manage its petroleum riches after discovering oil in the North Sea in 1969.
389Laroi, Vibeke/ Stigset, Marianne (2009), Bloomberg 11 March.
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• to secure a sustainable development of the living resources in Norway’s
ocean domain.
2. To sustain and develop the alliance with the US through NATO and with
it
• to fight international terrorism,
• to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
• to fight international crime and
• to maintain and develop good bilateral relations with Russia.
3. To maintain and develop good bilateral relations with the North Sea coun-
tries Germany, France, Great Britain and the Netherlands, the so called
North Sea alliance.
4. To maintain and develop good bilateral relations with the Nordic countries.
5. To maintain and develop good [and deeper] relations with the EU [and with
it to maintain and develop good bilateral relations with Russia390].391
Respect for international law is essential to a small state in order to be able to
protect its interests. Furthermore, the alliance with the US and the member-
ship in NATO is above all important in order to handle problems on the global
level of security policy. NATO and the US influence Norway’s bilateral relations
with Russia as they give a protective potential to Norway’s security situation,
but its value further depends on NATO’s ability to embrace Russia. The thesis
here, however, is that some European states, and above all the EU, are more
important in order to develop good relations with Russia than Norway’s mem-
bership in NATO. “To maintain and develop good bilateral relations with Russia”
is thus added to the fifth point of the very important Norwegian interests. The
disposition indicates that this is only possible in a multilateral framework and
with the support of close allies. This view is also represented in the following. A
sixth point can thus be added to Børresen’s disposition: To maintain and develop
good relations with Russia in a multilateral framework. As argued in chapter 1
of this part, Russia should be given enhanced influence in the Western security
cooperation.
Finally, Norway’s “important interests” in Børresen’s disposition are to forward
390Added by the author.
391 Børresen (2005a) [author’s translation].
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Norwegian export and economic interests, and hereunder
• an inflation trend in line with Norway’s trade partners and market access
for Norwegian export products,
• to have an arrangement which regulates the total national offer of gas,
• to develop a channel to the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC),
• stability in the Middle East and Caucasus so that extreme fluctuations of
the oil price is avoided and Norwegian investments are made possible.392
One important question here is to what extent the EEA agreement is good enough
for Norway’s economic interests in
In table I.1 Børresen’s disposition is advanced. It arranges Norway’s vital, very
important and important interests according to the level(s) where the interests
are found and the organisation(s) decisive for the respective Norwegian interests
at the different levels, independent of Norway’s status in these organisations.
The table further refers to either Russia, the EU and/ or the US if one or more
of these affect a Norwegian interest, or represent/ could represent a threat to
them. Thus Russia as a factor for Norwegian vital and very important interests,
at the national and regional levels in particular, and the importance of the EU
to Norwegian interests at all three levels, are the most interesting conclusions
of the table. The EU is at least equally important to Norwegian interests as
what NATO is, which is a point that needs to be emphasised as Norway is not a
member of the organisation.
As the table shows, Russia is the most important factor affecting Norwegian in-
terests. Norway and Russia also have common interests in several areas. The
fisheries in the Barents Sea are of great economic importance to both countries.
The Northern European sea areas are also important to the world’s marine biolog-
ical resources. Both countries have an interest in a distinct administrative regime
in order to secure a sustainable development. In addition to fishery, environmen-
tal threats and petroleum activities are decisive for wealth and development in
both Norway and Russia. The proximity to an essential Russian military area on
the Kola peninsula makes it important to avoid a conflict of interests. Further,
392 Børresen (2005a), p. 11 [author’s translation].
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❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Organ.
Level
National Regional Global
USA
NATO
To sustain the
Norwegian ocean
domain (R)
To sustain and develop
the alliance with the US
and NATO and with it
-to fight international
terrorism
-prevent proliferation of
WMD
-fight international crime
To protect Norway
against political and
military pressure and
aggression (R)
To sustain and develop the alliance with the US
and NATO and with it to maintain and develop
good bilateral relations with Russia (R)
European
Union
To sustain the
Norwegian ocean
domain (US, R)
To maintain and
develop good bilateral
relations with Russia
To maintain and develop good bilateral relations
-with the North Sea countries G, F, GB, NL
-with the Nordic countries
-with the European Union (R, US)
To forward Norwegian export and economic
interests, and hereunder
-market access for Norwegian export products
-to have an arrangement
which regulates the total
national offer of gas
-a cost trend line with
Norway’s trade partners
-stability in the Middle
East and Caucasus to
avoid extreme
fluctuations of the oil
price
UN
To sustain the Norwegian ocean domain (R, US, EU)
To maintain and develop a strong UN, hereunder
-respect for international law of war (R, US)
-strengthening of the UNCLOS (R, US, EU)
-sustainable development of the living resources in
Norway’s ocean domain (R, EU)
Neither
To forward Norwegian
export and economic
interests by developing
a channel to OPEC
To avoid a breakdown of
the world’s central trade
and finance systems or
commodity markets
Table I.1.: Norway’s interest portfolio arranged due to international level, organi-
sations of importance and reference to Russia (R), the EU (EU) and/or
the USA (US). The interests are specified by the font as follows: vital,
very important, important.
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the growing petroleum export from Northwest Russia has led to a significant in-
crease in sea transport along the North Norwegian coast, which is worrying from
an environmental point of view.393
How then should Norway act towards its transcontinental great power neighbour?
The view represented here is compatible with that of the critics of the Norwe-
gian defence reforms. Where interests are diverging, Norway should signal clearly
what the vital Norwegian interests are in order to prevent uncertainties or mis-
leading analyses on the Russian side. A military vacuum in northern Norway
is inconvenient as a crisis would imply force deployments that could lead to an
unwanted accentuation of the situation. The strategic importance of the north
indicates that a permanent military presence here is necessary to secure quick
and adequate Norwegian reactions. This would not be ‘gunboat diplomacy’, as a
state of this size cannot have any militarily deterrent effect, but rather a signal
to the environment that Norway has strategic interests in these areas.
Finally, and first and foremost, it is important to aspire to the relationship with
Russia being as good and trustworthy as possible based on cooperation in areas
where the two countries have common interests. Another common interest, in
addition to the regional aspects mentioned above, is e.g to keep the energy prices
stable and high. “In fact, Norway and Russia are heading for a new alliance in
the north driven by the geography, the geology and the world’s increasing energy
demand”.394 Russia’s importance to the development of the northern sea areas
is obvious and Norway thus seeks a status as Russia’s privileged partner in the
north.
Despite rapidly surging Russian defence budgets, an increasing economic self con-
fident and militarily modernising Russia, and a fierce Russian way of expressing,
at least prior to the financial crisis, this development does not represent any direct
threat to Norway. The current Norwegian-Russian relationship can in a historic
perspective indeed be characterised as good.395 The political cooperation is broad
393 Berggrav (2004), p. 11.
394 Udgaard (2006).
395In April 2005, the Russian FM Sergej Lavrov stated that Russia’s relations with Norway
are better than with any other neighbouring country. (Cited in Aale (2005b). In November
2006, minister of defence Sergej Ivanov suggested that Norway and Russia should soon abolish
the border patrols along the common land border.(Cited in Russland.RU Internettavisen
(2006).
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and profound, and Norwegian government ministers have been visiting Russia al-
most on a weekly basis. A similar increase in contact also implemented on the
state secretary and state bureaucracy level.396 Further, the economic cooperation
is increasing. Whereas a correspondent economic normalisation has taken place
between Russia and the other Nordic countries as well, the political relations be-
tween them and Russia are rather frigid. Several times, irritations have occurred
between Moscow and Copenhagen, Helsinki and Stockholm.397 This indicates
that Norway’s interests are more connected to and dependent on Russia com-
pared to the other Nordic states. The common border in a strategic important
area is also a reason for regular talks. However the past also shows that Norway
has wished to inform “key figures” in the EU’s “key countries” about difficulties
with the Russians in the north.
The Norwegian-Russian relations on a regional level are to a very large extent con-
cerned with fishery, which is of greater direct importance to both Norwegians and
Russians in the Barents Region than oil and gas interests. The Norwegian-Arctic
codfish is particularly important to the Norwegian-Russian fishery relations; it is
the most important fish stock in the Barents Sea and one of three stocks in the
Barents Sea that is defined as common Norwegian/ Russian. Its area of dispersion
covers most of the Barents Sea, including the areas with disputed jurisdiction.398
As Norway and the Soviet Union failed to agree on the border between their
economic zones in the 1970s, important fishing areas were located in the disputed
area of about 155 000 km2. In 1978, Norway and the Soviet Union agreed on
a temporary agreement for the regulation of fishing in the most important area
within the so called “Grey zone” to secure the control of fishing.399 This defined
an area in which Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia have agreed on specific
temporary procedures for the regulation and control of fishing. The Grey zone
agreement was brought to an end with the coming into effect of the delineation
treaty. Moreover, the area north of the Norwegian economic zone’s border near
Svalbard is excellent for fishing and especially important as a spawning area for
the Norwegian-Arctic codfish. The regulation of fishery in the Norwegian and
396Cited in Aale (2005b).
397See Aale (2005b).
398 Hønneland (2005), p. 73.
399See figure I.1.
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Russian economic zones would thus have had very limited effect if there would
have been free access to fishing in the Svalbard sea areas.400 As shown above, the
issue of regulating the fishing activity outside Svalbard’s territorial waters is still
unresolved, but in practice regulated by the fishery protection zone. However,
unless something else is decided, the quotas for the Barents Sea are determined
for the whole area of a fish stock’s dispersion and not for the single zones. As the
“Loophole”401 is situated far away, and the fishing there is unstable, the area has
had only minor importance as a fishing area.
The fishing pressure in high seas grew considerably after the establishment of the
EEZ of 200 nautical miles in 1975. Thus a new agreement in the UN on fishing in
the high seas was determined in August 1995. The agreement states that coastal
states and states with trawlers fishing in high seas are obliged to cooperate on
maintenance of the respective fish stocks in regional administrative organisations.
This is the general basis for the Norwegian-Russian administrative cooperation
of fishery in their common fishing areas.
“Whereas the Barents cooperation and Norway’s environmental engage-
ment in Northwest Russia emerged in the wake of the late 1980s’ political
changes in the Soviet Union, the Norwegian-Russian fishery maintenance-
regime in the Barents Sea is a rare example of a formalised East-West
cooperation that begun during the Cold War. It is even more sensational
that this cooperation took place in a high tension area of security policy,
and that it happened relatively smoothly and with a relative high degree of
aims achievement. The détente from the end of the 1980s enabled a signifi-
cant extension of the established management cooperation between the two
states, and the Norwegian and Russian fishery sector were also attached in
a totally different way than before.”402
This is the very positive background of the Norwegian-Russian cooperation on
fishery management. The common Norwegian-Russian fishery regime shows a
successful cooperation in this area for many years and thus exemplifies the im-
400 Hønneland (2005), p. 76.
401A large area north of the ‘Grey zone’ is still international water. This “Loophole” attracted
much attention in the early 1990s as there was a long lasting conflict between Iceland on the
one hand and Norway and Russia on the other. Iceland claimed historical rights in the Barents
Sea whereas the two latter countries showed a common attitude against the “intruder”. An
agreement was signed between the three states in 1999. Iceland got a general quota in the
Barents Sea but abstained from fishing codfish in the Svalbard Fishery protection zone. In
return, Norway and Russia obtained fishing rights in the Icelandic zone. Hønneland (2005), p.
78.
402 Hønneland (2005), p. 73 [author’s translation].
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portance of common interests for the development of good bilateral relations.
However, fishery disputes caused on the lower levels soon form national policy
and thus show the explosiveness that fishery entails for the Norwegian-Russian
relations in general. Norway’s good bilateral relations with Russia on the top
level can thus not belie the problems attached to the neighbourhood with Russia,
clearly exemplified by the fishery disputes. An incident in the Fishery protection
zone easily led to export embargoes of Norwegian salmon, which was the case in
both 2005 and 2011. Russia is one of Norway’s largest export markets for fish.
4.1.2. Factors of strategic importance and threat
perceptions
The most important strategic factor of a permanent character is the geography.
Norway’s security and its strategic position, i.e. Norway’s value for the surround-
ing great powers, are dominated by maritime conditions as a consequence of being
a coastal state and a maritime nation. Norway is dependent on close relations
with the central naval powers along the Norwegian coastline. These are for the
time being the US and Russia. Traditionally, Norway’s strategic position has
been connected to the country’s location near strategically important sea routes.
In the 17., 18. and 19. century, the Baltic Sea was the decisive route for the great
powers in the north. In the 20. century, the transit from the North Sea to the
Atlantic was decisive. Germany’s attempts to get access to the open sea and the
British attempts to stop them led to the German occupation of Norway in 1940.
During the Second World War, the sea route over the Norwegian Sea,403 around
the North Cape to the Barents Sea and Russia became strategically important.404
During the Cold War, the importance of the northern sea route increased. The
Soviet Union planned and prepared to get over the Norwegian Sea to interrupt
NATO’s supply lines over the Atlantic, whereas the US and NATO planned and
prepared to stop them from doing so. In order to threaten the Western supply
lines, the Soviet navy had to pass the bottle neck outside the Norwegian coast.
403The Norwegian Sea is part of the Atlantic Ocean and situated between the North Sea, the
Greenland Sea and the Barents Sea.
404Norway’s geographic location was central both as regards the allies’ attempts to militarily
support the Soviet Union over the Kola White Sea harbors, and Germany’s attempts to stop
them.
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Thus Norwegian territory was important in order to control this area. From a So-
viet point of view, Norwegian territory was also an important preliminary terrain
for the defence of the large Kola military complex. The Nordic countries thus
constituted a flank to this front. Their territories could have become important
as an axis to reach the central European front.405
After the Cold War, the necessity of controlling the northern sea route disap-
peared due to the disappearance of the Soviet threat, and Norwegian territory lost
its strategic importance. With the central front the flank dimension disappeared
as well. This enabled the central European countries to reduce their military
structures. The Nordic countries were on the other hand more reluctant, as the
Russian capacity was still sufficient to represent a threat. Although the threat
based on ideology had disappeared, the military complex on the Kola peninsula
was still of great importance to Russia. As Russia was weakened conventionally,
the nuclear second-strike capacity was comparatively more important and there-
fore also the northern sea areas. Russia could no longer utilise the supply lines
through the Baltic states and the previous Eastern European states. Hence a
problem remained in the north after the Cold War and contributed to a deceler-
ated reduction of the armed forces in Finland, Norway and Sweden compared to
other European states.406
The northern sea area’s military strategic importance has been reduced despite
the fact that the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea have kept its role as an op-
erative area for strategic submarines from both the US and the three European
nuclear powers (Britain, France and Russia), and as a home base and an exercise
area for the Russian northern fleet. The northwestern region has furthermore
become strategically more important to Russia as a result of the geopolitical de-
velopments in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea.407 Thus Russia is to a greater
extent a Northwestern European country than what the Soviet Union was. Fi-
nally, energy resources in the Barents Sea and northwest Russia underline this
area’s importance to the Russian Federation. Norway and other Nordic countries
will be important as both the production in these areas and the energy transit to
405 Berggrav (2004), pp. 3-4.
406 Berggrav (2004), pp. 3-4.
407The Soviet Union had its harbours here but Russia has no access to them today.
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the European market are concerned. In addition, the Nordic region is the region
where Russia meets the US as a global fleet power and in regards to vital interests
of Central and Western Europe. Norwegian territory would thus become inter-
esting in a crisis where Russian, US and/ or European interests are involved.408
Altogether, the northern sea areas are perhaps more important than ever before.
The importance is now above all of economic nature, tied to production and
transport of oil, gas and fishery products. The melting of the Arctic ice adds
additional interest to the High North, as shown in chapter 1.
Hence, the great powers’ interests in Norway are basically related to maritime
concerns, and above all to Norway’s role as an important oil and gas producer
and exporter.409 Given the importance of the great power interests linked to
a secure access to energy and the demand of fish and fishery products, there
is potential for a conflict about rights or access, that in a worst case scenario
could become a military dimension.410 The control of Norway also implies the
possibility to control the sea routes outside the Norwegian coast, to threaten
them or to protect them.411 “Such control, to whom Norway is allied and how
Norwegian alliance policy is performed is thus not indifferent whether in relation
to Russia, the US or the EU.”412 Altogether, new factors of strategic relevance
are Norway’s petroleum activity and the transport routes for petroleum and gas,
in addition to strategic nuclear weapons of intercontinental reach. Both factors
tie Norway’s security to the security developments in distant areas.413
Today there are 70 fields of petroleum production on the Norwegian continental
shelf which produce more than 2,0 billion barrels of oil per day (2011) and totally
about 100 billion Sm3 natural gas. This constitutes a production of marketable
petroleum of totally 229,7 billion Sm3 o.e. Norway is ranged as the world’s
seventh largest oil exporter and the fourteenth largest oil producer in the world.
In 2010 Norway was the second largest gas exporter and the sixth largest gas
408 Hansen Bundt (2002), p. 135.
409Norway co-operates on energy policy with its most important political and economic part-
ners in the International Energy Agency (IEA). These are primarily importers of oil and gas.
Norway also has important shared interests with other oil-exporting countries both inside and
outside the OPEC.
410 Børresen (2005b), p. 4.
411 Børresen (2004).
412 Børresen (2004) [author’s translation].
413 Hansen Bundt (2002), p. 127.
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producer in the world.414 About 60 percent of Norwegian oil is exported to
Western Europe and about 15 per cent to North America.415 The Norwegian gas
export covers about 20 per cent of the European consumption. The largest part of
the export goes to Germany, the UK, Belgium and France, where Norwegian gas
makes up between 20 and 35 per cent of the total consumption. The Norwegian
oil directorate estimates a gas export on a level between 105 and 130 billion Sm3
around 2020 and between 80 and 120 billion Sm3 in 2025.416 Also, the reliance on
Norway becomes even more apparent since a memorandum of understanding on
gas cooperation between Algeria, the EU’s third biggest supplier with a market
share of 11 percent, and Russia came into effect.
To sum up, Norway has become a potential influence on other countries’ national
security and economic developments. The production and deliveries of strategic
resources will have security consequences for Norway.
“Threats against the Norwegian energy production will for the most part
depend on the international situation and will increase in periods of conflict
in our area and in other parts of the world where Norway, NATO, producers
on the Norwegian shelf or the recipients of Norwegian energy are involved.
Assaults or attacks may also be a result of conflicts where Norway initially
is not involved. The intention of assaults against the oil and gas industry
could be to exert a political and military pressure against Norway, NATO
or countries that are dependent on energy deliveries from Norway. The
primary target could thus be the recipient countries, with the result that
Norwegian security interests get affected.”417
Thus Norwegian security also depends on the security of important energy part-
ners. The risk of war in Europe today seems marginal. However, the security
challenges and threat perceptions are very unpredictable, whereas the most visi-
ble force in the geopolitical game seems to be the interests linked to energy. The
world’s dependency on fossil energy is a relative constant factor in an otherwise
dynamic international situation. This dependency will probably increase, so that
Norway would soon be influenced by eventual changes or conflicts in the world’s
energy regions. Accordingly, Norway’s geostrategic situation has become more
complex because national interests get influenced by areas dominated by energy
414 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2012), p. 20.
415Norway’s oil and gas industry. Key figures 2005, http://www.odin.dep.no/filarkiv/253233
/nokkeltall_2005_e.ppt (accessed 16 July 2006).
416Cited in Helgesen (2012).
417 Hansen Bundt (2002), p. 133 [author’s translation].
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geopolitics.418 Further, interest conflicts in distant areas can have consequences
for Norway as a result of developments in warfare technology, and national se-
curity is threatened through the merchant fleet. Norway’s interest areas are tied
to developments in, firstly, Central Asia, Caucasus and the Black Sea area, sec-
ondly in the Arabic Gulf and the Middle East, and, thirdly, in South-East Asia
and East-Asia.419 A destabilisation of the Middle East might for instance create
petroleum crises that can have serious consequences for Norway’s administration
of its oil and gas resources and its control of the transport routes between Russia
and the US. Steiro argues against the pretension that Norway is not strategically
important:
“The pressure between the US’ and other Western countries’ permanently
increasing import needs, and Russia’s interests as an oil-exporting nation
competing with Norway, might create unclear situations in foreign policy
and alliances that not necessarily follow the patterns we know today. (...) It
should be sufficient to look to the Middle East in order to understand what
importance the oil has and increasingly will get in international politics.”420
Norway has thus in reality become “a player in the geopolitics of oil”.421 The
question is what strategy Norway has, given the strategic importance of energy
in a situation where the Middle East is in a permanent crisis, the oil and gas
supply from Russia from time to time is disturbed by bilateral conflicts and
the world’s energy demand increases every year. According to Hansen Bundt,
Norway has perceived the oil and gas activity to be solely a resource question and
the products to be solely trade objects, whereas the country’s environment also
perceives the significant amount of Norwegian oil and gas activities as a question
with clear foreign and security political implications and consequences.422 Energy
questions must become an integral part of all external EU relations, says a policy
review of the European Commission,423 published after the disturbances of the
oil supply from the important Druzhba pipeline in the beginning of 2007, a result
of a bilateral conflict between Russia and Belarus. As the EU furthermore has
418 Hansen Bundt (2002), p. 133.
419 Hansen Bundt (2002), p. 134.
420 Steiro (2004) [author’s translation].
421 Børresen (2004).
422 Hansen Bundt (2002), p. 134.
423European Commission (2007) Mitteilung der Kommission an den Europäischen Rat
und das Europäische Parlament. Eine Energiepolitik für Europa, Kom (2007)1, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0001:FIN:DE:PDF (accessed 28
February 2007), p. 22.
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troubles convincing Russia to open its gas market, it also calls for stronger ties
to former Soviet states, Algeria and Norway.424
Moreover, the infrastructure related to the production of oil and gas is of great
strategic importance. An attack or a threat of attack to this infrastructure could
have serious consequences for the economic interests of many nations and cause
a considerable impairment of NATO’s military capacity. Even if such a threat
does not exist today, NATO is aware of the risk of an attack or damage. Thus
the Norwegian petroleum industry, especially the production, processing and gas
pipelines, has become a potential target in the case of war, or a target to terrorists
who wish to hit Norway or some of its recipients.425 The question is still if Norway
does have a strategy. Independent of what threat perceptions exist, the military
strategic importance of Norway and the adjacent sea areas will be decided by how
important Norwegian territory is perceived to be in international crises and wars.
This chapter shows that its importance is great. Decisive is thus Norway’s real
ability to uphold its decisions and priorities in regards to energy. Such an ability
would at least imply diplomatic skills and a relevant military ability. Norway’s
capability to guarantee safe deliveries of oil and gas in different crises and war sit-
uations is probably Norway’s most important contribution to European security.
According to Hansen Bundt, Norway’s credibility as an alliance partner depends
on this ability, which at the same time demands a clear strategy and an opinion
on what energy deliveries will have to be prioritised in different crisis scenarios.
Otherwise, other players will take this decision for Norway.426
The defence reforms of Norway presuppose that eventual aggressions from outside
only would aim at laying pressure on Norway in a given situation without the in-
tention of conquering territory. The threat perception of the last decade was first
of all the asymmetric threat of international terrorism. However, international
terrorism first of all challenges the secret services, and only the defence forces
have the necessary command organisation and instruments to handle attacks on
424European Commission (2007) Mitteilung der Kommission an den Europäischen Rat
und das Europäische Parlament. Eine Energiepolitik für Europa, Kom (2007)1, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0001:FIN:DE:PDF (accessed 28
February 2007), p. 29.
425 Hansen Bundt (2002), pp. 132-133 (footnote 28).
426 Hansen Bundt (2002), pp. 134-135.
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e.g. petroleum installations at sea.427 According to a report of the the Norwegian
Defence Research Establishment, the initial phase of a strategic assault of Nor-
way will basically have to be handled on the national level.428 Norway’s problem
according to the report and several Norwegian researchers independent of the
Armed Forces or the Defence Ministry, is that the army has become too small,
has lost the ability of maneuver warfare and that troops are bound to operations
abroad, i.e. mainly Afghanistan. Moreover, the aerial defence is not sufficient
to defend all the important spots that need to be defended. Also problematic is
the planned reduction in ground based air defence.429 The report also concludes
that if interest conflicts between Norway and Russia increase as the coherence of
NATO deteriorates, then a Russian military attack of Norwegian territory can
not be excluded.430 The problem is that the defence forces do not develop in a
short or medium period of time.431 The question is thus if Norway is sufficiently
prepared if the situation should change for the worse. When strategic choices are
made, it should be clear why one strategy to be preferred to another. It has to
be spoken out loudly that something is given a higher priority than other things.
Even close allies will not have completely coinciding interests with Norway. There
is no guarantee that they are just as concerned to secure Norwegian rights and
interests, e.g. fish resources that are rare and thus disputed. Børresen criticises
the view that when the state is not threatened through hostilities, a close defence
cooperation with other similar states based on a large degree of division of labour
is the solution.432 Rather, it should be the interest of a small state surrounded by
great powers that these use their power in accord with the small state’s interests.
The small state has to aim at a relationship with the great powers where their
dependence on the small state is as great as possible. This would necessitate that
the great powers’ ability to discipline the small one is minimal. How can Norway
operationalise such a strategy? The dependency is connected to the importance
the great powers assign to the control of Norwegian territory in the case of crisis
427 Børresen (2004).
428 Bukkvoll et al. (2009), p. 22.
429 Bukkvoll et al. (2009).
430 Bukkvoll et al. (2009), p. 23.
431It takes 30 years to produce a land or sea commander and 20 to 25 years to produce a
brigade chief etc. Børresen (2004).
432 Børresen (2004).
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and war. As this proves to be great, this is where the dependency on Norway
is. The question of what prize they are willing to pay to obtain such control is
connected to Norway’s ability to discipline them. Their considerations in such
a context would be influenced by the policy Norway has towards the different
parties in a conflict and of what military resources Norway possesses. The greater
Norway’s military capacity is, the larger the potential costs of a political and
military pressure against Norway are.433 This, however, is not sufficient. An
institutionalisation and increased cooperation in terms of the mutual interests
existing between Norway and the great power would decrease the necessity to
discipline Norway at all. Further, a common security community with all great
power neighbours would be the optimal strategy.
4.1.3. The strategic environment
Due to its importance as a global naval power, the US’ importance for the coastal
state Norway has increased rather than decreased. The US sets the preconditions
for what economic, judicial and security policy regimes develop at sea. Moreover,
the large geographic distance to the US, in contrast to the proximity of Russia,
is convenient to Norway. In comparison, Norway is closer to the US than Russia
in regards to language, culture and societal developments. The US is Norway’s
most important ally.
Russia on the other hand is, and will continue to be, a challenge for Norway.
Regardless of the future developments, Norway has to handle a transcontinental
great power neighbour. Even if Russia’s influence in the international system
seems to be weakened compared to the Soviet Union, Russia has several geopolit-
ical, military, economic and political qualities that make it a far more attractive
partner to both the EU and the US.
“It is a common misunderstanding that if only Russia gets more demo-
cratic, capitalistic and liberal, more like us, the challenges of the neigh-
bourhood will be solved. The Latin American countries’ and Canada’s
problematic relationship with the USA testifies that this is not necessarily
the case. Great powers have a tendency to act as great powers, driven
more by geopolitics and interests than by ideology and values. A demo-
433 Børresen (2004).
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cratic, wealthy and self-confident Russia in a multipolar world will hardly
be an easier neighbour to handle than the Soviet Union of the Cold War.
Maybe rather quite the contrary.”434
Its role as an essential global energy supplier broadens Russia’s strategic pos-
sibilities and strengthens the Russian economy, although it makes the Russian
economy very vulnerable to declining oil prices. Russia’s weakness after the Cold
War was accompanied by its need to make a strong appearance. Russia has
become less flexible as territorial questions, defence of sovereignty and power ex-
ertion are concerned.435 However, except for Russia’s status as an energy power
and its nuclear arsenal, Russia has a weak resource base for a great power. Russia
still perceives itself to be in an inferior position vis-à-vis NATO, and its nuclear
capability is still militarily decisive. For the time being, it is very unlikely that
Russia would risk an escalation of political tensions into hostilities that would
involve a direct confrontation with NATO countries. Military power is used to
keep the country together, as the war in Chechnya shows, but also to attack re-
gions in a neighbouring country, Georgia, which according to Russian thinking
belongs to Russia’s sphere of interest.
NATO developments are on the other hand decisive for Norway’s relationship
with Russia and the overall European security. These concern new enlargements,
the US’ future dispositions and Europe’s answers to these, and NATO’s ties to
Russia. The latter factor in particular is very decisive for Norwegian security.
Should Eastern European countries like the Ukraine and Georgia become NATO
members, it would probably lead to severe difficulties in the organisation’s rela-
tionship with Russia. NATO territory would move closer to Russia and make the
impression of an encirclement, created by US activities in Central Asia, even more
acute. Negative Russian reactions in connection with discussions of a Ukranian
NATO membership indicate this.436 US plans to position an antimissile defence
in Eastern Europe has also led to negative Russian reactions. The question is
whether NATO wants to signal how the strategic partnership with Russia will be
developed. Until now, Russia has not gotten the impression of being seen as an
adequate partner.
434 Børresen (2004) [author’s translation].
435 Neumann (2002), p. 10.
436 Weisser (2006).
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“As, however, global stability is only secured through close cooperation
between America, Europe and Russia, the substance of the cooperation has
to be significantly improved - eventually even through a Russian member-
ship in the Alliance. Still there is time not to force Russia in the arms of
China. NATO and the EU now have to contribute to that purpose.”437
The EU on the other hand seems to have difficulties involving Russia in its future
plans for a European security structure and in giving the country an adequate role.
NATO seems to be more suited for cooperation on security policy with the former
Soviet states, Russia included, than the EU, given the significant institutional
weaknesses of the ESDP. NATO is thus more than a military power in Europe.
However, the indifference to Russian complaints about e.g. NATO enlargements
and the lacking Western ability to include Russia in the transatlantic security
community is a problem to European security.
Russia is the factor that decides the importance to Norway of the two other
corners of the power triangle.
“It is a superior consideration that all conflicts that could become too
big for Norway but too small for our allies to take the burden of involving
themselves in, are reduced as much as possible. The answer to this dilemma
lies partly in a stable and concise relationship with Russia but first of all
in a close alignment with the allies, that is as close as we can get them.
Norway as a small state with Russia as neighbour has to ask for support
from the power triangle’s other two corners.”438
It is , however, problematic if a “stable and concise” relationship with Russia
should prove to be incompatible with “a close alignment”. Thus a lot depends on
the inclusion of Russia in Western security cooperation. An antimissile defence in
Eastern Europe would from this point of view not be in Norway’s interest. Rus-
sia’s need of acceptance is most of all directed towards the US and then towards
the EU. Its relationship with Norway is according to Neumann first of all seen
as a function of this, and Norway to an alarming extent appears to Moscow as
the US’ extended arm in the north. The Arctic is the large frame of Norway’s
strategic environment. The report “Arctic Strategies and Policies” elaborated by
the Finnish researcher Heininen describes a geopolitical situation in the Arctic
characterised by a defensive buildup of tension, i.e. taking care of own inter-
437 Weisser (2006) [author’s translation].
438 Neumann (2002), p. 20 [author’s translation].
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ests, and at the same time by clear offensive traits, especially on the rhetorical
level. Arctic nations are thus monitoring each other (and China) and seek to
build up an offensive capacity in order to be able to react if other nations should
cross any limits.439 Engen and Nilsen indicate that Norway to a large extent
has US support for Norwegian claims in the north. The factors favouring such
an assessment are a Russian policy in defiance of US interests, the politicised
Russian energy sector and a closed and risky Russian economy. Finally, Russia
needs large societal investments. At a time with uncertain outlooks for the oil
price, the US would clearly prefer that a loyal NATO ally like Norway possesses
as much as possible of the presumed oil and gas resources. Nevertheless, they
argue, Norway’s ambitions of sovereignty in the north should not disturb the long
term stability with Russia. Norway should leave the current US anchored uni-
lateral policy based on one state, the US, and instead cooperate inside the EU’s
multilateral and multinational partnership with Russia.440 This thesis will be the
initial point for the further discussion on the balance between the two options for
a Norwegian security strategy. Not to change the Norwegian foreign and security
policy at all would imply that choices are made unconsciously. Norway needs
to find the balance between the US’ importance as the world’s dominating naval
power and the increasing strategic importance of the EU. As shown above, the
Atlantic line still dominates the Norwegian foreign and security policy but is to
a certain extent weakened by external developments. According to Engen and
Nilsen, US support would not boost Norwegian interests in a long term perspec-
tive compared to a stronger cooperation with the EU. A good point is that the
US has not even ratified the UNCLOS.441 However, the National Security Presi-
dential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive of 9 January 2009
on “Arctic Region Policy” strongly emphasises the importance of US accession to
UNCLOS.442 Hillary Clinton has moreover, both as a senator and as Secretary of
State, given positive statements in regards to an accession to UNCLOS.443 Also
of great importance to Norway is that the Directive argues that the “geopolitical
circumstances of the Arctic region differ sufficiently from those of the Antarctic
439 Heininen (2011).
440 Engen/Nilsen (2005).
441 Engen/Nilsen (2005).
442National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive of 9
January 2009 on “Arctic Region Policy” at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm
443 Holtsmark/ Smith-Windsor (2009), p. 22.
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region such that an’Arctic Treaty’ of broad scope - along the lines of the Antarctic
Treaty - is not appropriate or necessary.”444 Given the increasing strategic impor-
tance of the High North due to the melting of the Arctic ice, and its implications
for the great powers’ interest in the region, a clash between this interest and
international rule of law would indeed be problematic to Norway. “We dismiss
the claim that the Arctic is some kind of an anarchic area, which immediately
needs a treaty to become manageable, because we have a solid and good initial
point in the Law of the Sea”.445 In contrast to this, a decision of 9 October 2008,
made by the EP, stated that the EU Commission should initiate international
negotiations on a new agreement to protect the Arctic. The agreement, which is
regulating the activity in the Antarctic, is mentioned as a concrete example on
what such an agreement could look like.446 According to the EP, the UNCLOS
“was not formulated with specific regard to the current circumstances of climate
change and the unique consequences of melting ice in the Arctic Seas.” More-
over, “the Arctic region is currently not governed by any specifically formulated
multilateral norms and regulations, as it was never expected to become a navi-
gable waterway or an area of commercial exploitation.”447 However, despite this
initial scepticism, the EU has concluded that current international law must be
respected also in this regard. The EU has without doubt both interests in and
influence on the High North, but there are different opinions on how the increased
interest in the Arctic should be handled. A reconsideration of the views of the
EP was to a large extent put forth by the centre-right European People’s Party
with the German EP member Michael Gahler in the front. The EP thus decided
on a new resolution with the title “A sustainable EU policy for the High North”
(2011) which not refers to any new treaty or a resource moratorium but focuses
on how the EU can play a positive role in the region.448
According to John Hamre, director of the Center for Strategic and International
444National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive of 9
January 2009 on “Arctic Region Policy” at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm
445FM Jonas Gahr Støre cited in Aftenposten (2008) [author’s translation].
446European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-
0474+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN (accessed 22 October 2008.)
447European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-
0474+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN (accessed 22 October 2008.)
448 Østhagen, Andreas (2012), p. 66-68.
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Studies (CSIS) in Washington, NATO will not focus on the northern areas despite
an increased emphasis being laid on Europe in the US after the Georgia-crisis.
The US does not focus on the High North and will not do so for a long time,
at least not in Washington, according to Hamre. Hamre also states that it will
be difficult to pass the UNCLOS, despite the fact that even then-president Bush
and other important interests, also military, have argued for this option.449
The argument that Norway needs US protection, with the implicit political op-
tion of subordination this has implied, is not so convincing anymore. However,
considering two of the the vital Norwegian interests (see table I.1) to be protec-
tion against political and military pressure and aggression and maintenance of the
Norwegian sea domain, the dependency on the US is still the most important ele-
ment of Norwegian security and defence policy. Moreover, though, a membership
of the EU would have made it easier to develop a new anchor point in Norwegian
security policy. The development of the EU as a more independent partner of
the US has until now not been perceived to be in Norway’s interest, as the US is
the only power capable of guaranteeing military security in the North Atlantic. If
Norway should be left alone with pressure from a foreign power, being anchored
in the EU would not be enough to secure Norway’s freedom of action. As the EU
will never have the military power of the US, Norway has only one relevant mil-
itary ally.450 However, if the EU countries are able to coordinate their positions
in regards to foreign and security policy, Norway would be even more politically
and diplomatically marginalised. Transatlantic consultations on foreign policy
already take place between the EU and the US on a high, daily-based level. The
failure of the transatlantic dialogue inside NATO has been obvious, at least since
the Iraq crisis in 2003. Important international matters, like the dialogue with
Iran on its nuclear programme, showed the absence of NATO in the transatlantic
coordination between the EU and the US. The important topics are not always
on the NATO agenda, which to a large extent is reduced to military questions.
An alternative Norwegian policy would be to broaden the partnership with Russia
in the north inside a European frame and include all interested parties in some-
thing broader than the Barents cooperation. The EU has extended its “strategic
449Cited in Dragnes (2008b).
450 Bingen (2003).
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partnership” with Russia as the member states agreed to reinforce the cooper-
ation with Russia through four Common Spaces in addition to the Partnership
and Co-operation Agreement. These common spaces cover “economic issues and
the environment; issues of freedom, security and justice; external security, in-
cluding crisis management and non-proliferation; and research and education,
including cultural aspects.”451 A membership in the EU would create long term,
stable frames around Norway’s relationship to Russia. If the EU in a long term
perspective becomes an increasingly important corner of the power triangle, Nor-
way must according to Neumann avoid a policy that, from an EU point of view,
appears to be one-sided US oriented. If Norway should end up with such a situ-
ation it could, in a worst-case scenario, lead to a situation where Norway stands
alone with Russia in the north without support from the other two corners of
the triangle.452 Nevertheless, the EU’s difficulties with Russia, e.g. in the en-
ergy cooperation, show that Norway needs both the US and the European corner
of the power triangle. As Putin has underlined several times, the EU does not
speak with one voice about Russia, as the different member states have different
preferences depending on their geographic proximity to the eastern neighbour.
Katinka Barysch, a Russia expert at the Centre for European Reform in London,
gets to the point: ‘The EU has looked on helplessly as Putin has exiled his critics,
renationalized the country’s biggest oil firm and abolished regional elections (...).
No amount of upbeat statements after summits can hide the fact that the the
two sides do not agree on what their partnership should look like.’453
Further, the strong dynamics in the relations between the US and European
corners of the power triangle, in short the transatlantic relationship, is assumed
to be a central challenge for Norwegian diplomacy. Transatlantic tensions will
probably be a dominating figure in the power triangle in the nearest future. The
probability that this will lead to constant open conflict is, however, not very
high according to Neumann. In regards to security policy, NATO structures
these tensions effectively enough to hide them. The permanent transatlantic
erosion will, however, increase the possibility that conflicts reach the public.454
451European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_11
_04/m04_268.htm (accessed 20 September 2007).
452 Neumann (2002), p. 21.
453Cited in Bilefsky (2006).
454 Neumann (2002), p. 16.
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The ESDP might not be an alternative to NATO for Norway, as only the US is
able to balance Russia. However, the fact that a strategic entity in addition to
NATO exists means a significant change. Norway has to comply with increasing
transatlantic tensions. The weighting of the security cooperation with the two
corners might give the impression that Norway is choosing one of them.455 In
fact, however, Norway just follows suit without taking real choices. Regardless
of which corner of the power triangle is the most important one, and regardless
of changes in the strategic environment, Norway needs to evaluate its policy in
order to make independent choices. In regards to European security cooperation,
Norway has not yet made that choice.
4.1.4. The necessity of political and military allies
As shown in chapter 3.3, Norwegian governments started substantial reforms of
the defence forces, becoming more mobile and flexible in order to participate in
international operations abroad and adjust to new strategic circumstances. In the
following, a comparison of two different views regarding the defence reforms will
be used to exemplify the important connection between the necessity of military
and political allies on the one hand and Norway’s relevance to those on the other
hand.
The first view is affiliated with Janne Haaland Matlary, currently professor of
international politics at the Department of Political Science, Oslo University.
She welcomed the 2005 strategic concept of the Norwegian Armed Forces which
stressed military power as a foreign policy tool, instrumentalised to promote
Norwegian interests.456 Military deterrence is accordingly no longer necessary as
Russia is no longer a military threat. Rather, political deterrence is in demand
as limited conflicts about resources may arise.457 According to this view, a bilat-
eral Norwegian-Russian conflict about energy in the north would hardly involve
NATO because this is not primarily about security. Rather, if military power is
increasingly used as an integrated part of the security policy, i.e. Norwegian par-
455 Neumann (2002), p. 20.
456 Norwegian Ministry of Defence (2005).
457 Haaland Matlary (2005a).
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ticipation in international operations, Norwegian relevance and usefulness in this
area would, together with an EU membership, create a European engagement in
the north, according to Haaland Matlary. This because the EU has an increasing
demand for relevant military power, as have the NATO and the UN. Norway’s
comparative advantage in foreign policy, crisis management and peace keeping
operations, could thus be complemented by military power.458
This view is opposed by Commodore and defence analyst Jacob Børresen. He
criticises the new defence concept for being based on threat analyses imported
from the desires of the US and NATO. In other words he presumes that the Min-
istry of Defence did not undertake independent analyses of Norwegian interests
before reforming the armed forces. This also implies that the desires of NATO
and the US are not necessarily compatible with Norwegian interests, and further-
more that the defence concept does not sufficiently assess the fact that Norway is
in a different strategic position than some of its allies and thus has other defence
needs as a small state and a significant energy producer. Instead of favouring mil-
itary power as a foreign policy tool in international operations, Børresen stresses
that military power causes constant political change first of all through control
of territory.459 Haaland Matlary on the other hand stresses political rear cover
from allies with common energy interests as Norway and sees military deterrent
power of only secondary importance or, if misused, as counterproductive because
it demands a great power status. Instead, great powers will have to be integrated
in a common platform with Norway.460
Haaland Matlary definitely has a point when she stresses the necessity of polit-
ical allies in the north with common energy interests but also the necessity of a
Norwegian membership of the EU. Norway does need political support from key
countries in the north. However, Russia will automatically be noticed more by
the EU as long as Norway is not a member. The possibility of consolidating Nor-
wegian views with other European states would be better inside the EU, but it
is impossible to say if or when Norway will become a member. Norwegian politi-
cians, and FM Gahr Støre in particular, stress the importance of the High North
458 Haaland Matlary (2005a).
459 Børresen (2005c).
460 Haaland Matlary (2005b).
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when they meet leading European politicians and arrange bilateral and multi-
lateral meetings in the north, but this can not substitute an EU membership.
The question then remains how military power can be transformed into polit-
ical influence. There is reason to doubt the plausibility in Haaland Matlary’s
argument that Norwegian contributions to e.g. EU operations in turn would
strengthen Norway’s interests in the north, whereas an EU membership probably
would. The international engagement of the defence forces is meaningful in many
regards: to strengthen the organisations Norway depends on, to gain contacts
and influence with great powers and to measure military efficiency. This, how-
ever, does not automatically assure Norway the support of the great powers if the
country should be militarily threatened. The political relations with e.g. the US
can, however, be degraded as a result of failing Norwegian engagement. Notwith-
standing, the support of London and Washington is only ensured if these consider
it to be in their interest to take any economic, political or military risk to help
Norway out of a difficult situation.461 In this way Børresen contradicts Haaland
Matlary’s argument that Norwegian contributions to EU troops would give Nor-
way political support in the north. This could be helpful but does not influence
Norway’s position in security policy. Rather, political alliances in the north can
be achieved through Norway’s reliability as an energy supplier. As shown above,
Norway’s importance to the EU is linked to the energy supply strategies of the
EU countries.
The challenges related to Norway’s own territory will have to be handled in order
to improve the strategic situation. Børresen argues that for a small state at war
with a superior enemy, the aim is not a military victory but to impress the inter-
national opinion and thus possibly contribute to a good starting point for peace
negotiations.462 Therefore there is a basis for claiming political and diplomatic
relevance of a relative voluminous force that has endurance through its numbers
and is capable of operating in a terrain and under climatic circumstances that
favour the defender.463 The counter-argument is that military presence in itself
is not a deterrent regardless of its military quality. Further, as Norway is not
461 Børresen (2004).
462 Børresen (2004).
463 Børresen (2004). As international operations are concerned, the forces would not have
the offensive ability to be involved in an attack on behalf of a great power ally but would be
more suited to contribute to peace and stability.
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capable of defending its territory alone, the country’s armed forces have to be
capable of operating effectively alongside its allies.464 This can be provided by
regional military integration aiming at international operations abroad. Rear ad-
miral Berggrav claims that even raising budgets will not be enough to strengthen
Norway’s independent military capability enough to have a real deterrent effect.
Further, if the member countries don’t contribute to the cooperation of armed
forces, NATO will be eroded. Firstly, the toolbox becomes less complete, and, as
a consequence, the ability to cope with tasks decreases. Secondly, the political
coherence becomes undermined. It is in Norway’s interest that NATO remains
an authentic defence organisation and that Norway remains a credible security
partner. This credibility would be affirmed by Norwegian participation in inter-
national operations.465
However, as Børresen has argued, the defence forces should be modelled to be able
to react to military pressure and aggression in a way that makes the aggressor
change his behaviour to the small state’s advantage. The defence forces should
not be a “miniature edition” of Norway’s great power allies’ forces. Neither are
other small states proper models as the geographic location, topography, climate
and demography are specific criteria that have to be considered. This does not
mean that Norway can ignore the developments of weapon technology. However,
the defence forces have to be modelled according to Norwegian tasks and premises
and have a structure based on Norwegian challenges in order to offer its duties
to the UN, NATO or the EU. To do the opposite, to model the defence forces
according to NATO or great power needs, would reduce the Norwegian govern-
ment’s freedom to act in conflicts and crises in the vicinity, and thus threaten
Norwegian security.466 Furthermore, the benefit of military deployments in the
“worldwide war against terrorism” is increasingly assessed with scepticism. First
of all, international police cooperation is required to control the threat of ter-
rorism. “There are only two concrete constellations where terrorism will demand
the deployment of armed forces: the danger of nuclear anarchy and extortionary
access denial to the world’s energy reserves.”467
464 Berggrav (2004), p. 15.
465 Berggrav (2004), pp. 16-17.
466 Børresen (2004).
467 Weisser (2006).
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Although Norway on the one hand is totally dependent on military assistance
in a crisis situation, the military attention to Norway and the military strategic
importance of the Northern European areas have on the other hand declined
after the end of the Cold War. This fact will not change because of mobile
and flexible Norwegian armed forces capable of operating with its allies abroad.
Norway has chosen to build a defence based on quality at the cost of quantity
and contingency which according to Toje practically is a supplementary defence
where single capacities can be plugged into the American machine. Norway does
this at a time when the US is shifting focus towards Asia.468 NATO is the alliance
which Norway has to trust in the case of war in its vicinity. Toje uses the example
of Georgia to exemplify the lacking military support from the US despite the fact
that Georgia sent its troops to Iraq. This example rather clarifies the important
fact that an agreement is not an agreement unless it is in writing. This is the case
with NATO’s Article 5. However, NATO’s development and the fact that “the
transatlantic alliance is dead”, i.e. NATO is not longer a defence alliance, it is a
political-military consultation forum469, shows that a treaty is not a viable treaty
unless it is reconsidered from time to time. The question must then be if Norway,
and others, can rely on any help if this should be necessary. The problem with the
essence of the North Atlantic Treaty, that an armed attack of a NATO member
should be considered as an attack at all NATO members which again will take
necessary measures, is that it has not been undertaken a reconsideration of the
agreement after the Cold War. An agreement has to live, which means that the
interpretation of it has to be clear, because if that is not the case, it does not
follow up new times. NATO has elaborated new strategies with new strategic
situations, but it has done so without reconsiderating the mandate. Thus the
lacking enthusiasm of both European and American allies is quite obvious. The
Europeans have changed, the US has changed, and the world has changed. NATO
has also changed, but there has been no reconsideration of its original mandate.
How then can it be successful? Adapting to a new situation is not the same as
having an aim. NATO has to have clear aims, and in order to allow for this,
a reconsideration of the old system has to be made in order to develop clear
intentions. Toje suggests that Norway should take the lead and build on the
468 Toje (2012).
469 Toje (2012).
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NATO alliance with a formal Norwegian-American defence pact which settles all
ambiguities.470 The question is then first of all how interesting Norway is to the
US. A reconsideration of the history would still have to be undertaken, because
what would be the basis of such a bilateral defence pact? Do Norway and the
US have the same strategic interests and the same aims? First, strategic choices
must be made in order to consider whether such a basis exists. Anything else
would be another adaption to a new situation without having considered what
should be achieved.
Haaland Matlary points to the remarkable fact that former officers of all people
have criticised the alliance policy of the US and NATO and the consequences for
Norwegian security.471 Børresen for example claims that Norway is among those
countries that go the furthest in taking the NATO and US “propaganda” about
the need of flexible and mobile expedition corps literally. As the situation is
today, he claims, the task of the Norwegian defence forces is mainly to contribute
with military capacities to the international community of like minded “Western”
states, which in reality is a form of “neocolonialism”. This might conform to
Norwegian missionary traditions but clearly conflicts with Norwegian military
tradition and is hardly in Norway’s interest.472
Norway’s geostrategic situation is different from its European NATO allies and
the Nordic neighbours. Norway thus needs to cooperate with other states’ armed
forces in regards to the defence of Norwegian territory without loosing the ability
to play a decisive military role itself. It is both important that Norway’s military
allies have the ability to operate under the climatic and topographic conditions
in the north, and that they have an interest in getting involved in northern secu-
rity issues. The so called North Sea Strategy mentioned in chapter 3.3 presents
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain as Norway’s primary
military cooperation partners. The Nordic countries also gain importance as in-
creased Nordic defence cooperation is in the making. Considering its strategic
challenges and possibilities, Norway needs allies that can contribute to solve crises
and conflicts between Norway and other countries and contribute to strengthen
470 Toje (2012).
471 Haaland Matlary (2005d).
472 Børresen (2004).
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Norway’s bargaining position towards Russia, and to some extent in the EEA.
Norway needs close political relations to all relevant European countries. This in
particular applies to European powers that have compatible interests with Norway
in regards to energy, environmental questions and other international questions
and to a significant extent depend on Norway. In addition it is important that
they have good relations with both Russia and the US, at the same time great
influence both inside NATO and the EU and are aware of the importance of the
transatlantic security community. Norway’s allies’ influence in the international
system generally and inside these organisations depend on their size and status.
Until now, the US has been Norway’s most important ally and, until recently,
Britain has been the most important European ally. The Norwegian diplomat
Jervell questioned this strategy in his working paper from 2003. Accordingly, Nor-
way’s strategic challenges and opportunities require a gradual closer commitment
to Europe as a result of the political changes in the US, the moving of US strategic
focus from Europe to the Middle East, and the lack of will to respect international
law. Norwegian analysts have generally seen the UK as Norway’s most important
European ally. Hansen Bundt in 2002 pointed to the US and the UK as Norway’s
most important NATO allies, which probably also have the greatest influence on
the ESDP process and the future relationship between NATO and the ESDP.
Further, these two countries’ views on the ESDP are the most compatible with
the Norwegian and thus the most suitable states to promote Norwegian interests
in the EU and NATO.473 However, the tendency of a bilateralised NATO rather
favour Germany as it, to a larger extent than Britain, has a more balanced view in
regards to the Atlantic and European components of security policy. Britain went
too far in its support for Bush’ policy and has marginalised itself inside the EU.
Moreover, the Norwegians should bear in mind that Britain strongly supports the
dynamic development of the European integration of defence and armed forces
because it is on this field they can play the leading part in the EU. The most
important element is however not which country is the most important but the
fact that EU members do not guarantee the security of the other members, and a
collective defence between the defenceless is not an alliance but a suicide pact, as
473 Hansen Bundt (2002), p. 141.
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stated by Toje.474 The most important result of the financial crisis is that where
Germany is heading, Europe is heading. According to Toje, the weak reaction of
NATO to the war in Georgia was due to Germany’s protection of Russia inside
the alliance.475
4.2. Sweden
Whereas Norway is an important European energy supplier, Sweden is increas-
ingly dependent on energy imports. Sweden’s strategic challenges and possibilities
are found in the BSR but maritime conditions do not play such a great role as they
do in Norway’s case. First, the challenges in the BSR are of an environmental
character, as the pollution in the Baltic Sea makes the environment increasingly
unsustainable. Second, the conditions for economic development are good con-
sidering “a very welleducated workforce, expertise in innovation, especially in
knowledge-based industries, a spacious and relatively unspoilt land environment
rich in natural resources and a strong tradition of intra-regional cooperation.”476,
but the region has still some way to go before becoming prosperous. Better
transport links should be developed and security should be improved. Sweden is
also not so directly linked with bilateral relations to Russia as in Norway’s case,
but Russia still plays a crucial role in the security of the BSR and thus also in
Sweden’s.
The already mentioned Nord Stream pipeline could have implications for the
stability of the BSR and is thus a strategic challenge to Sweden:
“It is ... reasonable to assume that the NEGP477 will affect the strategic
pattern and be a source of friction. It is a project that divides the littoral
states of the Baltic Sea into factions, which may rock the regional stability
and thus reduce the potential of the new EU members to become security
providers in the region. It also gives increased leverage and influence to
474 Toje (2012).
475 Toje (2012).
476Commission of the European Communities (2009) Communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.
COM (2009) 248 final, p. 3.
477The Nord Stream pipeline was previously named North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP).
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Figure I.2.: North European Natural Gas Network. (Source: ec.europa.eu)
Russia”.478
As figure I.2479 shows, the pipeline crosses the Baltic Sea from the Russian town
of Vyborg, situated by the Gulf of Finland, to Greifswald in Germany, and is
connected to further terminals in the Netherlands and the UK. The pipelines’
consequences for regional stability has been discussed in chapter 1. The Swedish
and Finnish governments granted permits to utilise their EEZs for the pipeline
through the Baltic Sea on 5 November 2009. The pipeline will pass through 506
km of the Swedish EEZ.480 Sweden’s approval was a crucial step for the Nord
Stream project and came two weeks before a EU-Russia summit to take place
in Stockholm during the Swedish presidency. This resolved what had become a
dispute between Stockholm and Moscow.481 The Swedish social democratic party
criticised the decision from an environmental point of view. Pertti Joenniemi at
478 Larsson (2006b), p. 12.
479Accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/ten/energy/documentation/doc/2004_brochure/natural
_gas_network_01_en.jpg
480http://www.nord-stream.com/press-info/press-releases/sweden-and-finland-grant-
permits-to-nord-stream-255/
481Energy Daily (2009) “Nord Stream unleashes criticism in Sweden, Finland” 6 November at
http://www.energy-daily.com (accessed 12 December 2009).
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the Danish Institute for International Studies said it was “clear that the Baltic
Sea region cannot become ... a model for European development unless the
(environment and security) fears related to the pipeline project are cleared out
of the way.”482 The Sweden approval however led to a revival of Swedish-Russian
relations and led to the first visit of a Swedish PM to Russia in ten years in March
2010. Sweden is not dependent on Russian gas unlike many other European
countries and has criticised Russia more freely than others, e.g. during the war
in Georgia. A Swedish-Polish initiative to a “partnership in the east” between
the EU and the former Soviet republics Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova,
the Ukraine and Belarus also provoked Russia. Then-PM Putin stated during
the Swedish visit that “Russia and Sweden have to developed closer economic
and political ties. Russian governments will support all suggestions that can
strengthen these ties”.483 The second aspect in this regard is Sweden’s energy
situation, which is also a strategic challenge for Sweden’s foreign policy, not least
because of the increasing dependence on energy imports from Russia. The option
of having Russia as an energy supplier must be seen as a challenge rather than a
possibility, at least not a possibility without risks.
Sweden’s power generation, totally 155 TWh1, was made up of 45 per cent nuclear
power, 47 per cent hydro power and 6 per cent renewable power in 2005.484
Sweden’s primary energy supply depends mainly on nuclear energy (37 per cent),
oil (29 per cent) and renewable sources, mainly hydro power (26 per cent), whereas
natural gas takes up only 2 per cent and solid fuels 6 per cent. The consumption
of the two latter elements is significantly lower than the EU-27 average (24 per
cent and 18 per cent respectively).485 Domestic energy production is largely
limited to electricity generation, and this again is limited to nuclear and renewable
energy (mainly hydro power). 10 nuclear reactors provide almost half of the
generated electricity in Sweden, and the country’s electricity generation is almost
independent of coal and oil. Sweden is the third largest producer of nuclear
energy in the EU, and the production results from renewable sources has been far
482Cited in Energy Daily (2009) “Nord Stream unleashes criticism in Sweden, Finland” 6
November at http://www.energy-daily.com (accessed 12 December 2009).
483Cited in Bakken (2010).
484 E.ON Nordic (2006).
485“Sweden-Energy Mix Fact Sheet January 2007”, http://ec.europa.eu/energy_policy/doc/
factsheets/mix/mix_se_en.pdf (accessed 29 September 2007).
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above the EU-27 average of 12 per cent.486 Swedish energy policy has, however,
put limitations on its usage and expansion of both hydro power and nuclear
power.487 Hydro power will not be expanded as rivers are protected. The decision
of abandoning nuclear power in a long-term perspective was taken as early as in
1980, but the date 2010 has later been discarded.488 The four government parties
presented a historic energy package at the beginning of February 2009 and open
up to the establishment of new nuclear reactors that can replace the current
ones. The Swedish government’s intention of building new nuclear reactors shows
that increased gas imports are not a real option. The Social Democratic Party
however still favour a nuclear phase-out because of domestic reasons.489 The
Riksdag resolved upon the main direction of a government proposition in June
2010, which suggested to abandon the central elelment in Swedish nuclear policy:
the aim to phase out nuclear power within 2010. Up to 10 new nuclear reactors
can thus be built to displace those operating today. The proposition does not
include any exact aims for the future nuclear production but the level is expected
to be approximately the same as it currently is.490 After the accident in the
Fukushima Daiichi power plant there has been no serious debate on the future of
the Swedish nuclear power as the case was in Germany. An enquiry undertaken
on 22 March 2010, i.e. 11 days after the accident in Fukuchima, still indicates
a considerable decrease in the support for nuclear energy compared to a similar
enquiry from 2008. Another enquiry after the accident, published on 19 March
2011, also shows large resistance against nuclear powere. Here, 64 per cent rejects
new nuclear power plants in Sweden whereas 27 per cent is positive.491
36,5 per cent of Sweden’s primary energy depends on imports. This was below
the EU-25 average in terms of import dependency. The majority of imports is oil
486“Sweden-Energy Mix Fact Sheet January 2007”, http://ec.europa.eu/energy_policy/doc/
factsheets/mix/mix_se_en.pdf (accessed 29 September 2007).
487Simultaneously, Swedish energy policy aims at reducing its dependence on oil.
488In 1997, then PM Persson made a compromise with the Centre Party to close the power
plant Barsebäck and at the same time reverse the decision of a nuclear phase-out until 2010.
489Then-social democratic leader, Mona Sahlin, wanted to build a new government coalition
alternative with the Environment Party and the Left Party and hence decided to oppose previous
PM and leader of the Social Democratic Party Göran Persson’s policy of ignoring a phase-out
until 2010.
490“En samanhållen klimat- och energipolitik. Energi.” Proposition 2008/09: 162 at
http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/12/27/85/65e0c6f1.pdf (accessed 20 December 2011)
491Cited at http://www.bellona.no/factsheets/atomkraft_sverige (accessed 20 December
2011)
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(84 per cent) whereas 12 per cent was solid fuels in 2004.492 Russia (32 per cent),
Denmark (28 per cent) and Norway (27 per cent) were Sweden’s main suppliers of
crude oil in 2007. Sweden has imported an increasing amount of oil from Russia
in the last decade, whereas oil imports from Norway and Iran are decreasing.
Denmark is above all a country of dispatch and not really a source of crude oil.
Oil imports from Russia amounted to 32 per cent in 2007, a decrease of 5 per
cent from 2006.493
Also when it comes to electricity, Sweden is increasingly dependent on imports
from Russia, and Russia’s importance is expected to increase in the future.494
Gas only makes up 1,5 per cent of Sweden’s TPES495 but has 20-25 per cent of
the available market where it has been presented. The Swedish industry sector
uses 44 per cent of the consumed gas within this area.
Due to the general characteristics of gas power plants, including the lowest CO2
emission among the thermal plants, gas plants appear to be the best technology
both in terms of efficiency and climate policy. Natural gas is also predicted to rep-
resent the major increase in additional power generation capacity for Europe in
general. However, this source of electricity is facing high price risks and increases
the dependency on gas exporting countries. Only Russia and Norway have the
capacity to be the gas suppliers of Sweden. From this perspective, the depen-
dence on Russian energy exports will be discussed mainly from a gas perspective,
although Sweden is also increasingly dependent on crude oil imports from Rus-
sia.496 The risks associated with nuclear power plants must be compared to the
impact the dependencies arising from increased energy imports make.
Before looking at the option of Norway as a gas supplier, which is mainly a ques-
tion of resources and capacities, the Russian option must be further analysed.
Sweden’s dependence on Russia would without a doubt increase should it be cou-
492“Sweden-Energy Mix Fact Sheet January 2007”, http://ec.europa.eu/energy_policy/doc/
factsheets/mix/mix_se_en.pdf (accessed 29 September 2007).
493Svenska Petroleum Institutet, http://www.spi.se/statistik.asp?omr=1&kat=5 (accessed 29
June 2009).
494 Larsson (2006b), p. 43.
495The total primary energy supply, i.e. the ratio of the energy loss measured at the raw
materials compared to the final energy output at end consumers.
496In Sweden, the transport sector uses 60 per cent of the imported oil, the industrial sector
22 per cent, the residential sector 6 per cent as well as 6 per cent for non-energy usage. IEA
International Energy Agency (2004), p. 74.
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pled to the Nord Stream pipeline or generally lean on more energy imports from
Russia. Dependence can be defined as a “state of being determined significantly
by external forces”.497 If Sweden has no viable options to energy imports from
Russia, then the situation goes from one of sensitivity to one of vulnerability.498
As Larsson states,
“Sweden’s energy imports of Russian energy in specific can in conclusion
be characterised as highly sensitive and highly dependent. An import index
is however no proof of vulnerability, but only of sensitivity.499
Larsson also points to the fact that in a political security context, sensitivity is
important for a dependent state as well. However, there is no immediate danger
as long as nothing happens that triggers a crisis.500 “Should a large conflict or
even war materialise, unlikely as it seems, dependence on Russian energy would
be devastating.”501 Larsson furthermore sees sensitivity leading to vulnerability
if there are no sufficient ways of tackling dependence problems, or if the supplier
is unreliable, something Russia has proved to be towards its eastern European
customers.502
Norway’s FM Gahr Støre has stated that “another possibility” for Sweden would
be the building of a gas pipeline from Kårstø outside Stavanger on the Norwegian
west coast, which would supply the Swedish west coast with natural gas.503 How-
ever, this does not seem to be of preference to the current Swedish government.
497 Keohane/ Nye (2001).
498According to the Complex Interdependence Theory of Keohane and Nye, sensitivity is a
“liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the
situation.” Keohane/ Nye (2001), p. 13. Vulnerability is on the other hand the “liability
to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered.” Keohane/
Nye (2001), p. 13. Moreover, “the vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on the
relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face.” Keohane/ Nye
(2001), p. 13.
499 Larsson (2006b), p. 43.
500Such triggers are wars, revolutions, civil unrest, nationalisation, state monopolies, boycotts
and transport availability. Sweden does not have the resources to act by itself in case e.g.
a boycott should occur. Of the above trigger elements, Russia has had all of them since
1990. Larsson (2006b), p. 46.
501 Larsson (2006b), p. 61.
502 Larsson (2006b), p. 39.
50315 Norwegian and Swedish companies are investing in the project, and the pipeline will
presumably be ready for gas deliveries in 2012. Sweden for the time being uses about one billion
m3 natural gas per annum but is estimated to need three times as much in a few years. The
pipeline from Norway is planned to have a capacity of six billion m3 per year, whereas only
three billion m3 in the beginning. As opposed to this, the Nord Stream pipeline has a capacity
of 27 billion m3 per year. Eriksson (2006).
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Then-minister of trade and industry, Maud Olofsson (Centre Party), stated in
2007 that she sees no future in Norwegian gas as she prefers renewable energy
sources, nuclear energy included. Despite a certain amount of imports to the
Swedish west coast, Sweden has according to Olofsson “a lot of biomass and also
a lot of hydro power and nuclear power”.504 Unlike the minister, Swedish industry
is interested and asks why the gas is not transported to Sweden when the demand
is existent.505 Sweden’s FM Bildt on the other hand sees the potential for energy
cooperation between Norway and Sweden as there are synergy effects between
the two countries which previously have been underestimated. “To be drilling for
oil and gas has not always been so “sexy” in the political debate, but this is not
the case anymore.”506
In the following sections, the importance of the BSR to Swedish security becomes
apparent, and Sweden’s non-alignment is further discussed in relation to the
regional security situation.
4.2.1. Economic and security interests
Børresen’s disposition applied in figure I.1 will now be adjusted to Sweden’s
economic and security interests. However, the disposition only involves vital and
very important interests. Because Sweden is an export nation comparable to
Germany and dependent on its exports industry, the importance of Sweden’s
export and economic interests is here upgraded to the “very important” Swedish
interests. The last category of the disposition, “important interests”, is thus
omitted. Free trade is essential to a nation totally depending on imports and
exports and is thus added to the list of vital interests. Sweden’s vital interests
are then as follows:
• to protect Sweden against political and military pressure and aggression
• a favourable world order, i.e. free trade
• to avoid a breakdown of the world’s central trade and finance systems and
• to avoid a situation of vulnerability (and sensitivity) in regards to energy
504Cited in Cervenka (2007) [author’s translation].
505 Cervenka (2007).
506Cited in Cervenka (2007) [author’s translation].
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imports
The latter vital interest has been discussed above, whereas the third point is
dependent on worldwide developments. The financial crisis hit Sweden hard,
layoffs affecting the labour market and unemployment rising to 9,8 per cent in
June 2009.507 According to Statistics Sweden, industrial production dropped to
its lowest level in at least 18 years in January 2009, when domestic and foreign
demand fell as the global economy slowed.508 Economy had a top priority during
the Swedish 2009 EU presidency.
The first two interests will be discussed as they seem to be prioritised differently
by the Swedish formulations of its foreign and security policy. The prevailing
importance attached to the interest also depends on its topicality. Is there any
threat in the present situation against the interest, or are there in fact possibilities
to advance this interest? This question is decisive for a government’s policy for-
mulation. In times of solid international cooperation and a favourable economic
development, a policy which promotes a general favourable world order seems
more suitable. In contrast, the need to strengthen the defence to protect national
survival seems less urgent. Conversely, in an international situation characterised
by strong antagonisms, the importance of an interest is the opposite.509 Tun-
berger et al. argue that Sweden has a strong national interest in contributing
to a European and global development that returns to the cooperation which
existed in the 1990s. A stable, collaborating and economic successful Europe is
what Sweden needs. At the same time, it is in national interest to be able to
avert and protect oneself in case of a more negative development. Hence, they
describe two main components of Swedish national interests: to promote Swedish
valuations in international relations on the one hand, and to defend and protect
national freedom of action, self-determination and national survival on the other
hand.510 This to a large degree depends on the development of the international
situation but also on how Swedish politics view their possibilities of influencing
the development. Swedish ambitions have proved to be great on the European
507Statistics Sweden, http://www.scb.se/ (accessed 6 August 2009).
508Cited in Carlstrom, Johan (2009), Bloomberg 19 March. The success of Sweden’s economic
recovery has been discribed in chapter 3.4.2 of this part.
509 Tunberger/ Blomqvist/ Andersson/ Granholm (2004), p. 33.
510 Tunberger/ Blomqvist/ Andersson/ Granholm (2004), p. 33.
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stage, and the Swedish assessment of the urgency of its national interests has
prioritised the focusing on a favourable international development.
Furthermore, Sweden’s very important interests are the following:
1. To maintain and develop a strong UN, which implies
• to work for continued respect for the international law of war as it is
put down in the UN charta and the Geneva Convention.
2. To sustain and develop the relations with the US and cooperate closely with
NATO and with it
• to fight international terrorism,
• to prevent the proliferation of WMD,
• to fight international crime and
• to maintain and develop good bilateral relations with Russia.
3. To maintain and develop good bilateral relations with all neighbouring
Baltic Sea and North Sea countries.
4. A future successful EU and with it
• to maintain and develop good bilateral relations with Russia
• to obtain political emphasis on Northern Europe
• to fight international crime and environmental threats
• to improve the situation within energy security
• to increase economic stability
• to contribute to a stable and positive development of the BSR
5. To forward Sweden’s export and economic interests.
Sweden’s interest portfolio does not have a global character to the same extent
as the Norwegian, but Sweden as an export nation depends on global develop-
ments. Of Sweden’s exports in 2011, Europe’s share was 71,0 per cent (EU-27:
56,0; EMU-17: 37,7; others 15,0), whereas 3,8 percent of Sweden’s exports went
to Africa, 10,0 per cent to America, and 12,8 per cent to Asia. Oceania and
Antarctica had an export share of 1,5 per cent. The shares of imports were the
following (in percentage): 84,7 (Europe), 0,6 (Africa), 4,7 (America), 9,6 (Asia),
and 0,4 (Oceania and Antarctica).511 The value of Swedish exports amounted to
511Statistics Sweden (2012) http://www.scb.se/Pages/PressRelease____329692.aspx
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SEK 1 213 billion (137,1 billion euro) in 2011, an increase of 7 per cent from 2010.
Imports also increased by 7 per cent and amounted to SEK 1 141 billion (128,9
billion euro) which resulted in a net trade surplus of SEK 72 billion (8,1 billion
euro).512 Norway and Germany are the two markets that compete for being Swe-
den’s largest which is rather fascinating due to the difference in population sizes.
In the order of their percentage of total dollar value, Sweden’s most important
trade partners in 2011 were the following: Norway (10,61 per cent), Germany
(10,2 per cent), the UK (7,45 per cent), Denmark (7, 35 per cent), Finland (6,
44 per cent), the US (6, 36 per cent), France (5,05 per cent), and the Nether-
lands (4,67 per cent).513 Sweden’s most important export goods are machinery
and transportation equipment and electrical/ electronic products. Sweden’s ma-
jor industrial sectors are telecommunications, transportation equipment, forest
products, mechanical engineering and machinery, iron, steel and other fabricated
metals, pharmaceuticals and food processing.514 Through the country’s EU mem-
bership, Sweden’s trade premises are very good, as Europe is the most important
market. The EU’s foreign trade relations are also important to Sweden as an
export nation. However, the further European development of solving the euro
crisis and defeating recession is thus vital to Sweden’s economic development.
Germany is the most important country in this regard and thus vitally important
to Sweden.
Further, compared to the EU, NATO seems in Sweden to be valued more for its
global engagement and its value in regards to regional security is not considered
to be high enough for Sweden to apply for a membership. Nevertheless, the im-
portance of close relations with the US is essential to Sweden due to Russia’s
power in the BSR. Moreover, “to actively participate and contribute to a positive
development of the EU” is important in many regards. A good example is the
Swedish participation in EU missions, as the country seems to follow the logic
that participation equals influence, which is comparable to Norway’s logic, that
participation in NATO operations equals support in the case of a crisis or war on
Norwegian territory. Sweden has been a fervent participant in EU missions, as
opposed to Denmark and Finland, and has volunteered to play an active role in
512Statistics Sweden (2012) http://www.scb.se/Pages/PressRelease____329692.aspx
513http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_exp_par-economy-exports-partners
514Statistics Sweden (2012) http://www.scb.se/Pages/PressRelease____329692.aspx
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❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
Organ.
Level
National Regional Global
USA
NATO
To protect Sweden
against political and
military pressure and
aggression (R)
A favourable
international order, i.e.
free trade
To sustain and develop the relations with the US and
cooperate closely with NATO, and with it to
-maintain and develop good bilateral relations
with Russia (R)
-prevent Russian-German dominance of the
BSR (R)
-fight international
terrorism and crime
-prevent the production
of WMD
European
Union
To protect Sweden
against political and
military pressure and
aggression (R,US)
A favourable international order, i.e. free trade
A future successful European Union, and with it to
-fight international crime and environmental threats
-forward Sweden’s export and economic interests
-maintain and develop good bilateral relations
with Russia (R)
-obtain political emphasis on Northern Europe (R)
-improve the situation of energy security (R)
-contribute to a stable and positive development of
the BSR (R)
To maintain and develop good bilateral relations
with all neighbouring Baltic Sea and North Sea
countries
UN
To maintain and develop a strong UN, which implies to work
for continued respect for the international law of war (R,US)
None
To avoid a situation of
vulnerability as regards
energy imports (R)
To avoid a breakdown of
the world’s central trade
and finance systems
To forward Sweden’s export and economic interests
Table I.2.: Sweden’s interest portfolio arranged due to international level, organi-
sations of importance and reference to Russia (R), the EU (EU) and/or
the USA (US). The interests are specified by the font as follows: vital,
very important.
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EU security policy from the very beginning. This is seen as a strategic possibil-
ity for a medium-sized state to gain international power and standing. Another
factor was that Sweden did not want to make the impression of only taking in-
terest in Northern Europe where its national interests are assumed to be but to
take interest in areas which are important to the entire Union. Hence, Sweden
enables itself to get to the “inner core” of the EU. If Sweden has ambitions to
influence international crisis and conflict management according to its national
interests, the ability of rapid reaction can constitute a significant “influence cur-
rency” according to Tunberger et al. In addition to the greater possibilities of
influencing both aim and choice of the instruments applied, another aspect is that
a state with a high international profile in crisis and conflict management “can
expect greater solidarity from the other states if it is being threatened itself.”515
The plausibility of this view will be challenged in the next chapter. Nevertheless,
Swedish interests are to a greater extent than the Norwegian connected to gaining
influence in the EU.
In table I.2, the disposition of Sweden’s interests is advanced. Compared to Nor-
way, the UN does not seem equally vital to Sweden. The reasons are the absence
of disputed international questions and the lack of responsibility for matters of
international interest on Swedish territory, and the fact that Sweden is inside the
EU. The EU is the framework of choice when Swedish interests are affected by
either the US and Russia. The latter seems to affect Swedish interests equally
frequently as Norwegian interests, although Norway and Sweden have different in-
stitutional frameworks in NATO and the EU. In turn, Norwegian interests seem
to be more affected by both the US and the EU than what is the case with
Sweden.516
There is no doubt that Sweden wishes to promote its political and economic in-
terests along the southern coast of the Baltic Sea. As both Swedish economic
and security interests are attached to the developments here, the regional aspect
of Swedish economic and security interests will be highlighted in the following.
As Kaliningrad is a good example because most aspects of the further develop-
515 Tunberger/ Blomqvist/ Andersson/ Granholm (2004), p. 67 [author’s transla-
tion].
516See table I.1.
I.4.2. Sweden - 149 -
ment of the BSR are concerned, the problems and possibilities affiliated with the
Russian exclave will be analysed. Here, Russia’s relations with the EU and the
possibilities and difficulties of integrating Russia in Europe become clear. At
the same time, military developments in the BSR can be anticipated through
Kaliningrad developments. Also, the Swedish policy on the BSR has to be seen
in a European perspective, where the north often opposes the south in regards
to political attention and economic resources. Regional cooperation is moreover
to a large extent dependent on Moscow and Brussels and the political will here.
The case of Kaliningrad is of great relevance as it shows the still existing borders
in the BSR in regards to political, geographic, economic and mental develop-
ments. The future of the oblast’ Kaliningrad is considered to have a substitute
function for the superior European-Russian relationship. The options for Kalin-
ingrad are either to become a Russian window to Europe or a Russian fortress
in Europe. As figure I.3517 shows, the Russian exclave is situated in the middle
of EU and NATO territory. In addition, uncertainties regarding Russian mili-
tary activity here, serious different problems of environmental character, poverty,
bad conditions for economic development and HIV to mention some, have been
facing Kaliningrad, which again impairs the security of the neighbouring states
and the BSR in general. Kaliningrad’s possibilities to develop are dependent on
both Russia and the EU, but there is not much appreciation between Moscow
and Brussels as Kaliningrad is concerned. Brussels has wanted to secure the EU
area against negative influence from the Russian exclave, whereas Russia wishes
to secure its integrity and Kaliningrad’s possibilities as Russian territory. One
Russian fear is that Kaliningrad might be absorbed by the EU. The chance of
integration in the European economy through the EU enlargement depends on
the Russian will to open up its exclave, but nothing indicates that Russia has
any interest of doing so.
A solution to the border and visa question is decisive for how well Kaliningrad can
function being a part of the BSR.518 Russian laws are in force, but as an enclave
in the EU, the area depends on the environment’s conditions and influence to a
larger extent than before. Brussels did not accept a “corridor solution” through
517Accessed at http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?p=30942590
518See chapter 2.2.2 of part III.
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Figure I.3.: Kaliningrad and the Baltic Sea Region. (Source: wikimedia.org)
the neighbouring Lithuania and Poland for the citizens of Kaliningrad without a
visa. In 2001, Sweden’s PM suggested an exceptional position for Kaliningrad in
the EU but this was not realised with the new quasi-visa-regulation.519
The next consideration concerns the military character and uncertain aspects of
demilitarisation associated with Kaliningrad, especially as the transport of gas is
increasing in the BSR. Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, the number of
military personnel in Kaliningrad was estimated to be between 100 000 and 120
000, including about 25 000 naval forces. Moreover though, Kaliningrad’s 900
000 inhabitants were all more or less devoted to the functioning of the military
area of Kaliningrad.520 According to the IISS521 the deployed ground forces in
Kaliningrad went from 103 000 in 1993 to 10 500 in 2001.522 The high degree
of militarisation proved to be incompatible with the economic development of
the 1990s. More autonomy from Moscow was wished for in order to transform
519A step in the right direction might be that the inhabitants of Kaliningrad no longer have
to go to Moscow to get a German Schengen visa. There are 600 kilometers between Kaliningrad
and Berlin whereas the distance between Kaliningrad and Moscow is twice as much - in the
opposite direction. Plath (2007).
520 Chillaud/ Tetart (2007), p. 178.
521International Institute for Strategic Studies
522Cited in Chillaud/ Tetart (2007), p. 178.
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Kaliningrad into a Hong Kong of the BSR. However, economic interests were not
strong enough in comparison to the growing strategic value of the region following
the EU and NATO memberships of the three Baltic states in 2004.
The questions remaining in regards to military developments are to what extent
Kaliningrad is de facto demilitarised, and whether or not nuclear weapons are
situated here. As Chillaud and Tetart state,
“it would be highly doubtful that Russia unilaterally demilitarizes Kalin-
ingrad - even if the country were to decide unilaterally to demilitarize, it
would be a moratorium without legal value. The only thinkable pattern
would have been to set up such [a] zone bilaterally (with NATO) or multi-
laterally (with Poland and Lithuania).”523
The topic of demilitarisation and the demand for it by the exclave’s neighbours
became acute with the crash of a Russian SU-27 fighter which violated Lithuanian
air space in September 2005. Moreover, Russian warplanes shuttling to and from
Kaliningrad are responsible for most violations of NATO airspace. A demilitari-
sation of Kaliningrad, whether de jure or de facto is obviously not on Russia’s
agenda.524 On the contrary, then-president Medvedev announced in a November
2008 speech to the Russian parliament the possible storage of Iskander missiles525
in Kaliningrad as a result of the encroachment of NATO to Russia’s border and
the planned US antimissile defence in eastern Europe. After the US’ decision
to abandon the anti-missile defence in eastern Europe, Russia’s ambassador to
NATO, Dmitrij Rogozin, stated that Russia will not store missiles in Kaliningrad
either. However, the exclave is strategically important because NATO keeps en-
larging. Furthermore, Kaliningrad is the only part of Western Russia that is
not bound by the “flank” restrictions of the CFE Treaty, limiting troop redeploy-
ments.526 The military activity of the Baltic Fleet could also increase as a result
of the gas supply line passing through the Baltic Sea.
Further, the question of a denuclearisation of Kaliningrad is uncertain. According
to rumours, Moscow chose Kaliningrad as destination in the beginning of the
1990s for the relocation of nuclear weapons from former Warsaw Pact countries
523 Chillaud/ Tetart (2007), p. 173.
524 Chillaud/ Tetart (2007), p. 174.
525Iskander is a surface-to-surface missile with an operating distance of 415 kilometres.
526 Chillaud/ Tetart (2007), p. 177.
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to the Russian mainland. An article by the Washington Times published in
January 2001 indicated that Russia had transfered short-range tactical nuclear
missiles to Kaliningrad six months earlier. The accusations have never been
proven. Another point is that Russia has no legal obligation to restrain itself as
Kaliningrad is Russian territory and has never been formally denuclearised.527
Rumours further indicate that Kaliningrad has a tactical (not strategic) nuclear
storage site with some land-based missiles and some nuclear warheads for artillery
(SS21). However, it is not clear if the storage sites in Kaliningrad are full or empty,
which can be an asset from a Russian point of view.528
4.2.2. Factors of strategic importance and threat
perceptions
The importance of a state’s geography can be influenced by political changes
in neighbouring states and by developments of strategic importance. Sweden’s
geographic location does not imply that the country has the same level of strategic
importance to the great powers as Norway does due to its long coastline. Sweden
does not have any natural resources of strategic importance comparable to oil
and gas either. However, the strategic importance of the Nordic region in general
due to global energy interests and the transport routes of these resources might
also increase the interest in Sweden.
The BSR is the decisive region for Swedish security and strategic interests. For
several hundred years, a pattern has developed in the Baltic Sea where the
strongest regional powers have tried to make it a Mare Clausum under their
control. Their challenger among the great powers have traditionally tried to
counteract such a dominance by securing the sea as a Mare Liberum. The latter
variant is compatible with Swedish interests. The trade across the Baltic Sea has
been intensified and new trade patterns have been created after the end of the
East-West conflict. Sweden as an exporting nation has profited from the new
trade situation. Sweden is thus dependent on developments in the neighbouring
Baltic Sea littoral states Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany,
527 Chillaud/ Tetart (2007), p. 176.
528 Chillaud/ Tetart (2007), pp. 176-177.
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Poland and Russia. The BSR has with the enlargements of the EU and NATO
become integrated into European and Euro-Atlantic security structures. In 2003,
the Swedish Defence Commission described the situation as follows:
“The development and deepening of relations between Russia and the
United States, the EU and NATO has contributed substantially to the
improved situation. The Baltic Sea countries are not just in a new security
policy environment; they also enter into an integrated system of European
cooperation now, where it is very difficult to imagine a serious threat to the
security of one state that does not also concern the other states in our part
of Europe. (...) The conditions for meeting common threats and challenges
in our immediate vicinity will improve when all the countries around the
Baltic Sea participate in shaping the European Union’s common policy, in
close partnership with Russia. (...) Sweden’s security will also be enhanced
as a result.”529
The picture drawn by the Swedish Defence Commission in several reports is
that security is threatened mainly by an insecure world and to a lesser extent
by developments in the vicinity. Nonetheless, Sweden’s strategic situation is
primarily decided by regional developments, not least by Russian developments,
and the war in Georgia was met with deep concern and was food for thought in
Sweden. A factor of strategic importance to Sweden and the BSR is the lack of
ability to integrate Russia and its western regions, and Kaliningrad in particular.
Security-building cooperation has little sense in the BSR if Russia is not a part of
it, be it in the frame of the EU, NATO or other regional cooperation. According to
many experts, Swedish security can only be won through cooperation with other
states, above all within the EU, but also through NATO.530 This is a new turn
in Swedish security policy thinking, in contrast to what was prevalent during the
East-West conflict. However, as long as these two organisations are not capable
of including Russia when it comes to security policy, such cooperation can not
take place.
The geopolitics of energy, and Russia’s role within it, has strategic implications
for Sweden as well. Russia gradually becomes more military capable of handling
enemies outside the former Soviet Union by “strategic irruptions”. According to
Leijonhielm, this also applies to Sweden, if its security policy stays the same.531
529 Swedish Defence Commission (2003), p. 3.
530 Huldt (2005), p. 9.
531 Leijonhielm (2007), p. 11.
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Moreover, the negative developments in Russia in regards to democracy, human
rights, freedom of NGO’s etc., combined with Russia’s aim to regain its position
as a superpower, implies a revaluation of Sweden’s strategic situation that also
questions the policy of military non-alignment. Finland, which due to a clear
public majority against NATO membership will probably not join NATO in the
nearest future, has experiences with the great Russian neighbour that may be of
value to Sweden, as well as Norway.532 Finland is the only Nordic country keeping
a territorial defence with a maximum wartime strength of about 350 000 people
(2008). The strength of the Army is 240 000, the Air Force 38 000 and the Navy
28 000.533 The country also cooperates closely with NATO. Finland’s strategic
thinking seems to be stable and not formed by strategy cycles or changing trends
of security policy. There are reasons to believe that Finland’s historical experi-
ences with the great neighbour have led to a greater understanding of “realpolitik”
compared to Norway and Sweden, in addition to a greater understanding of Rus-
sia’s strategic thinking. According to statements made by Nikolai Makarov, chief
of the general staff of the armed forces of Russia and deputy minister of defence,
Finland’s participation in NATO’s military exercises constitutes a military threat
to Russia’s security. Moreover, he presented a map of the planned missile defence
in Europe. Here, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were marked as “Rus-
sia’s sphere of interest”. 534 Thus Finland at least has a very clear basis for action
and strategy.
Finland’s then-supreme commander of the armed forces, admiral Kaskeala, stated
in 2007 that “Norden”, i.e. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden,
has probably nothing to fear from the Russians. However, the possibility of
single episodes grows with Russia’s operative ability.535 The increase of energy
532The Ribbentrop-Molotov German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939 allocated
Finland, along with Latvia and Estonia, to the Soviet sphere of influence, and Stalin opened
the Winter War when the Soviet Union attacked Finland on 30 November 1939. 25 000 Finns
died in the Winter War, which lasted until the Peace Treaty of 12 March 1940 was signed,
and the entire Karelian peninsula in southeastern Finland was transferred to the Soviet Union.
During the Continuation War against the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1944, Finland fought as a
co-belligerent with Nazi Germany. As a precondition of the armistice with Stalin in 1944 the
Finns agreed to remove the German troops from Finnish soil.
533 Public Information Division of the Finnish Defence Command (2008), p. 6.
The real employees of the Finnish Armed Forces are about 8800 soldiers and about 7200 civilians
(2008).
534Cited in Dragnes (2012b).
535Cited in Fyhn (2007b).
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transports in the Baltic Sea is seen as a key factor in this regard. In the view
of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish Parliament, the Baltic Sea and
the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland are attaining an increasingly important
strategic position. The main reason for this is that Russia is increasing the use
of its terminals on the far end of the Gulf of Finland.536 The Nord Stream
pipeline has its initial point at the end of this gulf (see figure I.2). Russian plans
are to nearly double the exports of oil through the Primorsk oil terminal at the
eastern end of the Gulf of Finland.537 The risk of a terrorist attack might of
course be the most important reason for the increased Russian military activity
in the Baltic Sea. The protection of energy interests will, however, enhance the
strategic relevance of Finland and Sweden. Moreover, A gas pipeline through
the Kola peninsula down to Vyborg which connects to the planned Nord Stream
pipeline is also intended (see figure I.2). The plans also imply to lay the pipeline
between the Danish island Bornholm and the South Swedish region of Skåne.538
A transport system may be built up capable of transporting about 100 million
tons of fossil products in 2015. The increasing importance of energy supply thus
implies more attention, increased deployment of armed forces due to the fear
of terrorist attacks and competition. Sea transport, pipelines and harbours are
vulnerable, and the risk of terrorist attacks could close down the whole transport
system. This, in addition to the general developments in Russia, leads some of
Sweden’s military analysts to stress a renewed focus on domestic and regional
defence.
A regional focus of the armed forces would have to be combined with a closer
alliance with the US in order to be able to discipline Russia if this would become
necessary. The greater Sweden’s military capacity is and the closer the alignment
with the US, the greater are the potential costs of political and military pressure
against Sweden. For the time being, Russia’s ability to discipline Sweden is not
significant but could increase if Sweden’s dependency on Russian energy increases.
The membership of the EU gives Sweden a multilateral framework for its relations
with Russia. However, the EU can not save Sweden from an eventual vulnerability
536 Helsingin Sanomat (2007).
537 Helsingin Sanomat (2007).
538Sveriges Radio (2007): “Gasledning mellan Bornholm och Skåne”, 22 August 2007 at
http:// www.sr.se (accessed 23 August 2007).
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from dependence on Russian energy, and neither from the lacking ability to defend
its territory. An argument against an enforced focus on domestic issues of the
Swedish armed forces is that Sweden can not tackle a threat alone in case of a
worsening of the security situation. Hence, more cooperation and integration with
other states is the solution. Widman argues that this is impossible if Sweden, as
the only European country focuses on a military invasion from Russia. Rather,
the experience from international operations, that are taking place in a very tough
environment, is the best instrument to gain defence capacity. The international
operations should in this capacity dimension the Swedish defence.539
“And if we now are afraid that Russia in twenty years will have a military
capability which can challenge the West, there is an apparent and immedi-
ate way to strengthen our safety: A Swedish membership in NATO.”540
However, it is not given that the interests and strategies of the US and NATO
are compatible with Swedish interests - or Norwegian for that matter. The need
to have a national ability to defend one’s country until allied help arrives is thus
still essential as the allies do not always have the same interest in defending a
partner’s territory. Sweden is to a larger extent than Norway a middle-sized state
with higher ambitions of international influence. Sweden’s historical role in the
Baltic Sea area can to some extent explain this. However, being in the EU’s inner
circle, and engagement beyond the national interests of the proximate areas, do
not automatically improve Sweden’s security situation.
Rather than bilateral Swedish-Russian conflicts, the troublesome relations be-
tween the Baltic states and Russia is likely to be the largest security risk in the
BSR and thus to Swedish security. Should a situation occur where military as-
sistance to the Baltic states is needed, this requires a leading role for Sweden.
The question is how both the EU and NATO can contribute to improving the
situation, and what role they could play in case conflicts militarise. Another
aspect is the Swedish interest of influencing the development both inside the EU
and through NATO. Instability and crisis in the BSR are likely to be interlinked
with the security of three Baltic states. To actively contribute to a stable re-
gion is an obvious Swedish interest, and Sweden has actively supported Baltic
539 Widman (2007).
540 Widman (2007) [author’s translation].
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sovereignty since the early 1990s. The Baltic States’ memberships in NATO were
highly compatible with Swedish interests as Sweden had no desire to carry a
larger responsibility for their security. This was shown in chapter 3.2. However,
the future vitality of NATO is not given.541 Signs furthermore indicate that the
alliance wants the Baltic states to concentrate a large part of its military priorities
on certain niche capabilities that would be useful in NATO led international oper-
ations. This, however, implies that the resources available for national “threshold
defence” are minimised. If instability or a crisis with military components should
occur in the Baltic states, military reinforcement arriving too early could make
the situation worse. A refraining from undertaking measures could on the other
hand create an even more unstable situation. This dilemma would be reinforced
by the weak defence ability of the Baltic states, which accentuates the need of a
rapid reinforcement.542 An alternative would according to Tunberger et al. be
EU action or a “Coalition of the Willing”, that could accomplish a “preventive
deployment” with a long-term political profile. This would also be the result if
NATO looses its importance.543 In such a scenario, it would be in Sweden’s in-
terest to both contribute to a stabilised situation, and to a largest possible extent
influence other states which participate in crisis management by means of mil-
itary contribution. In a security political fragmented Europe a situation would
even be plausible where Swedish initiatives are decisive for the deployment of an
international operation.544 In a regional crisis, the military value that Sweden
could offer would naturally be larger than in military operations in distant areas.
Air and naval forces based in Sweden would thus be able to support the deployed
forces. The Swedish defence forces should therefore be able to “accomplish a time
limited power effort significant to an international operation in the proximate
areas.”545
US support would be necessary in order to outbalance Russia in the BSR. An
alliance with the US is thus necessary regardless of the future development of
NATO. Sweden then needs to develop good connections with the US and be
541 Tunberger/ Blomqvist/ Andersson/ Granholm (2004), p. 73.
542 Tunberger/ Blomqvist/ Andersson/ Granholm (2004), p. 73.
543 Tunberger/ Blomqvist/ Andersson/ Granholm (2004), p. 73.
544 Tunberger/ Blomqvist/ Andersson/ Granholm (2004), pp. 73-74.
545 Tunberger/ Blomqvist/ Andersson/ Granholm (2004), p. 74 [author’s transla-
tion].
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willing to contribute to secure its own vicinity. Sweden’s strength is its defence
industry and its contribution to the Nordic neighbours’ defences. A Nordic de-
fence cooperation would thus be a step in the right direction for Sweden. In
addition, several factors indicate the necessity of a Swedish NATO membership.
The argument that the EU can guarantee Swedish security is dismantled by Lilj-
gren, who was Sweden’s ambassador in Washington from 1993 to 1997 and is the
current chairman of the Swedish Atlantic Committee. He questions not only Eu-
rope’s ability but also the will to defend northern Europe, as the EU has shown
weak interest in strategic aspects of European security.546 Since the end of the
Second World War, the main reason for Swedish non-alignment has been not to
provoke Russia. Interestingly, Russia’s former ambassador in Helsinki, Derjabin,
stated that it is only a question of time before Sweden and Finland join NATO.
“We are about to getting used to what is happening. We can’t do anything to
prevent it. Those times are gone. But we don’t like it.”547
Sweden’s largest problem seems in fact to be its inability to make choices in
regards to security policy, and compared to Norway and Finland which pursue
predictable security and defence policies, Sweden rather makes its security policy
very anonymous. The country cooperates closely with NATO but does not want
to join the alliance. The close cooperation was probably also given during the
Cold War, and the phobia against siding with someone became very clear during
World War II when Swedish policy shifted with the turning point of the war.548
4.2.3. The strategic environment
In contrast to Norway, Sweden is itself a part of the southern component of the
Nordic power triangle. As the Baltic states are integrated both in the EU and
NATO, Sweden and Finland’s lack of NATO membership probably reduces their
role in the BSR security policy. The power triangle of Northern Europe has
moreover a variant in the BSR where Germany is a decisive factor in the EU
corner of the triangle. Germany’s ability to combine a good relationship with
546 Liljegren (2007).
547Cited in Fyhn (2007c).
548See chapter 3 of this part.
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Russia on the one hand and the ability to act solidly united with e.g. the Baltic
states and make the EU speak with one voice on the other hand, is decisive for
the strategic situation in the BSR. Russia has been able to split up the EU in
regards to energy security. Disputes between Russia and its neighbours in the
BSR is a strategic challenge to Swedish foreign policy. The US influence in the
BSR stabilises the situation somewhat as the security of the Baltic states and
Poland has another focal point. Their fear is rather that the EU may uncouple
itself from NATO. From a Swedish point of view, it is not positive that Russia
and Germany develop too strong of a partnership, and an increased US influence
in the BSR would again strengthen the influence of the smaller states of the BSR.
A Swedish, or Finnish, membership in NATO would increase this influence even
more. Of course, the relationship with Russia could be worsened for a period of
time.
Unlike the scarcely populated Barents Sea Region, the BSR is characterised by
several different cultural influences. The littoral states are situated close to each
other and their relations go far back in history. Thus the review of some historical
aspects will be undertaken in order to clarify some of the region’s current con-
flict lines and relations. Subsequently, the failing ability of the EU to integrate
Russia’s western regions in European cooperation will be discussed.
The era of the German culture begun in the early 13th century. The Hanseatic
cities, with Lübeck in front, controlled the Baltic Sea trade from Flanders to
Novgorod. The relations across the Baltic Sea were not solely economic, but
also developed political power factors. The Hanseatic influence was strengthened
through German settlement in the eastern parts of the Baltic Sea area in the
12th and 13th century. Hence, rivalries occurred between the German cities
and the kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden. The influence of German merchants
prevailed, whereas the German order of knights conquered Gdansk and Pomerania
in 1308 and German settlers came to the region. On the other hand, through
the personal union with Lithuania of 1386, Poland was strengthened and the
German order of knights was finally beaten in 1410. Poland-Lithuania was a
relative significant factor for about 150 years, whereas Sweden was to become
the dominating power factor, as its political consolidations started already in the
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Figure I.4.: The Baltic Sea Region. (Source: nordregio.se)
beginning of the 13th century. The Western parts of Russia were not experiencing
the same rise of power, as their power position was weakened by the invasion of the
Mongolians.549 The Swedish possessions were significant. Between 1560 and 1658,
Sweden created a Baltic empire centered on the Gulf of Finland and included the
provinces of Karelia, Ingria, Estonia, and Livonia. During the Thirty Years War
Sweden gained tracts in Germany as well, including Western Pomerania, Wismar,
the Duchy of Bremen, and Verden. In 1645 and 1658, Sweden conquered Danish
provinces north of the Sound (1645 and 1658).
In the Great Nordic War (1700-21), Sweden’s supremacy was threatened through
the alliance of Russia, Denmark-Norway and Poland-Saxony.550 Sweden was
beaten by Russia in the battle of Poltava in 1709 and the defeat significantly
contributed to Sweden’s final defeat. By 1720 Sweden had lost its north German
possessions to Hanover and Prussia. Nevertheless, Swedish influence had been
significant: Karl XII ruled over Saxony for a short period in 1704. The southern
coast of the Baltic Sea was Swedish territory for a short period. West Pomera-
549 Klinge (1994), p. 32.
550Prussia and Hanover joined the coalition from 1715. Sweden on the other hand was helped
by the Ottoman empire.
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nia was a Swedish province from 1648 to 1815, which was a longer period than
the Prussian one later on. And finally, the city of Wismar formally belonged to
Sweden until 1903.
Russia with the new capital of St. Petersburg replaced Sweden as the dominant
power of the Baltic Sea and became the new great power of the region. Swe-
den lost Finland to Russia in 1809, and after the Congress of Vienna in 1814
the Russian empire ruled over the entire eastern part of the Baltic Sea from
the Finnish-Swedish border along the Finnish coast to Ingermanland, and from
Estonia and Livonia to the area of Königsberg (East Prussia).551
During the first decade of the 20th century, six new states were created or recre-
ated: Norway, Finland, Estonia, Livonia, Lithuania and Poland. The weakness
of Russia and Germany after the First World War contributed significantly to the
consolidation of the new states. The peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Russia
and the Central Powers created a cordon sanitaire which isolated Russia from the
rest of Europe. Furthermore, a consequence of the Treaty of Versaille was that
Germany had to abandon the area between Pomerania and the river Visla (West
Pomerania) in order to provide Poland access to the Baltic Sea. The Polish corri-
dor thus divided the city of Danzig (Gdansk) and East Prussia from the German
Reich. However, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 between Germany and
the Soviet Union divided Eastern Europe into their respective spheres of interest.
After the German defeat in 1945, Estonia, Livonia and Lithuania had become
Soviet republics, whereas Finland kept its sovereignty. Extensive “resettlements”
and banishments took place, especially in East Prussia and Lower Pomerania.
The Soviet Union annexed Königsberg, that changed its name to Kaliningrad.
During the Cold War, the communication between the western and eastern parts
of the Baltic Sea area was reduced to a very low level, a situation which did not
change until the end of the Cold War.
Thus, except for some periods of Danish or Swedish expansions, the BSR has been
characterised by German or Russian dominance, which was only limited through
periodical interventions of the so called sea powers Holland, England and, during
the Cold War, the US. These interventions led to a certain protection for the
551 Klinge (1994), p. 17.
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smaller states of the region. The situation in 1989-91 was unique as both Ger-
many and Russia had limited interest and small opportunities to act in the BSR.
This vacuum implied possibilities for the smaller states, i.e. the Nordic states,
Poland and the Baltic states, to act on their own. This was also encouraged by
the Clinton administration. Today, the Russian need of a “European window”,
i.e. access to the Baltic Sea, is possible because of its exclave Kaliningrad. For
Russia’s neighbours in the BSR, security questions are related to Russia. Ger-
man influence, which formed the region for more than seven hundred years, has
significantly declined.
Unlike the historical relations of the Baltic Sea area, that stayed regionally rooted,
the current conflict lines of the BSR can not be defined solely by regional factors.
The US influence in the BSR has increased through the NATO memberships of
the Baltic States and Poland. Russia disliked the eastern enlargement of NATO
but had no choice but accepting it. Both the EU and the US are decisive factors
in determining the security policy and integration policy in Europe generally, as
well as in the BSR. Brussels and Washington are the key points of reference, al-
though the US has not been a geographic or historical factor here. The increasing
influence of NATO in the BSR and the security of e.g. the Baltic states on the
one hand has to be balanced with the ability of NATO and the EU to consider
Russian interests and fears on the other hand. The US plans of an antimissile
defence in Eastern Europe, somewhat moderated by president Obama, are only
the latest example of the Western indifference to Russia’s interests since the end
of the East-West conflict. The question is how the security of Russia’s neigh-
bours can be protected and at the same time making sure Russia is not ignored.
The question is also how Russia can become an equal partner of NATO. The
preconditions after the Cold War were good as the Warsaw pact was dissolved.
The other defence alliance, however, continued to structure the developments in
Europe. The West has ever since been unable to include Russia, which is now
turning into a difficult partner for both NATO and the EU. A military threat is
non-existent but Russia is using its power for what it is worth to regain its old
power position. It is in Russia’s interest to make sure its new energy empire is
secure. This to a large extent involves and affects the BSR.
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The relations between the EU and Russia largely take place in the BSR. With
the EU memberships of the three Baltic states and Poland, all Baltic Sea littoral
states except Russia are inside the EU.552 The EU’s external borders were ad-
justed to the east and thus Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova represent
the border regions. The question is how the EU can integrate e.g. Russia’s west-
ern regions. This is decisive for the further development of the BSR. The BSR’s
triangular pattern includes EU members, aspiring EU members like the Ukraine
and Georgia, and Russia as the EU’s “strategic partner”. As the perspective of
a Russian membership of the EU is not even being discussed given the size of
the country, the institutional border of the BSR might grow even tighter. The
potential of the BSR lies in Russia’s resources and manpower, the transit routes
of the Baltic states and the financial and technological base of the EU.553 In or-
der to exploit this potential, barriers as customs, visa, different legal norms and
different infrastructure has to be abolished, and the precondition for this is a
positive political partnership between the EU and Russia, a solid Eastern Policy
of the CFSP, and integration prospects for Eastern Europe, i.e. the Ukraine,
Belarus, Georgia and Moldova. An important criteria for the EU memberships of
2004 was the technical-administrative security of the new member states’ eastern
borders in order to prevent problems like organised crime and illegal migration.
The Schengen agreement foresees visa for Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian
citizens. The Schengen border complicates the relations with e.g. Russia’s west-
ern regions. A clarifying example of the region’s position within the EU are
the EU priorities for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) compared
to the Balkans. The EU projects earmarked Eastern Europe for the year 2003
amounted to 94 million euro (Russia), 48 million euro (Ukraine) and 20 million
euro (Moldova). The budget for the Balkans was 775 million euro.554 Thus the
gravity of the EU’s neigbourhood policy becomes clear. Kempe and van Meurs
further show the lacking mechanisms of the EU in regards to security and stabil-
ity in the CIS area and ask for concepts and capacities beyond the enlargement
policy.555 Duleba asks why the EU has not yet developed any regional strategy
552Here, Norway and Iceland are not considered to be Baltic Sea countries, although they are
members of the CBSS.
553 Trenin (2000), p. 67.
554 Kempe/ van Meurs (2002), p. 33.
555 Kempe/ van Meurs (2002), pp. 35-37.
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towards Eastern Europe:
“This is especially intriguing since the EU has developed its regional
strategies towards Southern neighbours - the Mediterranean Region (cov-
ering twelve countries) and the countries of the Western Balkans. It seems
reasonable for the EU - if it wants to be more capable of pursuing its own
interests in Eastern Europe - to develop its regional policy in addition to
the existing bilateral frameworks of its relations with East European coun-
tries.”556
The EU therefore needs a new Eastern policy. The first point is that the existing
EU policies towards the eastern neighbourhood was formulated before the entry
of the Central and Eastern European countries that border this region. Secondly,
the CFSP is not possible without an effective Eastern policy as the EU will
never become a major player in world politics if it fails to be one in Europe.
Duleba considers the most challenging deficit in the existing framework of the
EU’s approach to the Eastern neighbours to be the discrepancy between goals
and instruments. Another point is that the EU’s energy dialogue with Russia
should not take place without the other East European countries.557
The Northern Dimension of the EU (EUND), initiated by the Finnish presidency
and turning into EU policy in 1998, could be a project with potential success in
this regard if there is also a political will behind the projects from the “heavier” EU
members and the European Commission, and is strongly supported by Sweden.
The EUND is not strictly geographically defined and places much emphasis on
cross-border cooperation with Russia. Furthermore, the European Commission
adopted a Communication on the EU Strategy for the BSR on 10 June 2009,
which is the first time a comprehensive strategy, covering several Community
policies, is targeted on a ’macro-region’. The aims of the strategy will be to make
the BSR a. environmentally sustainable (e.g. reducing pollution in the sea), b.
prosperous, c. accessible and attractive (e.g. better transport links) and d. safe
and secure.558 The Baltic Sea strategy is a priority of the Swedish EU presidency
of 2009. This shows that Nordic countries inside the EU can successfully promote
556 Duleba (2005), p. 11.
557 Duleba (2005), pp. 8-11.
558Commission of the European Communities (2009) Communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region
COM (2009) 248 final.
I.4.2. Sweden - 165 -
regional initiatives. However, in order to influence the regional development,
support from at least one significant European power is needed. This is where
Germany’s importance to Sweden’s is great. The question is whether the BSR
is a heavy enough priority for Germany compared to other European regions.
Moreover, a real breakthrough in the EU-Russia relations should not be expected
as long as Russian politics dominate Russian economics.
4.2.4. The necessity of political and military allies
Sweden’s need for allies can be linked with the discussion on Swedish NATO mem-
bership and Sweden’s place in the Euro-Atlantic security community. As shown
above, Sweden’s reforms of its armed forces completely rely on the integration
with other states’ armed forces, based on NATO standards. The Swedish defence
forces alone can not defend Sweden against a substantial attack. The perception
that the EU will develop to a new defence alliance in Europe is unrealistic as the
EU’s strategic direction is unclear. Moreover, 75 per cent of the EU’s member
states are also NATO members and therefore allied to e.g. the US.559 As Win-
nerstig emphasises, it is the nation states and not the common institutions which
are the key players within security policy. Their different national interests are
still decisive.560 Thus
“the EU will not ‘take over’ NATO’s role as the main military entity in
Europe. The Swedish military leadership can thus not count on EU cover
for the reductions of our own defence: As a consequence, the Swedish non-
aligned security policy becomes unsustainable both in theory and practice.
Military non-alignment has always presupposed a real independent defence
capability: the environment must continuously rely on that the non-aligned
state is able to protect its territory even against substantial attacks. How-
ever, our defence is now transformed to almost solely handling international
crises abroad.”561
As the assertion of sovereignty becomes more important to all the Nordic coun-
tries as a result of the increased importance of Europe’s High North, this may be
one of the reasons for the plans of a mutual defence cooperation between Sweden,
559 Winnerstig (2006).
560 Winnerstig (2006).
561 Winnerstig (2006) [author’s translation].
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Norway and Finland.562 This is positive as the national and regional dimension of
defence policy has been neglected in Sweden since the defence reforms started.563
Finland’s former FM Kanerva stated that there are no questions regarding for-
eign or security policy that can not be discussed between the three countries.
According to current defence minister and then-Norwegian state secretary of the
Defence Ministry, Barth Eide, Nordic security cooperation is about practical co-
operation where the formal memberships of organisations is less important.564
This might be of minor importance to Nordic cooperation, although Haaland
Matlary remarks that Nordic defence cooperation without supranational control
through NATO and the EU would be to prefer an ad-hoc solution and hope for
the best.565 Again, however, there is no mutual defence guarantee in writing, and
thus the defence cooperation is not really much worth despite the cost savings. A
common defence declaration would however change this picture although Nordic
cooperation alone will hardly be sufficient to secure Sweden against a substantial
attack. Sweden is firmly rooted in the EU and has the security benefits of this,
but Sweden can not rely on EU cover for the cutbacks of the Swedish defence ei-
ther, as there is no formal European guarantee for the security of other members.
It is a proximate assumption that Sweden needs a military guarantee from the
US, which is the only state capable of this. In order to achieve such a guarantee,
Sweden would however have to make a choice in regards to its status as non-
aligned and leave its anonymous security policy. As Sweden has chosen to turn
around its military strategy, the basis for non-alignment has vanished. In order
to obtain a second security anchor, Sweden needs to join NATO to approach the
US.
The arguments for a Swedish NATO membership have been summarised by Lil-
jegren, here appearing abbreviated:
1. “Better protection for Swedish territory. If we become the object of threats
other members will be expected to come to our assistance according to
Article 5. Most important is the transatlantic link to the US and Canada.
2. Better possibilities to influence our own and the region’s security through
participation in the decision making of NATO.
562See chapter 3.3 of part I.
563 Ericsson/Moore (2007).
564Cited in Fyhn (2007a).
565 Haaland Matlary (2007).
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3. Better insight in and influence over planning at an early stage of NATO-led
operations in which Swedish personnel participate.
4. Better economy for the Swedish defence.
5. Better conditions in many cases for Swedish weapon exports.
6. Better conditions for active participation in the transatlantic security policy
dialogue and for influencing the coordination between the EU and NATO.
7. Better possibility to influence the dialogue between NATO and Russia.
8. Better possibility to demonstrate our solidarity with those who stand up
for western values such as democracy and human rights. In addition it
can be argued that Sweden has a moral duty to extend the same security
guarantees as EU members who are also members of NATO have extended
to Sweden.”566
As shown in chapter 4.1.4 of this part, however, NATO can hardly be named a
defence alliance anymore and has problems defining its aims.
The Reinfeldt government has actually given some signs of a new thinking in
Swedish security policy. The Statement of Government Policy of 19 September
2007 left the regular element in every Swedish government statement out, i.e. the
declaration that Sweden is non-aligned. This can not have been a coincidence.
Nevertheless a Swedish membership application to NATO is hardly probable in
the near future as this can only be applied for with the support of the Social
Democrats. The Swedish Social Democrats generally oppose a NATO member-
ship, and the public scepticism is still hard to ignore. It is nevertheless interesting
that former leader of the Social Democratic Party and then-member of the De-
fence Commission, Håkan Juholt, suggested to drop the non-alignment, which is
not the same as joining NATO, in order to increase the possibilities of cooperation
with Sweden’s neighbours.567
4.3. Conclusions
Table I.3 shows the strategic challenges and opportunities facing Norway’s foreign
policy, which all have Europe’s high north and the Barents Sea as their common
566 Liljegren (2007).
567Cited in Stenberg(2007).
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denominator. The first apparent conclusion of the table is that Norway’s chal-
lenges are far more numerous than the opportunities, and that the latter are
almost solely found in the power potential of Norway’s energy resources. On the
other hand, although the opportunities are fewer, the power of those should not
be underestimated. The challenges and opportunities which will prove to be those
Norway has to handle alone are accentuated.
Table I.4 shows an overview of Sweden’s strategic challenges and opportunities
facing its foreign policy. Sweden’s strategic opportunities seem to be found in
more realms than what is the case with Norway, due to Sweden’s membership
in the EU. Sweden’s challenges are to a very large extent connected to Russia,
although not so much in a bilateral as rather in a regional context. The oppor-
tunities and challenges that can and must be handled by Swedish governments
alone are accentuated.
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The most important factors of strategic relevance
Enormous
natural
resources (oil
and gas)
Environmen-
tal
threats
Security
policy
situation
The arctic
region
Jurisdiction
of the sea
areas
around
Svalbard
c
h
a
l
l
e
n
g
e
s
•Geopolitics of oil
and gas in general
•Scarce global oil
and gas resources’
impact on the
jurisdictional
amount of the
Barents Sea
•Russia as a
competitor on oil
and gas (pricing
pressure, market
shares)
•Other states’
(conflictive) energy
interests in the high
north
•Nuclear
facilities and
pollution sour-
ces in northwest
Russia
•Retired
submarines,
nuclear-powered
icebreakers,
nuclear fuel,
nuclear waste,
dumped waste,
nuclear
accidents
•Arctic climate
change
•Oil and gas
transport in the
Barents Sea and
along the
Norwegian
coastline
•Integration of
Russia in the
Western security
community
•Nuclear-
powered
submarines and
warships
operating from
naval bases on
the Kola
peninsula
•Future
development of
NATO
•Being outside
the European
Union
•Increasing
importance for
global politics
•International
cooperation
•Great power
interests vs.
Norwegian
interests
•Number of
parties involved
•Lacking
support for
Norway’s
administration
of the "Barents
Sea North" (the
Fishery
protection zone)
•Problematic
relationship
between
Norwegian claims
and the limited
capacity to act
as a small state
o
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
t
i
e
s
•Security of energy
supply (Europe,
North America)
•Proximity to the
European and North
American markets,
Norway’s position in
these markets
•Key to more
independence from
Russia for some
European states
•Know-how as
regards the further
developments of the
oil and gas business
in the Arctic areas
•Political
stability, low
level of tension
•Member of the
Arctic Council;
influence on
arctic
developments
Table I.3.: Challenges and opportunities facing Norwegian foreign policy.
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The most important factors of strategic relevance
Scarce Energy
Resources
Environmen-
tal
threats
Security
policy
situation
The Baltic
Sea Region
Membership
of the
European
Union
c
h
a
l
l
e
n
g
e
s
•Increasing
dependence on
energy imports
•High sensitivity
and high
dependence vis-à-vis
Russia
•Great competition
for energy resources
and failing
capability of
common EU energy
policy
•Nuclear
facilities in
Sweden and the
BSR
•Increasing
transport of
fossil fuels in the
Baltic Sea and
along the
Swedish coast
•Pollution of
the Baltic Sea
•Nuclear power
plants as
alternatives to
dependence on
electricity
imports
•Integration of
Russia in the
Western security
community
•Russia’s
relations with
the Baltic Sea
littoral states
•The Nord
Stream pipeline;
increasing
Russian military
activity
•Being outside
NATO
•Failing
integration of
Russia’s
westernmost
regions
•Kaliningrad
•Russia’s
relationship
with the Baltic
states
•Energy as a
Russian foreign
policy tool
•Bilateral
strategies on
energy
cooperation in
the EU
•Swedish
interests vs.
influence as a
small state
o
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
t
i
e
s
•Situated in the
neighbourhood of
Europe’s second
largest supplier of
natural gas
•Proximity to the
North Sea and
Barents Sea regions
•Nordic cooperation
as key to more
independence from
Russia
•Political
stability, low
level of tension
•Being inside
the EU
•Swedish
possibilities of
economic and
political
influence
•Multilateral
frame boosting
Sweden’s
relations with
e.g. Russia
•East-West
integration in
the BSR and in
general
•Enhanced
possibilities for
Swedish
economy
Table I.4.: Challenges and opportunities facing Swedish foreign policy.
5. Conclusions and further
considerations
By comparing issues of great importance to Norwegian and Swedish foreign poli-
cies respectively, focus has been on the differences facing the two countries. The
differences are the regions of pivotal importance (the BSR and the Barents Sea
Region), the institutional frames of the EU and NATO, the foreign policy tradi-
tions, foreign trade and the nature of the challenges and opportunities themselves.
This notwithstanding, the similarities of both countries’ challenges and opportu-
nities are more important. The common denominators are Russia, international
law, regional cooperation and US presence in Europe. The question thus arises if
not both countries are dependent on the same factors in order to achieve a positive
development in regards to the challenges and opportunities facing their foreign
policies, and the logical answer to this is yes. Both Norway and Sweden have tried
to contribute to the creation of an international order increasingly based on in-
ternational law, engaging in a more legal based international order since the days
of the League of Nations. Small countries with open economies are particularly
dependent on predictability and protection in questions concerning war, peace,
environmental survival, trade and economic capitalisation of natural resources.
The most important factor which can be derived from the analysis above is in-
ternational law. One can for example only try to imagine where Norway would
have been today without the UNCLOS.
Six fundamental principles can be abstracted from the practice of international
law in different international societies across nearly three millennia: sovereignty,
recognition, consent, good faith, international responsibility, and self-defence.
Since Hugo Grotius a seventh fundamental principle has been regarded: the free-
dom of the seas. The freedom of the seas concerned not only traffic and trade, but
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also exploitation and fishing. With the growth of technology came the possibility
of exploitation of the sea-bed and subsoil. Freedom of exploitation would lead to
exploitation by the rich and technologically highly developed states. They would
be the only states able to use this freedom. They would dominate the sea and
sea-bed economically, as they had dominated foreign lands politically in former
centuries. Freedom serves in fact the interests of the rich and powerful. Hence,
with respect to the sea-bed, Malta proposed at the 1967 UN General Assembly to
replace the regime of freedom by a regime of order, serving the whole of mankind,
an order in which the poor and less developed nations might share in the benefits
of exploitation. The Maltese proposal led to a thorough review of the Law of the
Sea by the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973-82). The develop-
ing countries generally supported a restriction of the ’freedom of the seas’, which
they considered to be a reprehensible product of the mighty maritime nations.568
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted in 1982, and the positive
implications it has had on Norway can not be exaggerated.
Moreover, the main factor of both countries’ challenges and opportunities has
proven to be an integration of Russia in the Western security structure, notwith-
standing the fact that Norway has a lot more bilateral issues to handle with
Russia compared to Sweden, which first of all has regional challenges in this
regard. Both countries’ security situation is highly dependent on Russian de-
velopments. If they do not develop positive relations with Russia, not a single
strategic challenge or opportunity is solved satisfactorily. As noted in chapter
1 of this part, the ’Russian challenge to the West is the overall essential factor
to Nordic security.’ It is thus of equal importance to both Norway and Sweden
that Russia sticks to international law. They are all members of the international
society of states with its common rules. Russia’s domestic development would,
however, have to move in a democratic direction in order to broaden the basis
for cooperation. It is obvious that that such an undertaking would be depen-
dent on greater actors than the two Nordic countries. This is the point of origin
before determining what actually accounts for Germany’s importance to Norway
and Sweden. Before analysing Germany’s importance to the issues thoroughly
elaborated in part I, a theoretical frame should be found for this analysis.
568 Rölling, B.V.A. (1992), p. 286.
Part II.
Theoretical implications

1. International society theory
The analysis has to move beyond pure power politics, and the theory suitable
to guide the following empirical analysis is derived from the English School, the
advocate of a theory of international society which recovered an older European
stream of thinking which recognised the habit of cooperation and the importance
of law in the practice of international relations. Here, the antimony between
realism and idealism underpins the most interesting works.1
International society theory emphasises the existing structure of the society of
states, with its language of sovereignty, law and rights. It is a constructivist ap-
proach as the English School rejects rationalism, in sharp contrast to neorealism
and neoliberalism, which both share the positivist assumptions that actors are
rational, interests are given, and outcomes can be explained (or predicted). In
international society theory, the society of states is not a given. It has been con-
structed by states but is not reducible to them. As a structure, it contains the
behaviour of states through institutions (or practices) which embody highly de-
veloped forms of intersubjective identity that rationalism cannot comprehend.2
The task for neo-institutionalists is to show how compliance with the rules is
maintained by the requisite proportion of incentives and sanctions. In short, the
crucial element of the rational actor model is that cooperation can be understood
without recourse to common beliefs or shared values (the US neo-institutional
model of coopration). A core assumption of Hedley Bull, one of the most fa-
mous English School theorists, is the way in which interstate cooperation has
developed out of ’the subjective sense of being bound by a community’. Broadly
summarized, for international society theorists, the pull of societal values means
that cooperation is prior to regimes, whereas for institutionalists, regimes create
1 Dunne (1995), pp. 128-129.
2 Dunne (1995), p. 145.
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cooperation.3
Before continuing, an excursion will be made in regards to what is meant by
the ’English School’. There have been considerable discrepancies in the way its
identity has ben construed, but Suganami and Linklater have undertaken a crit-
ical examination of the history of the idea of the English School. Accordingly,
it is best seen as a historically evolving group of mainly UK-based contributors
to International Relations. Ties were cultivated within the British Committee
on the Theory of International Politics but there were no rigid classification of
’insiders and outsiders’. Central figures of the school are nonetheless C.A.W.
Manning, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, Alan James, John Vincent and Adam
Watson. They were first active in the latter part of the twentieth century and
broadly see rationalism, in Wight’s sense, as a particularly important way to
interpret world politics.4 Martin Wight considered there to be three traditions
of international thought: ’Rationalism’, ’Realism’ and ’Revolutionism’. Wight’s
rationalism, sometimes labelled ’Grotian’, should not be confused with the ra-
tionalism in the American political science of international relations, according
to which states as key actors are rational utility-maximisers.5 The rationalist
tradition in Wight’s terminology sees that inter-state relations are governed by
normative principles despite the formally anarchical structure of world politics.
Thereby states do to a remarkable degree behave reasonably towards one an-
other.6 Rationalism was furthermore a via media between Realism (also known
as ’the Machiavellian’ or ’Hobbesian’ tradition) and Revolutionism (also known
as the ’Kantian’ tradition).
There has been a distinction within the English School between classical inter-
national society theorists, who have contributed to understanding key ’interna-
tional theorists’, and critical international society theorists who more explicitly
view international political theory as a site for normative exploration. Above all
Hedley Bull and Martin Wight among the classical authors are said to belong
to the ’Grotian tradition’ in international relations, a tradition with a ’constitu-
tional approach’ distinguished from the tradition based upon Hobbesian or realist
3 Dunne (1995), p. 145.
4 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 41.
5See Keohane (1989).
6 Wight (1991), pp. 13-14.
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assumptions, and from conceptions resting upon Kantian or universalist assump-
tions. Huig de Groot (Hugo Grotius) was a 17th century Dutch jurist and is said
to exemplify a particular tradition in international law. His works comprehend
issues like international law, the law of the sea, jus ad bellum7 and jus in bello8.
“Grotius asserts that the law of nature is the law that is most in confor-
mity with the social nature of man and the preservation of human society.
This law of nature in its ’primary sense’ prohibits the taking of what belongs
to others, demands restoration to others of what is their property, imposes
the duty to fulfil promises and to make reparation for injury, and confers
the right to inflict punishment. In other words it yields the requirements
for ’just war’.”9
Grotius was convinced of a society of states as much as there existed a society of
men comprising a state. His relevance for the present international system is more
than doubtful due to technological developments, the process of democratisation
within the nation state, and the process of democratisation in the world, i.e.
the expansion of the number of states forming the legal community in which
international law matters. His writings on ’just’ and ’unjust’ wars are nonetheless
of interest as they stress the necessity of judicial settlements of international
matters. 10
“It is evident that the sources from which wars arise are as numerous as
those from which lawsuits spring; for where judicial settlement fails, war
begins. Actions, furthermore, lie either for wrongs not yet committed, or
for wrongs already done.”11
Cutler argues that while Wight, Bull and some regime theorists have much in
common with Grotius, they do not rest their thinking on natural law founda-
tions and are thus termed “neo-Grotians”. She furthermore distinguishes between
“solidarist” and “pluralist” views of international society, that both accept the ex-
istence of a society of states and reject the argument that international relations
is a pre-contractual state of nature. The disagreement concerns the role of war
in international society, their identification of the source of international law and
7The law on resort to war.
8The law on the actual conduct of war.
9 Draper (1992), p. 194.
10 Draper (1992), p. 194.
11Grotius cited in Draper (1992), p. 194.
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the status of individuals in international society.12 The “pluralist” view, e.g. rep-
resented by Hedley Bull, assumes that states do not exhibit ’solidarity’ in regards
to the standards governing state action. Moreover, states “are capable of agreeing
only for certain minimum purposes which fall short of that of the enforcement
of law.”13 Hence, as Bull argues, there is no universal consensus as to right and
wrong conduct in international relations. Laws granting the ’just party’ special
status in war rather threaten to weaken the reciprocal enforcement of the laws
of war. Particular rules of intervention could thus undermine the principle of
territorial integrity as long as a societal consensus on how they should be applied
is failing’14 This view is problematic today as international law is increasingly
adjusted to the international military interventions pursued by NATO in partic-
ular and supported by almost all Western states. Germany is a country which at
least has thoroughly debated the role of military interventions.
Critical international society theorists on the other hand have a more compatible
view with the concept of a civilising foreign policy. Although progressive, for a
critical theorist the society of states is an incomplete moral sphere as it leaves
the potential for self-interested action largely untouched. In its place, Linklater
articulated an ethical universalism “whereby states enact their roles as members
of an international law-making community ... as the primary ethical reference
group in the area of foreign policy.”15 According to Dunne, the task for criti-
cal international society theory is to work towards a global consensus in three
interrelated areas: “strengthening states by broadening and deepening the prin-
ciples of good governance; civilizing foreign policy by promoting the concept of
international citizenship; and reforming international institutions in accordance
with the goal of a world common good.”16 This would imply to rethink the ex-
ternal obligations of states, which was something argued for by the pro-civilising
foreign policy concept in Germany, and to explore more thoroughly the ethical
bases of political community.17 The difficulties obviously appear when there is
a conflict between what is defined as ’vital security interests’ and the rules and
12 Cutler (1991).
13 Bull (1968), p. 52.
14Cited in Cutler (1991), p. 54.
15 Linklater (1990), 195.
16 Dunne (1995), p.138.
17 Dunne (1995), p.138.
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norms of the international society of states. This difficulty is also a challenge to
small states like Norway and Sweden. However, the tension will automatically be
greater when German foreign policy is concerned. In the case-studies following
in part III, German foreign policy will be examined on issues of vital importance
to Norway and Sweden.
As a critical remark, it can be said that “English School authors have not them-
selves been very explicit about the epistemological nature of their contentions”.18
The English School has mainly been dealing with broad questions such as ’how
does the institution of the balance of power contribute to the maintenance of
international order?’, and has tended to structure discussions in terms of the
contest between two opposing positions, pluralism and solidarism. The argument
in regards to the first part of this thesis is that the pluralist norms and rules ema-
nating from the modern society of states are the basic platform on which Norway
and Sweden have to build their relations with e.g. Russia. However, the thesis
is that in order to really improve the relations, which is the basic prerequisite to
both countries’ strategic challenges and opportunities, solidarism has to be devel-
oped in these relations. Further questions thus concern how and to what extent
this is possible, and what factors influence such a process. In the following, the
tension between pluralism and solidarism will be discussed. In order to use the
approach of the English School, which highlights coexistence and cooperation, as
well as conflict, in the relations between sovereign states, the project outlined by
Linklater and Suganami “to engage in a normatively grounded empirical analysis
of the immanent possibility of a radically improved world order” must be the
point of departure as they indicate a coherent way in which to proceeed with the
achievements of the English School.19
18 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 6.
19 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 41.

2. What are the English School’s
arguments?
There are three basic and inter-related orientations in the English School’s in-
vestigations into world politics that may be named ’structural’, ’functional’ and
’historical’. The ’structural’ orientation’s main contribution is the identification
of the institutional structure of contemporary international society, and some of
the most important works are Manning’s The Nature of International Society
(1975), James’ Sovereign Statehood (1986) and parts of Bull’s The Anarchical
Society (1977). The word ’structure’ can be associated with the institutional
framework of the world rather than with Waltz’s materialist definition as a dis-
tribution of capabilities. Thus, where ’great powers’ are discussed, they rather
think of the “socially recognized status of a small number of powerful states,
rather than merely their outstanding military capabilities.”20 Bull distinguishes
between an ’international system’ and an ’international society’. The former ex-
ists when two “or more states ... may be in contact with each other and interact
in such a way as to be necessary factors in each other’s calculations without
their being conscious of common interests or values, conceiving themselves to
be bound by a common set of rules, or co-operating in the working of common
institutions.”21 International society exists “when a group of states, conscious of
certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that
they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations
with one another, and share in the working of common institutions”22 In Bull’s
thinking, this ideal-type of international society is dependent on the practice of
states and in competition with the elements of international system and of world
20 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 44.
21 Bull (19952), p. 13.
22 Bull (19952), p. 13.
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society. These three ideal types thus approximate the the Realist, Rationalist
and Revolutionist interpretations of world politics, respectively.23
In the ’functional’ study of international society, the institutional structure of
contemporary international society is studied in regards to how, and how satis-
factorily, it has functioned and is also compared with other possible institutional
structures. This orientation to world politics is illustrated by parts of Bull’s The
Anarchical society, Vincent’s Nonintervention and International Order (1974)
and Human Rights and International Relations (1986). Among recent works, N.J.
Wheeler’s Saving Strangers (2000) and Jackson’s The Global Covenant (2000)
should be mentioned. According to Bull, six basic goals must be fulfilled in order
to sustain an international society:
1. the preservation of the system and society of states itself against challenges
to create a universal empire or challenges by supra-state, sub-state and
trans-state actors to undermine the position of sovereign states as the prin-
cipal actors in world politics;
2. the maintenance of the independence or external sovereignty of individual
states;
3. peace in the sense of the absence of war among member states of interna-
tional society as the normal condition of their relationship, to be breached
only in special circumstances and according to principles that are generally
accepted;
4. limitation of inter-state violence;
5. observance of international agreements, and
6. the stability of what belongs to each state’s sovereign jurisdiction.24
“Order” is the key term of the English school in this realm.
The third orientation of the English School concerns the historical evolution of
the institutional structure of international relations. Wights’s System of States
(1977), Bull and Watson’s The Expansion of International Society (1984), and
Watson’s The Evolution of International Society (1992) are important studies.
Watson produced a world-historical analysis of different types of international
system. An important reason for current efforts to resume the work of the
British Comitte is the wish to build on historical-sociological works instead of
23 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 53.
24Bull in Anarchical Society (1977) cited in Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 57.
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the ”ahistoricism of neo-realist theory” in order to reveal “important differences
in the nature of states and their moral purpose, in the conduct of their external
relations, and in the charcter of international systems”.25
2.1. Radicalised Revolutionism
Linklater and Suganami’s efforts to further develop solidarist tendencies of the
English School will be used as the theoretical fundament for the case studies
developed in part III. They strongly favour a reassesment of the English School’s
subsumption of Kant’s writings in the category Revolutionism and rather suggest
to put Kant in the category “radicalised rationalism”. Wight categorised different
species of revolutionism. The first form was cosmopolitanism, which he described
as a perspective defending the idea of a
“civitas maxima ... by proclaiming a world society of individuals, which
overrides nations or states, diminishing or dismissing this middle link. It
rejects the idea of a society of states and says that the only true interna-
tional society is one of individuals ... This is the most revolutionary of
Revolutionist theories and it implies the total dissolution of international
relations.”26
Bull as well criticised the Kantian tradition for threatening the fragile structure of
international society. On the contrary, Linklater and Suganami argue that Kant’s
defence of world citizenship is a conception of an international society in which
the sovereign equality of its constituent parts and the duty of non-intervention
are universally respected.
“At no point then did Kant celebrate the right of any enlightened transna-
tional elite to use force to impose its will on the rest of humankind; instead,
he envisaged an international society which would respect individual hu-
man rights, and to that extent his position was solidarist in the sense of
defending cosmopolitanism although he did not support ’cosmopolitan law
enforcement’. His defence of the principle of non-intervention reveals that
he did not break entirely with the pluralist conception of international soci-
ety, fearing that global despotism was the most likely alternative to a world
based on territorial sovereignty.27
25 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), pp. 189-190.
26 Wight (1991), p. 45.
27 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 162.
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As Kant’s vision of a world order combines sovereignty with respect for human
rights and cultural diversity, it has little in common with Wight’s description
according to Linklater and Suganami. Rather, Kant should be regarded as “a
dissenting voice within the Grotian tradition” and furthermore as a great expo-
nent of “a radicalized form of revolutionism” which aims at a “progressive” use of
the harm principle28 in international affairs. The harm principle’s validity should
thus be extended from intra- to inter-state relations and, ultimately, to all of
humanity.29 Moreover, the Kantian view is that international society should be
built on sovereignty, but states should be held responsible for observing global
moral principles. Kant’s idea of a “cosmopolitan condition of general political se-
curity” is thus a state in which the respect of individual human rights everywhere
is essential and makes up the core of radicalised rationalism.
A cosmopolitan condition of general political security is not in any way given in
Europe’s relations with Russia. Isolating Russia is difficult because vital interests
are attached to cooperation. Integration and not isolation thus seems necessary.
The war in Georgia in 2008 and the respective reactions to it exemplifies the
closeness of Norwegian and German views in order to keep the dialogue with
Russia going, whereas Sweden canceled several military visits and meetings with
Russia as a result of the war. A great Russian visit to Sweden in September
2008 was also postponed. The disagreement on Russia after the war in Georgia
was apparent both within the EU and NATO, despite a common statement of
the latter. Germany, Italy and France did not want to isolate Russia, whereas
Great Britain, Sweden, Poland and the Baltic states - among others - wanted to
do so. Norway on the other hand argued for keeping the possibility of using the
NATO-Russia-Council for a dialogue with the Russians.30 The argument is that
in this realm of Norway’s and Sweden’s strategic challenges and opportunities,
solidarist elements have to be considered when assessing Germany’s importance.
The question is whether Germany has the potential, ability and will to encourage
such a policy. The question is furthermore when solidarist and pluralist rules re-
spectively are the most effective to achieve improvements in relations with Russia,
28A cosmopolitan harm principle argues that the failing universal conception of justice should
not restrain the acknowledgement of an obligation to limit transboundary harms.
29 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 163.
30 Andreassen (2008).
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and on other matters as well. The balance between e.g. keeping a dialogue going
on the one hand and not ignoring global moral principles on the other hand will
be crucial when developing case studies on Germany’s importance to Norway and
Sweden. The general question should be raised whether German policy envisages
the progressive application of the harm principle in international affairs. Before
proceeding, more attention should be given to a ”progressive” transformation of
international society, and the tension between order and justice will be discussed.
2.2. The good international citizen
The dichotomy between preserving and strengthening international society on the
one hand and moral global justice are apparent when comparing Bull’s writings.
It took a new generation of writers in the English School who were strongly
influenced by solidarist tendencies in Bull and Vincent’s last writings to discuss
what the “good international citizen” can do to promote the transformation of
world policits, i.e. release existing potentialities in world politics and eradicate
human suffering.31 Thus, Vincent’s work on human rights and Bull’s more explicit
normative standpoint have been used to develop the idea of good international
citizenship to a case for a solidarist international society. Former Australian FM
Gareth Evans first used the expression in the late 1980s when describing a vision
of a more internationalist Australian foreign policy in which the promotion of
legitimate national interests and goals would be moderated by what Bull called
’purposes beyond ourselves’.32 This also strongly resembles the foreign policy
image Norway and Sweden have been aiming at.33 Wheeler and Dunne even go
as far as to state that “in exceptional cases” the good international citizen can
exercise the right to act alone even though unilateralism “weakens the rule of law
in the society of states”.34 This goes far beyond the English School’s thinking.
Linklater and Suganami point out that liberal-democratic societies aspiring for
a good international citizenship will have to develop principles of foreign policy
31See Wheeler/ Dunne (1998) and Wheeler/ Dunne (2001).
32 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 227.
33See chapter 3.5 of part I.
34 Wheeler/ Dunne (1998), p. 869.
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relevant to relations with very different types of states. The modern society of
states moreover remains “essentially pluralist in character”. On the other hand
is the EU an example of solidarism strengthening the ties between “core liberal-
democratic powers and also in the standpoint they adopt in their dealings with
the rest of the world.” States attached to solidarism may have abdicated power
to substate and transnational authorities.35 States like China or Russia, however,
rather commit to pluralist principles of international relations and, as a result,
hostile to external interference in domestic affairs. Russia thus has pluralist
responses to the EU.
Liberal-democratic societies are able to intervene in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq,
but this will never be possible to accomplish in larger and more powerful states.
In the present society of states, there is no consensus that ’human rights outweigh
souvereignty’. States still form the basic elements of international relations. West-
ern interventions thus sometimes appear as imperialistic actions in the name of
freedom. Here, there is tension between solidarists and pluralists. Linklater and
Suganami have considered different principles of good international citizenship,
in order to work out a best possible solution for world politics today, i.e. what is
really a good international citizenship? Before applying their conclusion on this
thesis’ research purpose, the three categories of principles will be presented.
1. The first category, in the following named pluralistic principles of good in-
ternational citizenship, applies to “the principles of good international cit-
izenship which are relevant to a condition in which great power rivalries
suggest that agreement on pluralist rules of coexistence, or on some basic
international harm conventions, is all that can reasonably be hoped for”.36
2. In the second category the principles, in the following named solidarist prin-
ciples of good international citizenship,are considered “where like-minded
states are capable of progressing beyond a pluralist contract to a soli-
darist agreement to establish cosmopolitan harm conventions which protect
individuals and non-sovereign communities from unnecessary suffering”.37
These principles are in the following named “solidarist principles” of good
international citizenship.
3. Finally, the third category reflects the principles “which apply in circum-
stances where societies which are evolving in a broadly solidarist direction
have relations with weaker societies which are commited to pluralism and
35 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 231.
36 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 232.
37 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 232.
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which resent or fear efforts to make them comply with what they see as alien
notions of human rights.”38 These principles are in the following named uni-
versally applicable principles of good international citizenship.
Despite the differences of these principles, they are united by “the ethical aspi-
ration to build a global community that institutionalizes respect for the harm
principle and grants all human beings the right to express their concerns and
fears about injury, vulnerability and suffering.”39
2.2.1. Pluralist principles
An important remark is that a pluralist system of states, where the conduct of
foreign policy ideally follows the principles below, is one which strongly favours
the dominant powers and ignores the interests of smaller states and minority peo-
ples as well as victims of human rights abuses within national borders.40 Norway
and Sweden definitely are small states, so this must be a factor to be considered
in the following. Good international citizenship which enables common progress
of states “in creating and maintaining pluralist arrangements” should at least
include the following principles:
1. states are the basic members of international society;
2. all societies have a right to a separate existence subject to the need to
maintain the balance of power;
3. intervention in the internal affairs of member states to promote some vision
of human decency or human justice is prohibited;
4. states should relinquish the goal of acquiring preponderant power in the
international system;
5. the duty to cooperate to maintain an equilibrium of power is incumbent on
all states;
6. diplomatic efforts to reconcile competing interests should proceed from the
assumption that each state is the best judge of its own interests;
7. an ’inclusive’ as opposed to ’exclusive’ conception of the national interest
should be pursued so that other states, and the society to which they belong,
are not harmed for the sake of trivial national advantages;
38 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 232.
39 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 232.
40 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 238.
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8. because of their unique military capabilities the great powers should as-
sume special responsibilities which are determined by mutual consent for
preserving international order;
9. an essential purpose of an ’inclusive’ foreign policy is to make changes to in-
ternational society which will satisfy the legitimate interests of rising powers
and new member states;
10. force is justified in self-defence and in response to states that seek prepon-
derant power; and
11. proportionality in war should be respected along with the principle that
defeated powers should be readmitted as equals into international society.41
2.2.2. Solidarist principles
It will be argued that in order to protect e.g. small states in their relations
with great powers, international law and cosmopolitan values must be added as
principles of the international society of states. Linklater and Suganami have
further derived the more important principles from those English School writings
considering current possibilities for transforming world politics in a solidarist
direction:
1. individuals and the various communities and associations to which they
belong are the fundamental members of international society;
2. unnecessary suffering and cruelty to individuals and their immediate asso-
ciations should be avoided in the conduct of war;
3. pluralist commitments to sovereignty and sovereign immunity should be
replaced by the notion of personal responsibility for infringements of the
laws of war;
4. superior orders do not justify violations of humanitarian international law;
5. breaches of the laws of war should be punishable in domestic and interna-
tional courts;
6. the sovereignty of the state is conditional on compliance with the interna-
tional law of human rights
7. sovereignty does not entitle states to be free from ’the legitimate appraisal
of their peers’ with respect to human rights;
8. states have responsibilities as custodians of human rights everywhere;
41 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), pp. 238-240.
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9. individuals have the legal right of appeal to international courts of law when
violations of human rights occur; and
10. regard for human rights requires respect for non-sovereign communities and
requires the society of states to protect minority nations and indigenous
peoples from unnecessary suffering.42
2.2.3. Universally applicable principles
Whether Vincent nor Bull argued that good international citizens had the right,
or duty, to intervene on humanitarian grounds. Vincent, however, perceieved
the emergence of a “world civil society” with responsibility for monitoring com-
pliance with human righs law to be an effective compromise between pluralism
and solidarism.43 Hence, there are many methods below military intervention to
influence a regime violating human rights. The EU as an example has rules gov-
erning the acceptance of new member states, which have to commit to solidarism
with respect to human rights.44
Far more disputed, of course, is the question of whether the good international
citizen is entitled to defend human rights by using force. There is thus no simple
answer to the question of how to respond to gross violations of human rights.
Although this was not the initial reason for invading Afghanistan in 2001, it
is often used as a legitimising argument towards the public in the participant
countries, under which Norway, Sweden and Germany are found. The ques-
tion further discussed by Linklater and Suganami is “how far solidarists should
apply the principles which pertain to relations between themselves to relations
with pluralist societies (and, conversely, how far relations between solidarists and
pluralists should be governed by distinctive principles of good international cit-
izenship).” Based on Bull’s remark on the consensus that certain acts are so
abhorrent that the idea of natural rights is legitimised, they have come to the
following: First, pluralist regimes should not be exempt from solidarist principles
regarding the conduct of war. Second, pluralist regimes should not be immune
from close scrutiny by peers. This implies that the principles listed in chapter
42 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), pp. 243-244.
43 Vincent (1992), p. 291.
44 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 248.
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2.2.2 of this part also apply to the solidarist’s relations with pluralist states.45
Finally, a third list of recommended principles of good international citizenship
is concerned with humanitarian responsibilities for minimising harm to members
of vulnerable societies and based on English School discussions of human rights:
1. subject to United Nations approval, solidarist states can exercise a collective
right of humanitarian intervention when gross violations of human rights
occur;
2. the good international citizen may believe there is a strong moral case for
unilateral intervention, but doubts about legality require a global dialogue
to ascertain whether states can agree that supreme humanitarian emergen-
cies justify new principles of humanitarian intervention;
3. solidarists have a prima facie duty to avoid being complicit in human rights
violations in other societies;
4. there is a related obligation to avoid exploitation (in the sense of ’taking
advantage of the vulnerable’) as well as profiting from unjust enrichment;
5. there is a duty to protect vulnerable peoples from terrible hardship such as
extreme poverty and curable disease;
6. aﬄuent societies have global environmental responsibilities to ensure that
vulnerable populations enjoy a safe natural environment;
7. obligations to protect the vulnerable require the establishment of global
political structures - involving close cooperation with international gov-
ernmental and non-governmental organizations - that institutionalize the
universal right to be able to protest against actual or potential harm.46
Applying such a logic, this means that Norway and Sweden should act accord-
ingly toward their great neighbour Russia, Norway would probably have to ad-
just its policy more in the Swedish direction. Nonetheless, considering obvious
inequalities, this is probably not possible for a state outside the EU. The policy
recommendation must thus be both a Norwegian EU membership and an im-
proved EU policy on Russia. A counterargument pertaining to principle three
listed above might be that pressure on e.g. China in the human rights domain
could jeopardise its support for global non-proliferation norms.47 From this also
follows that it is sometimes necessary with a cautious response, not least when
great powers are concerned.
45 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 253.
46 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 254.
47 Wheeler/ Dunne (1998), p.865.
3. Further considerations
Linklater and Suganami conlude that “the key issue ... seems to be the legiti-
macy of the chosen means.”48 This would furthermore secure the conception of
solidarism from become a self-serving doctrine, and a modified interpretation of
solidarism would rather be
“a political attitude which insists that we must not be pessimistically fa-
talistic about the extent to which progress can be made in international re-
lations; that we must nurture those potentialities, perceptible in the world,
which, when realized, will make it a more orderly and just place; and that
in attempting to actualize such potentialities, care must be taken to act on
the basis of sound consensual legitimacy.”49
Finally remains the question what a “sound consensual legitimacy” would be.
One implication is to take a pluralist stance where a necessary consensus is ab-
sent.50 Consensus and legitimacy are thus seemingly the key terms both when
considering humanitarian interventions, which are only possible in certain weaker
states, and of improving world politics in general. This means that solidarists
and pluralists must find the least common denominator and act from here to
broaden the common agenda. This is also what the West is trying to do with
Russia, but the different approaches of e.g. Norway and Sweden show that not
even liberal-democratic states can agree on what is the right way to go. It more-
over shows that states act on the basis of their own preferences and their own
presumed strengths. The core of Norway’s and Sweden’s strategic challenges is
thus to challenge the right of the strongest, i.e. principles should be based on
legitimacy and not power. Some further aspects must however also be involved
in the further analysis because the analysis of part I moreover shows that it is
not only a matter of principles but also of mechanisms. Why do some states
48 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 271.
49 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 271.
50 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 272.
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become more power than they necessarily need to have have? What is the im-
pact of fear in international politics? Consensus and legitimacy are key terms,
but consensus at what price? Is it better that states pretend to agree when they
actually disagree instead of taking a dispute at an early stage? Do large states
get more powerful simply because they are allowed to? Is the international so-
ciety of states simply too afraid of the powerful? Where is the legitimacy when
some states can be invaded whereas other states are allowed to do whatever they
want to because of their size or economy? Principles should be equally applied
to all states regardless of their status. This is the point where it is the hardest
to apply a “sound consensual legitimacy”. To avoid disputes with great powers
at almost any price just gives them increased power. This however also implies
that the West does not have the legitimacy to say “this is the way things shold
be”. If there are disagreements between states, this should still imply that the
views of the opponent are respected. If problems with great powers are brushed
under the carpet, the international society of states is letting them do whatever
they like. A policy, which allows for disagreements but still respects the oppo-
nents, would allow for more foreseeability and less power games. If the power is
given away, somebody else will take it. If a significant actor is allowed to break
international law without significant reactions, then you really got a significant
problem in the end. Consensus and legitimacy are thus terms that should be com-
plemented by independence. States, and alliances, need to have strategies and
cannot solely lean on international law or multilateralism either. There is thus
no definite conclusion on what a good international citizenship should comprise,
because the preconditions are always changing and because of this, a policy or a
principle also need to be reconsidered. The risks must thus always be considered
when a solidarist position is taken instead of a pluralist, but the most important
part must be conscious policies, i.e. that the aim is clear and the risks as well.
Developments can not always be predicted, but if the policy is not reconsidered,
the problems will return because no improvement has taken place. What might
prevent such reconsiderations are rather the power structures as such, and that
is why they are so dangerous. It must be possible to take a position in order
to change this at a later point of time. This also implies that a solidarist policy
direction in one case might be the right decision at one point of time and the
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wrong position at a a later point of time. These additional reflections should be
added to the theoretical background of international society theory.
This is the theoretical basis which will attend the further analysis. Is Germany
a “ ‘good international citizen” who can unify the best of pluralist and solidarist
principles to the best of the international society of states? This will also be
dependent on the mechanisms prevailing in German politics and the ability to re-
consider its policy. A thorough analysis of German foreign policy from 1945 until
1990 will be conducted first. Then, the most important actors and institutions
shaping Germany’s foreign policy and their roles are analysed. This is the setting
of today’s German foreign policy. Finally, case studies will be designed in order
to analyse Germany’s approaches in areas of significance to Norway and Sweden
with special focus on a. whether German policy is based on acting “on the basis
of sound consensual legitimacy” and b. German attitudes on the legitimacy of
the chosen means when there is a conflict between order and justice. Its post-
war foreign policy history is the initial point for picking Germany as the most
probable exemplar of a a good international citizen in the international society of
states. Being European also increases the topicality for north European issues.

Part III.
Germany’s foreign policy on
Northern Europe

1. German foreign policy
1.1. Historical classification of German foreign
policy
Kenenth Waltz’1954 distinction of three levels of foreign policy analysis comprised
the level of the international system of states, the level of collective innerstate
actors and the level of individual innerstate actors.1 This historical construction
will, as outlined by Haftendorn, be seen as a structural explanation of develop-
ment patterns and specific interaction between actors and system.2 The actors
here are the political elite of West Germany. The most important reference sys-
tem of West German foreign policy was the Euro-Atlantic area. Security, the
German question, European integration and foreign economics were important
key aspects. According to Haftendorn, foreign policy is in a theoretical perspec-
tive understood as a process of interaction, where one state tries to realise its basic
goals and values in competition with the other states. The process is influenced
by the demands from the international system and by the domestic society and
state. The result is thus a dynamic process of two-way adaption and influence,
which is performed both on the international and domestic level.3
According to Watson, French, German and British policies were during the
Cold War still rooted in their experience in the European system of the grande
république and had to be “painfully adapted to the very different patterns of power
which ... prevailed in the world”.4 The rift between the two super-systems was
not as great as it is sometimes portrayed. The world remained very much one sys-
1See Waltz (20013).
2 Haftendorn (2001), p. 14.
3 Haftendorn (2001), p. 13.
4 Watson (1993), p. 293.
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tem strategically, and each superpower was the principal military concern of the
other. The world also remained formally one international society, with a com-
mon structure of international law, diplomatic representation and other rules and
institutions inherited from the European society. Watson also notes that Russian
policy for the last three centuries has usually had a “considerable preference for
stability in the European grande république and for expansion elsewhere.”5
German foreign policy is often characterised as more suitable for small Euro-
pean countries than what is usually common for a European power. A historical
classification is necessary to understand the basis of Germany’s current foreign
policy. In order to to do, one should go as far back as the period 1945 to 1949
when Germany was parted in two and occupied by the victorious powers from the
Second World War - the US, the Soviet Union, the UK and France. The great
task of West Germany’s foreign policy was to regaining the freedom of action for
German politics. The way the politicians answered to challenges like foreign con-
trol, limitations and boundaries imposed by Germany’s occupiers is important.
Voluntarily abandoning sovereignty was in many cases necessary to achieve an
increased freedom of action.6
The history of West German foreign policy is thus also a history of European
integration. West German foreign policy until 1990 was to a large extent charac-
terised by a cautious foreign policy style, military abstinence, the firm integration
in international and supranational organisations and the denial of any kind of na-
tional great power policy as well as any “Sonderwege”.7 Famous is the kneeling
down of Willy Brandt in 1970 after the wreath ceremony on the memorial of the
victims of the Warsaw ghetto revolt of 1943. This did not lead to improved rela-
tions between Poles and Germans, but what began as a confession of guilt by a
German head of state, was on 6 December 2000 converted to a Polish conciliatory
gesture when a memorial of the kneeling down was disclosed.
“Anhand des Kniefalls lässt sich exemplarisch verdeutlichen, wie um-
fassend die außenpolitischen Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik von der Ver-
gangenheit, in erster Linie der nationalsozialistischen, geprägt sind. Mehr
noch: Ohne Kenntnis dieser Vergangenheit lässt sich die Außenpolitik der
5 Watson (1993), p. 293.
6 Haftendorn (2001), p. 10.
7 Schwelling (2007), pp. 102-103.
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Bundesrepublik nicht verstehen.”8
The politician Willy Brandt also played a special part in Germany’s damaged
relations with Norway and Sweden. Moreover, the political parties, and the so-
cial democratic ones in particular and their political élites even more so, played a
crucial role in the recovering of German-Scandinavian relations after the Second
World War. This, although not counting to the core policy areas or top priority
of post-war West German foreign policy, will be the closing issue the following
analysis. The focus will be on German foreign relations with Norway and Swe-
den, and as opposed to the other chapters, this will be dated further back in
history in order to put German-Scandinavian relations in the right perspective
and illuminate what a great break the Second World War accounts for.
1.1.1. The strategy of Westintegration
Four years after the end of the Second World war the US, Great Britain and
France established a German “West-state” of their three occupation zones which
was based on a liberal democracy and market economy. The Soviet Union on the
other hand created the GDR as the German outpost of its communistic sphere
of control. Two German provisional constituent states thus existed from 1949
on under allied provisos. They were thus only to a very limited extent able to
make their own foreign policies.9 Four fundamental principles for Germany were
established by the occupying powers: demilitarisation, denazifisation, decentral-
isation and democratisation. In the West, four High Commissioners resided on
the Petersberg above Bonn, whereas the Soviet Control Committee was situated
in Berlin-Karlshorst. It was not until 1951 that the FRG had a Foreign Office at
its disposal. With growing scepticism towards the Soviet Union the US initiated
a new turn in their policy on Germany in the autumn of 1946 which preferred a
political rearrangement of Germany. Since February 1948 the Western allies dis-
cussed ways to create a federal system of governance in West Germany and the
possibility of Germany joining the Marshall plan. In the Frankfurt documents,
the prime ministers of the German countries were authorised to convene a con-
8 Schwelling (2007), p. 102.
9 Kronenberg (2009), p. 14.
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stituent national assembly. Not a constitution but a temporary “Grundgesetz ” of
8 May was agreed on in order to prevent an enduring partition of Germany. From
a foreign policy point of view, the Grundgesetz communicated two national ob-
jective dispositions (Staatszielbestimmungen): First, there was the commitment
“in freier Selbstbestimmung die Einheit und Freiheit Deutschlands zu vollenden”
(preamble). Second, the preparedness to delegate sovereign rights to interstate
arrangements in order to bring about and secure “eine friedliche und dauerhafte
Ordnung in Europa und zwischen den Völkern der Welt” (Art. 24) was impor-
tant.10
There were three competing conceptions of foreign policy in this early stage of the
FRG, developed by the decisive party politicians Konrad Adenauer (CDU), Kurt
Schumacher (CDU) and Jakob Kaiser (CDU). According to Adenauers view, the
old world was threatened by a relationship of inferiority in regards to the two super
powers. This picture could only be corrected if the European democracies joined
forces through integration. To Adenauer, the prerequisite for Europe’s recovery
was the overcoming of the antagonism between Germany and France.11 He also
considered the “Westbindung” to be more important than German unity, whereas
Kaiser, the CDU chairman in the Soviet occupation zone (SBZ), was the opinion
that Germany could prevent the partition and function as a bridge betweeen East
and West. The social democrat Schumacher only approved of Westbindung to an
extent which allowed West Germany to erode the power system in the SBZ. His
higher goals were independence, equality and self-determination for Germany.12
Adenauer’s view was to be established with his long chancellorship from 1949 to
1963. He additionally even acted as a foreign minister from 1951 to 1955 as foreign
policy was a matter of the German chancellery until 1955. Adenauer’s policy was
unique because he sought to achieve the aim of national sovereignty through a sort
of “payment in advance” to the Western powers which should result in the claimed
equality. The formula “Souveränitätsgewinn durch Souveränitätsverzicht”13 thus
demonstrates this policy.14
10 Lappenküper (2008), p. 3
11 Kronenberg (2009), p. 16.
12 Lappenküper (2008), pp. 4-5; Kronenberg (2009), p. 16.
13“gain of sovereignty through abandonment of sovereignty”
14 Kronenberg (2009), p. 16.
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In 1949, West Germany lacked both an international reputation and full
sovereignty. To Adenauer the gain of security and sovereignty, the anchoring
as an equal member of the western society of states and the firm conncection
with the US was more important than unity. Lappenküper describes the pe-
riod 1949 to 1955 as “sovereignty through integration”.15 Germany was a struc-
tural dependent system which regularly needed to adapt its policy.16 Economic
prosperity was dependent on the end of the dismantlement and control of the
West German industry, in addition to accession to the world market by the West
German industry. In the question of a remilitarisation of West Germany, the
Western powers disagreed, and France was a strong opponent. NATO had de-
cided to increase the size of its troops. This was only achievable with a West
German participation. Adenauer’s concept “security through integration” thus
seemed suitable to combine military necessities with the emotional and political
sensitivities of the Western European neighbours. From a West German point of
view only the US and the Atlantic Alliance were able to protect West Germany’s
security. A prerequisit was a certain amount of democratic behaviour as well as a
settlement with France. In order to achieve this, Bonn voluntarily took on limita-
tions in areas which could jeaopardise France’s security. In addition to favouring
supranational or strong intergovernmental solutions through the abandonment of
sovereign rights, the allied proviso rights in regards to Germany as a whole and
Berlin contributed to the German self-restraint.17 Keeping Germany outside any
alliance in a European security system would have been an alternative to the
unconditioned Westintegration followed by Adenauer’s government, which made
a German reunion impossible in a short and and medium term perspective. Ade-
nauer wanted inner stabilisation and protection from outside. As the interests of
the Western powers were concerned, Adenauer had no choice but supporting the
views of particularly France and the US in order to increase its political freedom
of action. On 6 March 1950 the same year the Western powers implemented a
“small amendment” of the occupation charter and allowed the FRG to reestablish
a Foreign Office and to have diplomatic relations with foreign states. On 18 April
1951 the foreign ministers of the FRG, France, Italy and the Benelux-states signed
15 Lappenküper (2008), p. 5
16 Haftendorn (2001), p. 13.
17 Haftendorn (2001), p. 57.
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the treaty of the establishment of the the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC). A further foreign policy success of Adenauer was the German acces-
sion to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Further German
allowances were, however, met with some irritation by the Western powers, and
German rearmament was still supposed to be organised in a European Defence
Community and not in NATO. In March 1952, Stalin suggested to its three West-
ern counterparts the closing of a peace treaty with a neutralised, united Germany
(Stalin Note). This, however, rather accelerated the negotiations on the ending
of the occupation charter and the rearmament of West Germany. The “Treaty on
Germany” was concluded on 26 May 1952 in Bonn and entitled the FRG to the
full power of its domestic and international affairs. However, the Western pow-
ers kept the supremacy and several provisos in regards to Berlin, German unity
and the deployment of troops. Thereafter, the treaty on the European Defence
Community was signed in Paris. This project, however, soon came to a grief in
1954 due to French sentiments.18
Adenauer attached the readiness of a German military contribution to the claim of
an abolishment of the occupation charter and succeeded. The legal validity of the
Treaty on Germany was from the beginning attached to a military and security
political west-integration of the FRG. The Western powers finally confirmed the
modified Version of the Treaty on Germany from May 1952 in the Paris Treaties
of 23 October 1953. Important is thus that West Germany developed to an
important ally of the West in the conflict with the Soviet Union, not least as a
result of its geographic position. This made up Germany’s political weight. When
the UK accepted a permanent West German troop presence in Europe and the
FRG stated the abandonment of ABC weapons production, France finally gave up
the resistance against West Germany’s admission to NATO after having achieved
the membership of Germany in the WEU, which it acceded to on 7 May 1955.
Two days later West Germany joined NATO, whereas East Germany became part
of the Soviet’s Warsaw Pact. West Germany was thus both in a transatlantic and
European way integrated in the western security alliance. With the end of the
occupation charter, the establishment of the ministry of defence and with it the
creation of the Bundeswehr, a large extent of sovereignty was created for the
18 Lappenküper (2008), pp. 8-11; Kronenberg (2009), pp. 16-17.
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“Bonn republic”.19
1.1.2. European policy
As a long-term objective of West Geman foreign policy was the creation of a
United States of Europe. The European policy of Adenauer thus had a post-
national perspective. Such federative ideas were, however, far too far-reaching
not least to France, and the French national assembly finally deleted the idea
of a European federal state with the rejection of a common european defence.
From then on, Adenauer chose a double track to pursue his European policy:
supranational approaches and interstate cooperation as far as possible. Adenauer
thus set the benchmark for the following federal governments.20
An economic way to Adenauer’s long-term objective of a united Europe seemed
rather plausible as compared to the failing attempts to create an EPC. The
connecting factor was the ’Schuman plan’ or the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC). French FM Robert Schuman had presented the suggestion of
such a union between France, the FRG, the Benelux-states and Italy in 1950.
Such an economic association of the West European heavy industry should thus
through a supranational control authority contribute to promote Europe’s po-
litical unification. The German chancellor saw the possibility in the ECSC to
provide Germany equal rights in Europe and to strengthen the West altogether,
to achieve a compromise with France in the Saar-question21 and at the same time
to make the allied limits put on the West-German economic capacity redundant.
The ECSC Treaty was signed on 18 April 1951 and came into effect on 23 July
1952. Thus the so called “Ruhr statute” which had put limits on the German
production ceased to exist.22
The supranational form of organisation which the ECSC comprised was a case
19 Kronenberg (2009), p. 18
20 Bredow(2006), pp.220-221.
21From 1947 onwards, the Saar was detached from the French occupied zone in Germany
and became part of a customs, economic and monetary union with France. The Saar Regional
Government did enjoy political autonomy but remained under the authority of the French High
Commissioner. There was, therefore, a real economic frontier between the Saar and the rest of
Germany. The Saar Treaty signed on 27 October 1956 solved the question and the Saar became
a full federal state of the FRG.
22 Kronenberg (2009), p. 18.
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sui generis and was intensely discussed in domestic German politics. Adenauer
also faced great opposition to the achieved German membership of the European
Council as an associated member without a seat in the committee of ministers al-
though at the same time the Saarland should be accepted as a member. Adenauer
however was convinced that a national abandonment of sovereignty through inte-
gration in European (ECSC) and Atlantic (NATO) structures was the best way to
accomplish German interests which were Freiheit, Frieden und Wiedervereinigung
(Freedom, Peace and Reunion).23
After having resolved the Saar-question with France in 1956, as the region was
incorporated in the ambit of the Grundgesetz, the negotiations on a common
European market experienced a breakthrough. The Treaties of Rome were both
signed on 25 March 1957 by the six countries pursuing European integration.
The first treaty signed was the one establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community (EAEC). The second treaty established the EEC, often referred to
as the Treaty of Rome.24 The EEC came into effect on 1 January 1958 and with
it was the contractual integration of Germany in the West completed in the first
instance.25
The concepts of European policy in France and Germany were different in sig-
nificant aspects. In 1958 the federal government of West Germany aimed at
accelerated implementation of the Treaties of Rome and the development of the
EEC. Furthermore, it was the opinion that the EEC, which institutions were
the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Assem-
bly, already had become the core of a political community. French president de
Gaulle on the other hand preferred an EEC reduced to its politico-economic func-
tions, and additional policial cooperation should be organised due to interstate
principles.26
In July 1960 de Gaulle suggested a German-French alliance, with which a closer
cooperation between both states in all realms of politics, economy, culture and
23 Kronenberg (2009), p. 19.
24This treaty was renamed Treaty establishing the European Community (the EC Treaty) by
the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 and Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Since 1993 it has been joined by the Treaty on European
Union (TEU).
25 Kronenberg (2009), p. 19; Hesse/Ellwein (2012), pp. 134-135.
26 Haftendorn (2001), p. 73.
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defence should be achieved. The supranational institutions of the EEC should on
the other hand be repositioned and reduced to consultant and technical functions
acoording to de Gaulle, who also suggested to displace the integrated defence
programme of NATO with a closer military cooperation of the six and thus re-
duce the US dominance in the alliance.27 Adenauer was very much situated in
a dilemma between not annoying the French and at the same time not jeopar-
dising the US security guarantee. In regards to monetary policy West Germany
belonged to the world’s fifth strongest states but was otherwise a political dwarf
and dependent on Western goodwill. The French were very firm in their support
for the West German view on Berlin, and when the building of the Berlin wall
started on 13 August 1961, this contributed to Adenauer’s decision to open up
to the French proposals. In mid 1962 the chancellor even opted for a bilateral
alliance with France and to some extent left the multilateral path. On 22 January
1963 de Gaulle and Adenauer signed the treaty on German-French cooperation
in order to tie the union to international law. In the parliamentary legislation
process, however, a close coordination with the US and a comprehensive political
opinion process was performed in West German politics before the Elysée Treaty
was ratified by the Bundestag in May. In the preamble of the ratification law,
the multilateral linkage of the FRG was stressed and thus relaxed the exclusive
alliance.28 Germany also acceded to NATO’s nuclear policy and to an active col-
laboration on a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) planned by president Kennedy.
According to Kronenberg, Adenauer’s great merit was to have conducted the
policy of Western alignment consequently and against any resistance. A further
merit is thus the reconciliation policy with France which culminated in the Elysée
Treaty, shortly before the end of his term in office. Both sides affirmed the in-
tention to arrange common consultations on important foreign policy questions.
In addition, the foreign- and defence ministers of both states should meet four
times a year, achieve a harmonisation in strategic questions and intensify the
cooperation in questions of youth and culture.29
However, the following West German government coalition between CDU and
27 Haftendorn (2001), p. 73.
28 Lappenküper (2008), p. 17; Haftendorn (2001), p. 78; Kronenberg (2009), p.
20.
29 Kronenberg (2009), p. 20.
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FDP resulted in a liberal foreign minister, Gerhard Schröder, who was very much
dedicated to Anglo-Saxon politics. Both Schröder and the new chancellor Erhard
stressed a transatlantic partnership and a British membership in the EEC. Ludwig
Erhard (CDU), who felt a close affinity with British politics, succeeded Adenauer
as chancellor in October 1963. As France asked for German support in the nu-
clear question, Bonn faced the difficult alternative of choosing between Paris and
Washington. This was a conflict of priority which designated West German for-
eign and security policys in the following years.30 The fusion of the institions of
the EEC, the ECSC and the EAEC to the European Communities by 1 January
1963 could not cover the many conflicts with France that now faced the FRG.
The peak of the dissonance between France and Germany on the topic European
policy was reached in 1965 when de Gaulle questioned the majority rule in the
Council of Ministers. France’s return to the supranational processes of the EEC
was eventually reached in January 1966 with the ’Luxemburg compromise’ which
allowed for a refusal to be overruled by the majority in questions of vital national
interests.31 Conflicts were moreover apparent in the alliance policy, the Ostpolitik
and the policy of détente. These difficult questions further increased the distance
between those who prioritised amicable adjustments with France as the first for-
eign policy goal (“Gaullists”) and those who first and foremost tried to sustain
the Atlantic Alliance and the relationship with Washington (“Atlanticists”). This
conflict even affected the potency of West German diplomacy according to Haf-
tendorn.32 However, there was no such thing as two dividing camps among West
German foreign policy actors according to Lappenküper. This because the “At-
lanticists”, who one would find in every political party, did not want to suspend
the understanding with France, and the “Gaullists” of the CDU/ CSU were by
no means unconditionally following de Gaulle.33
Eventually, things improved when Erhard and de Gaulle left their offices. The
European policy of the social-liberal coalition led by Brandt was based on four
principles: the enhancement of European unity, the deepening and enlargement
of the EEC, the bridgning between West European conciliation and transatlantic
30 Haftendorn (2001), pp. 81-82.
31 Kronenberg (2009), p. 21.
32 Haftendorn (2001), pp. 83-84.
33 Lappenküper (2008), p. 87.
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partnership and the normalisation of the relations to Eastern Europe.34 The EPC,
stipulated on the summit of Den Haag in December 1969, coordinated the foreign
policies of the member states within an intergovernmental framework. In March
1971 it was agreed on the gradual implementation of an Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) was generated, and in the mid 1970s France and Germany again
started being the engines of European integration. Chancellor Brandt further
demanded new efforts to implement the enlargement of the communities. The
EPC was more successful than the EMU and was joined by the UK, Ireland and
Denmark in March 1972. This new consultation mechanism was not part of the
Treaties of Rome as a result of French resistance but was limited to interstate
processes. At the same time transatlantic tensions were apparent as European
assertiveness in both monetary and energy questions ignored a coordinated policy
with the US. As a result, a new charter on transatlantic relations was signed by the
NATO member states. Both sides furthermore decided to intensify consultations.
Thereafter it was up to every member of the EPC to claim the consultation with
a third state (the US) before a decision-taking. Denmark, Ireland and the UK
moreover became members of the EC in 1973, not least as a result of an active
German diplomacy.35
The second social-liberal coalition government was led by Helmut Schmidt
from 1974 to 1982. As opposed to the Ostpolitik and defence policy of
Schmidt/Genscher, their European policy has not been a common research sub-
ject. 1974 has, however, been classified as a break in West German European
policy as the new government put a cost-benefit aspect in the centre of the
decision-making. Further, there is evidence that Schmidt perceived the political
cooperation in Europe as indispensable from the very beginning of his chancel-
lorship but that the traditional preference for the Anglo-Saxon option did not
weaken before the deficiency of the US leadership became apparent and was thus
exchanged with a preference for France.36 According to Kronenberg, Schmidt
often prioritised European over German interests.37 Schmidt’s cooperation with
Giscard d’Estaing has been thoroughly examined, which he consolidated out of
34 Lappenküper (2008), p. 100.
35 Haftendorn (2001), pp. 85-88; Kronenberg (2009), p. 26.
36 Lappenküper (2008), p. 105.
37 Kronenberg (2009), p. 26.
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pragmatic considerations. As a result of the oil crisis of 1973 president Gis-
card d’Estaing and chancellor Schmidt agreed on a new platform of economic
gathering, which later developed to into the G-7 and accordingly G-8. A new
European body, the European Council, was also created during Schmidt’s term
in office in addition to direct elections of the European Parliament in 1979. The
European Monetary System (EMS) created in 1978 was the greatest common
French-German effort. The economic division of the EC as a significant obstacle
to growth should thus be overcome. The EMS should stabilise the European
currencies through a so called exchange rate mechanism which determined the
fluctuation of the currancies in certain specified fluctuation margins.38
Precisely through the initiative of the EMS and through the always close
attunement with the French president Giscard d’Estaing, Helmut Schmidt
succeeded in taking the leading role in the EC together with France and
also in strengthening the EC internationally and not least also towards the
weakened US under president Carter. However the selective achievements
under the pressure of the economic conditions could not hide the fact that
the European processes of integration stagnated from the mid 1970s to the
beginning of the 1980s.”39
In the beginning of the 1980s the European integration got into a stage of stag-
nation. Necessary reforms (Common Agricultural Policy and public finances law)
failed, as did also the attempt to arrange a “European foreign policy”. FM Gen-
scher and his Italian colleague Colombo initiated a “European Act” in 1981 in
which further task areas of the foreign and security policy, the development pol-
icy, the technology and energy policy as well as the societal and culture policy
should be communitarised.40 Genscher’s initiative on revitalising the political
unity was opposed by Schmidt. Whereas Genscher tried to pursue a reform of
the EEC treaty system, the chancellor concentrated on the German-French con-
nection as the core of European cooperation.41 Genscher continued as a FM in
the new government of Helmut Kohl (CDU), and Kohl’s attitude was positive. He
perceieved himself as a guardian of Adenauer’s European policy and envisioned
the idea of a political union in the larger context of the Atlantic Alliance. The
policy of distinctive bilateralism with France, beginning in 1984, played a key
38 Kronenberg (2009), p. 27.
39 Kronenberg (2009), p. 27. Author’s translation.
40 Hesse/Ellwein (2012), p. 135.
41 Lappenküper (2008), p. 106.
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role in shaping the Single European Act (SEA), which as an expansion of the EC
foundation treaties created the legal basis for the accomplishment of the Single
Market in particular.42 The federal government was not interested in a collec-
tivisation of foreign policy, although Genscher tried to reform the institutional
decision-making process of the WEU. The FM of the FRG was an exponent of
integration policy as opposed to interest policy.43
To sum up, the priority conflict Paris/Washington was the structural precondition
of the West German foreign policy which constrained Bonn’s freedom of action.
However, the cooperation in the EC also enabled Bonn to add more weight to its
own interests towards the US.44 According to Haftendorn it was not very hard for
Bonn to play the European card as Europeanisation was one of the ideological
pillars of the FRG, which from the 1960s on conformed to the West German
economic interests.45 As the economic historian W. Abelshauser stated, nothing
has shaped the West German state so strongly as its economic development.46
1.1.3. Ostpolitik and policy of détente
The overall Western détente policy, beginning with US president Johnson’s vi-
sionary speech in 1966 of a bridging between East and West, composed the frame
of the German Ostpolitik and policy of détente.47 President Johnson’s vision-
ary speech of a bridging of East and West in 1966 was a sign of détente policy.
Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, both advisers of the State Departe-
ment, demanded of the West German government to pursue efforts to improve
the East-West relations without linking it to progress in the German question.48
At the approximate same time, France intensified its relations with the Soviet
42 Hesse/Ellwein (2012), p. 135.The SEA was the first major revision of the Treaty of
Rome. The act set an objective for the EC to establish a single market by 31 December 1992,
and codified EPC, the forerunner of CFSP.
43 Lappenküper (2008), p. 109.
44 Hellmann (2006), p. 96.
45 Haftendorn (2001), p. 93.
46Cited in Hellmann (2006), p. 95.
47Important steps of Western détente-policy was the teststop treaty, signed in August 1963
between the UK, the Soviet Union, and the US, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty from 1968.
Moreover, US-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)and negotiations on the abdi-
cation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) begun in the late 1960s. Both led to agreements in
1972.
48 Haftendorn (2001), p. 173.
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and East European states. In 1963 and 1964 he West German federal govern-
ment was able to begin economic relations with Poland, Romania, Hungary and
Bulgaria, in addition to stipulating the exchange of trade missions. However,
unsolved questions in regards to borders and status conflicted with closer rela-
tions to these states. As signs became apparent of a future Soviet West-policy
in the end of 1965, West German state secretary Karl Carstens (CDU) went to
Moscow to signal interest in resuming a dialogue. The federal government hence
decided to start a diplomatic initiative (“Note zur Abrüstung und Sicherung des
Friedens”) in order to keep records of its preparedness of détente. On 25 March
1966 the federal government directed a note to all states with which the FRG
had diplomatic relations and to the East European and Arabic states, except of
the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Here, the government’s Germany and
détente policies were presented. It was argued for both a peaceful solution of the
German question and for a consistent disarmament policy. Concrete suggestions
were the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, military confidence building and
exchange of non-violence declarations.49 Mutual statements on renunciation of
violence were suggested in order to meet the security needs of the Eastern Eu-
ropean states. The decisive change in the German Ostpolitik from 1963 to 1966
was that the policy of détente was no longer dependent on concrete progress in
the German question. In his first government declaration, chancellor Kiesinger
moreover uplifted the maintenance of peace to the highest goal of federal foreign
policy in place of reunification.50
Problematic core issues were the Oder-Neiße line as Poland’s western border,
the invalidity of the Munich agreement of 1938 and the existence of the GDR
as a state. Karl Carstens encouraged a revision of the Germany-policy, i.e. a
modification of the Alleinvertretungsanspruches (the right of West Germany to
represent the whole of Germany by itself). A more active Ostpolitik towards the
states of the Warsaw pact necessitated a softening of this pretension to represent
Germany on their onwn.51 From 1966 onwards the great coalition of CDU, CSU
and SPD also advanced their position on this policy. This implied that the GDR
should be recognised as a state-connatural entity, confidential talks with the so-
49 Haftendorn (2001), pp. 174-175.
50 Kronenberg (2009), p. 21.
51 Kronenberg (2009), p. 22.
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viet Union should be established. Germany also established diplomatic relations
with Romania in 1967 but as a result some Warsaw pact states agreed on the
so called “Ulbricht-doctrine” whereby no socialist state was allowed to exchange
ambassadors with the FRG as long as the GDR was not accepted according to
international law by Bonn. In Moscow talks on the abandonment of violence
(Gewaltverzichtsgespräche) stopped in July 1968 as a result of the Soviet Union’s
wish to strengthen its leader role in Eastern Europe because of the happenings in
Czechoslovakia which ultimately led to the Brezhnev-doctrine. This proclaimed
the limited sovereignty of the socialist satellite states and and the subsequent
Soviet right to intervene. The German government seemed to have pursued the
strategy of achieving an opening access to Moscow via the Soviet “satellites”.
The experience of Prague thus taught the government not to make the impres-
sion of pursuing any differenciated détente policy without Soviet participation.
It was not until the Soviet Union was dependent on détente in the West due
to Soviet-Chinese disputes on the common border that new perspectives were
opened. However the Brezhnev-doctrine was still valid.52
With the “appeal of Budapest” of March 1969 the Warsaw pact states put a
European security conference on the political agenda. In Germany, the posi-
tions on the Ostpolitik and Germany policy further diverged. Whereas chancellor
Kiesinger (CDU) was not prepared to give up any legal positions, SPD and FDP
argued for a new approach in the Ostpolitik. In the summer of 1969 the gov-
ernment initiatied new talks on bilateral violence abandonments and presented
new drafts for non-violende declarations. Preparedeness of participation in a Eu-
ropean security conference was also signalled. To FM Willy Brandt, there was
no alternative to a policy of détente, and a normalisation of the relations with
the Soviet Union was only possible on the terms of the status quo. In the au-
tumn of 1969 considerations of a basic agreement with the GDR were outlined.53
The new government of Willy Brandt (1969-1974) took the created realities and
territorial integrity of the eastern partners as the initial point of its policy. In
his government decleration from 28 October 1969 Brandt spoke as the first Ger-
man chancellor of “two states in Germany” which could not be foreign countries
52 Lappenküper (2008), p. 91; Kronenberg (2009), p. 22.
53 Haftendorn (2001), pp. 177-178.
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to each other. However, no acknowledgement of the GDR according to inter-
national law followed. The new about the Ostpolitik was the attempt to find a
modus vivendi for the dead hands of the Second World War and thus mitigating
the East-West confrontation. The basis for this policy was the formula “Wan-
del durch Annäherung” elaborated by leader of the planning department of the
AA and upcoming state secretary, Egon Bahr. Aims of the Ostpolitik were to
overcome the military confrontation, to decrease the political tensions, to deepen
the cooperation and develop understanding between nations.54 The government
was furthermore prepared to approve of the GDR as a state, which, however,
premised the protection of Berlin. This policy thus meant a factual acceptance of
the partition of Europe and Germany55 The wish to also involve the GDR in this
policy was a completely new element compared to Kiesinger’s government, and
chancellor Brandt spoke of “zwei Staaten in Deutschland”.56 Egon Bahr was the
head and heart behind the “new Ostpolitik ”, which saw the key to the German
question in Moscow. Brandt and Bahr wanted to create the premises for a slow
change of the status quo in the frame of a European order.
The first German-Soviet talks began in december 1969. Questions concerning
Germany as a whole, its borders and Berlin could, however, only be debated
after having consulted the three Western powers. In May 1970 a framework
contract (“Leitsätze für einen Vertrag mit der UdSSR”), also known as the “Bahr
paper” was agreed on which entailed the main issues of the future treaties with
Moscow and Warsaw. Political concessions and the agreement on an economic
countertrade of Soviet natural gas supply through West German pipelines affected
Moscow to reduce their own claims, i.e. the recognition of the GDR, immutability
of the borders, and a West German abandonment of German reunification.57 The
paper led to controversies within West Germany, in particular was the stated
“Achtung der territorialen Integrität der DDR” highly disputed. The acceptance
of the Oder-Neiße border also meant that there was no chance of winning back
the areas of Pomerania, Silesia and East Prussia in a peace tretay.58 FM Walter
Scheel (FDP) continued the official negotiations with the Kremlin. The Treaty
54 Haftendorn (2001), p. 179; Kronenberg (2009), p. 23.
55 Haftendorn (2001), p. 179.
56 Lappenküper (2008), p. 27.
57 Lappenküper (2008), p. 28.
58 Haftendorn (2001), pp. 183-184.
III.1.1. Historical classification of German foreign policy - 213 -
of Moscow was signed on 12 August 1970. Both governments committed to
reciprocal renunciation of violence, approved the sanctity of the existing borders
and agreed on the extension of the bilateral cooperation. A “letter concerning
the German unity” rendered by Scheel still verified the government’s intention
to retain the aim of reunification. The treaty moreover served as a standard for
similar agreements with other Eastern European states and the GDR.59
The Treaty of Warsaw was moreover signed on 7 December 1970. This was above
all a border treaty and secondly a treaty of renunciation of violence. The German
phrasing that both states were to ascertain that the Oder - Neiße line composes
Poland’s western border was in the end accepted, but the Poles were annoyed that
the corners of the border arrangement was already inclosed in the Bahr-paper. In
1975/76 the treaty was mended due to political developments in both countries:
The FRG promised Poland a economic compensation of 1,3 billion D-mark to
Polish pension claims, and Poland promised exit permits to further 120 000 to 150
000 German resettlers. The closing of the two treateis had a positive effect on the
negotiations in the Berlin question. The four occupation powers for the first time
agreed on a judicial settlement on 3 September 1971. The implementation of the
provisions was realised in inner German negotiations with the transit agreement of
17 December 1971 which governed the traffick on the streets and railway between
the FRG and West-Berlin.60 Inner German negotiations were thereafter again
resumed and resulted in the “Grundlagenvertrag’ of 21 Decmeber 1972.61 The
eastern treaties and the Grundlagenvertrag moreover made both German states
become full members of the UN on 18 September 1938. The last West German
treaty with Czechoslovakia was signed on 11 December 1973. Besides a mutual
diplomatic recognition, the 1938 Munich Agreement was declared null and void
as the inviolability of the common borders and the abandonment of all territorial
claims were agreed on. Hence the FRG had diplomatic relations with most of the
states of the Warsaw pact which would have been impossible ten years earlier.62
The Norwegian Nobel committee awarded Brandt for his Ostpolitik with the
59 Lappenküper (2008), pp. 28-29; Kronenberg (2009), p. 23.
60 Kronenberg (2009), p. 24.
61The treaty comprised the agreement on good neighbouring relations, the sanctity of borders
as well as respecting each state’s independency in its inner and foreign matters. The exchange
of “foreign representatives” were moreover agreed on. Kronenberg (2009), p. 25.
62 Kronenberg (2009), p. 26.
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Noble peace price of 1971. At home, the policy was highly disputed, but the
eastern treaties were ratified during 1972.63 The Germany-policy in Schmidt’s
term in office showed that the policy towards East-Berlin initiated by Brandt did
not achieve the sustainable improvements, particularly in regards to humanitarian
alleviations, which it had aimed at.64
Nonetheless was the new, and in the beginning parliamentary highly
disputed, course of the Ostpolitik and policy on Germany of the FRG from
the late 1960s just as necessary as the policy of Westintegration in the 1950s.
The reconciliation with the West was followed by the normalisation or at
least the improvement of the relations with the east. With this policy of
“Westbindung + Ostverbindungen” (Werner Link) the FRG achieved more
freedom of action in foreign policy and thus avoided the imminent threat
of isolation in the world - also in the western world. The new Ostpolitik did
not lead to any turning away from the West. After all the firm integration in
the Western alliance ultimately allowed for the social-liberal policy towards
Central- and Eastern Europe.”65
The opening up to the east through a “Wandel durch Annäherung” was thus only
conceivable through the firm integration with the West.
Brandt also concentrated on reducing the military confrontation through disar-
mament and troop reductions. The federal government participated in the CSCE
from July 1973. The conference closed on 1 August 1975 with the signing of
the Helsinki Final Act by all participating states (all European states except of
Albania, and Canada and the US). The aim was a definition of the territorial
status quo in Europe. The formulation “peaceful change” was however from the
FRG’s point of view still compatible with keeping the option open for a German
reunification. The humanitarian principles of the final act’s chapter VII were thus
also signed by the GDR and the Eastern European states and symbolised in the
late 1980s the very important reinsurance for the civil rights movements in dif-
ferent Eastern European states.66 From the autumn 1973 the FRG participated
in the negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on Mutual Balanced
Forces Reductions (MBFR), which was joined by only twelve NATO countries
and seven members of the Warsaw pact. Brandt’s aim of a Europeanisation of
the détente between the superpowers was not dependent on France’s attitude
63The Treaty of Prague was ratified on 20 June 1974.
64 Kronenberg (2009), p. 27.
65 Kronenberg (2009), p. 27. Author’s translation.
66 Kronenberg (2009), p. 26.
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but on the collaboration with the US and the agreement with the Soviet Union.
However even one year after the signment of the CSCE final act the Soviet Union
set out to site intermediate-range missiles type SS-20. Chancellor Schmidt as one
of the first demanded a Western rearmament if the negotiations on armament
reductions should not succeed. The most important heads of government met
in Guadeloupe in January 1979 and created the basis of the so NATO “Double
Track” decision of December 1979 which signalled both the Western prepared-
ness to mutual disarmament on the one hand, and the deployment of of US
intermediate-range missiles type Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Eu-
rope on the other hand if the negotiation talks should fail. Chancellor Schmidt
supported this position despite massive domestic protests, and also within the
SPD. The NATO “double track” decision ultimately also contributed to Schmidt
falling through as a chancellor due to decreasing support in his own party.67
Hans-Dietrich Genscher continued as a FM under chancellor Kohl, who seized
power in October 1982, and thus signalled continuity in foreignpolicy. Kohl com-
mitted himself to both pars of the NATO “double track” decision already in his
first declaration of government, i.e. also the deployment of Pershing missiles on
German ground and declared the Atlantic security alliance to be the central point
of German reason of state. He also confirmed the will to pursue an “active peace
policy” towards Central- and Eastern Europe. On 22 November 1983 were the
decision of deployment taken despite the largest mass protests in the history of
the federal republic.68
“This enforcement, a symbol of the reliability and predictability towards
NATO was a political show of strength which Kohl and Genscher dared to
accomplish as a “proof of alliance loyalty” (Wolfram F. Hanrieder) - and to
which they could refer to again and again in the following years, particularly
in the course of the negotiations on the German reunification in 1990.”69
The Kohl government was moreover sceptical towards US president Reagan’s
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) as well as the confrontational US policy to-
wards Moscow and rather hoped for a détente policy through substantial eco-
67 Kronenberg (2009), p. 27.
68 Kronenberg (2009), p. 28.
69 Kronenberg (2009), p. 28.
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nomic contacts towards the East.70
1.1.4. The German reunification
The “Two Plus Four talks” on the international aspects of German unification
between the FRG, the GDR, the US, the UK, France and the Soviet Union
began on 5 May 1990 and were finalised on 12 September with the signing of
the “Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany”71 (Two Plus
Four Agreement) which replaced the allied reservation rights. Germany regained
its full sovereignty and became a completely equal partner in the international
system. The preconditions of the Soviet acceptance of the German reunification
were the acknowledgement of the sanctity of the European borders, payments
of economic aid to the Soviet Union as well as a German preparedness to stay
outside NATO. The latter was on the other hand a core claim of the US. However
the negotiaters managed to modify the Soviet claims through a solid economic
package from the FRG to the Soviet Union. The NATO defence strategy was also
revised and thus made a German reunification in peace and freedom possible on 3
October 1990 after a free federal election. The GDR was joined the ambit of the
Grundgesetz due to article 23 GG. In the Two Plus Four Agreement Germany’s
borders were defined as final, and Germany again let go of the right the right to
produce or posess ABC weapons. Moreover an upper limit of the Bundeswehr
was set to 370 000 men and women.72 The reduction of the number of soldiers was
to be accomplished within three to four years according to a declaration of both
German states (August 1990) in the frame of the CFE Treaty. The Bundeswehr
was furthermore only allowed to be mobilised in accordance with the German
constitution and the UN charter.
The reunited Federal Republic was free to choose its alliance, and thus stayed a
member of NATO. The West German foreign policy aims of reunification and a
full reintegration in the international community were thus accomplished. In a
seperate treaty between Germany and Poland, the Oder-Neiße-border was con-
70 Kronenberg (2009), p. 28.
71“Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung in Bezug auf Deutschland”.
72 Kronenberg (2009), pp. 28-31.
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firmed as the final border. The preamble of the Two Plus Four Treaty confirms
the preparedness of consolidating world peace in accordance with the UN charter
and values Germany’s unification with its full sovereignty as a contribution to
peace and stability in Europe.
An agreement with the Soviet Union was also reached in regards to a pull-out of
the Soviet troops until the end of 1994. A deployment or relocation of nuclear
weapons and foreign armed forces were furthermore prohibited after the accom-
plished Soviet redrawal. Moreover, the process leading to German unity enabled
both the integration of the five former East German states into the ambit of the
Grundgesetz as well as the integration of the united Germany in a deepening Eu-
ropean community. In this process, Germany was addicted to the continuation
and acceleration of European integration. The Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 and
the created European Union was thus also a qualitative jump which was rooted in
the German unification.73 The demands for a German mediator role between the
present, the new and the future members were significantly increasing in the early
1990s. The regaining of its full political freedom of action made Germany a new
exporter of security and moved the country in Europe’s middle - geographically,
politically and economically.
With the German reunification, the West German strategy of multilateralism,
both Atlantic and European, proved of value. Although the frames of German
foreign policy changed, there has largely been assessed a constituent German
foreign policy after reunification.74 An important exemption is the change in
military policy. In addition, the picture changes somewhat when focus is directed
to the connectivity between the German past and German foreign policy. The
conciliation policy pursued by all West German governments did not abruptly
end with reunification but went through processes of change during the 1990s.
First, there was a decreasing power of the past as a main point of orientation to
foreign policy making. This became apparent both in the German debate and in
the attitudes of Germany’s neighbours. Secondly, there has been a trend towards
a “Europeanisation” also of the Holocaust commemoration, which has changed
both the German self-perception and how Germany is perceived by other nations
73 Weidenfeld (2007), p. 120.
74 Rittberger (2001).
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as a political actor.75
The development from a broad anti-military consensus, which was apparent dur-
ing the Gulf war in 1991, to a recommendation of a military intervention in
Kosovo in 1999 did basically take place among the political élite. Here, both the
changed expectations of Germany’s allies and a break in the collective memory
are according to Schwelling important explanations for the change of attitude in
this short period of time .76 Moreover, chancellor Gerhard Schröder used key
terms as “self-confidence of a grown-up nation”, “normality”, and “German in-
terests” and contributed to a loss of importance in regards to the German past
and its implications for German foreign policy.77 He proclaimed a “German way”
during the Iraq conflict, insisted on a permanent seat in the UN security council
and furthermore described Germany as a “great power”.78 The post-unification
German foreign policy is further analysed in the following chapters 1.2 and 2.
1.1.5. Foreign relations with Norway and Sweden
As far as foreign relations between the Scandinavian states and Germany are
concerned, this is very much a question of the small states’ relations with and
policy on Germany. If the perspective is reversed, there is not much to say simply
because there is not much focus in Germany on neither Norway nor Sweden.
Former chancellor Helmut Schmidt, as an example, devoted less than seven pages
to the “taciturn Norwegians” in a book of more than 1000 pages.79 Nonetheless,
Germany’s Wiedergutmachungspolitik after the Second World War also applied to
Norway, but it took more than confidence-building multilalteralism to restore the
political relationship with Norway (in particular) and Sweden. The great cultural
influence of Germany in the Scandinavian countries prior to the Second World
War, and with it the German language, has not been able to regain a similar
role. History is an important factor when the German-Scandinavian relations
are assessed. These compose the important basis when Germany’s importance to
75 Schwelling (2007), p. 104.
76 Schwelling (2007), p. 104.
77 Schwelling (2007), p. 109.
78See Peters (2001), p. 32, footnote 3.
79 Gilberg/Drews (1993), p. 147.
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Norwegian and Sweden foreign policies is assessed.
1.1.5.1. Norway
Norway is historically attached to two European powers in particular, the UK
and Germany. The Anglo-Saxon direction was substantiated after 1945. The
Norwegians had their resistance headquarter in London during the Second World
War. Additionally, Norway was historically a nation of merchant shipping and
thus dependent on cooperation with the British. However, if the perspective is
broadened, German territories have been more important to the developments
in Norway. The Hanseatic League linked Western and Northern Norway to a
European trading system with its centre in Lübeck by the Baltic Sea in the 15th
century. Knowledge of mining thus came to Norway. Copenhagen had very close
connections to German territory in the south, continued to be the Norwegian
political and cultural centre,80 and as a result the most important academic, cul-
tural and religious incentives in the 18th and 19th centuries came from Germany
and German territories. The Norwegian church, the military tradition, the tra-
dition of the civil services and the university system are some of the elements
with strong German incentives. When Norway finally got a university in 1811,
the complete model of organisation was taken from the Humboldt-University in
Berlin. The German influence on the Norwegian university tradition is assessed
by Inge Lønning, Norwegian parliamentarian and former principal of the Univer-
sity in Oslo:
“German influences had a very strong impact on the Norwegian church,
and already during the time of the reformation, there were many Norwe-
gians studying in Wittenberg, and later at the north German universities of
Rostock and Greifswald. (...) The first Norwegian student in Rostock was
matriculated in 1435, and the intriguing part of it is that it is a reminder
of the fact that the most important influences to Norway from Europe,
and from Germany in particular, were brought home by the youth and
the students. Student mobility was of course tremendously higher than
it is today, and the reason was naturally that there was no university in
Norway, so those who wanted an education had to venture out on the [Eu-
ropean]continent.”81
80Norway belonged to the Kingdom of Denmark from 1536 to 1814.
81Inge Lønning, interview with author, 17 June 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statement
in Norwegian: “Norsk kirke ble jo veldig sterkt preget av impulsen fra Tyskland, og det var
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By contrast, Jervell refers to the German occupation 1940-1945 as a “mental hu-
miliation of a young nation.”82 The Norwegian post-war society was affected by
a deep scepticism towards Germany. Especially the political elite and the media
took long to get over this reluctance. Norway annonced the formal termination of
the state of war with Germany in July 1951. In 1953, Norway’s occupation force
of 6000 soldiers was withdrawn from northern Germany. A restitution treaty with
Norway was furthermore signed in August 1959.83 Unlike the slow resumption
of political cooperation, which first gained momentum in the 1970s, the secret
services in both countries developed contacts early in the postwar period. They
cooperated especially in the north, e.g. in Finnish-speaking areas. The cooper-
ation could take place without much clearance from political authorities.84 The
defence of the northern part of Germany was furthermore subject to the Kolsås
NATO command near Oslo whereas the German navy had the defence of south-
ern Norway as a special task. For most of the 1950s and 1960s, NATO was the
basis of Norway’s relations with Germany.
Norwegian governments postponed the process of normalisation and thus con-
tributed to maintain the negative sentiment towards the Germans. This reluc-
tance continued longer in Norway than in other European countries with corre-
sponding experiences with the Nazi regime. Moreover, Norwegian political parties
disregarded opportunities to make good contacts with German colleagues. Nev-
ertheless, close contact existed between Norwegian and German politicians in
the 1970s and 1980s in questions concerning foreign and security policy. This
was especially the case with politicians from the social democratic parties, the
Norwegian Labour party (DNA) and the German social democratic party, SPD.
Knut Frydenlund, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Gro Harlem Brundtland and Thorbjørn
Jagland were most active on the Norwegian side, Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr and
Karsten Voigt on behalf of the SPD. Although this was a small number of politi-
mange norske studenter som studerte i Wittenberg allerede på reformasjonstiden, og siden ved
de nordtyske universitetene Rostock og Greifswald. (...) Den første norske studenten i Rostock
hadde skrevet seg inn i 1435. Og det interessante ved det er at det er jo en påminnelse om, de
viktigste impulsene Norge hentet hjem fra Europa og særlig fra Tyskland, det var jo gjennom
ungdommen og studentene den gang. Og studentmobiliteten var jo eventyrlig mye høyere enn
i dag. Og det skyldes selvfølgelig at det fantes ikke noe universitet i Norge, så de som ønsket å
få utdanning ble nødt til å begi seg ut på kontinentet.”
82 Jervell (2003), p. 87 [author’s translation].
83 Gilberg/Drews (1993), pp. 145-146.
84 Jervell (2003), pp. 88-89.
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cians, it was an important network for Norway. Willoch from the Conservative
Party (Høyre), was one of the first Norwegian politicians who saw the necessity
of a reestablished cooperation with Germany. Helmut Kohl and Willoch met
frequently and had a good relationship, both as opposition leaders and heads
of government.85 The greatest impact on Germany’s improved reputation in
Norway and Scandinavia as such was the election of Willy Brandt to West Ger-
many’s chancellor in 1969. Brandt came to Norway as a young political refugee,
joined the anti-Nazi resistance, married a Norwegian woman, acquired citizen-
ship, and returned to Germany as a Norwegian foreign service officer in January
1947. Willy Brandt was thus perceived as invaluable for the improvement of
Norwegian-German relations, and he definitely brought particular preconditions
for a breakthrough in Norwegian-German relations. The political course correc-
tions he made also contributed to the creation of “particular relations” with Nor-
way.86 Interestingly, the change of government in West Germany also changed
the Norwegian position on European policy. The Norwegian social democrats
now saw a possibility of improving the social democratic influence on European
cooperation. This delivered the political reasons needed for an approval of a
Norwegian accession to the EEC. At the same time, Brandt both as a FM and
chancellor engaged in the particular problems of the Scandinavian states.87 In
fact, Germany became Norway’s most important ally in the country’s efforts to
obtain access to the EEC. Although the improved relations were rather ignored
by the public also in the following years, the consciousness of a particular rela-
tionship was growing in the political-administrative circles.88 Brandt used his
positions as FM and chancellor to stress the political importance of the inclusion
of the Nordic countries in the Community within the German government and
also engaged in Norwegian and Scandinavian issues in the dialogue with Euro-
pean colleagues. According to a contemporary British diplomat, Brandt’s efforts
in the negotiations on fishery led to the acceptance by all participants of Nor-
way’s classification as a special case. Allers’ examination of German-Norwegian
relations from 1966 to 1974 also show, however, that Brandt’s efforts were liable
to limits both in regards to domestic policy and the interests of other European
85 Jervell (2003).
86 Allers (2009), p. 393.
87 Allers (2009), p. 393.
88 Allers (2009), p. 389.
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countries.89
After Norway’s negative referendum on EC membership in 1972, the bilateral
relations did not develop or intensify much further. Germany showed little in-
terest in Norwegian affairs. Moreover, the real normalisation first occurred with
the large agreements on natural gas in the 1980s.90 According to Lønning, the
symbolic turning point that brought the relationship Norway - Germany back
on the track it had followed through centuries can be dated quite exactly to the
state visit of then Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker (CDU) to Norway
in 1986. It was not the first state visit after the Second World War but it was
the first that was followed closely by the media. King Olav V of Norway and
von Weizsäcker were brought to the town of Elverum, which had been the most
dramatic location of 9 April 1940 when the German ambassador came from Oslo
to meet King Haakon VII and demanded an unconditioned capitulation.91 “And
this was King Olav’s personal idea, not the State Department’s. (...) He wanted
to show on this specific place that this chapter was in a way finished, and a
new chapter was opened in the relationship between Norway and Germany.”92
Thereafter, the Norwegian-German relations have not only gone back to business
as usual but have had an especially positive development compared to Norway’s
other bilateral relations. Here, Lønning stresses the solid historic lines. “It cer-
tainly is an imposing demonstration that such historic lines of tradition are far
more persistent and strong than what one would think. It takes more than a
break of a few decades to erase them.”93 The state visit did, however, not change
the pattern of the relationship, being “friendly, stable, and predictable but not
very dynamic.”94 In the realm of military matters, it was not until February 1990
that a large contingent of German soldiers were allowed to participate in NATO’s
89 Allers (2009), p. 402.
90 Jervell (2003), p. 87.
91King Haakon, however, refused to comply with German demands to appoint a new gov-
ernment under the leadership of Vidkun Quisling and thus, together with the government, left
the country on 7 June 1940 before the Norwegian capitulation of 10 June.
92Inge Lønning, interview with author, 17 June 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statement
in Norwegian: “Og det var jo Kong Olavs personlige idé, ikke UDs. (...) Han ønsket å markere
akkurat på det stedet at nå er på en måte det kapitlet avslutta og nå har vi begynt på et nytt
kapittel i forholdet mellom Norge og Tyskland.”
93Inge Lønning, interview with author, 17 June 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statement
in Norwegian: “Det er ihvertfall en inntrykksfull demonstrasjon av at sånne historiske tradis-
jonslinjer, de er mer seiglivede og sterke enn man tror. Det skal mer til enn et avbrekk på noen
tiår for å utradere.”
94 Gilberg/Drews (1993), p. 147.
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winter maneuvers on Norwegian soil. This despite the fact that West Germany
and Norway had cooperated on military matters ever since the German NATO
membership of 1955.95 The conclusion made by Gilberg and Drews can thus be
approved of:
“Norwegian-German relations have been a function of Oslo’s perception of, and
response to, the postwar world order.”96
1.1.5.2. Sweden
For centuries, Sweden was more aggressive towards Germany than the other way
around as Germany in its various forms never attacked Swedish territory. During
the Thirty Years War, into which king Gustav Adolf brought Sweden in 1630, his
soldiers spread fear and terror on German territory. There are many examples
of Swedish influence, particularly in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, beginning
with the various acquisitions under the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. King Karl
XII ruled over Saxony in 1704, and the southern coast of the Baltic Sea was
Swedish territory for a short period of time. West Pomerania was a Swedish
province from 1648 to 1815, which was a longer period than the Prussian one
later on. And finally, the city of Wismar formally belonged to Sweden until 1903.
Sweden had lost most of its north German possessions to Hanover and Prussia
by 1720, and the Swedish glory vanished in the 18th century as Russia and the
North German states grew stronger and disintegrated the Swedish hegemony in
the Baltic. Nevertheless, Swedish influence remained. An important factor in
German-Swedish relations was royal marriages and the role of the nobility in
foreign relations.
Swedish-German trade flourished in the late 19th century and economic growth
in Sweden was closely linked to developments in Germany. The Ruhr area’s need
of an iron ore for its iron and steel industry gave Sweden a powerful ally in the
south. As Salmon points out, Germany was more dependent on Swedish iron
ore than Sweden on German industrial goods.97 The Emperor Wilhelm II was
95 Gilberg/Drews (1993), p. 142.
96 Gilberg/Drews (1993), p. 144.
97 Salmon (1997), p. 37.
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interested in creating a Zollverein to formalise his country’s economic relations
with Sweden, that he wished to turn into a German federal state. Conserva-
tive Swedes on the other hand favoured a partnership with Germany in order
to achieve hegemony in northern Europe.98 The fear of the Soviet Union and
scepticism toward the entente enforced the traditional pro-German attitudes of
the Swedish elite. Sweden lost Finland to Russia in 1809 and since then, Russia
had become a very close neighbour not least because they controlled the Åland is-
lands situated not very far from Stockholm. In the event of a Russo-German war,
Sweden preferred a German victory. Nevertheless, public opinion in Sweden was
divided and the Social Democrats favoured the Western powers. As the Åland
islands are concerned, the German Emperor offered king Gustav his support for
a Swedish occupation if Sweden supported Germany with iron exports.99
During the Second World War, Sweden practised a “friendly-minded neutrality”
towards Germany. According to Arter,
“commercial cross-pressures strained Swedish neutrality to the limit and
beyond. At the start of hostilities the German steel industry was based
on annual imports of around 20 million tons of iron ore, almost half of it
emanating from Sweden. Since steel was a crucial material for war produc-
tion, the Allies exerted strong pressure on Sweden to terminate supplies to
Hitler.”100
Sweden permitted the transit of the Engelbrecht division consisting of 14 712
armed troops across Sweden to join Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet
Union. This decision sharply divided the four-party coalition and the Riksdag.
Further, between June 1940 and August 1943 approximately 2 140 000 German
soldiers on leave were permitted to cross through Sweden travelling to and from
Norway and Finland. Germans were even allowed to mine the Sound on the
Swedish side. The concession policy ceased as the war went on. The transit
agreement was cancelled in July 1943, and the transportation of troops and war
materials came to an end in August the same year.101 Sweden feared the prospect
of a postwar northern Europe totally dominated by the Soviet Union and thus
balanced a policy which responded to wartime circumstances but focused on the
98 Salmon (1997), pp. 49-50.
99 Arter (1999), pp. 258-261.
100 Arter (1999), p. 272.
101 Arter (1999), p. 272.
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postwar future. The only long-term perspective for a Great Power balance in the
Baltic was a place for a democratic Germany in the postwar order. Also, Willy
Brandt and Bruno Kreisky, wartime refugees in Sweden, were writing to Wash-
ington about how Germany and Austria as new democracies should be integrated
in the allies’ plans for the postwar world.102
Nonetheless, the war changed the perspective on Germany in Sweden as well,
and despite the traditional German influence on Swedish society, the Western
reorientation was in its effectiveness impressively accomplished. August Strind-
berg once described Sweden as a ‘German colony’ and the Swedish language as
‘plattdeutsch103, divided into twelve dialects’. An example from the beginning of
the current decade that perfectly characterises the Anglo-Saxon reorientation in
Sweden was the maiden speech of the director of the Goethe institute in Stock-
holm, that was held in English in front of a German speaking audience.104
The Social Democratic parties in Sweden and West Germany re-established in-
dustrial relations during the years of the Wirtschaftswunder. As Swedish govern-
ments were considering joining the EC in the 1960s and 1970s, connections be-
tween the governing social democrats in Sweden and West Germany were equally
important.105 In addition to good connections between sister parties in both
countries, good relations also developed between trade unions and other organ-
ised interests.106 In times of economic recession, the value of a healthy Common
Market based on an expanding West German economy and stable political rela-
tions between France and Germany were stressed as particularly important for
Sweden’s economic recovery.
“Sweden had long recognized the ‘Bonn-Paris axis’ in the EC, but even if
French President de Gaulle often made the headlines, it was West Germany
that was regarded as more important and politically, economically as well
as culturally closer to Sweden.”107
Furthermore, unlike Denmark and Norway, Sweden had focus on East Germany.
102 Koblik (1993), p. 167.
103Low German.
104 Leitner (2004).
105 Lindahl (2002), pp. 159-160.
106 Lindahl (2002), p. 165.
107 Lindahl (2002), p. 160.
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The Scandinavian Left saw the GDR as an example of ‘successful socialism’
(‘gelungener Realsozialismus’) in some realms. Sweden’s and Finland’s positions
as neutral countries made it easier to have a certain level of exchange with East
German institutions. In the 1960s there was academic contact between the two
Nordic countries and the GDR through the universities of Rostock and Greif-
swald. Both Sweden and Finland officially visited the East German regime and
strongly supported the West German Ostpolitik, which was perceived to be very
important for the political and military situation in northern Europe. The nor-
malisation achieved opened up for increased contact with the GDR and prospects
of Baltic Sea cooperation.108
1.2. Basic principles and structures
1.2.1. European developments
Dislimitation proceses have changed the policy fields of great importance to the
West-German foreign policy of the 1980s. The development of the European
Union and its influence on German foreign policy will be assessed in the following
because it is the most important dislimitation process German foreign policy is
facing. It is the frame comprising German foreign policy.
The Treaty of Maastricht (1991) added the EMU and a political union to the
Single Market. The European Union became an integrated structure of supra-
national institutions and communitarised policies as well as intergovernmental
task fields. The EU thus consisted of three pillars, the EC, the CFSP, as well
as the Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs. From a German point of view
this was a significant progress in the European unification process. However,
it became clear that the historical founded will of integration, which until now
had been supported by the majority of the German population, for the first time
reached its domestic limits. The German will of further integration was however
continued by the disposition to abstain from the Deutsche Mark.109 The EU was
108 Lindahl (2002), p. 165.
109 Hesse/Ellwein (2012), p. 136.
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enlarged by totally twelve new member states from 2004 to 2007. The necessary
institutional changes due to this process were aimed at but the Treaties of Ams-
terdam (1997) and Nice (2000) did not bring upon any essential new direction of
the institutional context of the EU Treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon was an example
of a further integration of the different political and judicial levels of decision in
the frame of the EU.110
Did anybody suggest to reconsider the policy of European integration on the
terms created by the post-war period? Did anybody question the compatibility
of the basis on which European integration was built with the European dissimi-
larities? Was the fear of the Germans and war in Europe and the German fear of
itself still the main reason behind European integration? The European project
and German European policy has not been questioned. Germany had come to
term with its world war past, this is at least true for its Western half, but the
same reflection has not taken place in regards to the Cold War period. The Ger-
man reunification was thus followed by a discussion on whether Germany should
be more conscious of its foreign policy power. Germany’ s future in international
organisations was also part of the discussions. Both the German government as
well as the opposition stressed the continuity of German foreign policy priorities.
From the mid-1990s however, a “creeping change of paradigm” has been visible
up to a more independent German foreign policy.111 Signs of a “national policy of
interests” were recognisable. However, the insight that it would now be the time
to simply trust the Germans because they have proven to be trustworthy, which
would be the logical conclusion if the Cold War period would be the basis of the
assessment, did not prevail. The legitimacy to reconsider Germany’s success story
in order to make further improvements seems to have been non-existent, and thus
German policy is condemned to overlook the policy lines which need to change
due to new times. The “easiest” way is simply to adjust to new circumstances
without having an aim of its policy.
The problems which follow such a policy strategy, or rather the lack of a such,
becomes clear during the current European euro- and debt crisis. Meantime
110 Hesse/Ellwein (2012), pp. 136-137. On the legal order and the institutional organisa-
tion of the EU see Hesse/Ellwein (2012), pp. 138-148.
111 Hesse/Ellwein (2012), p. 149.
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Germany again stands alone in Europe as a negative power factor. This time it
is only a war fought with money. Germany apparently gets the power whether it
wants it or not, despite being in a union with several other states. Is it then not
time to question the union? The problem is the superior forms of cooperation: it
is not defined how Europe must cooperate. There is no structure in the EU on
the distribution of power and thus there is no tool for governing the European
integration. Is the EU supposed to be a controlling organ or is it about superior
cooperation? Is it a community of sovereign states or is it supranational? The
EU has a legal basis but there is nonetheless a lack of a common platform. What
is the EU good for? Is the aim to get the best out of each country? If the answer
to the latter is yes, then the question is how to achieve this. The Germans would
like to abstain from its sovereignty because of its self-extinguishing philosophy,
but they are probably the only state in Europe. If the other states still want to be
sovereign, then why does integration has to be implemented by a jungle of rules?
Does the current policy of integration allow for the fact that every member state
is different from the other? The lacking abilility to create a common platform,
which is a consequence of the fact that no balance has been drawn, now culminates
in the European debt crisis. Germany thus needs to take the dispute now. The
EU needs to clarify how the cooperation will look like also in regards to the failing
power distribution. To simply invent new governing instruments for the economic
and monetary cooperation would be to take the symptoms as initial point for a
new strategy. A reconsideration of the whole pholosophy of European integration
is necessary.
1.2.2. Normative foundation and structural preconditions
The German constitution, the Grundgesetz, comprises the basic guidelines and
rules for German foreign policy. Already the first sentence of the preamble refers
to the three oldest and most important guidelines of federal foreign policy:
“als gleichberechtigtes Glied in einem vereinten Europa dem Frieden der
Welt zu dienen”.112
112Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stand: September 2010) at
https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/10060000.pdf
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This peace postulate is furthermore substantiated through article 26 para 1 GG:
“Handlungen, die geeignet sind und in der Absicht vorgenommen wer-
den, das friedliche Zusammenleben der Völker zu stören, insbesondere die
Führung eines Angriffskrieges vorzubereiten, sind verfassungswidrig. Sie
sind unter Strafe zu stellen.”
Moreover article 24 para 2 GG states Germany’s preparedness
“sich zur Wahrung des Friedens einem System gegenseitiger kollektiver
Sicherheit einordnen; er wird hierbei in die Beschränkungen seiner Hoheit-
srechte einwilligen, die eine friedliche und dauerhafte Ordnung in Europa
und zwischen den Völkern der Welt herbeiführen und sichern”.113
Article 23, which was reformulated because of the creation of the EU in 1992,
commits Germany to the further development of the EU and allows for the trans-
fer of sovereign rights to the EU through law-making provided that the Bundesrat
and the German states are closely involved in the process. On the other hand
article 23 also creates obstacles to the relocation of constitutional rights in favour
of the EU because a two-thirds majority is required.114 Article 25 GG estab-
lishes the primacy of international law over national law, and article 9 para 2
GG forbids associations which turn against the thought of international under-
standing. An “open multilateralism”, i.e. the preparedness to accept cooperation
based on rules and a balance of interests with several international partners, is
thus firmly anchored in the normative basis of German foreign policy.115 The
articles 23 - 26 GG and some basic rights are the so called substantive (materiell-
rechtliche) specifications which comprise the limits of policy making. Procedural
(verfahrensrechliche) rules on the other hand decide what governmental bodies
are in charge of foreign policy actions and what other governmental bodies they
have to collaborate with.116
As the previous chapter shows, the federal republic from the very beginning estab-
lished itself as a state which rejected any striving for dominance and aggression,
and rather displaced this through cooperation on the basis of common norms and
113Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stand: September 2010) at
https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/10060000.pdf
114 Gareis (2009), p. 6.
115 Gareis (2009), p. 6.
116 Wolfrum (2007), p. 157.
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institutions. The term “Zivilmacht” (Hanns Maull) characterised this direction
of (West) German foreign policy. Germany has thus experienced that restraint
in regard to the country’s own power potential rather continuously increases the
German influence.117 If the NATO countries are grouped according to their will-
ingness to use military power as a political tool, Germany and Great Britain have
represented the anti poles in Europe. Most analysts of German post-unification
security policy moreover stress the continuity in German security policy, i.e. mul-
tilateralism and aloofnes when it comes to use military force.118 Due to changes
after 1990 Germany has however been forced to modify its identity as a civil
power. As its allies pushed for a German military engagement, Berlin had to
decide whether the policy of restraint should be continued or whether it should
place a higher value on the relationship with its allies, the so called “Bündnisrä-
sonverpflichtung”. According to Varwick, the Gulf war of 1990/91 was the “hour
of birth” of a new conflict on what direction German foreign policy should take.
The leadership of CDU/CSU was basically willing to conform to US expectations
in regards to military participation in missions outside NATO territory but could
not accomplish such a policy change within the coalition with the FDP. The lat-
ter pursued a constitutional interpretation which assessed a deployment of the
Bundeswehr outside the NATO ambit to be incompatible with the Grundgesetz.
The party was prepared to agree to a constitutional change, but this would not
be possible without the approval of the largest opposition party, the SPD, which
together with the Greens and the PDS followed the line of the German peace
movement and criticised the US approach in the Gulf and thus disapproved of the
theoretical possibility of a German participation in combat operations abroad.119
The policy statements of the political parties mirror the dissent over this topic.
Point 129 of the CDU policy statements of 1994 says the following:
“We Germans are prepared and capable of fulfilling increased foreign
political responsibility. Germany must like all other partners participate
in the Euroepan defence and the common tasks in the frame of the NATO
alliance. Germany must be able to fully realise its rights and duties which
it has adopted through the accession to the UN. We wish that Germany
can participate in the frame of the UN Charter in the actions of the UN,
117 Gareis (2009), p. 7.
118See Baumann (2001), pp. 141-142.
119 Varwick (2007), pp. 274-275.
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NATO, WEU and the CSCE to the keep and restore peace.120
In 1997, the FDP policy statements “Wiesbadener Grundsätze” includes the fol-
lowing passage of importance:
“International law cannot protect itself. It must be protected by the
community of free constitutional states. Those which decline to secure
peace and freedom also with military means in case of need, leave the people
in the lurch. Who murders, tortures and rapes should not be allowed to feel
safe anywhere. War criminals belong in an international court of law.”121
Thus, both the CDU and the FDP express a position compatible with solidarist
principles in the question of whether the good international citizen is entitled to
defend human rights by using force. The German parties took up the distinction
between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and a broad consensus developed
“that the Bundeswehr should participate in multilateral peace-keeping operations
with a strong peacekeeping character.”122 Whereas the CDU and CSU demanded
the participation in both forms of operations, the FDP inititally only endorsed
participation in peacekeeping operations and did not support combat operations
before 1994.123
The SPD on the other hand dismissed through a party conference decision on
the “perspectives of a new foreign and security policy” both the “militarisation of
the European Union” and the participation of the Bundeswehr in deployments
which exceed the peacekeeping missions of the UN.124 Even in such limited cases,
the SPD underlined the necessity of a constitutional change.125 The SPD also
approved of peace-keeping operations and humanitarian operations in 1994, but
NATO-led operations including the use of force were not embraced until 1998, and
the imprecise term ’peace missions’ was used.126 The SPD did not openly favour
multilateral combat operations at this point of time. The Greens opened up to
peacekeeping operations as late as 1998, and the PDS opposed any Bundeswehr
120Cited in http://www.grundsatzprogramm.cdu.de/doc/grundsatzprogramm.pdf (Author’s
translation, author’s accentuation).
121Cited in http://www.fdp-bundespartei.de/files/363/wiesbadg.pdf (author’s translation).
122 Baumann (2001), p. 167.
123Cited in Baumann (2001), p. 167.
124Cited in Varwick (2007), p. 275.
125 Varwick (2007), p. 275.
126 Baumann (2001), p. 167.
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deployment outside German territory.127 All the supporters of out-of-area opera-
tions moreover stressed the necessity of a firm international legal basis, of which
the most important is a mandate from the UN Security Council.128 As Baumann
underlines with the example of the SPD’s support for the Stabilisation Force in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR), which was technically a combat operation but could
be titled a ’robust peacekeeping’ operation,
“the crucial point is not whether an operation falls under chapter VII of
the UN charter. Rather, the operation needs to have a strong peacekeeping
character for German participation to be consistent with societal norms.”129
In the question of Bundeswehr deployments abroad, i.e. combat operations, a
conflict on basic principles in regards to Germany’s role in foreign policy is re-
vealed according to Varwick. The question was whether Germany should nor-
malise its foreign policy behaviour and thus bring its policy more in line with
other European middle-sized powers also in the case of military deployments.
The alternative would have been taking a role as a “civiliser” of international
relations in line with the political tradition of the left parties.130 The Federal
Consitutional Court decided in 1994 that the Bundeswehr is allowed to partici-
pate in out-of-area operations within the framework of collective security as long
as the Bundestag approves of it.131 Moreover, NATO was considered by this court
to be a system of collective security. The constitutional limits are on the other
hand also at hand: “German participation within a collective security system
must serve the maintenance of peace (art. 24 para 2 GG); the fundamental rules
of international law are part of German federal law (art. 25 GG); and preparation
of a war of aggression is unconstitutional (art. 26 para. 1 GG).”132
The massacre of Srebrenica in July 1995 was the turning point in the value conflict
between human rights and peace. Military missions aiming at the defence of
human rights became legitimate, and this resulted in the deployment of German
bombers in the Kosovo war of 1999. It was now more the duty of Germany to
defend human rights, if necessary also with military means. This is exemplified by
127 Baumann (2001), p. 167.
128 Baumann (2001), p. 168.
129 Baumann (2001), p. 168.
130 Varwick (2007), p. 275.
131See chapter 1.3.7 of this part.
132 Baumann (2001), pp.166-167.
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the considerations made by then FM Fischer, whose statement made on 7 April
1999 reflects the value conflict which sometimes exists between human rights and
peace: “Ich habe nicht nur gelernt: Nie wieder Krieg. Ich habe auch gelernt:
Nie wieder Auschwitz.” As Varwick comments, whereas the historical heritage
from the Second World War had been used to legitimise the policy of civilisation
in international relations, Germany was now presumed to be obliged to protect
human rights worldwide also with military means if necessary.133
The development in the 1990s thus developed from no troops (1990-1991) to non-
combat troops (1992-1996) and combat troops (1996-1999).134 Most of the out-
of-area operations Germany participated in were legitimised by the UN Security
Council acting under chapter VII of the UN Charter. The important exception
in the case of Germany was the air strikes against Serbia and Montenegro in the
Kosovo conflict. There was no resolution made by the Security Council which
legitimised the air strikes, and thus the legal basis for this operation was ques-
tionable.135 Testing the predicative power of constructivism as a foreign policy
theory, Baumann notes that the
“importance of observing international law is stressed both at the so-
cietal level and in Germany’s international environment. Still, Germany
has participated in a combat operation that may have violated one of the
core elements of international law, i.e. art. 2 para. 4 of the UN Char-
ter. Even if we accept that, in the Kosovo conflict, Germany acted in line
with a norm calling for humanitarian intervention, it would remain a puz-
zle for constructivism why Germany has given priority to such a norm over
one of the cornerstones of the international order, even more so because
German participation does not rest on an established societal normative
consensus.”136
The German government thus cut across “the domestic normative consensus” e.g.
in regards to the deployment of combat troops with SFOR and in the war against
Serbia and Montenegro.
133 Varwick (2007), p. 278.
134Since 1992, Germany has participated in the following NATO missions: the monitoring
and enforcement of UN-mandated sanctions against (former) Yugoslavia (1992-96); the Im-
plementation force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995-96); the SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina
(1996-2005); the strikes against Iraq (1998); the air strikes against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslovia in the Kosovo conflict (1998-99); the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) (since 1999)
and the UN-mandated NATO-ISAF mission in Afghanistan (since 2003). The exception is the
non-participation in the Iraq crisis of 1998.
135 Baumann (2001), p. 175.
136 Baumann (2001), p. 177.
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“It is very plausible to assume that such steps have themselves shaped
the development of the societal norm since the German public got used to
engagements of the Bundeswehr step by step. This implies that, to some
extent, the policy of the German government has been based on a deliberate
strategy to accustom the German people gradually to out-of-area operations
of the Bundeswehr. Apparently, for German decision makers the domestic
norms operated as constraints they could not fully ignore but nevertheless
tried to overcome slowly.”137
Whereas the German participation in Kosovo was legitimised by humanitarian
considerations, this aspect was less articulated in the case of Afghanistan. Then
minister of defence Peter Struck (SPD) made the famous and often critisised
statement in 2003 that Germany’s security was being defended in the Hindu
Kush.138 TheWhite Paper on German Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr
(2006) also mentions national interest as a justification of military action, and the
guarantee of free trade and energy security as one of the German forces’ tasks.139
The White Paper states that
“German security policy is forward-looking. The new risks and threats to
Germany and Europe have their origin in regional and global developments,
often far beyond the European area of stability. They are multifarious and
dynamic, and will spread if not addressed promptly. Preventive security
can hence be guaranteed most effectively through early warning and pre-
emptive action, and must incorporate the entire range of security policy
instruments.”140
This direction of German security policy is new. It is still however observable
that German restraint in regards to military interventions is still existent, and
the allies’ expectations are not always the crucial factor. Germany’s clear “no” to
a war against Iraq in 2002 was a sign that the country still represents an antipole
in regards to using military power as a political tool. Germany’s inactive attitude
to the UN resolution 1973 (2011) on the situation in Libya, which “authorized
Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrange-
ments, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack
in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of
137 Baumann (2001), p. 178.
138Cited in Merz (2007), pp. 1-2.
139Cited in Merz (2007), pp. 1-2.
140German Ministry of Defence (2006): White Paper on German Security Pol-
icy and the Future of the Bundeswehr at http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/germany
_white_paper_2006.pdf
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any form on any part of Libyan territory”141 is also an example of such restraint.
Ten countries voted in favour the resolution whereas five (Brazil, China, Ger-
many, India and Russia) abstained from doing so. Whereas the first decision to a
large extent was supported by both states and political commentators, the latter
decision was sharply criticised not only by Germany’s Western allies but also by
German politicians and commentators.142
According to Gareis however the German self-perception remains that of a “civil
power” despite the increased implementation of military instruments.143 Nonethe-
less, Germany can just as much be characterised as “Handelsstaat Deutsch-
land” (Michael Staack) because it is existentially dependent on good and sta-
ble economic relations to as many states as possible. Trade associations as the
“Deutsche Industrie- und Handelskammertag” (DIHK) and the “Bundesverband
der Deutschen Industrie” (BDI) but also companies from all the large German in-
dustry branches thus make efforts to contribute to prosperous political-diplomatic
relations between Germany and its partners which also effect the economic cooper-
ation. This picture becomes clear when the chancellor or the FM are accompanied
by business delegations on their foreign travels abroad. Economic lobbyists often
aim at a more cautious human rights policy towards attractive economic partners
such as China, or favourable international standards in regards to social security,
environment and climate in addition to advantageous market regulations. More
than every fourth Euro is generated through the export of German products.
Thus the importance of German foreign trade for the economic development and
prosperity in Germany can not be overestimated.144 German exports amounted
to 1060 billion Euro in 2011 according to the Federal Statistic Office of Germany,
11,4 per cent more than in 2010.145 However there has been a radical adjustment
of the most important German business markets as a result of the European debt
crisis. China has thus increased its percentage in German exports from three to
six within a few years, and the Chinese economy is for the first time more impor-
141UN Security Council (2011) at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm
142One example was previous FM Fischer who stated that the federal government’s dealing
with the Libya conflict was perhaps the worst foreign policy debacle since the creation of the
Federal Republic. Cited in Spiegel Online (2011) “Fischer rechnet mit Nachfolger Westerwelle
ab”, 27 August at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,782882,00.html
143 Gareis (2009), p. 7.
144 Gareis (2009), pp. 7-8.
145Cited in Beller/ Ohanian (2012).
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tant than the Italian. With an export quota of 6,1 per cent China is number five
among the most important trade partners of Germany and thus ranks dead level
with Great Britain.146 Germany’s leading role in Europe has become increasingly
clear with the Euro crisis, i.e. the European debt crisis. At the same time, regions
outside Europe have become increasingly important to Germany as opposed to
Europe from an economic, and ultimately also political, point of view.
This leads to the third picture of Germany as a foreign policy actor. In addition to
being a “Zivilmacht” and “Wirtschaftsmacht” Germany can also be characterised
as a “Zentralmcht”. According to Janning, Germany’s centrality in Europe ap-
pears in the economic geography through the movement of goods, exporting and
importing structures and the development of the traffic volume. The political
centrality is characterised by three factors:
1. Germany is present in more geographic spaces in the enlarged EU than any
other large member state - in the Baltic Sea area, in Central-Eastern Eu-
rope, in the old core of Western Europe and also in the south of Europe due
to Germany’s economic power and the changing positions of other actors.
2. The ongoing European integration is domestically less disputed than in
other large member states and is thus also more compatible with Germany’s
own role definition, although the degree of “diffuse acceptance” of integra-
tion is declining in Germany as well.
3. Germany’s positions and preferences are more relevant than those of most
other member states in a majority of the topics on the European agenda.
The big exception and Germany’s weakness is found in the security and
defence policy.147
When analysing Germany’s importance to Norway and Sweden, it is of minor
importance whether Germany is defined as a Zentralmacht, a Zivilmacht or a
Wirtschaftsmacht as long as it uses its Macht to consolidate the international
society of states.
146 Beller/ Ohanian (2012).
147 Janning (2007), p. 756.
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1.3. Actors and institutions
What characterises the political system of Germany is the prevailing existence of
coalition governments, the accentuated role of the Federal Constitutional Court,
the federal system as such as well as the particular role of the Bundesrat (Federal
Council) and the increasing relocation of competences to the European level. This
presupposes several negotiation processes which to a certain degree relativise
the system of competitiveness between the political parties. In the following
the institutions and actors of German foreign policy will be analysed which are
regarded as the most important ones in the context of this thesis’ topic.
1.3.1. The German Federal President
The German Federal Presidents have from the beginning represented the “core
values” of German foreign policy rather than co-deciding the government’s po-
sition in concrete questions.148 As a soft power actor, the federal president can
concentrate on the long lines and aims of foreign policy and of being the highest
representative of democratic Germany.149 The symbolic value of a federal presi-
dent can even make a difference in Germany’s foreign relations as shown by the
example of Richard von Weizsäcker in chapter 1.1.5 of this part.
1.3.2. The Bundestag
There are first and foremost laws of instrumentality which are ascribed to the
Bundestag because the federal government emanates from the majority of the
parliament. Thus neither the constitution nor the political practice provide for
any competition between a strong executive and a powerful parliament.150 How-
ever, the Grundgesetz does not offer any terminal allocations of rights and duties,
and the partition between the Bundestag’s and the federal government’s compe-
148The Federal Presidents from 1949 on were Theodor Heuss (1949-1959), Heinrich Lübke
(1959-1969), Gustav Heinemann (1969-1974), Walter Scheel (1974-1979), Karl Carstens (1979-
1984), Richard von Weizsäcker (1984-1994), Roman Herzog (1994-1999), Johannes Rau (1999-
2004), and Horst Köhler (2004-).
149 Jochum (2007), p. 173.
150 Gareis (2009), p. 10.
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tencies does pose some problems in practice. As a basic principle, the creation
of Germany’s foreign relations is the responsibility of the federal government.151
Also, the legal practice of the Federal Constitutional Court favour the federal
government in regards to foreign policy making. The only two matters open to a
stronger parliamentarisation are the participation in the further development of
the EU and the foreign missions of the Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces).152
The Grundgesetz also deals with potential conflicts of competence between the
German federation and the German states, moreover the Bundestag (the Federal
Parliament) and the Bundesrat (Federal Council).
The German Bundestag and its members have the right to address any foreign
policy questions. This can be done in plenum as well as in the constitutional
stipulated committees on foreign relations and defence (Article 45a GG) as well
as the committee on European matters (Article 45).153 The increasing number of
departments in German ministries concerned with foreign affairs, and the increas-
ing importance of the functional departments compared to the classical ministries
of foreign relations, are also reflected in the Bundestag. Almost all functional
committees of the Bundestag deal with foreign affairs issues in addition to the
committee on foreign relations, the committee on economic cooperation and the
defence committee. Based on this development is the traditional designation
that the executive has the power of managing foreign relations increasingly dis-
putable.154 As mentioned above, the Bundestag is only allowed to intervene in
the government’s handling of foreign relations based on particular constitutional
provisions (art. 59 para. 1 GG). The Bundestag has the decision-making power
in wordings (art. 59 para 2 GG), in the transfer of sovereign rights as well as
in the cases of defence and peace agreements (art. 115 a and art. 115 1 GG).
According to art. 24 para. 1 GG, the transmission of sovereign rights to inter-
state arrangements can follow with a simple majority of the Bundestag without
the affirmation of the Bundesrat. This also applied to the EC until 1992. The
Grundgesetz can thus be perceived to pave the way for supranational organs in
the interest of a “peaceful and enduring order for Europe and between the nations
151 Wolfrum (2007), p. 157.
152 Wolfrum (2007), p. 157.
153 Gareis (2009), p. 10.
154 Ismayr (2007), p. 177.
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of the world”(art.24 para. 2 GG).155 As a consequence, the Federal Constitutional
Court has e.g. decided that the decisive changes of NATO’s strategy after the
Cold War must be understood as a further development and firm establishment
of the open-ended decisions of the NATO treaty.156 Several legislations on the
armed forces were affiliated in the Grundgesetz in 1956, which e.g. resulted in
the Bundestag’s defence commission having the rights of an enquiry commission
(Article 45a) and the creation of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed
Forces (Article 45b). The Federal Constitutional Court moreover made a decision
in regards to some Bundeswehr missions of the early 1990s that the constitution
obliges the federal government to obtain the constitutional affirmation of the Bun-
destag. Thus, according to the “Gesetz über die parlamentarische Beteiligung bei
der Entscheidung über den Einsatz bewaffneter Streitkräfte im Ausland ” (Parla-
mentsbeteiligungsgesetz ), which has been in force since 2005, the deployment of
armed German forces must have the affirmation of the Bundestag with simple
majority when the Bundeswehr is involved in armed operations. A proposition
to deploy the armed forces can however only be accepted or completely rejected,
which is also the case with other propositions from the federal government. The
Bundestag’s right to participate is thus limited. However the parliamentarian
debate in front of a Bundestag decision contributes to both transparency and
publicity in regards to the practice of Bundeswehr deployments. They thus also
give signals to the federal government of potential opposition from the Bundestag,
which thus indirectly is given the opportunitiy to influence the content of the de-
ployment mandate. In the case of deployments of minor intensity and reach,
the approval might be obtained in a simplified procedure, whereas every parlia-
mentary group or five per cent of the Bundestag members may demand that the
Bundestag deals with the issue. A subsequent affirmation by the Bundestag is
sufficient under exceptional circumstances where delay could mean an endanger-
ment. The Bundestag is not allowed to change a petition but may revoke its
compliance with a Bundestag deployment. 157
Another topic of interest is the Bundestag and the EU. Totally, about one third
of all adopted federal laws are of a European origin, about the half determined
155 Ismayr (2007), p. 178.
156 Ismayr (2007), p. 179.
157 Ismayr (2007), pp. 179-180.; Gareis (2009), p. 10-12.
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by EU directives. The spheres of consumer protection, nutrition and agriculture
as well as environment, nature protection and nuclear security make up about
70 per cent.158 The so called “Europe-Article” 23 § 1 of 1992 which was imple-
mented from the pressure of the federal states as the Treaty of Maastricht was
ratified, implies that in order to transfer sovereign rights to the EU’s institutions,
a qualified two-thirds majority in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat are required
for.159 Through the articles 23 and 45 GG, the Bundestag’s position compared to
the government’s has also become strengthened in the European decision-making
process, in addition to the revised position of the Bundesrat. The government
has to inform the Bundestag in a comprehensive way and to the earliest possible
point of time about all of the EU’s intentions which could be of interest to Ger-
many. The Bundestag’s positions on EU drafts must be “accounted for” by the
government before its participation in the EU’s legislative enactment. Hence, the
national parliament is supposed to enter the consultations on European policy
drafts at such an early point of time that it has a possible impact on its contents.
However, failing interest and delayed possibilities of information and reaction in
urgent cases are still apparent.160 As the EU is becoming more and more com-
petencies, it is important for the Bundestag to participate in shaping European
policy, adjusted to the European parliament, in order to avoid a further loss of
competence. In the beginning of the 13th legislative period, the “Ausschuss für
Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union” (EU committee) was established and
prescribed in article 45 German consitution. It is the main location for the par-
liamentarians’ participation in matters of the EU and is responsible for questions
of principle in regards to European integration, institutional issues and enlarge-
ment questions. Members of the European Parliament are also members of this
committe, and close contacts are cultivated with the European committees of
other national parliaments in the EU. This thus applies to its Swedish counter-
part. The Norwegian parliament’s European committe on the other hand is only
allowed to meet a delegation from the European parliament once a year to main-
tain a certain dialogue. The European Committee of the Bundestag furthermore
gives the direction of the Bundestag’s statements on European integration. And
158 Ismayr (2007), p. 187.
159For more details see Ismayr (2007), p. 179.
160 Ismayr (2007), pp. 187-188.
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as a cross sectional committee it aims at uniting the different policy fields. As an
expert committee for European matters it has a consultatory function for drafts
of importance to integration policy and as EU law is concerned. However, EU
directives already passed are the cases of the competent expert committees. In
order to secure a timely handling of EU drafts in the Bundestag, a plenary deci-
sion can legitimise the EU committe to administer the Bundestag’s rights towards
the government. Nevertheless, the matters are in most cases of little dispute be-
tween the governmental and the opposition’s parliamentary groups and rather
cases for specialists.161 This picture has however become somewhat moderated
through the federal constitutional court’s verdict on the Lisbon treaty (BVerfGE
123, 267 = NJW 2009, 2267), which criticised the Bundestag members for having
too easily given up on their political voice and too easily having assigned rights to
Brussels, even more than what the German constitution allows for. Two verdicts
following the Lisbon verdict furthermore stated that the Bundestag must not be
fobbed off with vague information and systematic secretiveness neither in regards
to minor interpellations nor in investigating committees.162 The verdict of the
federal consitutional court thus led to a “surprisingly rapid settlement” between
the parliamentary groups and also between the Bundestag and the fedreal govern-
ment.163 Thus new accompanying laws which complemented and substantiated
the Europe-article were created.164 The coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD decided
on provisions which exceeded the court’s demands. Accordingly, it is mainly up
to the parliamentarians to use the new possibilities given. Wefing speaks of a
“new architecture” (Norbert Röttgen) of the Bundestag’s foreign policy laws of
instrumentality.165
To a certain degree the Bundestag is also able to pursue an independent foreign
policy, though not operative according to international law, as the representatives
participate in parliamentarian conventions and international organisations, meet
with politicians from other states, discuss political questions and thus contribute
161 Ismayr (2007), pp. 189-190.
162Cited in Wefing (2009).
163Cited in Wefing (2009).
164“Gesetz über die Wahrnehmung der Integrationsverantwortung des Bundestages und des
Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union; Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von
Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundetag in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union; Gesetz
über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union.
165Cited in Wefing (2009).
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to a differentiated picture of Germany in the world. The Bundestag can also invite
e.g. heads of states to speak in plenum and furthermore position itself through
comments. With its resolutions on Tibat has the Bundestag set a different course
as opposed to the pragmatic policy on China of the federal government.166
1.3.3. Federal states and Bundesrat
The international presence of Germany’s 16 federal states has reached an im-
pressive level. They have worldwide about 130 offices first and foremost to serve
their foreign trade interests and provide political information. The Brussel offices
of the sixteen states come in addition to 20 external representations in the US.
Further focal points are in Asia, Russia, and Central and Eastern Europe. Par-
ticipation in interregional and cross-border cooperation on the subnational level
is also given, in addition to an active shuttle diplomacy of politicians. Hence,
this activity is not very compatible with the constitutional disposition that the
relations with other countries are in principle “Sache des Bundes”167 (article 32
GG).168 The Brussel agencies of the German states are by way of example a
parallel action to the federal level in regards to European policy which is rather
conflict-ridden.
Article 24 para. 1 GG comprehends the constitutional principle of an open polit-
ical system (statehood). The federation is thus authorised to transfer sovereign
rights through statutes not requiering the assent of the Bundesrat. This article
thus enforced European Community law domestically. To the extent allowed by
article 79 para. 3 and article 20 GG, the federation was allowed to transfer com-
petencies of the federal states to the European level. Although this was a matter
of substantial constitutional amendments, whether the Bundestag’s approval nor
a two-third majority were necessary. This was the situation until the constitu-
tional amendment of 1992 when the “Europe Article” 23 was admitted to the
constitution.169 Through this article are not only domestic participation rights
of the German states broadened, but they also have direct access to EU decision-
166 Gareis (2009), p. 12.
167“The federal level’s concern.”
168 Fischer (2007), p. 192.
169 Fischer (2007), p. 193.
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making procedures through the possibility of direct involvement in the Council
of Ministers and through the Committee of the Regions. Fischer comments that
focus is no longer on the federal states as a “collective actor”. Instead, the Ger-
man states want to win back independent scope of action which ultimately could
result in an increased competition between the states and a stronger emphasis on
cultivating individual foreign relations.170
The collective cooperation rights obtained through article 23 are the following:
1. German approval of changes to European constitutional law is dependent
on a two-third majority in the Bundesrat.
2. The federal states take part in matters concerning the EU through the Bun-
desrat and in the decision-making of the Federation if the issue is part of
their domestic competency. If mainly the federal states’ legislation com-
petencies are concerned in projected European legal acts, then the federal
government has to account for the position of the Bundesrat in a significant
way. The same is the case when the composition of the states’ administra-
tion or their administrative procedures are concerned.
3. In cases where the exclusive Land legislation is affected, the German con-
duct of negotiations in the Council of Ministers must be led by a minister
from one of the German states appointed by the Bundesrat.171
In addition, about 300 authorised representatives of the regional government au-
thorities in about 300 advisory boards of the Council and the European Com-
mission are appointed by the Bundesrat for a period of three years. They have
the task to inform the German states, initiate the positions of the Bundesrat,
represent the Bundesrat statements on EU level and, if necessary, work towards
further statements of the Bundesrat.172
Another point of interest is the federal states’ cooperation with other European
regions. Two types of regional associations are identified. First, in the transborder
cooperation with local authorities of neighbouring states the aim is above all to
manage common problems in order to achieve a stronger integration of border ar-
eas with considerable geographic, historic-cultural or socio-economic similarities.
The forms of neighbourhood cooperation resulting from this natural common-
ness are completely covered by the competencies of the German states. Such
170 Fischer (2007), p. 195.
171 Fischer (2007), p. 197.
172Homepage of the State of Berlin at http://www.berlin.de/rbmskzl/europa/europapolitik/
netzwerkbundesratsbeauftragte.html
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cooperation can, however, also be a matter of inter-municipal cooperation and
also mixed forms of the federal level, the federal states and municipalities. As
opposed to this, transborder cooperation with non-neighbouring regions does not
have an integrative purpose but rather aims at networking to develop mutual
political or economic benefits. The tension between the federal and state level
is most obvious in the first group. Article 24 para. 1A GG gives the German
states the right, with the affirmation of the federal level, to transfer sovereign
rights to neigbouring establishments (“grenznachbarschaftliche Einrichtungen”).
An increasing legal regulation has been the tendency since the 1990s.173
The competencies dilemma of the German federal system is here admittedly less
important than the possible implications for Northern European cooperation with
the, compared to other regional actors, very influential German states. Interreg
IV B is a support programme of the EU for the strengthening of economic, social
and spacial coherence in Europe. The North Sea Region and Baltic Sea Re-
gion are thus two of totally 13 European cooperation regions in which Norway is
able to participate through the EEA treaty. The North Sea Region Programme
2007-2013 of the European Union (Interreg IVB) involves regions in Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. The German
states involved are Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein.
The Baltic Sea Region Programme 2007-2013 on the other hand consists of Den-
mark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden as well
as the partner countries Belarus, Norway and Russia. The German states partici-
pating are Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania,
Brandenburg, Berlin and the Region Luneburg. Moreover, The Baltic Sea States
Subregional Cooperation (BSSSC) is open to all regional authorities of the Baltic
Sea area immediately below the level of central government. The German mem-
bers are Schleswig Holstein, Hamburg, and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. Other
associations to be mentioned in this context are the Union of the Baltic Cities
and the Baltic Sea Chambers of Commerse.
173 Fischer (2007), p. 199.
III.1.3. Actors and institutions - 245 -
1.3.4. Federal chancellery
In the realm of foreign policy-making, the Federal chancellery is together with
the Ministry of Defence and the Auswärtiges Amt174 (AA) the central corridors of
power. German foreign policy was created in the Federal chancellery until 1955 as
mentioned in chapter 1.1 of this part. The German constitution on the other hand
does not say anything about the scope of duties of the chancellery. The actual
activities reach from the secretary to the government headquarters. Moreover,
the foreign policy of the Bundeskanzkleramt is characterised by “Führen, Koor-
dinieren, Strippen ziehen”.175 The first characteristic leads to the chancellor prin-
ciple (Kanzlerprinzip), whereby the chancellor decides the guidelines of the policy.
This is supported by the right to form the cabinet (Kabinettsbildungsrecht) in ar-
ticle 64 para 1 GG and the leadership competence (Leitungskompetenz) in article
65 para. 4 GG. Hence, the power of organising (Organisationsgewalt) is derived.
Governmental declarations are often used to show the leading aspirations of the
chancellor in the realm of foreign policy.
The coordination function of the chancellor first of all applies to the cooperation
between the functional departments. The AA has the pivotal competence in the
management of foreign relations. However, this role is softened by the strong
constitutional role of the chancellor and his foreign political assistants in the
German chancellery, in addition to the competencies of other ministries. The
third characteristic, to be the puppet master, leads to what the chancellor can do
to compensate a possible loss of power, e.g. use party power in combination with
the parliamentary group of the Bundestag. It also refers to the minor coalition
partner, which since 1963 is represented by the vice-chancellor and since 1966
by the foreign minister.176 The Federal chancellery thus governs the different
principles of policy making in regards to the competencies of the chancellor,
the departements, the parties and the coalition in addition to the principle of
collective responsibility. It also has the competency of introducing a bill according
to article 76 GG. In matters of foreign policy it is responsible for the Federal
Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) and, until 1990, for the operative
174Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
175 Korte (2007), p. 204.
176 Korte (2007), p. 204-205.
- 246 - III.1. German foreign policy
management of the Germany policy.177
The leading section of the Federal chancellery consists of the chancellor, the
respective minister of state and the staff and offices assigned to them. The chan-
cellery is led by the Head of the Federal Chancellery in the intersection between
administration and politics. He prepares and participates in the cabinet meetings.
He sets the agenda and organises the decision-making and the implementation
of governmental tasks. Finally, the so called working levels of the Federal chan-
cellery contain six departments, which again are structured in groups, which are
structured in units. Department 2 is responsible for foreign relations, develop-
ment policy, European policy and security policy and mirrors the bodies of the
AA, with which it has to cooperate closely.178
Also belonging to the Federal Chancellery is the Federal Security Council. Orig-
inally, it was meant to have the role as a coordinating organ of German security
policy. According to Varwick, it is neither capable of taking this role nor able
to act as a decisive centre of gravitation for the strategic forming of the political
will of the federal government.179
In foreign policy, the chancellor principle is often used to overrule the departmen-
tal principle. The Federal chancellery is a particularly central European policy
actor and plays a key role in all bilateral relations to the EU partners, is strate-
gically important to the preparing of European Council meetings and supports
every initiative on European policy of the chancellor without accounting for par-
ticular departmental responsibilities.180 In regards to the coordination of the
governmental performance on foreign policy, the Cabinet is the most important
decision-making institution of the executive. The weekly agenda gives the chan-
cellor the possibility of an assessment of the international situation, which the
other members of the Cabinet have to follow up. With other words, it regulates
the political language of the government in foreign policy matters.181 The Cab-
inet committees have an advisory, preliminary function in front of the cabinet
meetings, which in the case of foreign policy are the committees for European
177 Korte (2007), p. 205.
178 Korte (2007), p. 206.
179 Varwick (2008), pp. 80-81.
180 Korte (2007), p. 207.
181 Korte (2007), p. 208.
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policy and the Federal Security Council.182
1.3.5. The Federal Ministries
The several international departments and units of the the federal ministries are
examples of a differentiation of the governmental-administrative field of actors
participating in foreign policy making. They are concerned with specific topics
and the practical work of foreign policy. Every federal ministry has its own insti-
tutional capacities for the administration of European and international matters.
Hence is also clear that the German foreign policy is not anymore just a matter
of high politics. Rather, foreign relations necessitate a an attunement of highly
differentiated task fields and policies. The question of an effective horizontal
coordination of the German ministries is thus also of great importance to the
making and implementation of foreign policy.183 A good example is the climate
policy which next to the federal chancellery and the AA involves the ministries
of environment, economy, research, finance and economic development in order
to formulate and implement the appropriate policies of importance.184 Clashes of
interests between different ministries are obvious from time to time, and they do
not disappear just because political decisions are taken on the international level.
The international dimension is obvious in all other ministries in addition to the
AA, which on the other hand follows their work closely but is not able to con-
trol them.185 Particularly interesting is the fact that Germany coordinates and
adjusts political activities and decisions with other states mainly in the frame
of the EU. Every ministry has its own units for EU matters, totally over 50.
Moreover, every federal ministry is more than ever also a “foreign ministry” of its
topic.186 This must be something to consider for Norway which, firstly, launched
a “Strategy on Germany”187 in order to strengthen its relations with Germany
182 Korte (2007), p. 208.
183 Hesse/Ellwein (2012), pp. 150-151.
184 Hesse/Ellwein (2012), p. 151.
185 Weller (2007), p. 210.
186 Weller (2007), p. 211.
187In 1999, the Norwegian government launched the so called “Strategy on Germany”. The
strategy has been followed up by subsequent governments, i.e. is the responsibility of the State
Department, and was revised in October 2007 as a result of Germany’s economic and political
importance to Norway, being Norway’s third largest export market and second largest trade
partner.
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despite the fact that it stays outside the EU’s political decision-making. The
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stresses the cooperation with Germany as
flawless, both Norway and Germany are pleased with the existing cooperation.
The doors of the AA are open to Norwegian diplomats.188 This, however, ig-
nores the differentiation of foreign policy making. According to Alfred Grannas,
contact person for the economic service at the Federal Republic of Germany’s
embassy in Oslo, Germany and Norway to a larger extent than what is the case
with Sweden have to coordinate issues because Norway is not a member of the
EU. As opposed to this, Germany’s relationship with Sweden is deeper, as topics
are more thoroughly discussed within the EU.189 The EU membership is thus also
mirrored in the federal ministries.
1.3.6. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges Amt)
The government is the most important foreign policy actor on the federal level
with the right to initiate legislation and a general political mission. The fed-
eral government, and first and foremost the AA, is responsible for the diplomatic
relations with other states, negotiates treaties and agreements according to inter-
national law and has great authority in regards to their interpretation and further
development. The AA has a permanent working crisis reaction centre in order to
keep track of international developments. Also, commissioners and coordinators
of particular policy fields such as human rights, humanitarian aid and disarma-
ment, as well as for countries and regions, are situated in the AA.190 Germany’s
cultural foreign policy is also a matter of the AA. In addition to European inte-
gration and the transatlantic partnerships are international crisis prevention and
conflict management, global economic cooperation, development policy as well
as environmental and climate questions high on the agenda of German foreign
policy makers.191
The organisation of the AA consists of the following elements (2009): The main
office in Berlin, 229 diplomatic representations (149 embassies, 62 consulates gen-
188Interview at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 6 May 2009.
189Alfred Grannas, interview with author, 7 July 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation.
190 Gareis (2009), p. 8.
191 Gareis (2009), p. 9.
III.1.3. Actors and institutions - 249 -
eral, 12 permanent representations, 6 further representations), diplomatic rela-
tions with 190 countries, representatives in twelve intergovernmental organisa-
tions, 5862 employees of which about 3000 are stationed abroad, chambers of
foreign trade in 80 countries, establishments of the foreign cultural policy and
with it six Germany-centres in Brasilia, Kairo, Mexico, New Delhi, Paris, Beijing
and Washington.192 The 2012 budget for the AA is estimated to be 3,3 billion
Euro.193
Here, the task allocation in the AA will be highlighted, i.e. the Europe De-
partment and the Political Department 2 are of particular interst.194 First, the
Europe Department of the AA is in charge of the conception and creation of the
federal government’s European policy, adjusted to the other federal ministries.
The competency of the AA on European questions concerns the EU’s foreign
relations, institutional questions (basic and legal questions included), questions
of EU enlargement and deepening as well as the bilateral relations to the mem-
ber states. The AA moreover coordinates important European negotiations, for
example the future EU financial frame.195 More detailed, the focal points of the
Europe Department are the following:
1. Preparing, implementing and accompanying the projects on European pol-
icy and the decisions of fundamental importance (e.g. enlargement and
deepening);
2. coordination-function inside the federal government for the European Coun-
cils;
3. supporting and developing the bilateral relations to the member states of
the EU, and France in particular;
4. language questions in the EU;
5. public relations on European polciy;
6. supporting the relations between the federal level and the German states in
regards to the EU.196
192 Gareis (2009), p. 9.
193See the Auswärtige Amt (2011) at http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/AAmt/00Aktuelles/111123_Haushalt_2012.html
194Departments of the AA which will not be mentioned are the Disarmament Department,
the department Culture and Communication, the Political Department 3, the protocol, the
Legal Department, the United Nations department, the Economic Department, the Corporate
Department as well as a department for further matters.
195 Bettzuege (2007), 228.
196 Bettzuege (2007), 229.
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These are the tasks of nine units, the EU coordination group, the task force
France and the task force EU financial perspectives. Country units attend to the
bilateral relations with the EU’s partner states. The bilateral relations between
the partners in the union are still of great importance despite the close cooper-
ation inside the EU. Not least due to the large number of states in the EU, a
regular bilateral exchange has become increasingly important, as European coop-
eration will only be successful if issue-free bilateral relations are the basis, which
are especially important in regards to the small countries of the community.197
This is thus also the department where Germany’s bilateral relations with Swe-
den are taken care of, as opposed to Norway, which belongs to another political
department of the AA. Other units serve the relations with the European Parlia-
ment and the European parties, are responsible for e.g. questions concerning the
Lisbon process, the EU single European market or the EU policies on economy,
currency and finance, are preoccupied with legal aspects of the EU or questions
of enlargements and foreign relations.198
Second, the Political Department 2 analyses, plans, frames and coordinates Ger-
man foreign policy towards European, North American and Central Asian states.
It is also responsible for the shaping of the CFSP and all aspects of European
and transatlantic security relations. The leader of the political department is
the political director. He is supported by a representative for stability policy
in Souteast Europe as wellas a representative for Russia, Caucasus and Central
Asia. The assistant political director is at the same time responsible for security
policy and multilateral tasks.
The working unit “European Correspondents” of Political Department 2 manages
the coordination of all CFSP topics, which includes basic questions and the coor-
dination of the CFSP, the ESDP included, with EU partners and in the AA. Other
units observe and analyse the domestic and foreign policies of the US and Canada
and offer councelling to the political leadership in regards to a conception of and
German interests towards both states. Questions concerning the G8-process is
also taken care of here. These units are also responsible for basic questions of the
197 Bettzuege (2007), 229.
198 Bettzuege (2007), 229. See also http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/AAmt/
Abteilungen/Europaabteilung_node.html
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defence and security policy, whereas the Atlantic alliance is the operative centre
of gravity. Key activities are the military foreign missions of the Bundeswehr,
the forming of the partnership relations of NATO, the NATO-Russia-Council, the
NATO-Ukraine-Commission, the Mediterranean dialogue, the strategic questions
of the Alliance and the ESDP.199
The Political Department 2 is also resposible for the OSCE, and other units take
care of the relations with the European Council, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Ice-
land and Norway. In addition comes the task field of the representative for Russia,
the Caucasus and Central Asia, whereas key activities are the bilateral relations
with Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the CIS and their relations with
the EU. The relations with the states of the southern Caucasus (Armenia, Geor-
gia, and Azerbaijan) and of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) and again their relations with the EU are also
taken care of in the Political Department 2.200
Reinhard Bettzuege refers to the necessity of a Europeanisation of German foreign
policy which then again necessitates the Europeanisation of the Foreign Service,
which in particular has to be prepared on the future European diplomatic service.
In order to pursue a multilateral foreign policy, more German diplomats need to
be found in international corridors of power. International developments moreover
presuppose the development of a real “Weltinnenpolitik”, which again necessitates
a “value dialogue” with other societies.201
1.3.7. Bundeswehr
In 1990, Germany’s armed forces counted just under 600 000 men and women
which had to be reduced to 370 000 by 1994 (amount in peace-time). From 1991
on Germany has participated in several missions abroad. In the beginning, there
were solely humanitarian action or logistic support measures of UN missions
to Cambodia (1992) and Somalia (1993) as well as multinational surveillance
199 Bettzuege (2007), 229-230. See also Auswärtiges Amt at http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/DE/AAmt/Abteilungen/PolAbteilung2_node.html
200 Bettzuege (2007), 231.
201 Bettzuege (2007), pp. 225-226.
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measures (aircraft grounding in Bosnia-Herzegovina and embargo control in the
Adriatic Sea). Next to the Balkan missions and Afghanistan (from 2002), the
federal government has sent larger contingents of the marine (more than 1000
soldiers) in the frame of the operation Enduring Freedom to the Horn of Africa
(since 2001), to the coast of Libanon for surveillance in the context of the UNIFIL
mission (since 2006) and furthermore with the EU mission Atalanta for combating
piracy in the Gulf of Adan and by the coast of Somalia (since 2008). Moreover,
several smaller deployments for the logistic support of allies or the UN can be
added to the big picture of German missions abroad.202
In 2004, a reorganisation was accomplished under defence minisiter Struck. The
crisis reaction forces and main defence forces were grouped in three power cat-
egories: 1. The intervention forces for operations of high intensity and short
duration (35 000 soldiers); 2. the stabilisation forces for operations of low and
middle intensity and longer duration (70 000 soldiers) as well as the support
forces for logistic, basic establishment and education (147 500 soldiers). The cat-
egories moreover comprise the military branches army (about 107 000), airforce
(47 000) and navy (20 000).203 The decisive change was to move the emphasis
from defence to crisis management “out-of-area”. Effectively, conflict prevention
and crisis management were to a large extent equalised with collective defence
in regards to intensity and complexity.204 Thus, the new organisation was very
compatible with NATO’s strategic concept of 1999. On the other hand, however,
the Bundeswehr was considered to be chronically underfunded, which of course
was problematic in regards to its huge international commitments.205
The importance of European defence policy to Sweden’s defence was pointed out
in chapter 3.3.2 of part I. Also Germany found out quickly that their military
capabilities did not fit with the tasks of the out-of-area missions the country
was taking part in (above all Kosovo and Afghanistan). Economic necessities
moreover contributed to “a whole new dynamic and seriousness” to the defence
reforms, and as a reaction to the financial crisis, Germany passed a constitutional
202 Hesse/Ellwein (2012), p. 153.
203 Varwick (2007), p. 252.
204 Varwick (2007), p. 253.
205The 2004 defence budget amounted to 23,8 billion Euro, 5 billion less than France and 10
billion less than the UK, which made up 1,4 per cent of GNP in the lower third among NATO
states. Varwick (2007), p. 254.
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amendment limiting new federal debt to 3,5 per cent of GDP. The German defence
ministry thus had to cut 8,3 billion euro between 2010 and 2014 (2015), and with
an annual budget of the German defence of about 30 billion euro, these are
concussive numbers.206 Just like Sweden, Germany’s then-defence minister zu
Guttenberg was able to abolish conscription.207 The reform package moreover
comprises the reduction of the number of soldiers from about 252 000 (2011) to
about 180 000. The organisational structures will also be changed but the real
saving will not come from cutting personnel but from cutting equipment, both
of the materiel in service and those profected to be procured.208 This is thus a
distinct difference from the Swedish example.209
The German rearmament after the Second World War was followed by constitu-
tional regulations and principles which secured certain control competencies of
the parliament towards the armed forces and distinguished the Bundeswehr from
former types of military. There is no single chapter in the German constitution
for the Bundeswehr, which on the other hand appears in several other articles.
This is meant to link it to the whole constitutional order and prevent a special
position (“Sonderrolle”) of the armed forces. The political leadership is moreover
distinctly placed by the civil minister of defence with the supreme command of
the armed forces in times of peace.210 Furthermore, the defence committee of
the Bundestag has extensive control rights, and the Parliamentary Commissioner
for the Armed Forces supports the parliamentarian control of the Bundeswehr
and also secures the single soldier’s right to complain. Another important aspect
is the substantial multinational integration of the Bundeswehr in NATO. It was
not initiated as a national army but as a German contribution to the defence of
the Alliance, which is pointed out by the abandonmnet of the production of ABC
weapons and the control of the federal units by NATO command. Today, all Ger-
206 Keller (2011), p. 2.
207See Hesse/Ellwein (2012), p. 154.
208 Keller (2011), p. 3. Active weapon systems, including six U206A submarines, fifteen
Transall transport aircraft, 100 Tornado fighter-bombers, and 60 Marder armored tracked ve-
hicles will be put out of service. In regards to major defence projects, cuts will be made to
strategic and tactical airlift (A400M transporter and NH-90 and Tiger helicopters) programmes.
Also, the procurement of 37 Eurofighter jets will be stopped if possible, in addition to the pro-
jected 400 Puma armoured tracked vehicles and the missile defence system MEADS. Keller
(2011), p. 3.
209See chapter 3.3.2 of part I.
210The supreme command in times of war belongs to the chancellor.
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man army corps are multinational integrated and participants of the Eurocorps
(Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg, Spain), the German-Dutch Corps , the
multinational Corps North-East (Germany, Denmark, Poland) and two German-
US Corps and the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (14 nations). The exception is
the IV Corps in Potsdam.211
A subjective view of Major Odd Haugdahl, a former representative of the Nor-
wegian army at the German-Dutch corps in Münster (Germany) will be used as
initial point of a debate on the core dilemmas of German security policy. This is
of particular interest as it is the realm of German foreign policy where “change”
instead of “continuity” has prevailed. Haugdahl stated in 2004 that
“Germany is a challenging cooperation partner as the organisation and
culture in the Bundeswhehr can be very bureaucratic. Further, there is
not much history and recent experience in thinking multinational solutions
out of geopolitical challenges. I think maybe that a new generation officers
and politicians who do not have the “dead weight” of the postwar period
would be better capable of this. Until now, I think, the Bundeswehr might
have deliberately preferred to cooperate with “small” partners where they
have been able to implement their norms on others without much resistance.
Another challenge is failing abilities in English among the German soldiers.
(...) What I have depicted are types of challenges in relation to culture
and history that will be found in military cooperation between nations in
multilateral solutions.”212
History is indeed an important part of the current challenges which the Bun-
deswehr and German defence policy in general is facing. The FRG had actually
lost its strategic sovereignty with its NATO membership of 1955. As the only
NATO member state, all the units of the Bundeswehr were put under the control
of the alliance, and a strategic centre of the federal military policy was non-
existent. Strategy was developed at the level of the alliance. The “strategic
culture” of the old federal republic was thus characterised by silence on the topic.
211 Varwick (2007), p. 248.
212Major Odd Haugdahl, interview with author, 5 May 2004, Greven. Author’s translation.
Statement in Norwegian: “Tyskland er en utfordrende samarbeidspartner da jeg mener at or-
ganiseringen og kultur i Bundeswehr kan være byråkratisk, og at det ikke finnes særlig historikk
og fersk erfaring i å tenke multinasjonale løsninger ut fra geopolitiske utfordringer. Jeg tror
kanskje at en ny generasjon offiserer og politikere som ikke har etterkrigstidens “ballast” vil
være bedre i stand til dette. Jeg tror inntil nå så har Bundeswehr kanskje bevisst foretrukket
å samarbeide med små partnere hvor man har kunne implementere sine normer på uten større
motstand. En annen utfordring med samarbeidet er mmanglende engelskkunnskaper blant de
tyske soldatene. (...) Det jeg har pekt på er typer av utfordringer i forhold til kultur og historikk
som vil finnes ved militært samarbeid mellom nasjoner i multinasjonale løsninger.
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If a debate did take place it was rather enforced by e.g. the Nachrüstungsde-
batte of the 1980s.213 One of the core problems of the strategic stagnation of
German security policy is thus the trust in the established practice which was
well-functioning for 40 years. Germany’s two main strategic problems are ac-
cording to Naumann the marginal benefit of the established multilateral style of
action, and secondly the paralysing antagonism of hard and soft power in security
policy.214 There is no alternative to multilateral action. However, the problems
are beginning beyond this basic conclusion. “Assuming that what is good for
Europe, the Alliance or the community of states also coincide with with the Ger-
man interests, a political commitment was construed on the quiet which gave
little room for initiatives.”215 Also chancellor Schröder’s refusal to participate in
the war in Iraq was basically a defensive decision not accompanied by alterna-
tive suggestions according to Naumann. The same can be said about the neutral
position Germany took prior to the NATO operation in Libya in 2011.216 A de-
fensive attitude thus characterises German security policy, international requests
are waited for, and reservations and limitations are included in the mandated
missions. Germany’s policy on Afghanistan is a good example.217
The federal government’s action plan “Zivile Krisenprävention” from 2004 com-
poses an integrated and cross-departmental concept of “enhanced” security pre-
vention. This concept was furthermore mentioned as a “Baustein” in the 2006
White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr.218
Accordingly, the
“Bundeswehr undertakes operations at national and international level.
This similarly necessitates an all-round, networked approach that effec-
213 Naumann (2009), p. 14.
214 Naumann (2009), pp. 10-11.
215 Naumann (2009), p. 11. Author’s translation.
216See chapter 1.2.2 of this part.
217The German policy on Afghanistan has become well-known as a restrictive interpretation,
and the deployment mandate has been further narrowed through amendments. Provisos as a
ban on flying after dark has brought criticism both inside and outside NATO. Other safety
regulations imply that German PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) troops are not allowed
to stay outside their camps overnight, i.e. long-range patrols are not possible. Patrols have to
go along with armoured ambulance, which implies larger and less flexible convoys. Moreover,
Kunduz was chosen as the location of the first German PRT because of safety reasons. The
German policy leaves a “light footprint” which leads Germany to be an advocate of the PRTs
as “islands of security” made up by troops of a limited number. Germany also established the
only PRT with a shared military and civilian command. Merz (2007), pp. 8-9.
218 Naumann (2009), p. 10.
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tively combines civilian and military instruments. Such an approach is of
paramount importance in the context of comprehensive security provision,
particularly for conflict prevention and crisis management operations.”219
According to Naumann, German policy has a good concept in regards to the
civilian-military challenges. What is not provided for is the institutional uphold-
ing of promises made by the enhanced security concept.220
In a verdict of the Federal Constitutional Court of 12 July 1994221 it was decided
that the participation in all types of missions is permitted which take place in
the frame of collective security systems (UN, NATO, WEU). Mere national mis-
sions are thus not constitutional. The Bundestag has to approve of Bundeswehr
missions with a simple majority in advance, with certain exceptions in urgent
cases (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz). It can also reverse all foreign missions by
revoking its approval222 However, as Naumann remarks, there is no cross-sectional
structure of security policy in the parliament. The Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz
is limited to the military part of the deployments and thus leads to a further
marginalisation of the non-military components of the missions. The annual
routine of prolonging the mandates of the missions is limited to the size of the
contingents, their spaces and instruments, and are not characterised by strate-
gic thinking and the formulation of aims.223 Naumann poses the question what
political-institutional logic is followed by German security policy and states that
even this basic question can not be answered.224 In short, “the pronounced will
to think strategically dies in the institutional structures. Germany is acting pre-
dictably but fails dramatically to reach its full potential.”225
1.3.8. Political parties
Acting in a parliamentarian democracy, the government is borne by parties and
can not act against the basic values and convictions of their supporters without
destroying the basis of their practice. This also applies to the field of foreign
219 Federal Ministry of Defence (Germany) (2006).
220 Naumann (2009), p. 12.
221See also the previous chapter on the Bundestag.
222 Varwick (2007), p. 250.
223 Naumann (2009), p. 14.
224 Naumann (2009), p. 10.
225 Naumann (2009), p. 14.
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policy, where the importance of political parties primarily concern the funda-
mental decisions of direction. All such decisions were accompanied by intense
disputes between political parties. Interestingly, however, the opposition parties
have sooner or later accepted the decisions and finally carried them on, due to
requirements stemming from the international system.226 A good example is the
Ospolitik. During the Iraq crisis in 2002, some dissent was apparent between the
coalition partners Green party and the SPD on the one hand and the opposition
parties CDU/CSU and the FDP on the other hand.227 The opposition parties
were showing a more cooperative attitude towards the US. Here, the weighting of
supporting its most important ally on the one hand and preventing a war which
was more than doubtful in regards to international law, was decisive. Moreover,
the conflictual situation between the US’ partners in Europe following the crisis
was also about what role the EU should have as an actor in world politics. The
EU as a more independent military actor has advocates in all German political
parties, except of the Left party.228
A further interesting feature of German parties is the large amount of consensus
in regards to basic convictions or foreign political basic orientations. The basic
values of peace, freedom, democracy, human rights and solidarity are present in
all party programmes legitimising foreign policy actions. The succession of these
values, however, differ. The policy statements of SPD and FDP are somewhat out
of the ordinary according to Oppelland, who points to the SPD statements from
1989 which assessed peace to be of superior importance. The FDP’s “Wiesbadener
Grundsätze” of 1997 rather stress the universality of the human rights as its
normative basis. The “liberal world community”, moreover, is in need of a “global
legal order”.229 Nevertheless, the normative content of foreign policy, i.e. the
basic agreement on Germany’s integration in multilateral structures, and a united
Europe in particular, and as the strengthening of the UN as the guardian of world
peace, is evident despite differences in the practical policy making. Concensus is
also obvious in the topics not mentioned by the party platforms. Key terms of
the realistic school of foreign policy thinking like power, hegemony or balance of
226 Oppelland (2007), pp. 269-270.
227The very US-critical Left party is a case sui generis.
228 Oppelland (2007), pp. 278-279.
229http://www.koch-mehrin.de/uploads/2009/08/Wiesbadener_Grundsaetze_1997.pdf
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power are not mentioned.230 Writing in 1977, Bull states that
“it has been contended that international society is only one element in
world politics, that this element of society shares the stage of world politics
with the elements of war or conflict, and the element of human community,
and that the working of what have been called the rules and institutions of
international society [i.e. balance of power, international law, diplomacy,
war and the role of great powers] have to be seen in relation to these other
two elements, as well as in relation to international society.”231
The question is thus if German parties should be praised for not using these
“hard” terms as most Western states use in their discourse on foreign policy. It is
tempting to assume that whereas Norwegian polity likes to think of itself as moral
superior to most other states (especially in regards to the US and the EU), Ger-
man polity still does not have the self confidence to pursue a foreign policy which
calls a spade a spade. Hans-Peter Schwarz is mentioned as the (not very hon-
ourable) exception, perceiving Germany to be the “Zentralmacht” of Europe.232
That Germany is the most central power in Europe - geographically, economi-
cally, politically - does, however, not make the political parties verbally recognise
the same reality. The West German policy of uniting and reconsiling Europe
after the Second World War, and its very restrictive military policy, supported
by the German public, entail very valuable lessons. However, Germany does not
take a leading role in the global foreign policy discourse after reunification but
adapts to the policy direction of its Western allies from the 1990s on. However,
being the second largest troop provider in Afghanistan is not compatible with
the avoidance of difficult vocabulary. War is a matter of fact.
1.4. Conclusions and Outlook
After this presentation of German foreign policy, what implications are there
for the assessment of Germany’s importance to Norway and Sweden? Henry
Kissinger’s famous remark “Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?” could
be converted into “Who do we call if we want to speak to Germany”. Is it a
230 Oppelland (2007), pp. 272.
231 Bull (19952), pp. 307-308.
232 Oppelland (2007), pp. 274.
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necessity of a federal state to be so clouded when it comes to foreign political
strategies? The question is how many Scandinavian foreign policy actors take
the time to study the federal structures and “disorder” of German policy making.
Gareis concludes that German foreign policy at large has become “more complex,
peripheral and also more specific in the single departments.”233 There has been
a certain debate in Germany when it comes to new security challenges and the
way the political system is able to adapt to new situations. The CDU/CSU
claimed a new security strategy in 2008, which demanded a national security
council capable of concentrating the internal coordination on German security
policy. The advantages of a such are obvious, according to Varwick:
“Those who talk about cross-linked security also finally need to link their
own actions on security policy to a larger extent. There is certainly no lack-
ing of non-committal political and ministerial networking dimensions in this
country (maybe there are even too many of them). What is not provided
for, however, is a strategic link-up to the highest level which helps the net-
work to find a united will, and to implement it as well. (...) Beside the
improved internal coordination of different security-political instruments
and ideas, such a council could, provided that the adequate will of the po-
litical leadership is given, socialise more systematically with the partner
countries and integrate the security political concepts and strategies of the
Federal Republic internationally.”234
The counterargument is among other things that a national security council does
not fit in to the “proven, adaptable arrangement”235 of the decision processes on
German foreign and security policy. A further counter-argument is the danger of
a militarisation of security policy.236 From a Scandinavian point of view, however,
such a council would definitely simplify the question of who to call at least in the
field of security policy. It is true that as a parliamentarian democracy, a lot of
constitutional aspects make Germany different from the US and may question a
national security council. However, if it is only a matter of lacking self-confidence
leading to self-containment instead of improving its ability to enhance its (from a
Scandinavian point of view assumed volitional) influence on world politics, then
major Haugdahl’s outlook for the Bundeswehr may also have parallels in the
larger picture of German foreign policy. It certainly demands great expertise
233 Gareis (2009), p. 13.
234 Varwick (2008), p. 81. Author’s translation.
235Author’s translation.
236 Staack (2008), p. 82.
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and resources in small countries to follow up the federal world of German foreign
policy.
This conclusion must be taken even further in order to assess the importance
of German foreign policy to Norway and Sweden. At least, some important
questions must be raised. In order for Germany to be an important partner, it
can not live in the past. If Germany could choose the perfect policy, would it then
pursue the foreign policy of today? Is Germany still trying to make amends for its
past sins by trying not to be powerful? In that case they are getting hold of the
wrong end of the stick like the rest of the world is misunderstanding Germany.
Hence, German policy makers would be misunderstanding the definition of power
because it is all about how one uses its power. The last chapter shows that
Germany has a lot to contribute to in Europe and the world. They have the
necessary experience, have learned the necessary lessons, and has come to terms
with the (militant) past and would not let anything similar happen again. The
question which must be raised however is whether they have undertaken a similar
reconsideration of the experiences made during the Cold War. German foreign
and security policy, its principles, structures and institutions, rather shows that
the probable answer to this is no. In order to have policy aims, it seems necessary
to use time intervals to reconsider the old policy. Instead of solely adapting to
new situations, new goals should be set. The fear of power can thus prevent clear
intentions. The world is changing, but the Germans seem to think that they
have not changed. EU developments however show that although Germany does
not want the power, they have now received it. They can thus no longer play
the game of adapting to others. Germany has to choose and and then take the
consequences instead of refurbishing the world to others. The German federal
and institutional distraction of power also leads to the question who is taking
the responsibility for German foreign policy. The least what must be expected
is that Germany takes responsibility for itself. If everyone is just defending their
own role, how is it possible not reconsider anything at all?
The following perception of former German FM Joschka Fischer on German policy
in the European debt crisis is very alarming if it represents the majority view in
German politics, regardless of how one thinks the euro crisis should be solved:
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“In the 20th century Germany twice devasteted itself and the European
order to subjugate the continent. Germany has drawn the right conclusions
and only like that - through a convincing reversal and the integration of
this large country in the middle of the continent in the West and the EU -
was the approval of the German unity accomplished.”
So far so good, but he continues:
“It would be a tragedy and irony at the same time if at this point of time,
in the beginning of the 21 century, the reunited Germany would destroy
the European order a third time, this time peacefully and with the best of
intents.”237
Does Germany have more responsibility for other states’ choices than the other
EU members? Does Germany’s reunification prohibit the right of the Germans
to say out loud what is not functioning? Would the EU work better without
“Ordnung muss sein”, is there a point in having the same rules for different coun-
tries? This actually implies that every country is the same. The less laws and
rules, the more openness one would get. In the current situation, there is no point
in being engaged in European policies. Does the success of German European
policy during the Cold War, i.e. its legitimation for being “good” again, prevent
it from taking necessary decisions or asking necessary questions? The necessary
reconsideration has obviously not been undertaken. In order not to stay a neg-
ative power factor in Europe because of its economic power, Germany has to
handle the disputes and cut through in order to establish a new, sensible and
comprehensible European order. It is never too late to create something new.
237 Fischer (2012). Author’s traslation.

2. Case Studies
In order to elaborate case studies on Germany’s importance, three issue areas are
selected. Each issue area, i.e. Germany and the Arctic, Germany and the Baltic
Sea Region, and Germany and Russia comprise one or more case studies. In all
issue areas, German foreign policy will be put to the test in regards to whether it
is the “good international citizen” it is required to be in cases of great relevance
to the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the foreign policies of Norway
and Sweden.
Three groups of independent variables have been included in the research design
in order to classify German policy in the different cases along the scale between
order and justice. These are the three groups of principles of good international
citizenship (pluralistic principles, solidarist principles, and universally applicable
principles)238 The aim is, as concluded in chapter 3 of part II, a “sound consen-
sual legitimacy” which implies that a pluralist stance should be taken where a
necessary consensus is absent.239 In some cases, however, a more solidarist policy
might be necessary and possible. The question is thus if German policy uni-
fies the best of both solidarist and pluralist principles in the different cases, and
whether the principles are applied to small and large actors in a similar way. One
case consists of several observations of German policy on a specific, limited issue
within the issue area. The independent principles which need to be discussed
might, moreover, vary from case to case.
First, the issue areas were singled out due to the criteria of topical representa-
tiveness, macropolitical contexts, and dissimilarity in regards to the applicability
of the theoretical guidelines of part II. The topical representativeness was thus
derived from the tables I.3 and I.4, whereas the macropolitical contexts are con-
238 Linklater/ Suganami (2006).
239 Linklater/ Suganami (2006), p. 272.
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Issue area Case
Germany and the Arctic 1. Arctic sustainable development
Germany and the BSR 2. The Baltic states
3. Kaliningrad
4. Regional cooperation
Germany and Russia 5. Russia’s integration in Europe
Table III.1.: Case studies assessing Germany’s importance.
nected with the tables I.1 and I.2.240 The issues thus reflect both the topics of
particular interest to Norway and Sweden and the importance of the power tri-
angle surrounding the Nordic region. Second, one or more cases were selected for
each issue area due to certain criteria. First, the issue should be politically impor-
tant to Norway and/ or Sweden. Second, Germany’s foreign policy on the issue
is assessed to be important. And third, a meaningful classification of German
policy due to the balance between justice and order must be possible.
The case studies focus on the regional contexts of Norwegian and Swedish for-
eign policy. The overall focus is on international law and cosmopolitan values.
Finally, Germany’s compatibility with the principles of good international citizen-
ship should be compared between issue areas in order to conclude on the overall
importance of Germany to Norway and Sweden. Depending on the decisive ac-
tors of international society that emerge in the different cases, pluralist principles
might be more important than solidarist in some cases and the other way around,
whereas the universally applicable principles might be the most decisive in cases
with both “pluralist” and “solidarist” actors. If German policy should take a more
solidarist direction in some cases in order to be a good international citizen, a
more pluralist stance could just as well be eligible in other cases. The question
is whether there is a red thread running through the different cases, or if the
assessment of Germany’s suitability as the good international citizen on Nordic
matters vary strongly from case to case. In other words, the evaluations will
consider a. whether German policy is promoting a “sound consensual legitimacy”
which unifies the best of pluralist and solidarist principles and b. German policy
when there is a conflict between order and justice.
240All tables are situated in chapter 4 of part I.
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2.1. Germany and the Arctic
The Arctic accounts for one sixth of the global landmass, comprises more than 30
million km2 and 24 time zones. The Arctic has a population of about 4 million,
including over 30 different indigenous peoples and dozens of languages.241 The
natural resources are vast and the environment clean compared to other parts
of the world. A big environmental challenge, however, is the ice melting caused
by global warming, which not only raises the sea level - and 150 million people
today live less than one metre above sea level - but also imperils the general living
conditions of e.g. the polar bears. Other implications of the ice melting are the
new sea routes for shipping as described in chapter 1 of part I.
2.1.1. Case 1: Arctic sustainable development
2.1.1.1. Introduction
The first case study chosen for this chapter on the Arctic concentrates on envi-
ronmental questions. The most important reason for picking this area of study
is that a sustainable development in the Arctic is like no other realm dependent
on internatonal cooperation and regimes. International law has been a topic in
regards to economic interests and delineations of continental shelves in part I, but
environmental regimes seem more important when international law is considered
because they display a broader approach.
For once, NATO and the EU are not the main organisations of importance.
Rather, the Arctic Council (AC), established with the Ottawa Declaration of
1996, is the only institution solely preoccupied with this geographic area. Impor-
tantly, the AC includes both Russia and the US in addition to Canada, Denmark
(representing Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway and
Sweden. The council describes itself as “a high level intergovernmental forum to
provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among
the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities
and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sus-
241http://arctic-council.org/article/about
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tainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”242 It adopts
non-binding declarations at its bi-annual ministerial meetings and must be de-
fined as a soft-law institution. Between the meetings, the Senior Arctic Officials
of the eights member states supervise the activities of the six working groups.
The organisation is open to international organisations and non-arctic states as
observers. Until now, six non-arctic countries have been permitted a permanent
observer status: France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK.
China, South Korea and the EU are moreover among those eager to become
permanent observers. Moreover, also inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary
organisations (global and regional) as well as non-governmental organisations can
participate. Despite not being directly involved in Arctic questions, the EU is
not without importance. As mentioned in chapter 4.1.3 of part I, the European
Parliament in 2008 suggested new international negotiations on a new agreement
to protect the Arctic, as the ice melting and the new conditions caused by this are
believed to require new multilateral norms and regulations which the UNCLOS
is not covering. Although revoking this position, the considerations of the Euro-
pean Parliament annoyed not only the Norwegian FM but also e.g. Canada. The
question of multilateral norms and regulations is important. Also earlier men-
tioned are the Russian national strategy for the region published in September
2008 and the US strategy of 2009. In addition of coures comes Norway’s northern
areas policy, Norway being the most activist arctic state so far.
2.1.1.1.1. The environmental hazards of the Arctic Global environmental
changes affect the Arctic more strongly than other parts of the world, especially
in regards to change of temperature and bioaccumulation of pollutants. The
average temperature in the Arctic has risen more than twice as fast compared
to the rest of the world. The arctic sea ice withdrawal opens possibilities of new
navigation sea routes in the summertime. The Northern Sea Route could replace
the route through the Suez Canal, and the Northwest Passage along the northern
coast of North America could replace the route via the Panama Canal (see figure
242http://arctic-council.org/article/about
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Figure III.1.: Main shipping lines, settlements and protected areas in the Arctic.
(Source: nordregio.se)
III.1243).244 Greenland’s glaciers and the permafrost is melting, the snow cover
is reduced. These changes also deeply affect the way of living of the Arctic’s
indigenous peoples. Sea ice thickness of the Arctic as a whole has decreased
by about 40 per cent for the most recent several decades.245 Arctic warming is
directly connected with the importance of sea ice in the global climate system
as sea ice, and snow-covered sea ice in particular, is a “highly reflective surface”,
high albedo, as compared to the darker low albedo ocean. Sea ice reduction
thus exposes more open ocean to sun rays in the arctic summer, and additional
sunlight (energy) is absorbed, which again warms the ocean surface and the air
above. This results in increased ocean and air temperatures that again melt even
more sea ice.246
243The cartographer: Johanna Roto and José Sterling. Data source: World protected areas
database, UNEP-WCMC 2005. Russian data digitalised by WWF in 2005 by official sources,
National Statistics Institutions.
244 Chapman (2009), pp. 6-7. The probability of an open Northwest Passage is not as high
as for the Northern Sea Route as the sea ice is thinner within the latter.
245 Chapman (2009), p. 8.
246 Chapman (2009), pp. 8-9.
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Important is also the fact that the Arctic serves as a “sink” for many hazardous
substances with their origin in other parts of the world, e.g. reprocessing plants
in the UK and France, forty or fifty year old atmospheric nuclear tests, and fall-
out from Chernobyl. This is the case with most of the radionuclides found in
Arctic marine and terrestrial environments. Strong south-north air flows, rivers
and ocean currents contribute to the transportation of hazardous compunds, of
which the persistent organic pollutants (POPs) are particularly alarming. These
include organochlorine pesticides used in agriculture, industrial chemicals such
as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB), and combustion products. The particular
feature of the Arctic is thus the “cold trap” which prevents their further trans-
portation. The Inuit of Canada and Greenland have one of the highest exposures
to PCB and mercury in a global comparison. Heavy metals, and mercury in par-
ticular, are found in high concentrations in arctic areas, often caused by waste
incineration and coal burning power plants from as far away as Eastern China.
Also, some of the highest PCB levels measured in fat and blood are found in
polar bears around Svalbard and Franz Josef Land.247
Whereas long-range transported hazardous substances are significant, regional
sources of hazardious substances within the Arctic states also generate a sub-
stantial share of regional marine pollution such as organochlorines, heavy metals
and hydrocarbons. “Bad examples” are the Norilsk mining and metallurgical com-
plex, the West Siberian oil and gas industries, the huge Kuznetz coal basin, and
the nuclear reprocessing plant in Mayak on the southeastern slopes of the Urals.
The Yenisei and Ob rivers are the main channels for river-borne pollution into
the Arctic. In addition, two-thirds of the atmospheric heavy metals and most of
the sulphur found within the Polar Circle originate from industrial activities in
Northwestern Russia.248
2.1.1.1.2. Arctic governance In May 2008 the coastal Arctic states Canada,
Denmark, Norway, Russia and the US gathered in Greenland and concluded the
Ilullissat Declaration which asserted that
247 Schram Stokke (2007), p. 5.
248 Schram Stokke (2007), p. 9.
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“the law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations con-
cerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the pro-
tection of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of
navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We re-
main committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of
any possible overlapping claims.
This framework provides a solid foundation for responsible management
by the five coastal States and other users of this Ocean through national
implementation and application of relevant provisions. We therefore see no
need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern
the Arctic Ocean.”249
In regards to a sustainable development in the Arctic, the vital question is whether
there is time for a new Arctic Treaty, as predicated by Donald R. Rothwell250 or
whether the existing institutions “can provide better venues”, as argued by Olav
Schram Stokke.251 Before discussing this more thoroughly, the EU’s arctic policy
and role in this area will be discussed as it is part of the same set of discussion.
The EU, with the exception of the Danish dominions of Greenland and the Faroe
Islands, does not have arctic territory or a clear role in this area. The EU’s
first step towards an arctic policy was the “Arctic Window” of the Northern
Dimension which, however, did not attract much attention. In 2007, the European
Commission’s Integrated Maritime Strategy mentioned the Arctic Ocean in the
global warming context. In regards to the European Parliament, the debate of
October 2008 led to a Resolution on Arctic Governance which mentioned that
the Arctic is not governed by specific norms and regulations. It also stressed
concern about the policies on environment, naval traffic, energy and security in
this region and suggested an observer status for the European Commission in the
AC as well as an international treaty for protection of the Arctic based on the
Antarctic Treaty.252
249The Ilullissat Declaration pp. 1-2 at http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat
_Declaration.pdf
250 Rothwell (2009). Rothwell is a specialist in international polar law and professor of
International Law at the ANU College of Law, Australian National University.
251 Schram Stokke (2009). Schram Stokke is Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen
Institute, Norway.
252See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2008-
0474&language=EN The Antarctic Treaty covers the area south of 60◦S latitutde. 46 coun-
tries (making up around 80 per cent of the world’s population), as opposed to the initial 12,
have acceded to the treaty which has simple objectives: 1. to demilitarise the Antarctica
and make it a nuclear free zone, also free of radioactive waste, and ensure its use for peace-
ful purposes only; 2. to promote international scientific cooperation and 3. to abandon dis-
putes over territorial sovereignty. See the Antarctic Treaty at http://www.antarctica.ac.uk//
about_antarctica/geopolitical/treaty/update_1959.php
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The following Arctic Paper of the European Commission (2008) emphasised, as
an answer to the European Parliament, the implementation of existing obligations
rather than new instruments in arctic governance. The development of frame-
works and adapting to arctic conditions were on the other hand stressed, and
the Arctic should be integrated in EU policies and negotiations. Other suggested
steps were that the EU should closely follow UNCLOS negotiations in particular
and have a permanent observer status in the AC. EUND projects on environ-
ment and energy in particular should be developed, and a Maritime Strategy
Framework directive should be integrated in the EEA. Environment, sustain-
able exploitation of resources and enhanced multilateral governance are the three
important issues of the Commission guidelines.253 The Commission Paper thus
rather underlined the EU emphasis on existing frameworks (UNCLOS, AC, the
International Maritime Organisation (IMO)). Bailes here rises an important ques-
tion:
“But is the EU joining the ’grab for the Arctic’ as a knee-jerk reaction of
global self-assertion and typical Commission activism? Or does it have real
interests to protect, contributions to offer and useful assets for promoting
them?”254
The European state with the “clearest and most assertive”255 Arctic policy has
been Norway, belonging to the EEA. There is also the possibility of Iceland
becoming an EU member in the near future. Bailes notes, that if the EU wants
to take a leading role in climate change issues, an arctic policy is necessary as the
region is decisive for the further development. The Commission Report on the
Arctic is also assertive where EU interests are at stake and stresses the importance
of freedom of navigation and passage, and an observer status of the AC is the
institutional tactic. “But why should other powers and institutions make way for
the Union, as a relative newcomer, to join the High Northern game?”256 Bailes’
arguments are the following:
First, in a territorial sense, the EU is already there, as an important energy
partner (Russia, Norway), and a climate partner (the US). Through the EEA
253See http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/pdf/com08_763_en.pdf
254 Bailes (2009).
255 Bailes (2009).
256 Bailes (2009).
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membership of all Nordic states, EU norms are relevant in several areas of arc-
tic importance. Second, the asset of the EU compared to NATO is a greater
freedom due to its “non-threatening” image and could possibly act as “a cushion
or moderator between great-power interests up North.” Third, more than arctic
institutions themselves, the EU has “competence in just about every part of the
emerging Arctic agenda except hard defrence, but including ’hard economics’.”
Fourth, the EU’s large funds and direct legislative powers are relevant to complex
challenges of Arctic management, whereas the EU’s vast scope on the other hand
represents the main disadvantage of the EU in this regard. In addition to the
bureaucratic challenge comes the political challenge of achieving the consensus
among the EU 27, in addition to partners like Norway, when deciding how to
prioritise the high north. EU policy would also have to be tuned with NATO’s
policy on the Arctic.257
The question thus rises if there is any need for a “lead mediator” in the north when
the arctic coastal states have agreed on the UNCLOS as the legal foundation for
arctic activities which places rights and responsibilities with the coastal states.
Moe questions this role as a mediator. “At present the EU lacks an institutional
focus for its alleged interest in the Arctic. Only when ambitions are reflected
in organisational measures and the capacity for concrete action will EU have an
important role to play.” The EU’s knowledge resources would on the other hand
be more important to the arctic development than a mediator role.258
Returning to the question whether the UNCLOS provides a sufficient foundation
for resolving arctic issues, different views will be taken into account. As men-
tioned above, Rothwell assesses the UNCLOS to be unable to settle all arctic
challenges, although providing the foundation of problem solving in some cases.
Since 2001, claims of a continental shelf extending beyond the uncontested 200
nautical miles to possibly 350 nautical miles offshore have been made.259 How-
ever, the convention does not provide clear rules of how shared maritime space
should be divided. In regards to the AC, Rothwell acknowledges it as a forum for
Arctic issues. However, it has avoided contentious issues. Thus a regime based on
257 Bailes (2009).
258 Moe (2009).
259In regards to the Norwegian claims, see chapter 4 of part I.
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a regional treaty which again is “based upon respect for existing sovereign rights
compatible with current legal frameworks” is suggested.260
“A relatively short framework treaty addressing fundamental sovereignty
and dispute resolution mechanisms which included a set of overarching re-
gional management principles would provide a sound foundation for the
regime. (...) Comprehensive arctic-wide environmental managment with
a strong oceans focus would also be essential. (...) The time has come
for a reassessment of the reluctance of the arctic states to support a fully
functioning regional organisation. The current arctic regime is a patchwork
of soft political responses in need of an overarching binding treaty frame-
work which UNCLOS cannot provide. The time for an Arctic Treaty has
come.”261
As opposed to this it can be argued that the Arctic was indeed a focal point
when negotiating the UNCLOS. This becomes clear in Article 234 which allows
coastal states to adopt rigorous pollution prevention measures in ice-covered re-
gions. The Arctic was also an important incentive when drafting article 76 on the
extended continental shelf, and together with the CLCS the UNCLOS provides
“an invaluable basis for dispute resolution and avoidance”.262
Before pursuing with further views on whether new regimes are needed in the Arc-
tic, the term ’international regime’ must shortly be approached more specifically.
The study of international regimes is concerned with governance as an issue and
focuses on formal and informal rules, institutions and practices of international
relations.263 They have also been “broadly defined as governing arrangements
constructed by states to coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of in-
ternational behaviour in various issue-areas”.264 While states are often the formal
regime actors, they often act through non-state actors. Regimes can be created by
negotiation, by powerful states imposing them or by “spontaneous coordination of
state activities”. The reasons for complying with regime rules might be explained
to be a result of ”calculated self-interest” or, in terms of Oran Young, a ”general
sense of obligation, simple habit, utilitarian considerations of self-interest, reci-
procity and the fear of damage to reputation, as sources of compliance” can be
260 Rothwell (2009), pp. 7-8.
261 Rothwell (2009), p. 8.
262 Byers (2009), p. 21.
263 Cutler (1991), p. 61.
264Kratochwil F./ Ruggie, J.G. (1986) “International Organization: A State of the Art on the
Art of the State”, International Organization 40, p. 759, cited in Cutler (1991).
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the underlying reasons.265
Returning to the question whether new arctic regimes are needed in regards to
environmental governance of the Arctic, Schram Stokke negates this question.
“Not because strengthening of legal measures is unnecessary, but because there
already exist institutions (...) that can provide better venues.”266
The AC was established to coordinate and oversee the different working groups
of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), which was a result of
a Finnish initative of intergovernmental cooperation on protection of the arctic
environment (1991). The AEPS consisted of four activity areas which were co-
ordinated by respective working groups: the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment
Program (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency
Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) and Protection of the Arctic
Marine Environment (PAME). Later, the Working Group on Sustainable Devel-
opment has been added.267 The AC is an organisation including two important
actors of climate politics, the US and Russia. This makes the organisation “a
high-level international forum for discussing and acting on a range of regional
challenges and for generating arctic premises in broader debates on environmen-
tal regulation.”268 Although significant for regional environmental governance,
other instruments such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change and its Kyoto protocol are more important as most of the rapid arctic
changes are caused by global warming. Also the environmental damage resulting
from e.g. industrial activities in different other regions demand measures within
broader institutions such as the regional Convention on Long-Range Transported
Air Pollution (CLRTAP). Schram Stokke thus points to the fact that regional
states and institutions have to engage in broad international regimes in order to
address the POPs problem in the Arctic, in which the separate POPs Protocol un-
der the CLRTAP covering Europe and North America and the Stockholm POPs
Convention are important as they commit states to eliminate or even restrict the
production, use and trade of some harmful substances.269
265Cited in Cutler (1991), p. 61.
266 Schram Stokke (2009), p. 8.
267 Schram Stokke (2007), p. 4.
268 Schram Stokke (2009), p. 8.
269 Schram Stokke (2009), p. 9.
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The UNCLOS on the other hand is characterised as “the most important single
instrument regulating arctic activities” as it “provides a legally binding frame-
work for addressing a wide range of arctic issues, also in the environmental field.
Salient provisions of the treaty have become customary international law and are
therefore binding on all states, whether or not they have ratified it.”270 In regards
to the AC, activities of the AMAP have played an important part in achieving
the instruments just mentioned and has thus “successfully acted as a catalyst
for broader action.”271 In fact, environmental monitoring activities have proven
to be a special realm of the AC, and the AMAP examines pathways and levels
of hazardous contaminants, heavy metals, radionuclides and hydrocarbons and
their effects on human health, arctic flora and fauna as well as the impacts of
climate change.272 The AMAP has had positive effects on both Russian and US
developments in this realm and
“the soft-law nature of the AEPS and the Arctic Council has not im-
peded their ability to induce states to invest more in Arctic environmen-
tal monitoring and to harmonize some of those activities. (...) For the
Arctic states as a group, environmental monitoring has stood out as an
attractive object of cooperation - in part because it does not raise contro-
versial questions about the appropriateness of international regulation, but
also because of the substantial benefits of harmonizing data collection and
analysis throughout the circumpolar area, especially given the high costs
of conducting environmental research in the Arctic.”273
In regards to offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic (see figure III.2274),
“fact-finding” is the best characterisation of the AC’s action in this realm.275 It
has adopted Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, a soft-law instrument which
lacks reporting and review procedures. The AC’s potential as a negotiating body
is thus “modest”, as the members are both states with and without jurisdictions
over the arctic continental shelves. The shelf-states would loose regulatory lee-
way through binding rules on hydrocarbon activities, whereas the political and
environmental benefits would be common to all. Stokke thus concludes that sub-
regional fora seem more suitable when considering more ambitious regulations
270 Schram Stokke (2009), p. 9.
271 Schram Stokke (2009), p. 9.
272 Schram Stokke (2007), p. 5.
273 Schram Stokke (2007), p. 6.
274Cartographer:Johanna Roto and José Sterling. Data source: Grid-Arendal, ACIA, AMAP,
Gaz de France, East European Gas Analysis, NSIDC, United States Geological Survey.
275 Schram Stokke (2009), p. 9.
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Figure III.2.: Resources in the Arctic. (Source: nordregio.se)
in the Arctic, e.g. sub-sets of arctic states or the OSPAR Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North Atlantic.276 The pros and
cons of legal binding rules in the realm of arctic oil and gas activities are assessed
in the following:
“The normative force of these various guidelines is low ... and there
has been no systematic review of whether governments or others actually
make use of them. Had the norms articulated in these documents been
legally binding, their level of implementation would probably have been
subjected to greater scrutiny. On the other hand, given the caution that
states usually display in accepting legal constraints on their freedom of
action in areas important to them, negotiating such rules would have been
far more difficult. Moreover, procedures for review of follow-up activity can
be introduced also for non-binding norms.”277
In regards to arctic shipping, the AC has chosen a cautious approach. The UNC-
LOS restricts the scope for regional action in some issue areas. While dumping is
subject to minimum requirements, maximum standards are set for rules on other
276 Schram Stokke (2009), p. 10.
277 Schram Stokke (2007), p. 7.
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ways of pollution by foreign vessels. The scope of action for the coastal state is
significant within 12 nautical miles from the shore as it does not impede innocent
passage. In the EEZs, however, the coastal state can unilaterally only make rules
commensurate with the generally accepted internatinoal rules and standards es-
tablished through the IMO.278 Restrictions placed by the UNCLOS on coastal
states’ regulation of navigation beyond its territorial sea, and the navigational
interests of the leading powers that produced the different constraints, thus im-
plies little room for the arctic states to regulate maritime transport alone.279
The limits are, however, prevalent regardless of whether an arctic instition is a
soft-law forum or based on a binding treaty. Broader institutions are thus nec-
essary “because much of the activity that gives rise to environmental problems
either occurs outside the region or fall under the jurisdiction of non-arctic states.
(...) When it comes to environmental governance, the Arctic is often either too
small or too big.”280 Hence, the AC’s emphasis on monitoring and fact-finding
activies makes sense. It has improved the knowledge necessary for environmental
measures, produced practical guidelines on risk reduction, and has used broader
institutions to highlight arctic problems in addition to supporting arctic states
to implement the agreed commitments. Thus, instead of a legally binding arctic
environmental regime, Stokke prefers “an approach to strengthening substantive
commitments for protection of the arctic environment (...) in seeking productive
interplay betweeen arctic institutions and existing issue-specific regimes.”281
Such a policy coordination should promote better solutions to environmental
problems in the Arctic, which are becoming increasingly pressing. An additional
point of view presented by Berkman282 is that the prevention of international
discord in the Arctic Ocean as the sea-ice disappears is the most important issue
as “all activities in the Arctic Ocean are jeopardized without coherent strategies
for peace and stability.”283 Hence, peace and stability have to be the basis for
an environmentally sustainable arctic development. The UNCLOS is the “over-
278 Schram Stokke (2009), p. 10.
279 Schram Stokke (2009), p. 10.
280 Schram Stokke (2009), p. 10.
281 Schram Stokke (2009), p. 10.
282Paul Arthur Berkman is Head of the Arctic Ocean Geopolitics Programme from the Scott
Polar Research Institute at the University of Cambridge.
283 Berkman (2009), p. 16.
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arching policy-making system for the Arctic Ocean” and the five coastal states
have commited themvselves to it (Ilullissat Declaration). The AC on the other
hand is “the most important arrangement for cooperation in the Arctic Ocean”.
The necessary coordination between institutions associated with Arctic Ocean
governance could furthermore be facilitated by the AC “in a manner that fur-
ther acknowledges the special role and responsibilities of the arctic states and
indigenous people’s organizations.” However, “an inclusisve dialogue about secu-
rity risks and responses relating to the Arctic Ocean has yet to emerge” which
was exemplified by the five coastal states in the Ilullissat Declaration asserting
their “stewardship role” in the Arctic without mentioning security or peace.284
It should be noted that security threats involve non-state actors such as drug
smugglers, illegal immigrants, terrorists and gunrunners. Russia is with its sev-
eral dozen icebreakers, of which some are nuclear powered, the best equipped of
the Arctic countries in terms of military capability.285 National strategies are,
however, not sufficient, and the essential question is how to balance national and
international interests in the Arctic.
2.1.1.2. Case description and dependent variable
These considerations on environmental hazards and governance in the Arctic will
now be followed up by an assessment of the dependent variable, i.e. German
interests and, if existent, an outline of a policy on the matter.
Former FM Steinmeier stressed some aspects that could point to a certain amount
of German arctic policy in the AA:
“The global hunger for [energy] resources and global governance286
threaten to clash to an increasing extent. Our energy, foreign and secu-
rity policies have to rise to these challenges.287
“One has to be sure that no countries make their own definitions of how
the continental shelf has to be delineated. It is important that they keep
to the international rules present in international law ”.288
284 Berkman (2009), p. 16.
285 Byers (2009), p. 19.
286“Weltordnungspolitik”.
287 Steinmeier (2006a) [author’s translation].
288Cited in Dragnes (2007) [author’s translation, author’s accentuation].
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Energy, peace and climate protection are thus German concerns:
“Energy security policy is also peace policy. Only if we make sure that the
availability of energy resources does not become the sole decisive currency
of power, can we defuse potential tensions and allow for long term stability.
(...) I thus advocate that the EU and the US put the topics of energy
security and climate protection on the top of their common agenda.”289
Further:
“And when the eternal ice is melting, not only the polar bears are threat-
ened. The global warming is already causing the second footrace over the
region around the north pole. This time it is not only about national
and scientific glory but about hard economic interests: Because the raw
materials and mineral resources of the Norwegian Sea region is not just
attracting bold adventurers. International allocation conflicts of resources
could threaten in the High North already in few years.”290
Steinmeier was confident with the situation in the High North, which he visited
several times. This indicates that German interest in the north exist both in
regards to environmental and global energy perspectives. The statements cited
above indicate interest in a coherent policy combining different policy fields, and
the importance of international law and peace policy. The question is if the
underlying German interest above all is to ensure the safe accessibility to the
Arctic’s rich resources in a way that serves Germany’s interests as a high-tech
nation. Sea routes should also be of great interest to an exporting nation, and
in September 2009 it was reported that two German cargo ships had travelled
the Northern Sea Route (from South Korea to Rotterdam). The route saves 4000
nautical miles of the standard 11 000 miles via the Suez Canal. This implies
less time and less fuel costs.291 Almost 90 per cent of the German foreign trade
is seaborne.292 According to Haftendorn the importance of the Northern Sea
Route to the German East Asia trade will increase in future.293 Rather than
seamanlike problems, time-consuming Russian approval procedures impede the
option of this future Sea Route for German foreign trade. A German aim would
thus be a simplified approval practice at a lower price in the overall arctic area,
289 Steinmeier, (2007a) [author’s translation].
290 Steinmeier, (2007b) [author’s translation].
291 Dodds (2009), p. 11.
292 Haftendorn (2011), p. 75.
293 Haftendorn (2011), p. 75.
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and Haftendorn also suggests the attempt of integrating the transit traffic in the
German-Russian negotiations on economic cooperation.294 There is moreover no
judicial consensus on whether these sea routes are international waters, which
conforms to the view of the EU, or passages of coastal waters subject to national
control as claimed by Russia and Canada.295
Another topic of interest to Germany is connected with the growing arctic tourism
industry which demands a braoder rescue system in the region. The first interna-
tional agreement written exclusively for the Arctic region was atually signed at
the AC ministerial meeting in Nuuk on 12 May 2001, also attended by US foreign
secretary Hillary Clinton. The agreement deals with search and rescue of aero-
nautical and maritime vessels and passangers and was also the first international
agreement made by the AC. Berlin wanted to participated in the elaboration of
the treaty but this was not allowed for by the AC member states.296
Germany’s dependence on Russian and Norwegian energy supplies have been
analysed above.297 The additional factor of German know-how which is offered
to Russian and Norwegian energy partners in order to achieve an effective ex-
ploitation of their crude oil and natural gas resources should however not be
underestimated. With the 2010 Barents Sea frontier agreement between Russia
and Norway new opportunities have been opened in regard to the energy indus-
try in arctic waters. However a profitable business is dependent on the world
market price and demand, and Germany is an important market. At the second
German-Norwegian energy conference “Challenges towards a sustainable energy
security”, the Norwegian side of the energy business stressed the necessity of long-
term contracts and continued high demand scenarios in order to invest in future
production and infrastructure. A representative of the German gas business on
the other hand indicated a possible future scenario where subsidised alternative
energy could outbalance the future demand for gas in Germany because natural
gas wuold be a too expensive option. This would among other things be depen-
dent on the economic capability of continued subsidies of the alternative energy
294 Haftendorn (2011), p. 75.
295 Haftendorn (2011), pp. 75-76.
296 Haftendorn (2011), p. 76.
297See figure 2.1.1.3 and table I.2.
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business.298 A future prominent role of Norwegian or Russian gas in Germany
is thus not as given as one might think. Close cooperation with Germany on
the strategic perspectives of the Arctic energy business should however be in the
interest of all parties.
The question is then how Germany views the Ilullisat declaration and the coastal
countries’ decisive roles. This is again a question of how the assignment of roles
of the arctic states and the non-arctic interested states and organisations should
be, and how the cooperation should look like, i.e. if Germany, the EU, China
and others should have a say in the region. As mentioned above, Germany is one
of six non-arctic states with a permanent observer status in the AC. Germany is
solely an Arctic player in regard to polar research but is contributing significantly
to polar research through the Alfred-Wegener-Institute, and German institutes
are cooperating with research programmes of the EU, the Nordic Council and
the AC. And polar research is not an insignificant matter. The importance in
regard to German interests is connected e.g. to the future protection of a city like
Hamburg which is sensitive to a future sea-level rise. The German economy has
also an interest in estimating the conditions for further oil- and gas production in
these areas, and long-term trends are also indispensible when estimating future
possibilities for the merchant shipping in the northernmost regions. A compre-
hensive polar research is however limited by the very restricitve policy pursued
by the arctic states in regard to authorising research projects. The precondi-
tions moreover vary from state to state. Russia is the most restrictive country
and only allows for basic research with additional Russian participation.299 The
conditions for international research are thus a matter where German interests
are not compatible with those of the Ilullisat countries. A common arctic policy
on improving the terms of international research would be something Germany
would support in addition to increased cooperation and knowledge exhcange in
multilateral institutions.300
Germany is a leading nation in environmental questions and at the same time an
industrial state with a large demand for commodities. Germany prioritises the
298“2nd German-Norwegian Energy-Conference: Challenges towards a sustainable energty
security” in Oslo, 29 September 2011.
299 Haftendorn (2011), p. 73.
300 Haftendorn (2011), p. 74.
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cooperation with Russia in the EU environmental activities.301 In Westerwelle’s
term of office the AA has become increasingly active, hosting two international
conferences on the Arctic in Berlin where the key topic was future polar research.
At the second conference FM Westerwelle recommended the free access of all na-
tions to the Arctic.302 The impression of German concern about the development
connected with the Ilullisat declaration is strengthened by the following notice:
“From fish to natural resources to shipping routes, the region is of great
interest for Germany, according to officials at the Foreign ministry. The
diplomats are worried that the five countries bordering the Arctic (...) plan
to divide up the previously ice-covered ocean among themselves. They ar-
gue that there is a risk that the Arctic could be completely nationalized
when the sea ice melts, providing access to the sea floor. (...) Germany
... wants to ensure that the region remains the ’common heritage of all
mankind,’ say Foreign Ministry officials in Berlin. The five countries bor-
dering the Arctic, on the other hand, feel that Germany should not inter-
vene in their affairs.”303
Spiegel Online also cites Rolf Einar Fife, chief international law expert at the
Norwegian Foreign Ministry, who states that no ”others than the coastal nations
should be concerned about the question of overlapping territorial claims in the
Arctic”. Despite respecting international maritime law the German FM never-
theless argue that Germany and other states should have a say in what happens
in the Arctic.304 Due to ecological and economic core interests Germany aims for
strengthening regional stability in the Arctic which is the only way to secure the
access to the resources and enabling a well-regulated shipping traffic as well as
common programmes on environmental protection and climate. The comprehen-
sive attempt made by the EU to aim at a treaty similar to the Antarctic Treaty
of 1961 was also supported by the federal government of Germany. However Ger-
many has realised its limitations and rather seeks to expand the existing networks
of multilateral agreements and institutions.305 The problem is apparently that
Germany only has only very limited access to the most important institution, the
AC.
Haftendorn remarks that there is no systematic German strategy on the Arctic:
301 Haftendorn (2011), p. 76.
302 Haftendorn (2011), p. 72.
303 Schwägerl/Seidler (2011).
304Cited in Schwägerl/Seidler (2011).
305 Haftendorn (2011), p. 76.
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German interests are not formulated coherently, and there are no institutional
instruments available for an arctic policy. The different ministries primarily pur-
sue the specific departmental interests. The AA emphasises the aspects under
international law and the unit 504 ’The Arctic and Antarctic’ is situated in the
Legal Directorate-General. Although there is no recognisable security threat in
the Arctic at present, the unit FüS III 2 of the Military Policy and Arms Control
department in the defence ministry aims at developing an overall view on the
matter. Inside the federal government there is however no comprehensive assess-
ment of the chances and risks in the Arctic stemming from global warming.306
Haftendorn moreover misses a synopsis of German arctic policy, i.e. an inter-
connection of the policies on commodities, environment, shipping and security.
This would be necessary in order to create an image as an arctic player in more
realms than polar research. According to Hafterndorn partner countries actu-
ally complain about missing contact persons in Berlin on arctic matters. The
ministries are thus not sufficiently acquainted with the region, and in the AA
only the departments of bilateral relations are in charge. In front of the NATO
summit in the autumn of 2010 where the Arctic was expexcted to be specifically
mentioned in the summit document, the German defence ministry initiated an
internal study on the topic in order to upgrade its knowledge.307 The partition in
different departments furthermore prevents the existence of any public relations
of the federal government on the Arctic. The government could moreover pursue
German interests in a more effective manner if they were embedded in a coherent
and visible policy on the Arctic.308 An increased exchange with Nordic colleagues
might be a good idea. German engagement is definitely welcomed, and the public
attention in e.g. Norway when a German FM visits the country’s high north is
high. A visit by chancellor Merkel in the Barents Region would be a perceived
as an acknowledgement of the region’s importance.
306 Haftendorn (2011), p. 73.
307 Haftendorn (2011), p. 78.
308 Haftendorn (2011), pp. 78-79.
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2.1.1.3. Independent variables and policy assessment
This chapter rather assesses how the German role in regard to arctic governance
from an environmental point of view should look like rather than assessing a
German Arctic policy in its fledgling stages. The assessment will be undertaken
when including the independent variables which are the different principles of
good international citizenship (pluralistic, solidarist, and universally applicable
principles) cited in chapter 2.2 of part II. Those with the greatest relevance of
this case study will be used to assess how Germany could be a good international
citizen in this particular case. First, the pluralist principle 1 (“States are the basic
members of international society”) has to be discussed. Without doubt, the arctic
states are the main regime actors in the Arctic, not only in a formal manner.
Compared to the BSR309, the arctic states and first and foremost the coastal
states, play the decisive role. The Ilullisat declaration has been interpreted to
form an ”inner cirle” of arctic cooperation. The five coastal states are of particular
relevance in regard to fishery regimes310, and have undefined border questions
in regard to the extension of their arctic continental shelves. Also, the arctic
coastal states have the jurisdiction over arctic petroleum activities, also beyond
200 nautical miles. In addition, they deliver the infrastructure for safe shipping.
And last but not least the coastal states are responsible for the military presence
in the High North and are thus the closest to assess procedures to keep the tension
low and control the activities. Hence, an “inner circle” of Arctic cooperation made
up of five states may even be a necessity. Another obvious difference to the BSR
is the relative absent role of the EU in the Arctic. However, whereas the coastal
states are important, the largest challenges in the north are of an environmental
nature and demand action from many non-arctic (state and non-state) actors.
Also, with the melting ice in the Arctic new fishery opportunities could occur,
which necessitate a clear legal framework of living resources. In regard to legal
cooperation, the Arctic High Seas could thus be a potential area of cooperation.
Berkman suggests
“to draw a clear distinction between the sea floor (much of which may
309See the following chapter.
310The bilateral Norwegian-Russian fishery commission is for example decisive for interna-
tional cooperation in the Barents Sea.
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well come under arctic coastal state jurisdictions) and the overlying water
column. Ecologically and legally distinct from the sea floor, the overlying
water column reveals an alternative jurisdictional configuration for arctic
and non-arctic nations alike to share in the governance of the Arctic Ocean.
(...) By reframing the issues of Arctic Ocean governance from the center
outward rather than from the coastal periphery inward (...) the High Seas
opens the door for stable international governance in the Arctic Ocean
without contravening the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of
the arctic coastal states. This governance solution involves the integration
of science diplomacy tools (notably ecosystem-based management) with
recognition of international space and common interests in the Arctic Ocean
for the lasting benefit of all humanity.”311
A further input to the discussion is the solidarist principle number 10 (“regard
for human rights requires respect for non-sovereign communities and requires
the society of states to protect minority nations and indigenous peoples from
unnecessary suffering”). Non-sovereign communities are important in order to
handle the environmental threats facing the Arctic. The international society’s
respect and protection is thus important. The Inuit and other indigenous peoples
of the Arctic are not only those who experience the environmental changes directly
but are also part of the solution when environmental monitoring in the Arctic
becomes increasingly important. Just as the EU can play a more important role in
arctic environmental protection, “community-based monitoring” is an important
asset as suggested by Bravo.312 He also highlights the important role of the AC
and dismisses the idea of an Arctic Treaty:
“History ... shows us that the real weakness in seeking adequate conser-
vation measures in the Arctic is that the political and cultural diversity of
the eight arctic states is far greater than first meets the eye. The arctic
territories are at least eight backyards and many homelands - and not one
backyard that will be subsumed by a powerful environmental regime. That
is why we have an Arctic Council and why and Arctic Treaty is politically a
non-starter. That, together with the peripheral situation of arctic geogra-
phy, makes negotiating and ratifying comprehensive regional environmental
deals much, much more difficult. (...) The arctic communities, Permament
Participants of the Arctic Council and settler peoples, are very adept at
forming transnational partnerships.”313
The next pluralistic principle of importance here is principle 7 (“an ’inclusive’ as
opposed to ’exclusive’ conception of the national interest should be pursued so
311 Berkman (2009), p. 17.
312 Bravo(2009).
313 Bravo(2009), pp. 12-13.
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that other states, and the society to which they belong, are not harmed for the
sake of trivial national advantages”). An inclusive conception of national interest
seems of particular importance in the Arctic, as a sustainable development is
important to both the arctic states and the rest of the world. An inclusive focus
is thus equally important both to the coastal states with energy and territorial
interests, and to the EU and EU member states when making an arctic approach.
This leads to the universally applicable principles number 3,6 and 7 which are of
particular interest to arctic governance:
Principle number 3 states that “solidarists have a prima facie duty to avoid being
complicit in human rights violations in other societies.” Here, human rights vio-
lations must be extended to apply also for environmental hazards that again lead
to the violation of e.g. indigenous rights. Principle number 6 is equally impor-
tant, i.e. “aﬄuent societies have global environmental responsibilities to ensure
that vulnerable populations enjoy a safe natural environment.” Finally, principle
7 states that “obligations to protect the vulnerable require the establishment of
global political structures - involving close cooperation with international govern-
mental and non-governmental organizations - that institutionalize the universal
right to be able to protest against actual or potential harm.” Here, “the vulnera-
ble” must also be considered to be the arctic environment as such. What policy
recommendations are then to be derived from this case study to German policy
making? First, Germany should not support the idea of any Arctic Treaty but
rather support the coordination of the existing regimes. Second, European focus
on environmental issues in the Arctic, governance included, as well as climate
issues are important, and Germany could enhance these efforts in the EU. In ad-
dition, Germany could enhance both the transatlantic dialogue on arctic issues,
as well as a European-Russian dialogue on the matter. Third, Germany should
promote the role of the arctic indigenous communities in environental regimes.
Finally, Germany could advocate an approach of an ”alternative jurisdictional
configuration” for the overlying water column as proposed by Berkman, i.e. a
shared governance of the Arctic between arctic and non-arctic states. However,
this must be pursued in close cooperation with the Arctic states and the AC
and should not be made in an alliance with e.g. China which might have many
common interests with Germany in the Arctic but definitely is no cutting edge in
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environmental questions. In order to be able to do so Germany needs to develop
a coherent arctic policy as proposed by Haftendorn and increase the diplomatic
efforts in the region. There should be a clear conception of Germany’s arctic pol-
icy and competent contact persons in the AA. And vice versa the arctic coastal
states in particular need to welcome Germany’s and other nations’ important
contributions to e.g. arctic research. For example, the Alfred Wegener Institute
for Polar and Marine Research is making an important contribution which would
be of importance to an ecosystem-based management of the Arctic Ocean.
2.2. Germany and the Baltic Sea Region
The Baltic Sea area is not a very highlighted topic in German political discussion.
The exemption is the controversies caused by the planning and building of the
North Stream Pipeline. A good example are German-US tensions connected with
US suspicion in regard to German-Russian relations, of which the pipeline sub-
stantiates such a suspicion.314 Standard works on German foreign policy however
tend to neglect this region. For instance, Schmidt, Hellmann and Wolf’s “Hand-
buch zur deutschen Außenpolitik” (2007) analyses Germany’s foreign relations
with several states and regions - the US, France, the UK, Poland, East-Central
Europe, Russia, the CIS, the former Yugoslavia, Turkey, the Middle East, Israel,
the Maghreb states, Africa south of the Sahara, Latin Americda, Southeast Asia
and India - but ignores a region it is a part of, represented by the federal states
of Schleswig Holstein, Hamburg, and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. Moreover,
Berlin is situated very close to region. The relative low level of conflict might be
a reason for the absence of interest. On the other hand is this a very important
region where Russia meets Europe. And as noted before, Europe can not become
an important actor in world politics before it solves the challenges in its own
neighbourhood. A leading role for Germany is a precondition for a successfull
integration in the BSR. The question is whether this is at hand or not, and if it is
the case, what preferences do German policy actors have. The three cases chosen
for this issue area will moreover show whether there are different tendencies in
314See for example Beste/ Meyer (2008).
III.2.2. Germany and the Baltic Sea Region - 287 -
German policies on the different topics or if a coherent policy on the BSR exists.
2.2.1. Case 2: The Baltic states
The importance of the Baltic states to the security of the Nordic region was
analysed in part I. Also, their strategic importance to Sweden was stressed. Here,
the question what characterises Germany’s foreign policy on the Baltic states
must be pursued and finally, what is required of Germany in order to show a
good international citizenship?
2.2.1.1. Case description and dependent variable
Germany’s policy on the Baltic states is the dependent variable. It will be looked
at two different indicators. First, German policy on the Baltic states will be
evaluated in regard to European integration (EU and NATO). Second, German
reactions to Baltic-Russian disputes will be evaluated.
The Baltic states declared their independency from the Soviet Union on 11 March
(Lithuania), 4 May (Latvia) and 8 May (Estonia) 1990 respectively. After the
bloody clashes of the independence movements in Lithuania and Latvia with
the Soviet special operation force OMON in Vilnius and Riga in January 1991,
chancellor Kohl demanded of Gorbachev to stop the use of force and return to the
path of dialogue and understanding.315 Genscher received the provisional foreign
ministers of Estonia and Latvia a few weeks later in Bonn and thus signalled
German support although their sovereignty was still not acknowledged.316
The preceding Baltic efforts to accomplish their independency were however
widely ignored by the German federal government. As late as 10 July 1991,
Helmut Kohl misjudged the development in the Soviet Union as he characterised
the “undifferentiated support of the strivings for independence of the single Soviet
republics” as a ”dangerous stupidity” (“gefährliche Dummheit”), because thus the
“risk of a breaking apart of the Soviet Union” would be provoked.317 In order
315Cited in Klein/ Herrmann (2010), p. 68.
316Cited in Klein/ Herrmann (2010), p. 68.
317Cited in Garbe (2002), p. 187. Author’s translation. See also Klein/ Herrmann
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not to jeopardise the German unity and the stability of the USSR, contacts with
forces who could weaken Gorbachev’s position were avoided. In August 1991, af-
ter the recognition of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania by Russia’s president Boris
Yeltsin, the Baltic states’ foreign ministers were welcomed in Bonn by FM Hans-
Dietrich Genscher, and the resuming of diplomatic relations was agreed on. The
new circumstances allowed German support for the Baltic states without risking
anything.318 Germany formalised its relations with the Baltic states as one of
the first Western states on 28 August 1991, shortly after the August putsch in
Moscow. It must also be noted that Genscher was the first high-ranking West-
ern politician who visited the Baltic states. German embassies were opened in
Tallin, Riga, and Vilnius on 2 September 1991, before the official recognition by
the Soviet Union.319 The first German ambassadors to Tallin and Riga were of
German-Baltic origins. Genscher assured his colleagues from the Baltic states
that the German government would advocate the accession of the three coun-
tries to the PHARE320 programme within 1 January 1992 and the completion of
cooperation agreements with the EU a few months later.
The federal government however positioned itself far more distanced in the case of
a NATO enlargement reaching Russia’s Western border. Rather, the AA hoped
that closer political consultations and economic cooperation in the Baltic Sea area
would satisfy the security needs of the Baltic republics. The institutionalised
cooperation of the CBSS, a Danish-German initiative321, was thus Genscher’s
answer to the necessity of equally integrating both the Baltic states and Russia
in common structures.322 According to Klein and Herrmann the CBSS was,
in addition to the Baltic states’ approaching of the institutions of the European
Council, the EU and NATO, contributing to a temporary dualism between the AA
and the federal chancellery. The foreign minister was far more interested in the
Baltic states than the chancellor himself. They moreover prioritised differently,
the foreign minister concentrated on the three Baltic states whereas Kohl was
(2010), pp. 67-68.
318 Dauchert (2008), p. 54. See also Klein/ Herrmann (2010), pp.67-70.
319 Garbe (2002), p. 191.
320Created in 1989 as the “Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their
Economies” programme.
321See also chapter 2.2.3 of this part.
322 Klein/ Herrmann (2010), p. 72.
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preoccupied with the relations to Moscow. This assignment of roles applied to
Kohl and Genscher in 1991/1992 and later to Kohl and Kinkel from 1992 to 1998.
The federal chancellery was both indifferent and sceptical in regard to future EU
memberships of the Baltic states and decelerated such attempts.323 According to
Garbe, the regional affiliation might also have been a factor which explains the
reluctant Baltic engagement of chancellor Kohl, a catholic from the Rhineland.
The missing initiative from the chancellor in Germany’s early policy on the Baltic
states led to a shifting of competencies in favour of the AA and FM Genscher,
who developed an emotional relationship to the three states and advocated their
memberships in international organisations. His successor Kinkel did not have
such a personal connection to the Baltic states. Moreover, chancellor Schröder’s
official visit to the Baltic states showed that a lot more would have been possible
in the 1990s.324
Nonetheless, the basis of the German policy on the Baltic states was the commit-
ment to bear a particular responsibility for the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 which
ended the Baltic independencies. The German government committed to a distin-
guishable political, economic and cultural contribution in order to come to terms
with the comphrehensive problems facing the young republics.325 The former Es-
tonian PM Mart Laar has confirmed that there was a very active informal coop-
eration between Germany and Estonia.326 German “Vertragspolitik”327 between
1994 and 1998 aimed next to economic cooperation also at the development of
democratic structures and the making of market-oriented economic arrangements
in the Baltic states. The Kohl government also formulated some guiding prin-
ciples for its cooperation with the Baltic states in the “Agenda der Beziehungen
Deutschlands zu den baltischen Staaten” from 1998. Here Germany is charac-
terised as the “Lawyer of the Balts.”328 Germany thus became the “lawyer of the
Balts” in its own diplomatic vocabulary. Germany and the Baltic states moreover
agreed on the issue that an institutional approach to Europe would stabilise the
323 Klein/ Herrmann (2010), pp. 73-74.
324 Garbe (2002), pp. 246-247, footnote 1.
325 Wistinghausen (2004), pp. 156-157.
326 Garbe (2002), p. 244, footnote 1. See also Picklaps (2007)
327Important agreements were made on road transport, environment protection, problems
related to foreign workers, transborder passenger traffick and youth-political cooperation.
328 Picklaps (2007), pp. 245-246.
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political and economic reform process and thus secure Baltic independence in the
long run.329 The Baltic hope rooted in the common cultural history with the
Germans and in their pretension of a certain “Wiedergutmachung” of the conse-
quences stemming from the Hitler-Stalin pact. The former Estonian FM Trivimi
Velliste (1992-1994) expressed the Baltic hope for German support:
“After all, we are linked to Germany by some 800 years of common lan-
guage und cultural space. This investment has been made during 20-30
generations and it would be madness not to use it”330
This hope however slowly died, and during his state visit to Germany in 2000,
Estonia’s president Meri used the opportunity to criticise Germany’s policy on
the Baltic states. The efforts of the government Kohl to be the “lawyer” of the
Baltic peoples in the Western society of states - opening doors both to the EU
and NATO - were in their view more an illusiveness than rooted in reality. The
“Ostpreußenblatt” reflects Estonian dissapointments at this point of time:
“Indeed, the Bundeswehr facilitates armaments and education for the
Estonian armed forces on behalf of NATO, some few small-scale companies
have settled in Estonia, some German municipalities cultivate fruitful rela-
tions with Estonian counterparts, evangelical churches and German-Baltic
families engage in Estonia on a private basis. However, the government
in Bonn did no look at Tallinn or Riga but at Moscow. And despite nice
sounding words, Schröder’s Berlin does not act differently.”331
In the last twenty years, German policy on the Baltic states has rather alter-
nated between being the lawyer of the Balts on the one hand and a position
of an advocatus diaboli on the other hand according to Klein and Herrmann,
particularly when German relations with Russia were endangered.332 German
polticians and diplomats as well have criticised the quality of the German-Baltic
relations. Germany’s first ambassador to Estonia, Henning von Wistinghausen
(1991-1995), is very outspoken when he points to the early “misjudgement” of
German politicians in regard to the Baltic states, the lack of interest from the
German economy, and the “schoolmasterly” tone of some political representatives
towards the young Estonian republic.333 His refusal to visit the Baltic states was
329 Dauchert (2008), p.55. See also Klein/ Herrmann (2010), p. 66.
330Cited in Garbe (2002), pp. 193-194.
331 Schubbe (2000). Author’s translation.
332 Klein/ Herrmann (2010), p. 66.
333 Wistinghausen (2004), p. 162.
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“politically ill-advised”.334 The initial hopes of a strong German engagement were
according to Germany’s first ambassador to Latvia, Hagen Graf Lambsdorff,
“disappointed in the 1990s through the extraordinary contained policy
of the federal government which was so considerate of its Russian relations
that the Balts were in fact always kept on a distance. And it is not a
coincident that chancellor Kohl never called on the Balts.”335
The question is thus how the apparent German neglect of the Baltic states in
the 1990s should be assessed. The findings of Rittberger’s study on post-unified
Germany’s foreign policy concludes that this
“has almost always adhered to the value-based expectations of appropri-
ate behaviour shared within the international and domestic society. At the
same time, however, post-unification Germany has intensified its influence-
seeking policy. Particulary in the ’high politics’ issue areas, it has stepped
up its efforts to increase its influence on collective decision making and
collective action. Finally, and in line with its tradition as an institution-
ally integrated trading state, post-unification Germany has pursued a gain-
seeking policy, in the making of which demands of assertive private actors
have played a prominent role.”336
Dauchert’s conclusion in regard to the low-key approach towards Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania rejects the conclusion that Russia-oriented realpolitik was priori-
tised over its traditional value-based policy. Accordingly, the underlying reasons
for the German detachment was rather the policy of creating a peaceful and
integrated post-Cold War Europe and the difficulties it created. It was thus a
consequence of the efforts to pursue three ambitious political aims at the same
time: the enlargement and deepening of the EU and the integration of Russia in
Europe.337 Picklaps has a somewhat different angle of assessment when he states
that Russia was economically and politically Germany’s most important partner
in Central and Eastern Europe whereas the Baltic region had to stand back. The
interesting question thereby is why the German foreign policy makers had such
difficulties with explicitly expressing this matter of fact and rather constantly
talked about representing the Baltic states’ interests as their “lawyer”. The sole
sensible explanation seems to be attitudes based on moral-historical concepts and
334 Wistinghausen (2004), p. 586.
335Cited in Garbe (2002), pp. 193-194. Author’s translation.
336 Rittberger (2001), p. 323.
337 Dauchert (2008), p.57.
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an idealist-political world outlook prevelent in German foreign policy norms.338
Statements beyond a designed essential common identity (e.g. in regard to Eu-
ropean integration) were unpopular, very uncommon and classified as insensitive
in German foreign policy making. There was thus a real discrepancy between the
political language which came to the fore and the cognitive background of the
German foreign policy makers’ statements. The rhetoric substance of the stated
preferences were thus to a large extent ignored.339
Initially, the federal government of Germany got very actively involved with Baltic
memberships in the CSCE, the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Coopera-
tion Council, the CBSS, and with their integration in the EU. On the other hand
this commitment trickled away with the end of Genscher’s time in office in May
1992. German restraint was also apparent in regard to the European integration
of the Baltic states. Already in 1993 the German government reacted negatively
to the proposal of the Danish presidency of the European Council of promptly
adopting free trade agreements with the Baltic states. At this point of time ne-
gotiations on association treaties were also considered by Bonn to be unrealistic
and the federal government thus signalled that the three countries were not yet
considered to be ready for accession.340 The German restraint however yielded
during the German presidency of the European Council, beginning in July 1994.
The aim was formulated by the German presidency that the Eastern and Cen-
tral European states should be brought closer to the EU and that association
agreements with the three Baltic states should be signed within six months.341
The German presidency furthermore appealed to EU member states to approve
of such rapid association talks, and the European Council decided unanimously
on the summit in Essen of 9 and 10 December 1994 to start negotiations on Eu-
rope Agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They were finally signed
in June 1995. According to Klein and Herrmann, Germany had thus “decisively
promoted” the European integration of the Baltic states. The decisions also “un-
derlined (...) the sovereignty and the European perspective of the three states.”342
Despite the support during the German presidency the federal government con-
338 Picklaps (2007), p. 277.
339 Picklaps (2007), pp. 277-278.
340 Klein/ Herrmann (2010), p. 74.
341 Klein/ Herrmann (2010), p. 75.
342 Klein/ Herrmann (2010), p. 75. Author’s translation.
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tinued to be reluctant to a distinct schedule for the accession of the Baltic states
to the EU. Due to the consideration of Russian interests the German chancellor
inititally only favoured the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary
to the EU and NATO.343 Despite that German representatives of the government
consistently claimed to be the “lawyer of the Balts”, Picklaps assesses the efforts
of the German government to be “rather modest”.344 This direction of the Eu-
ropean enlargement policy was also continued after the change of government in
1998.345
In particular was the German government’s rejection of Baltic NATO member-
ships compatible with the position of the Russian leadership, which was basically
against any enlargement of the alliance.346 Germany’s cautious policy on the
Baltic states has been motivated by the great importance of the three states to
Russia in regard to economy and security politicy, in addition to the large Rus-
sian minorities here. The train of thoughts has been that unless Germany acts
with reluctance, the suspicion could be aroused that Germany strives for a dom-
inant role in the Russian ’sphere of interest’. In other words the German-Baltic
relations were and are to date overshadowed by the German-Russian relations.
First, the German reunification was the crucial point of German foreign policy as
the foreign relations with the Baltic states were concerned, but the federal gov-
ernment stressed the importance of not annoying Moscow also after the German
reunification.347 Hence, German policy on the Baltic states is basically realised in
a multilateral frame, and Germany does not allow itself to show more initiative
than other states on the Baltic states - as opposed to the Scandinavians who
can pursue an active Baltic policy because Russia does not suspect an interest
of domination. The creation of the CBSS was thus also an attempt to support
the Balts in a multilateral frame.348 However, when German and Baltic security
interests were compatible, which was the case of the negotiations on the pull-out
of the Russians troops from the Soviet Union’s previous territory, the German
government supported the Baltic interests, i.e. the demand of troop retreat.
343 Klein/ Herrmann (2010), p. 76.
344 Picklaps (2007), p. 269.
345 Picklaps (2007), p. 270.
346 Dauchert (2008), p. 57.
347 Klein/ Herrmann (2010), p. 70.
348 Garbe (2002), p. 244.
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The protection of Russians abroad was one of few issues of which the Russian elites
could agree on in the early 1990s. The Baltic states have large Russian minorities.
The numbers of the mid-1990s were 34 per cent in Latvia, 30,3 per cent in Estonia
and 9,3 per cent in Lithuana.349 Hence, the tensions in this regard were more
severe in the two former states. The policies of Estonia and Latvia in particular
towards the Russian minorities were also criticised by Western states, the Council
of Europe and the OSCE. Russian FM Kosyrev added the Baltic states to Russia’s
“near abroad”, whereas minister of defence Gratschov dramatically declared, the
Russian troops would not redraw from the Baltic states. The negotiations on
the redrawals could thus not be brought to an end because Russia considered the
new electoral and naturalisation laws in the Baltic states to be discriminating
against the Russian minorities. The exception was Lithuania, from which the
last Russian troops redrew in July 1993. In Latvia and Estonia, 13 000 and 2500
Russian soldiers respectively still resided.350 Concerned, the Balts sent their
representatives to Germany in the beginning of March 1994 in order to uncover
their close relationships with Germany and to secure German support. FM Kinkel
stated that Germany did not want to be the third part at the negotiation table,
but as the “lawyer of the Balts” Germany would speak to both sides. He demanded
a just treatment of the Russian minorities and a troop redrawal on schedule until
31 August the same year. Furthermore, the imperialistic thinking in “spheres of
influence” had to be prohibited according to Kinkel. The aggressive Russian tone
was thus met by a firmer German attitude towards Russia. It had to be clear that
the Russians should not go beyond a certain line.351 Bonn thus supported the
Baltic states and engaged internationally for the quick withdrawal of the Russian
troops from Estonian and Latvian territories which was accomplished on the due
date of 31 August 1994.352
Despite criticism from the Russian leadership in regard to the NATO enlarge-
ment, minister of defence Rühe continued to support this process. Rühe ex-
plicitly supported the enlargement by the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary,
349Cited in Mattusch, Katrin (1996): Demokratisierung im Baltikum? Über die Begrenzung
von Demokratisierungschancen durch politische Kulturen. Frankfurt a.M: Peter Lang, p. 14
(table).
350 Garbe (2002), pp. 207-208.
351Cited in Garbe (2002), p. 208.
352 Klein/ Herrmann (2010), p. 71.
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but memberships of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were opposed by resason of
military-strategic considerations. The relocation of NATO’s eastern border would
fill the military vacuum which was created in Eastern Europe after the end of the
Cold War, and Germany would thus be free from its position as a front-line state.
The inclusion of the Baltic states in the defence alliance was however not of partic-
ular relevance for this matter as a result of their missing strategic depth, exposed
position and military weakness. Rühe even rather feared that their memberships
could jeopardise the inner coherence of the alliance. Chancellor Kohl on the other
hand had geopolitical objections to the NATO enlargement as such, despite en-
hanced security from a military-strategic point of view, as the German-Russian
relationship was not to be strained. This also implied that Germany should have
a hands-off approach to Russia’s “near abroad”.353 It was thus only FM Kinkel
who considered the Baltic states’ security needs to be comatible in principle with
German interests. Although recognising the danger of antagonising the Russian
leadership, he also considered an exclusion of the Balts as a potential danger for
the stability in the region. Their security status would as a consequence of the
enlargement by other states possibly be weakened, which again could stimulate
objectionable actions towards them.354 Kohl finally ended the NATO discussions
in his government in September 1995 with a pro-Russian position on the mat-
ter.355 At the same time however the US government ended its initial hesitation in
regard to NATO enlargements. The German government accepted the US plans
but insisted that the enlargements of NATO and the EU should be continued
simultaneously. The Baltic States finalised their Europe agreements356 in June
1995 and anticipated memberships in both the EU and NATO. However, instead
of advocating Baltic memberships in both organisations, the German government
openly distanced itself from this option and concentrated on preparing the EU in-
tegration of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Estonian president Meri’s
state visit to German in July 1996 was held “in reticence” and no German state-
353 Föhrenbach (2000), p. 143.
354 Föhrenbach (2000), pp. 139-141.
355 Föhrenbach (2000), p. 144.
356The Europe agreements constituted the legal framework of relations between the European
Union and the Central and Eastern European countries. These agreements were adapted to the
specific situation of each partner state while setting common political, economic and commercial
objectives. In the context of accession to the EU, they formed the framework for implementation
of the accession process.
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ment to the press was given. Moreover, Rühe commended the deepening of the
Baltic states’ security cooperation with Finland and Sweden instead of seeking
“the path through the centre of Europe”.357
After Meri’s state visit to Germany, the security situation of the Baltic states was
not assessed by his German counterparts to be serious enough for a NATO mem-
bership, and Germany, i.e. Western Europe, could not give the Baltic states any
security guarantee unless their situation would change for the worse.358 Such an
assessment was without doubt peculiar as the situation in the second half of the
1990s could hardly have been much worse with the great eastern neighbour instru-
mentalising the minority question in the Baltic states to prevent their integration
Euro-Atlantic structures. Threats and verbal attacks from Rusisan politicians on
the Balts were not or only ineffectual contradicted by the German side. The US
however covered for the Baltic interests in regard to security policy and NATO
accession, whereas the German government primarily solicited understanding for
the Russian position. Bonn advocated a compromise between full membership
and the loose cooperation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council359.360 The
“Agenda der Beziehungen Deutschlands zu den baltischen Staaten” included the
notice of intent that the German government would advocate “a maximum of
rapprochement [of the Baltic states] to the alliance”361 - a process which on the
other hand should not create security political grey zones in the Baltic Sea. The
agenda thus also clarified the missing will to guarantee the political and territorial
integrity of the Baltic states, as it was clear that the three states were de facto
situated in a political grey zone.362 As opposed to German policy, the role of the
Nordic members of the EU must be accentuated:
“The German government reduced its Baltic policy to sharing decisions
prepared by others. Thus the invitation to enlargement talks made at the
1999 Helsinki summit of the EU Council, which came about due to pressure
from the Nordic states in particular, showed that the federal government to
a large extent had handed its role as “lawyer of the Balts” over to Dennmark,
357Cited in Dauchert (2008), p. 61. Author’s translation.
358Cited in Altenbockum (1996).
359The NACC was founded as a consultative forum between NATO and its partners in Eastern
and Central Europe. In 1997 it became the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
360 Klein/ Herrmann (2010), p. 74.
361Cited in Dauchert (2008), p. 62. Author’s translation. See also Picklaps (2007), pp.
245-246.
362 Dauchert (2008), p. 62.
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Sweden, and Finland. In the end, it was due to their cohesive advocacy
that the enlargement decisions in favour of the Baltic states were made at
the December 2002 Council summit in Copenhaghen.”363
Chancellor Schröder officially visited the Baltic states as the first German chan-
cellor in June 2000. He supported the Baltic EU accession but did not alter the
security political viewpoints of Kohl and Kinkel. In the context of his state visits,
Schröder stated that Germany’s “overriding goal is the enhancement of security
and stability in Central and Eastern Europe at large. We do not want new graves
but an order which avoids security political grey zones and disjunctures.”364 Ger-
many was in fact still an obstacle in regard to Baltic memberships of NATO.
However, with Russia’s new foreign policy direction, boosted after 11 September
2011, Putin announced to reassess the Russian resistance to NATO enlargements
if NATO would develop into a political rather than a military organisation and
provided Russia was allowed to participate in this process.365 This influenced
the German position, although the federal government was still very cautious to
comment on Baltic memberships and the enlargement as such. Several pro-Baltic
voices of the Bundestag became stronger. On the other hand, a report developed
by former minister of defence Rühe showed that the federal board of the CDU
still declined the inclusion of the Baltic states in the next NATO enlargement
round, which was substantiated with the argument that the Baltic states were
not situated in a crisis area but in a politically stable region and did not need
the protection of a NATO membership. The memberships of Slovenia, Slovakia,
Romania and Bulgaria were, in contrast, favoured.366 The German government
did not commit itself to specific candidates. As a result, the chairman of the
section for European Security at the RAND corporation, Stephen F. Larrabee,
recommended the US government to oppose the German position with an explicit
pro-baltic position.367
The German opposition finally demanded the accession of the Baltic states to
NATO, and the federal government soon followed suit. Symptomatic was how-
363 Dauchert (2008), p. 62. Author’s translation.
364Cited in Die Welt 7 June 2000 at http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article517556/
Schroeder_haelt_in_Riga_ein_Plaedoyer_fuer_Russland.html Author’s translation.
365Cited in Dauchert (2008), p. 64.
366Cited in Dauchert (2008), p. 65.
367Cited in Dauchert (2008), p. 66.
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ever the missing public debate in Germany on the NATO enlargement. In a
parliamentarian debate in May 2002 on this topic, before the NATO summit
in Prague later this year where seven states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) were invited to begin accession talks with
NATO, FM Fischer was the only prominent politician participating. Despite
the aloofness of the German government, he showed himself convinced that the
NATO enlargement was inevitable. He moreover underlined that this was in the
interests of Germany, Europe and the transatlantic relationship. Thus a promi-
nent member of the German government for the first time publicly mentioned the
dimension of the enlargement and that the government would not try to prevent
it.368
In front of the Vienna EU summit in December 1998 chancellor Schröder stressed
that the date of accession was not yet certain and stated that remaining open
questions would make such promises frivolous.369 Despite positive statements of
FM Fischer in regard to a Baltic NATO accessions as mentioned above, no federal
minister of the red-green coalition was actually engaged in the Baltic.370 Berlin
neither emphatically advocated the progress of the EU negotiations with Estonia
nor the catching-up process of Latvia and Lithuania which, however, successfully
implemented the acquis communitaire in the second turn. All three Baltic states
thus joined the EU on 1 May 2004, whereas they had already joined NATO earlier
that year. A negative factor from a Baltic point of view was moreover the process
leading to the Nord Stream Pipeline, in which they were not included. They also
did not feel well enough informed by the German and Russian governments.
The close relationship between chancellor Schröder and president Putin was an
important element in this process.371
The government coalition of SPD and the Greens (1998 to 2005) basically con-
tinued the policy on the Baltic states of their predecessors.
“Because of the ... existing low potential of conflict between Germany
and the Baltic states and a basic attitude of German foreign policy making
characterised by trade interests, the bilateral relations developed contin-
368Cited in Lohse (2002).
369Cited in Klein/ Herrmann (2010), p. 77.
370 Klein/ Herrmann (2010), pp. 77-78.
371 Klein/ Herrmann (2010), pp. 77-78.
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uously positively from 1994-1998 and also from 1998-2002. A change in
the foreign political attitude of the German societal, economic and politi-
cal elites after the change of government in 1998 is not identifiable. There
were also no important discernible changes in the decision findings. The
foreign policy decisions were characterised by liberalism and national trad-
ing and not power-political determined and was framed by an idealised
language of the German elites.”372
This assessment is compatible with Rittberger’s conclusion on German post-
reunification foreign policy cited above.
In regard to German direct investments in the Baltic states, the amount between
1994 and 2002 was relative small compared to investments in e.g. Scandinavia.
From 2000 on there was however a certain dynamic visible. The European per-
spective increased the willingness of German establishments to invest in the Baltic
states. This tendency was strengthened by the increased Russian willingness to
cooperate in questions concerning the Baltic states.373 There was moreover an
increase taking place during Schröder’s early chancellorship in the intensity of
the contacts between representatives of the German economy and the heads of
states and governments in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Schröder’s visit to
the Baltic states in 2000 was thus accompanied by a business delegation. These
contacts were also cultivated when the Baltic heads of states and governments
visited Berlin in the autumn of 2000. Economic relations were thus intensified
compared to Kohl’s term in office.374 Picklaps, who analysed German foreign
policy relations with the Baltic states from 1994 to 2002, concludes that both
the government of Kohl and Schröder aimed at the development of the economic
cooperation between Germany and the three Baltic states as well as at the sta-
bilisation of their political conditions.375
Although now being members of the EU, the security situation in the BSR is
affected by the fact that the Baltic states are not treated by Russia as if they are
but with arrogance, which indicates that they are not yet accepted as independent
actors. A representative example of the continuation of the “Russia first” policy by
chancellor Merkel’s government coalition between CDU and SPD was the neutral
372 Picklaps (2007), p. 279.
373 Picklaps (2007), p. 268.
374 Picklaps (2007), p. 266.
375 Picklaps (2007), p. 277.
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position of EU chairwoman Merkel during the Estonian-Russian dispute on the
removed Soviet soldier statue in Tallin of April/ May 2007 as opposed to the EU
solidarity with Estonia that would have been possible in this case. The Russian-
Estonian crisis also reminded of how the Russian populations in the Baltic States
can be mobilised by Russia. Subversive methods might thus be the instrument
which can be the hardest for the EU to answer. The motive of such actions might
both be of a general power policy character as well as related to the will of full
control over a new Russian energy empire. The Nord Stream pipeline with its
“security corridor” might thus fuel the Russian tendency to consider the areas
within as belonging to the Russian sphere of interest. The most important factor
to consider for Russia would be the presumed US counteractive measures.
Klein and Herrmann state that the current German-Baltic relations without
doubt can be characterised as “good and intensive”.376 As an evidence of good
relations they mention the consultation meeting of FMWesterwelle with his three
colleagues from the Baltic states in the autumn of 2009 in Brussels, shortly af-
ter his assumption of office. These consultations were continued in July 2010 in
Tallinn. When minister of state Cornelia Pieper visited the Baltic in the begin-
ning of 2010, talks were held on the extension of the cultural cooperation with
partners in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.377 Chancellor Merkel moreover visited
Lithuania and Latvia and met with their presidents and prime ministers during a
two day visit to the region in early September 2010. She praised the Baltic states’
handling of the economic crisis and signalled support for the further integration
of the region’s energy supplies with Western Europe:
“The Baltic states are still isolated; they are outside the EU’s energy
market. The European Council will discuss ways to integrate Latvia and
Lithuania into the internal energy market, and we are glad to say that
Germany’s EU Commissioner Guenther Oettinger from Germany highly
supports the development of the internal market”.378
Klein and Herrmann furthermore stress that the dialogue with the Baltic neigh-
bours is taking place within the institutions of the EU as well as in Berlin. Latvia’s
376 Klein/ Herrmann (2010), p. 65.
377 Klein/ Herrmann (2010), p. 65.
378Cited in Baltic Times at http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/26911/ (accessed 20
February 2011).
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then president Valdis Zatlers (2007-2011) and prime minister Valdis Dombrovskis
(2009-) both had one of their first official foreign trips to the German capital for
political talks in January 2008 and April 2009 respectively. In March 2010 the
foreign committee of the Estonian parliament moreover had talks with the for-
eign committee of the German Bundestag and the federal government in Berlin.
And also the German states as well as twin cities and towns in Germany and the
Baltic states are contributing to the consolidation of the bilateral relations.379
At large however the Baltic states have had no reason to be satisfied with German
policy as far as they are concerned. Dauchert suggests an expanded focus beyond
the German-Baltic relations which includes the German integration policies in
regards to NATO and the EU as a whole. “According to this, the disregard of the
Baltic states is not a result of an interest maximising stemming from realpolitik
but the unfortunate result of a policy aimed at creating an integrative European
balance.”380 Accordingly, the German policy line aimed at integrating Russia and
was not led by the efforts of improving Germany’s own security situation inside
NATO. Economic interests might have had a finger in the pie but can not be used
to account for any disruption of continuity in German foreign policy according to
Dauchert.
“Despite all the legitimate criticism of the German compliancy towards
the authoritarian and jingoistic tendencies within the Russian leadership,
both the mode of the cooperation and the criticism of this demonstrate con-
tinuity from the West-German Ostpolitik and, accordingly, Russia-policy of
the 1970s and 19080s. Already the Ostpolitik of the Brandt/Scheel gov-
ernment emanated from the premise that changes of the European overall
structure could only be achieved in consideration of Soviet interests. Thus
... the first of the Eastern treaties was concluded with the Soviet Union,
which leading role in the East-West relations was acknowledged. Accord-
ingly, the federal government exposed itself to the well-known allegation
that it would subordinate the interests of the small countries of Central
and Eastern Europe to its interest of good relations with the Russian lead-
ership.”381
The Baltic region’s importance for German security policy was thus far behind
Russia’s, Poland’s or the Czech Republic’s importance to Germany. Also eco-
nomic interests were more important to German governments than the Baltic
379 Klein/ Herrmann (2010), pp. 65-66.
380 Dauchert (2008), p. 67. Author’s translation.
381 Dauchert (2008), p. 69. Author’s translation.
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states’ wish of a rapid access to the EU.382
“For the German foreign policy, the Baltic states are, despite the histor-
ical responsibility, only one factor among others. (...) Russia is Germany’s
most important partner in Eastern Europe. The German-Russian relation-
ship is, compared with the German-Baltic, much more vital, although more
ambivalent, in security political, economic and historical terms (...).”383
It should thus be noted that when Germany chose a restrained position in regard
to the aims of the Baltic states, this was because of German interests.
“Germany always actively stood up for the Baltic issues when such an
attitude did not imperil the attainment of its own national aims. (...) All
in all it can be stated that all German governments from Helmut Kohl via
Gerhard Schröder to Angela Merkel got involved with the Baltic states both
in international organisations as well as through bilateral arrangements,
even though with shifting intensity.”384
Picklaps concludes that German foreign policy towards the Baltic states was a
balancing act between public promises and assertions and the actual protection
of interests. Eventually the real making of German policy was more directed
at national trade interests and to a lesser extent at “paying lip services”, and
the limits of the German engagement for the Baltic states became increasingly
clear.385
2.2.1.2. Independent variables and policy assessment
The independent variables here are again the pluralist, solidarist and universally
applicable principles of good international citizenship. The assessment of German
policy on the Baltic states, and thus the test of its importance to Norway and
Sweden, will be conducted in regard to whether Germany is acting on the basis
of a “sound consensual legitimacy” and whether there is a conflict between justice
and order. The question is whether a change of direction in German policy is
necessary in order to be a good international citizen.
As the analysis of Germany’s policy on the Baltic states shows, preserving interna-
382 Picklaps (2007), p. 270.
383 Garbe (2002), p. 243. Author’s translation.
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tional order was the main interest in the initial phase of this policy as nothing was
undertaken which advocated the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Also in the time
following, “order” was prioritised over “justice” by a German policy attempting to
balance between Russian and Baltic interests. Just as changes of the European
political structure could only be achieved in consideration of Soviet interests dur-
ing the Cold War, Germany’s plan to create a peaceful and integrated post-Cold
War Europe (“order”), which also implies a functioning cooperation with Russia,
was prioritised over its role as an advocate of the Eastern enlargement of the EU
and NATO (“justice”). The opposition from the Central and Eastern European
states when it comes to cooperation with Russia complicated the role Germany
was supposed to play in this process.386 A principle of particular interest here is
principle 6 of the pluralistic principles listed in chapter 2.2.1 of part II, i.e. “diplo-
matic efforts to reconcile competing interests should proceed from the assumption
that each state is the best judge of its own interests.” The German comprehen-
sion of Russian sensibilities even implies an implicit acceptance of the Russian
conception of its sphere of interest in its “near abroad”. Germany clearly accepts
Western restraint and the assessment that Russia is itself the best judge of its
own interests. However, following this principle, the Baltic states should equally
be considered as the best judges of their interests. This chapter clearly shows
attempts to dismiss the Balts’ own judgements of the need to become members
of NATO in particular. Bonn’s assertion that the security situation of the Baltic
states is not serious enough for a NATO membership and no security guarantee
will be given unless their situation changes for the worse, are examples of such
a dismissal of the premise that all sovereign states are the best judges of their
own interests. Due to the angle of this thesis, it is not satisfactory that Germany
pursues such a policy towards the Baltic states. The aim of integrating Russia
in Europe can not be pursued without at least expecting that Russia will follow
the principles of good international citizenship which are of a pluralistic nature.
If this is not expected of Russia, or when exemptions are made for the so called
“near abroad”, it can not be presumed that Russia will follow such principles ei-
ther. Swedish security in particular is strongly dependent on developments in the
BSR. The example of the Baltic states might not by implication be transferred
386 Dauchert (2008).
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to the Scandinavian states as they are, although small, not a part of Russia’s
self-defined “near abroad”. However, it does also not give any reason to solely
trust on German support if future difficulties with Russia should appear, e.g. in
the Arctic. When the aim is to improve the international society of states, it is
then not sufficient to refer to continuity in order to legitimise the current policy.
It might feel safe to persist in one’s viewpoint in order not to do anything wrong.
Notwithstanding the positive achievements of Germany’s Ostpolitik, the country
should realise that its options today are wider than they used to be, unless they
are liable to self-imposed restrictions. Moreover, Russia is not the Soviet Union.
In the case of the Baltic states and Russia, solidarist principles and universally
applicable principles can be consulted in order to reconsile competing interests.
In regard to Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia, principle 9 of the solidarist
principles, “individuals have the legal right of appeal to international courts of law
when violations of human rights occur”, is of great importance. The individual
rights of this minority should also be supported in order to minimise Russia’s
ability to instrumentalise them in disputes with the Baltic states. In regard to the
universally applicable principles listed, principle 5, i.e. “there is a duty to protect
vulnerable people from terrible hardship such as extreme poverty and curable
disease” must be referred to. Fortunately, extreme poverty and curable disease are
to a large extent no longer a problem in Europe. However, it must be recognised
that the Balts are in many respects more vulnerable than other Europeans. Their
need for protection must be fundamentally anchored in a European policy on
Northern Europe.
Concluding on the questions of whether a. Germany is promoting a “sound con-
sensual legitimacy” and b. whether there is a conflict between order and justice
in this case, it must in regards to the first point be underlined that the most
important thing is to apply the (at least pluralistic) principles equally on all
states regardless of size or location and not make exemptions to great powers.
In this case, there has moreover been a conflict between order and justice, and
Germany has until now without doubt favoured order. However, a move in the
solidarist direction is possible and hence necessary. The reference to continuity
is not sufficient to legitimise a good international citizenship.
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2.2.2. Case 3: Kaliningrad
2.2.2.1. Introduction
Several aspects concerning the exclave/enclave Kaliningrad have been anlysed in
chapter 4.2.1 in regards to the challenges facing Swedish foreign policy. The set
of problems attendant on the oblast’ was summarised by von Altenbockum in
2002 after the EU and Russia had agreed on a provision for travelling between
Russa’s exclave and the motherland:
“For the Russians living in Kaliningrad, the negotiations over train-, bus-
and car journeys from and to Russia are about vital everyday life questions.
For Russia it is about the future of a Soviet loot (...). Nothing thus indicates
that Russia could make concessions in regards to Kaliningrad’s status. On
the other hand nothing indicates that things will turn for the better in
Kaliningrad if it sticks to it. The area will continue to stay in no man’s
land between Russia and Europe, exactly where the attempts of improving
the relations between the EU and Russia end for the time being.”387
The new arrangement agreed on by the end of 2002 resembled the former transit
procedure between the GDR and the FRG for the traffick from and to Berlin. A
Russian citizen in Moscow, St. Petersburg or elsewehre can thus buy a ticket to
Kaliningrad but has to give personal information to the Lithuanian authorities.
Within 24 hours the Lithuanians approve of or decline the journey. If the passen-
ger does not get an answer, he is allowed to enter the train where he or she has
to complete a questionnaire. In return, the traveller obtains a simplified travel
document for the railway which again will be controlled on the border. Vehicle
drivers obtain a simplified transit document in the Lithuanian consulates which
accord the manifold entry and departure to and from Kaliningrad. The travellers
are not allowed to stay in Lithuania for more than 24 hours.388 Another topic is
the visa regulations. Until 2007, a Polish or Lithuanian visa could be obtained at
no charge but an agreement between EU and Russia on mutual visa alleviations
resulted in a loss of this privilege to the inhabitants of Kaliningrad who are now
put on a par with the rest of the Russian population. A charge fee of 35 Euro
is due to visit the two countries as the bilateral agreements between Russia and
387 Altenbockum (2002). Author’s translation.
388 Wehner (2003).
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the two countries were overruled. In addition, a health insurance, an invitation
from the respective country and other forms must be added to the visa appli-
cation commensurate with Schengen procedures.389 Lithuania and Poland thus
promoted a “short-distance border traffic” which would allow the inhabitants to
travel 30 to 50 kilmetres on both sides of the borders without a visa.390 Many
border merchants were using the possibility of multivisas at no charge, and the
cross-border trade is in some cases in the rural parts of the Kaliningrad oblast’
the only means of existence. With the multivisas the inhabitants were also able
to travel to other parts of Russa, Belarus, or in the Ukraine e.g. to visit rela-
tives. A weekend-trip to Klaipeda or Gdansk was also a possibility. According
to the Lithuanian consul general in Kaliningrad, 120 000 entry visas and 230
000 so called simplified transit documents were certificated in 2007.391 The total
population is 941 873 inhabitants (2010), a 1,4 per cent decrease from 2002.392
According to the Russian foreign ministry in 2009, they were working on a better
solution for Kaliningrad on this matter.393 The Polish consulate general certifi-
cated 70 000 visas in 2010. A new agreement between Russia and Poland on
the short-distance border traffick was signed in December 2011 which permits a
visa-free border traffick between Kaliningrad and the border regions of Poland.
The new arrangement will be effective from June 2012. All inhabitants of the
Kaliningrad oblast’ who have resided in the area for at least three years, are due
to the new agreement on the short-distance border traffick of between Russia
and Poland allowed to travel to the neighvouring areas of Poland without a visa
for a maximum 30 days stay. The maximum length of stay is 90 days per six
months. The agreement does not allow for any business activities in Poland.394
Russia’s FM Sergej Lavrov stated that the agreement was a first step towards the
abolishment of the visa obligations between Russia and the EU.395 Totally, the
inhabitants of Kaliningrad received 174 000 visas in 2010, of which 20 000 were
certificated in the German consulate general. 12 per cent of those were yearly
visas or visas valid for more than a year with a maximum stay of 90 days per six
389 Königsberger Express (2007).
390 Königsberger Express (2009).
391 Königsberger Express (2007).
392 Königsberger Express (2012c).
393Cited in Königsberger Express (2009).
394 Königsberger Express (2012c).
395 Königsberger Express (2012c).
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months. The development is remarkable because of the deficient transport con-
nection of the area. Four Schengen countries, i.e. Germany, Poland, Lithuania
and Latvia, are represented with visa offices in the Russian exclave.396
2.2.2.2. Case description and dependent variable
Germany’s policy on Kaliningrad and on topics related to the area is the depen-
dent variable. German foreign policy in this realm is presumed to be found in the
frame of regional cooperation within the many institutions of the BSR as well
as in the larger frame of German-Russian cooperation, thus avoiding indepen-
dent German inititatives or reducing them to low politics. It will be looked at
two different indicators: Kaliningrad’s German past and its influence or implica-
tions today and, secondly, Kaliningrad as a part of Germany’s policy on Russia.
The overriding question is whether there should be a German policy vision for
Kaliningrad.
It is an interesting point that Kaliningrad’s situation seems to be of greater
interest to Kaliningrad’s neighbours than to Moscow, except when it comes to the
strategic location of the exclave and its status. It is important to the cooperation
in the BSR that a sustainable concept is developed. However, this might require
some courage. This topic seems to be a taboo in German politics and research
altogether, which indicates that Germany does not have any policy in this realm
at all. This despite, or because of, its age-long historical relations with the
area of East Prussia. Thus neither Russian or German perspectives have been
particularly developed in regards to visions for the future of Kaliningrad. The
question is to what extent the population of the Russian exclave should be enabled
to shape their own future due to its very special situation as an enclave of the
EU. However, all possibilities of reforms are dependent on the political will in
Moscow. The question is thus whether Germany should pursue a policy of moving
the develepment in a positive direction.
Kaliningrad’s history begins in 1944 with the banishment of the German pop-
ulation from East Prussia, which was divided between Poland and the Russian
396 Königsberger Express (2011).
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Soviet republic. With new settlers coming from all parts of the Soviet Union the
ethnic structure of the northern part of the former East Prussia was completely
changed, and German toponyms were replaced with Russian. The process was
accompanied by the creation of new patterns of identification in the cultural and
architectural realm. After the Cold War, the inhabitants of the oblast’ Kalin-
ingrad for the first time had the opportunity of studying the German history
of their home. The historical heritage, the landscape and the old buildings are
silent contemporary witnesses of an affiliation with Germany over centuries. The
current inhabitants of Kaliningrad are searching for a legitimation of their own
belonging to the area, be it a local, Russian or a European identity. Migration of
“Russian Germans” or “Volga Germans” from Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Siberia and
the Volga region in the 1990s might be problematic from such a point of view but
is quantitative ineffectual for the area’s population growth. Moreover, hopes for
German investments were also associated with the migrants.397 Nonetheless, ru-
mours of a “regermanisation” of Kaliningrad have come up at some points of time,
especially in connection with offers for sale. According to an article in the Ru-
sisan newspaper Savtra there had been a “secret treaty” in 1996 between Kohl and
Jeltsin over a gradual handing over of Kaliningrad to Germany against a debt re-
lief of the Russian outstanding debts to Germany.398 In 2001, the British Sunday
Telegraph reported on such a sales offer and “secret talks” in Moscow.399 Despite
the fact that the German government has assisted and established agricultural
firms of the Russian-Germans from Kazakhstan in Kaliningrad400, German polity
and German economy discourage any attempt to raise allegations of a regerman-
isation. The former governor of Kaliningrad and former commander of the Baltic
Sea navy, Vladimir Jegorov, had the following view on the subject:
“The game over the regermanisation is a similar game as the nucleari-
sation. Every investor is welcome, regardles of whether he is engaged in
industry, agriculture or in social matters. We should not constantly scrab-
ble about in the past. Without investments we can not improve peoples’
lives. Is it then a bad thing that BMW has been installing its cars here
since 1999?”401
397 Königsberger Express (2000).
398Cited in Tukmanov (1998).
399Cited in Die Welt (2001).
400 Margolina (2001).
401Cited in Ihlau (2000). Author’s translation.
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Whereas concerns in Moscow were concentrated on “ ‘germanisation” in the 1990s,
the creeping absorption of Kaliningrad into the EU is rather the current worst
case scenario. This was observable prior to the EU accessions of (among others)
Poland and the Baltic states in the discussions of a transit solution for Kalin-
ingrad. President Putin declared, consistently with the Duma and the Federation
Council, an agreement with the EU over the transit problem to be the indicator
of the partnership between Russia and the EU in general. The importance of
Kaliningrad was also revealed through the appointment of Dimitry Rogosin, the
chairman of the Duma commitee on international relations, to his special deputy
to Kaliningrad.402 Later, Rogosin became Russia’s embassador to NATO.
As far as identity is concerned, the question is whether the Prussian history is
seen as a threat or a basis for a common identity in a multiethnical society. The
interest in the Prussian past and the German language is high in Kaliningrad.
This has for example led to the postgraduate degree programme “European stud-
ies in Kaliningrad” of the German Klaus-Mehnert institute, which is a yearlong
degree programme in the German language aimed at graduates of all univer-
sity degree programmes from all countries. Such a degree programme is so far
unique in Russia. However, German engagement is not solely unproblematic from
Moscow’s point of view, and Kaliningrad is used in order to pursue Russian inter-
ests in other realms. Germany already during Jeltsin’s presidency tried to open a
consulate general in Kaliningrad but did not succeed until 2004 when Cornelius
Sommer became the first German consul general of the former northern East
Prussia. This was seen as a success of German Russia policy, and also Moscow
emphasised this as a milestone in the German-Russian relations.403 However,
Germany did not obtain the acceptance of any building to house the consulate
by Russian authorities and thus had to delay its consular work and with it cer-
tificating visas. Moscow obviously averted the opening of the German consulate
general as long as it could not open its own in Frankfurt on the Main. According
to the German view, these were two different cases as Germany purchased some-
thing for its own account whereas in Germany, the Russians claimed an object
from the FRG’s property which according to international law would be left to
402 Timmerman (2000), p. 26.
403 Wehner (2004).
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the Russians in return for similar objects of the Russian property for Germany in
Moscow. Municipal concerns of the community in demand, Bad Homburg, was
the reason for the delayed process but were perceived as false pretences in Moscow.
Hence, the Russian foreign ministry took revenge in Kaliningrad.404 This might
not be the greatest of examples of German-Russian relations in Kaliningrad but
nevertheless shows how Moscow does not focus on the needs of the Kaliningrad
population in questions concerning the oblast’.
Other issues have been met with real scepticism in Moscow, as in 2004 when
the Russian foreign ministry excoriated a request (kleine Anfrage) in the Bun-
destag made by the CDU/CSU parliamentary group which concerned the fu-
ture of the Kaliningrad area. The parliamentary group enquired information
of the federal government on how it evaluates the considerations of creating a
Lithuanian-Russian-Polish “Euroregion” which “geographically approximately ac-
cord with the historical territory of East Prussia” and might be named “Prussia”.
The Russian foreign ministry stated that these expressions would evoke “surprise
and discomfort” and would be an attempt “to deny the results of the postwar order
in Europe.” The Russian foreign ministry appealed for an “unambiguous answer”
from the German federal government.405 The Russian ministry was on the other
hand happy with the 50 answers coming from the German government which
according to the Russian side clarified that an engagement for Kaliningrad will
furthermore be carried out in the frame of the German-Russian cooperation.406
According to the initiator of the parliamentary request, Jürgen Klimke, this was
made in order to obtain a clear statement from the federal government against
a revanchist idea but was obviously interpreted quite differently in Moscow.407
This is an example of how sensitive the matter of Kaliningrad is to Russians -
and Germans. The discussions on how to name the 750 anniversary celebration of
Kaliningrad/Königsberg which took place in the beginning of July 2005 is another
example. It might explain why German politics only reacts to and not shapes
404 Wehner (2004).
405Cited in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2004). Author’s translation.
406Cited in Russland Aktuell (2004) “Berlin will Kaliningrad nicht zu Prussia machen”, 15
November at http://www.kaliningrad.aktuell.ru/kaliningrad/lexikon/berlin_will_kaliningrad_nich_zu_prussia_machen_2.html
(accessed 19 January 2005).
407Cited in Russland Aktuell (2004) “Berlin will Kaliningrad nicht zu Prussia machen”, 15
November at http://www.kaliningrad.aktuell.ru/kaliningrad/lexikon/berlin_will_kaliningrad_nich_zu_prussia_machen_2.html
(accessed 19 January 2005).
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any policy on Kaliningrad. The question is only if misunderstandings would
be less frequent if it did. In recent years, Berlin has at least attracted annoy-
ance without really having any independent policy on the area. A good example
was the nuisance on the part of Poland and Lithuania when Russian president
Putin omitted the invitations of the two countries to the 750 anniversary cele-
bration. President Putin had invited chancellor Schröder but not the presidents
of Poland and Lithuania, countries which both border on the Kaliningrad oblast’.
The Lithuanian foreign minister Valionis in particular criticised German foreign
policy and chancellor Schröder. The cooperation with German diplomats would
normally be carried out “on the basis of mutual and benevolent understanding”.
Sometimes, however, the impression occurs “that the single steps of Germany’s
political leadership insufficiently account for the historical and political sensibil-
ities of our region”.408 Thus, if the aim of the lacking policy on the region is to
consider historical and political sensibilities, it is questionable if it succeeds. Here,
a simple act as an acceptance of an invitation has led to annoyance with German
policy. Again, it is Germany’s relations with Russia which causes the irritation.
“Flirt between Moscow and Berlin over Kaliningrad” was thus the title made by
Lithuanian newspapers. Valionis also criticised the missing clear statement from
Berlin on the suggestion of the Baltic states to position the Nord Stream pipeline
on shore through the Baltic states and Poland instead of through the Baltic Sea.
Further, if Putin and Schröder celebrate the anniversary of the founding of the
town “to the exclusion of the direct neighbouring states” this would “characterise”
the relations between Moscow and Berlin.409 As opposed to Kaliningrad’s next
neighbours, France’s president Jacques Chirac was invited to the anniversary.
Both Swedish, Polish and Lithuanian politics, among others, have been highly
interested in the question of Kaliningrad as it is important to the development
of the BSR. German states are also involved in regional cooperation, and for ex-
ample the state government of Schleswig-Holstein has since 1999 a partnership
with the Kaliningrad oblast’ in the frame of a “memorandum on regional coopera-
tion” with cooperation areas as agriculture, education, environmental protection,
culture, and cooperation between legal protection institutions. Regional coop-
408Cited in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2005b) Author’s translation.
409Cited in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2005b). Author’s translation.
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eration does, however, exclude the questions of the future status of the area
as well as the destiny of Russia’s Baltic fleet. Clashes of interests between the
oblast’ and the central power are to a large extent responsible for the difficul-
ties of the Kaliningrad area, and a certain amount of autonomy and stability
of the law are necessary for the area in order to function well.410 Criticism in
Kaliningrad towards the central government’s handling of the transit provision
discussions with the EU might have contributed to loosening Moscow’s inititally
rigid position on the matter. When special deputy Rogosin visited Kaliningrad
in mid August 2002, he was by way of example met with scepticism by the lo-
cal elite and the local press.411 As the discussions on the transit solution to and
from Kaliningrad show, the success of integration depends on the cooperation be-
tween Russia, the EU, and the neighbouring states. The EU finally realised that
Kaliningrad is a special case, and late approaches by the governments of France,
Germany, Sweden and then member to come Lithuania enhanced the willingness
to compromise in Brussels.412 The cooperation again depends on the will of all
involved parties. Whereas e.g. Lithuania has promoted the case of Kaliningrad
in Moscow and Brussels, Germany is reserved. This aloofness is met with disap-
proval in Vilnius.413 The question remains who, if not Germany, is able to move
the Russian-European cooperation on Kaliningrad in the right direction.
2.2.2.3. Independent variables and policy assessment
The importance of Germany is limited as the case of Kaliningrad shows, simply
because it is difficult for Germany to act without creating negative reactions,
which are even existent without any specific policy. Here, principle 2 of the uni-
versally applicable principles of good international citizenship cited in chapter
2.2 of part II will be circumscribed in order to fit this case. The principle states
that “the good international citizen may believe there is a strong moral case for
unilateral intervention, but doubts about legality require a global dialogue to ascer-
tain whether states can agree that supreme humanitarian emergencies justify new
principles of humanitarian intervention.” Here, of course, there is no question
410See for example Lebedeva (2001); Jegorov (2001).
411 Timmerman (2000), p. 27.
412 Timmerman (2000), p. 28.
413 Altenbockum (2000).
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of unilateral military interventions. From a moral point of view, however, more
should be done to relieve the situation in the Russian oblast’. Germany has, as
opposed to the smaller Baltic Sea countries, the political and economic weight to
make a difference. Doubts about the (moral) legality of German influence in the
former East Prussia, however, requires a regional dialogue to ascertain whether
Germany should have a more distinct role. A regional dialogue is necessary as a
German discussion of German foreign policy omits foreign points of view, and a
discussion without German participation is also pointless. Moreover, a Russian-
German dialogue is not sufficient as it excludes the smaller neighbours which
are also highly affected. A regional consensus on this matter would probably be
necessary to encourage new principles of German foreign policy which is freed
from taboos. There are only historical factors which impede the legitimisation
of a more constructive German role in this region. The question is whether they
should be assessed to be more important than the possibility of making necessary
changes to European integration. What objections are there to more German
influence?
An inclusive as opposed to exclusive conception of the national interest (pluralist
principle 7) is perceived to be very important to the BSR as the next chapter
shows. Principle 9 of the pluralist principles , i.e. “an essential purpose of an
’inclusive’ foreign policy is to make changes to international society which will
satisfy the legitimate interests and new member states” is of particular interest
in the case of Kaliningrad. Its development is important to all members of the
BSR and Kaliningrad’s interests should not be harmed “for the sake of trivial
national advantages” (pluralist principle 7). Instead, the legitimate interests of
the oblast’ should be the centre of the political discussions when attempting to
reconcile different national interests. As this case has shown, the question is
whether Germany should be an important political player rather than whether
the policy should move in a solidarist or pluralist direction. For the time being,
it has no direction at all, although there are probably pluralist considerations
(efforts not to annoy Russia) leading to German passivity.
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2.2.3. Case 4: Regional cooperation
2.2.3.1. Introduction
Inititally, some comments will be made on the BSR in itself. The BSR can be de-
fined as a cooperation net which function constitutes its identity. In the 1990s, a
so called “region building school”414 devoted its scientific work to this policy field.
The school has attempted to communicate that the region as a political entity has
other possibilities to deal with regional crises than states, not to mention the EU.
The regional cooperation takes place at several levels: States, subregions, cities,
enterprises, NGOs etc. of the entire Baltic Sea area cooperate to rebuild historic,
cultural and economic relations, to discover a new identity and to position itself
among the European regions. In the light of the diversity and relative complexity
of the regional cooperation structures, this case is mainly focusing on the CBSS
but also consider other forms of regional cooperation. Another organisation is for
example the Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation (BSSSC). Whereas the
CBSS is an interstate, intergovernmental cooperation institution, the BSSSC is
a political organisation for the decentralised authorities of the subregions. Both
organisations have had important functions in the implementation of EU strate-
gies in regards to the pre-accession policy and the policy of the EUND. Also the
Strategy on the Baltic Sea, mentioned in chapter 4.2.3 of part I, is targeted on
a ’macro-region’. Its aims of environmental sustainability, prosperity, improved
transport links, and safety and security415 are not new to the regional cooperation
itself, and the already existing institutions will probably be important tools in
implementing a comprehensive EU strategy on the BSR in particular. Neverthe-
less, the last twenty years show that several projects in the BSR are generated
on the local level as parts of a “bottom-up” process. Through such a “Baltic
Sea regionalism”416 the possibility is opened to embed the Baltic states and Rus-
414The attribute of this school is that it was specifically preoccupied with the BSR and
basically consisted of inputs from authors stemming from the Baltic Sea countries. Important
is e.g. the publication Neo-Nationalism or Regionality. The Restructuring of Political Space
Around the Baltic Rim edited by Pertti Joenniemi (Stockholm 1997).
415Commission of the European Communities (2009) Communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region
COM (2009) 248 final.
416See Joenniemi/Stålvant (1995), p. 23.
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sia in common cooperation structures. The question is what effects the regional
cooperation has on the stability and compatiblity of the BSR and whether the
BSR can accomplish something the EU or riparian states alone are not capable
of. The hope was in the 1990s that the interaction between local, regional and
national identities would create new political options, and that the Baltic Sea
regionalism would be a sustainable formula for the relations between politics and
cultural communities. Bernatowicz for example states that the network relations
are an important side show of European unity as it supports the trend of fusion.
The participants of these networks become obliged to create several intermediate
levels. Hence, cooperation fields of different societies are constituted which can
increase the mutual understanding and get over stereotypes. Economic coopera-
tion is a demonstrative example as it helps overcoming recessions within regional
structures.417 The EU enlargement has without doubt been an important factor
to increase the similarities and coordination in the BSR as well as a collective
interest in the common development. On the other hand, the borderline to Russia
becomes even more evident.
The participating members of the CBSS are Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland,
Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden in addition
to the European Commission. The CBSS consists of the foreign ministers from
each member state and a member of the European Commission. The presidency
of the CBSS rotates among the member states on an annual basis. The role of
the organisation is “to serve as a forum for guidance and overall coordination
among the participating states.”418 The foreign minister of the presiding country
is responsible for coordinating the activities and is assisted in this work by a
Committee of Senior Officials.419
The decisions of the CBSS must be taken unanimously, and declaratory policy
is weighted together with cooperation on several specific, indisputable policy ar-
eas. The political tasks are to encourage the alraeady existing cooperation and
participating in common projects with local authorities and institutions. These
417 Bernatowicz (1995), p. 114.
418http://www.cbss.org/CBSS-The-Council/the-council
419The Council does not have a general budget or project fund. Members are responsible for
funding common activities or for seeking and coordinating financing from other sources. Since
1998, the CBSS Member States have financed jointly the Permanent International Secretariat
of the CBSS.
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are in the majority economic cooperation, environment protection, culture, ed-
ucation and tourism, communications and transport as well as measures to the
protection of humanitarian and sanitary needs.420 However, in order to make
the role of the CBSS more relevant, it presupposes a broadening of the range of
tasks and a considerable increase of responsibilities. At least the CBSS brings
together the member states’ foreign ministers and thus facilitates a respectable
public for regional problems. This publicity alone, however, is not sufficient. The
EU has the final power of decision and determines the allocation of most budget
funds. What could be considered is a transfer of competencies from the EU to
macro-regional institutions corresponding to the principle of subsidiarity. For ex-
ample, the provision of an annual budget for the BSR, financed by EU funds but
distributed by the CBSS through a consensus of the governments involved would
be a step to upgrade the CBSS’s status.
2.2.3.2. Case description and dependent variable
Germany’s policy on the regional cooperation in the BSR is the dependent vari-
able. German priorities and preferences in regards to regional cooperation in the
BSR will be evaluated as well as the importance and role of different German
actors.
Hans-Jürgen Heimsöth, then chairman of the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO)
of the CBSS421, evaluated German policy on the BSR and with it the German
presidency of the CBSS starting in July 2000 and ending in July 2001. Ac-
cordingly, Germany was able to “exercise valuable influence in sense of region-
building.” The region should moreover become increasingly competitive and “be
a trade-mark of knowledge and science”. A successful policy also “has to be made
in partnership with Russia”.422 Heimsöth’s considerations must be considered
valuable when evaluating German priorities and policy as he was a high-ranking
representative of the AA when making these statements. Germany also holds the
420 Bernatowicz (1995), p. 114.
421The CSO consists of high ranking representatives of the ministries of foreign affairs of
the 11 CBSS member states as well as of the European Commission. The CSO serves as the
main discussion forum and decision-making body on matters related to the work of the Council
between ministerial sessions.
422 Heimsöth (2001), p. 103.
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presidency of the CBSS in the period 2011/2012. A pronounced goal is to mod-
ernise the southeastern part of the BSR, and “particular focus (...) will be the
development of the Kaliningrad region and the surrounding area, which have spe-
cial potential.”423 FM Westerwelle assesses the achievements of the organisation
20 years after its creation in the following way:
“In its original mission - to support the eastern Baltic Sea countries’ tran-
sition to democracy, the rule of law and market economies - the Council
of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) has been stunningly successful. Coopera-
tion among all Baltic Sea countries has been greatly boosted and become
a model resonating far beyond the Region itself. It’s not without reason
that people look to the Baltic Sea Region to see what a successful macro-
regional cooperation model could look like for the Black Sea, the Danube
or the Mediterranean.”424
The federal states of Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, and
Hamburg belong to the “real” Baltic Sea coastal region, whereas states as Lower
Saxony, Bremen, North Rhine-Westphalia as well as Brandenburg and Berlin are
increasingly interested in the region because of economic interests, cultural re-
lations, societal proximity or historical connections. Germany’s special position
in the region is constituted by its size, political weight and geographic location
as a link to the rest of the EU.425 After 1949, the political importance of the
BSR was provided for by Germany’s close bilateral relations to all of the Baltic
Sea riparian states. With Mecklenburg-West Pomerania the coast of the Fed-
eral Republic along the Baltic Sea was more than doubled after the German
reunion. The foreign relations of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania were moreover
considerably shaped by the BSR, and the importance of regional cooperation
has increased. Since 2003 the Land Government of Mecklenburg-West Pomera-
nia is reporting to the state parliament (Landtag) on the current and intended
developments in all parts of BSR cooperation. In 2009, practical experiences in
the frame of the cooperation with Russia’s northwestern areas were reported on
for the first time.426 The political importance of Baltic Sea cooperation is ob-
servable in several aspects. Mecklenburg-West Pomerania has six partnerships
423 Federal Government of Germany (2011), p. 3.
424 Westerwelle (2012).
425 Heimsöth (2001), p. 103.
426Landtag of West Pomerania (2009) Jahresbericht der Landesregierung zur Zusammenarbeit
im Ostseeraum und zur maritimen Sicherheit für den Zeitraum 2008/2009. Drucksache 5/2595,
p. 4.
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in Europe, whereas five are situated in the BSR (South Sweden, Southwest Fin-
land, the Leningrad oblast, and the Polish voivodeships Pomerania and Western
Pomerania). It is also a member of several Baltic Sea organisations and thus work
on the regional level. On state level, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania is involved
together with Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg in the federal German partici-
pation in the CBSS and further multilateral organisations. In this regard, the
task is to propose and if possible accomplish the interests of Mecklenburg-West
Pomerania in realms such as environmental protection, security of vessels, traf-
fick questions or fishery. Parliaments, local communities, universities, NGOs and
other institutions, associations and interest groups are also able to participate in
the networks and cooperation activities in the BSR. Moreover, the multilateral
cooperation is complementet by different forms of bilateral cooperation, which
in the case of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania has the emphasis on West Pomera-
nia and Pomerania.427 Thus the regional cooperation has become increasingly
important to German states since the early 1990s, and they have a strong role
in the practical work of BSR cooperation. In addition the Federal Government
coordinates its BSR policy with the three northern German states and consults
them on issues relevant to the BSR. Also Schlweswig-Holstein, positioned be-
tween the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, has traditionally close ties to the BSR,
and Poland, Denmark and Sweden are traditional close neighbours which have
increased their importance to Schleswig-Holstein.428 Both Schleswig-Holstein and
Hamburg are leading board members of the BSSSC and active partners in the
Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC).
Whether the move of Germany’s capital from Bonn to Berlin will lead to increased
awareness of the BSR in Berlin can “still not be predicted” Heimsöth wrote in
2001. He indicates the “cultural importance which Berlin even used to have in
earlier days in the region and towards the Scandinavian states. With the political
change of 1990, geography and regional references again become vital, of which
most of the current politicians can not bring to mind.”429 Today, however, it is
quite obvious that Berlin has not changed its Western oriented policy. The for-
427Landtag of West Pomerania (2009) Jahresbericht der Landesregierung zur Zusammenarbeit
im Ostseeraum und zur maritimen Sicherheit für den Zeitraum 2008/2009. Drucksache 5/2595,
p. 5.
428 Heimsöth (2001), p. 106.
429 Heimsöth (2001), p. 106. Author’s translation.
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eign ministers Kinkel (1992-1998) and Fischer (1998-2005) were moreover rather
indifferent to the BSR.430
The historical relations which developed in the BSR over many centuries have
been analysed in chapter 4.2.3 of part I. The new geographic facts of 1949 was
that the West German coast reached from Flensburg to Lübeck where the Iron
Curtain subsequently began. Thus, the BSR was inaccessible for West Germany.
The reunion, however, has given new opportunities for cooperation in the BSR.
The CBSS, founded in 1992, was as previously mentioned the result of a Danish-
German inititiative, and the foreign ministers Genscher and Ellemann-Jensen are
considered as its initiators. However, Björn Engholm even earlier campaigned for
a Baltic Sea council and proposed a new cooperation of Baltic Sea states as far
back as 1987. Björn Engholm was premier of Schleswig-Holstein from 1988 to
1993 and chairman of the SPD from 1991 to 1993.431 As a federal state premier
he launched the concept of the “new Hansa” as a strategy of securing north-
ern Europe’s position compared to other fast-growing regions of Europe. The
idea was mainly based on the development of communication investments and
infrastructure and indicates what influence the German states can have in the
multilateral frame of Germany’s relations in the BSR. The “new Hansa” concept
was initiated in Engholm’s speech “Zukunftsregion Ostsee” on a seminar in the
town of Travemünde from 12 October 1990 as well as in the publication “Zusam-
menarbeit im Ostseeraum” edited by the state parliament of Schleswig-Holstein.
Importantly, the name “New Hansa” was abandoned by both Engholm and Gen-
scher due to an implicit indication of German hegemony, and the CBSS initiative
was launched in close cooperation with Danish party colleagues.432 Correspond-
ing with the creation of various BSR organisations it was a favoured policy of
Germany to integrate with regional organisations and thus incorporate its BSR
activities into the international, supranational and subnational levels.433 Heim-
söth sees the importance of the BSR above all in the superior context of European
stability and security.
430 Saldik (2004), pp. 64-65.
431He was also a federal minister in the government of Helmut Schmidt in the early 1980s.
432 Saldik (2004), p. 61.
433See Saldik (2004).
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“In this context it has to be clear that security means more than disar-
mament and reduction of military tensions. Both the gap of economic effi-
ciency as well as environmental risks, migration and organised crime could
reach an extent which threatens the stability of a region. The political role
of Baltic Sea cooperation is found in its contribution to the pan-European
security structure. For that reason the point has to be to contribute to the
coalescence of the continent.”434
Most importantly, Germany prefers the EU as the central actor in this realm as
well, and the German position is that BSR policy has to be seen in close connec-
tion with European policy and the EU.435 For a long time, Germany was thus
reluctant to chair the CBSS436, and the 2001 presidency has not been followed up
since. Germany has definitely not had any leading role in the CBSS. The missing
interest of federal Germany has, however, led to some frustration in the northern
German states.437 According to Heimsöth, Baltic Sea cooperation has become
increasingly important because it is also used as a forum for meetings between
heads of government as well as other ministers.438 However, CBSS summits439
are rarely visited by German chancellors, with the exception of the 2002 summit
in St. Petersburg. In 2008, the CBSS summit in Riga was visited by all heads
of government except of chancellor Merkel and president Putin. FM Steinmeier
on the other hand pursued a more focused line on the BSR and joined the CBSS
Ministerial Meeting in 2007 and participated in the Summits of 2006 and 2008.
According to Heimsöth, German policy in the BSR has to be seen in the wider
frame of European policy, and it is also important that the EU gives the region
enough attention.440
Unlike Denmark and Norway, Sweden had its focus on East Germany during
the Cold War and strongly supported the West German Ostpolitik, which was
perceived to be very important for the political and military situation in Northern
Europe. The normalisation achieved opened up for increased contact with the
GDR and prospects for Baltic Sea cooperation. After the German unification,
434 Heimsöth (2001), p. 105. Author’s translation.
435 Heimsöth (2001), p. 108.
436 Saldik (2004), p. 65.
437See the Minister for European Affairs in Schleswig-Holstein, Gert Walter, in FOCUS
Magazin no. 32 1999: “Der Ostseeregion gehört der Zukunft” at http://www.focus.de/
politik/deutschland/standpunkt-der-ostseeregion-gehoert-die-zukunft_aid_180601.html
438 Heimsöth (2001), p. 107.
439The annual CBSS summit was initiated by Sweden in 1996.
440 Heimsöth (2001), p. 108.
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Swedish media as well as political debate have stressed the importance of German
activities in, and political support for, the BSR.441 In Swedish-German bilateral
meetings, the BSR is of course a habitual topic.442 However, German top-ranking
politicians do not contribute to give the BSR any high profile and leaves this to
e.g. Sweden and Finland. Nonetheless, Merkel stands up and defends northern
Europe if necessary as was the case with the “Mediterranean Union” initiative of
French president Sarkozy. She feared that northern and southern Europe would
drift apart and thus pursued the line that the project should be an instrument
available to all EU members.443
2.2.3.3. Independent variables and policy assessment
Baltic Sea regionalism nicely conforms to principle number 7 of the pluralist
principles listed in chapter 2.2.1 of part II, i.e. “an ’inclusive’ as opposed to
’exclusive’ conception of the national interest should be pursued so that other
states, and the society to which they belong, are not harmed for the sake of trivial
national advantages.” The Baltic Sea thus exemplifies the common dependence of
the littoral states. From an economic point of view, it must thus be in all states’
interest that the prerequisits for trade are given. The disadvantage of one state
can not be in the interest of the others. However, disputes between the Baltic
states and Russia do betray that the exclusive conception is still existent. What
role role then does Germany have to play in order to be the good international
citizen? The former chapter shows that there is a lot going on the regional level,
but Germany is keeping a low profile on the federal level. As an ’exclusive’
conception of the national interest is not so much the problem of the low politics
of regional or subregional cooperation but rather something emanating from high
politics, this is where a more active German role in the BSR is necessary. Germany
views the EU as the sole European stage for high politics. Is the low German
profile on the BSR, evident since the Danish-German initiative of the CBSS,
something its neighbours are asking for or is it Germany which is afraid of itself?
441 Lindahl (2002), p. 165.
442See for exemple Pressebegegnung Merkel-Persson 22 April 2006, http://www.bundes
regierung.de (accessed 26 November 2007).
443Sueddeutsche Zeitung on 14 March 2008 at http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/eu-
gipfeltreffen-in-bruessel-die-mittelmeerunion-kommt-1.288210 (accessed 13 September 2008).
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The example of the Danes disliking the term “new Hanse” does not indicate that
Germany has to keep a low profile to steer clear of hegemony suspicions. It might,
however, not be Denmark Germany has in mind when keeping a low profile on
the BSR.
There are a lot of cooperation projects going on in the BSR. The main coop-
eration areas of the CBSS are environment, economic development, energy, ed-
ucation and culture, and “civil security and the human dimension” - the latter
comprising everything from border control to task forces against trafficking and
nuclear and radiation safety. Security policy is omitted. The only political instru-
ment of the CBSS was the Commissioner on Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights, renamed as the Commissioner on Democratic Development in 2000. The
commissioner supported democratic institutions in the member states on matters
like democracy, good governance and law-making, strengthening of civil society
and human rights including minority rights. The commissioner had an ombuds-
man function and could also make recommendations to the members states in
this regard. According to the CBSS, the mandate was “deemed fulfilled” at the
end of 2003 and thus terminated “in light of the region’s progress in the field of
democratic development”.444 In view of the incomplete developments in Russia in
regards to democracy, good governance, civil society and human rights, this leads
to a discussion of principle 6 of the solidarist principles enlisted in chapter 2.2.2
of part II - ‘‘the sovereignty of the state is conditional on compliance with the
international law of human rights.” This principle is definitely non-applicable to
Russia, and this is why the BSR can not be further developed unless progress is
achieved. Cooperation with Russia is desired in order to enhance the prosperity
and the possibilities of the region. Here, Germany’s task is to move the cooper-
ation in a solidarist direction as the development of the BSR can not develop at
a higher level if improvements are not made also in this realm. If improvements
are made, it would be easier to pursue Russia’s integration in Europe as there
would be more values in common. Countries like Sweden and Denmark have
confronted Russia on difficult topics to a much larger extent than Norway and
Germany. This is a challenge to German foreign policy which it until now has not
444http://www.cbss.org/Civil-Security-and-the-Human-Dimension/civil-security-and-the-
human-dimension
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been willing to take. This case shows a German passivity which is self-imposed
and thus unnecessary. Decisive steps are indispensable for Germany to take in
order to promote a “sound consensual legitimacy”. In fear of a conflict between
order and justice, Germany again prefers to keep a low profile and limits its own
importance.
2.3. Germany and Russia
2.3.1. Case 5: Russia’s integration in Europe
2.3.1.1. Introduction
In addition to its importance as a gas supplier to Europe, Russia is a giant market
for EU exports where the buying power is increasing. On the other hand the EU
is Russia’s largest trade partner and the largest investor in the Russian economy.
The EU-Russian strategic partnership is supposed to be founded on common
interests and shared values. However, it is difficult to identify the latter. It is
difficult for the EU to have a positive influence on the developments in Russia
as it is not able to export stability, security and prosperity by the instruments
of accession. This option is not open to Russia for different reasons, and Russia
perceives itself to be an independent player and a regional power with global
aspirations, although its economic weight does not point at a position as a global
player.
Vare has a pessimistic outlook in regards to the future developments of EU-Russia
relations: First, as an essential political player but a moderate economic power,
Russia stresses high politics over economic ties. The EU is on the other hand an
economic giant and a political dwarf. Moreover, Russia has completely different
ideas about the rule of law compared to the EU, “the epitome of a rulebased
community”.445 Furthermore, the Russian leadership sees Russia’s relations with
the EU solely as a way of strengthening the domestic economy through trade
and to a lesser extent investment. The EU on the other hand still thinks that,
445 Vare (2005), p. 19.
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despite the autocratic tendencies in Russia, the strategic partnership should be
based on shared interests and shared values. Finally, the perhaps most problem-
atic development for EU-Russian relations according to Vare is that the EU is
undermined by bilateral ties between Russia and larger EU countries, e.g. the
German-Russian Nord Stream pipeline project.446
“...Russia can afford to ignore EU institutions while the larger EU mem-
ber states continue to cultivate special relations with Moscow and disregard
agreed-upon policy positions and long-established competencies.”447
Leonard and Popescu divide the EU member states are into five different groups
depending on their relations with and policies on Russia. The categories are
the “Trojan Horses” (Greece and Cyprus), the “Strategic Partners” (Germany,
France, Italy and Spain), the “Friendly Pragmatists” (Austria, Belgium, Bul-
garia, Finland, Hungary, Luxemourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Portugal),
the “Frosty Pragmatists” (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia,
the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK) and, finally, the “New Cold-
Warriors” (Lithuania and Poland).448 According to the foreign policy directives
approved of by president Medvedev on 12 July 2008, the development of advan-
tageous bilateral relations with Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Finland, Greece,
the Netherlands and some other countries are mentioned as means to further
Russia’s national interests in European and global matters.449 Russia has to a
large extent been able to split the EU members, which are supposed to speak
with one voice, and has arranged bilateral agreements on energy with single EU
states. Russia thus seems to have minor interest in a new partnership agreement
and prefer bilateral agreements with e.g. Germany.450
Leonard and Popescu’s ’medicine’ for a stronger EU is the following: First, the
Europeans should recalibrate their international diplomacy as Russia aims for
recognition in international politics, which is provided from the participation in
446 Vare (2005), pp. 19-20.
447 Vare (2005), p. 20.
448 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 3.
449Cited in Dragnes (2008a).
450A commentator at the EU-Russia meeting in Samara in May 2007 states the following
situation: “According to the greeting that ... Barroso and ... Merkel received in Samara...,
it was obvious that the German chancellor was the most outstanding guest, and not Barroso.
Merkel became an affectionate reception, whereas Barroso, who had arrived ten minutes earlier,
neither became flowers nor the same welcome committee.” Risa (2007). Authors translation.
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G8 and EU-Russia summits. In this context, they favour a “rule of law” approach
that would “keep Russia engaged in these institutions, but moderate the level of
cooperation in line with Russia’s observance of the spirit as well as the letter of the
common rules.”451 Second, the authors favour a so called “principled bilateralism”,
where “it should be possible to move towards a situation where the proliferation of
bilateral contacts reinforces rather than undermines common EU objectives.”452
This would e.g. mean that member states would have to consult each other
on certain issues before bilateral contacts with Russia are approached, even on
matters of great economic interest. Third, the “neighbourhood policy” accordingly
needs to be reformulated. The proponents of “creeping integration”453 have tended
to pursue a “Russia first” policy in order not to upset the Kremlin and thus
oppose an active EU policy in its Eastern neighbourhood. The “soft containment”
proponents on the other hand have favoured EU support to governments in e.g.
Georgia and the Ukraine in their disputes with Russia as well as rapid NATO
enlargemetns. The long-term design of the neighbourhood policy needs to be
complemented with rather shorter term measures in order to enable these states
to withstand Russian pressure. As an example the European Energy Community
could be extended and lead to the unbundling of energy companies in states like
Turkey, the Ukraine and Moldova. This would lead to a greater transparency
of the respective energy sectors - and ultimately to greater energy security for
Europe. Russia would not be able to use energy to exert political pressure to
the same extent as before. Finally, the EU needs to rethink law enforcement.
Here, a “rule of law” approach should favour mutual agreements and investments
but insist on their implementation as well. The European Commission would
first of all need to be empowered to apply competition policy in the sphere of
energy, that is to have the political support of the member states in addition to
its already existent formal competencies.454
As referred to in chapter 1 of part I, the EU has better soft and hard power
indicators than Russia, but as long as the latter splits the former, Russia is in the
better position. Thus, in order to counteract such a fragmentation of European
451 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 58.
452 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 59.
453See chapter 1 of part I.
454 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), pp. 58-61.
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power, the need is for a new paradigm: Promoting the rule of law.
While the long-term goal should be to have a liberal democratic Rus-
sia as a neighbour, a more realistic mid-term goal would be to encourage
Russia to respect the rule of law, which would allow it to become a reli-
able partner. The rule of law is central to the European project, and its
weakness in Russia is a concern for all Europeans working there. Russia’s
selective application of the law affects businesses who worry about respect
of contracts, diplomats who fear breaches of international treaties, human
rights activists concerned about authoritarianism, and defence establish-
ments who want to avoid military tensions. An approach based on the
rule of law would also have positive echoes within Russian society, where
even citizens who have become cynical about the language of democracy
are concerned about corruption and the arbitrary exercise of power by the
state.455
The suggested adjustments to EU policy are thus a conditional engagement with
Russia, a principled bilateralism, to integrate the neighbourhood, to enforce the
law and, finally, to rebalance the relationship which does not mean to minimise
the contacts but rather to change a relationship where dependence is rather uni-
dimensional.
2.3.1.2. Case description and dependent variable
German policy concerning Russia’s integration in Europe is the dependent vari-
able. It will be looked at two different indicators. First, the bilateral relations
between Russia and Germany will be evaluated because of their importance to
Russia’s integration in Europe and European security and stability. Second, Ger-
man preferences for EU policy on Russia will be evaluated.
2.3.1.2.1. The bilateral relations According to Stent, Germany’s cooperation
with Russia is predicated on a tangible economic cooperation and Germany’s wish
to integrate Russia in Europe - a process which was disrupted for a century by
the Bolshewik revolution. Moreover, Germany’s post-communist Ostpolitik is a
result of its recovered full sovereignty, its leading role in the EU and the enlarge-
ment process, as well as its partnership with the US and NATO. Geographic
and historic conditions have led Berlin to play the decisive role as to whether
455 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 3.
III.2.3. Germany and Russia - 327 -
the integration of Russia in the Euro-Atlantic structures of the next decades
succeeed or not.456 In a historic perspective, shifting phases of cooperation and
confrontation between the powers Germany and Russia in different shapes have
been dominated by two decisive factors: no natural borders and two economies
which mutually complemented one another.457 In his layout of the evolution of
the international society, Watson notes that both Russia and the United States,
which later were the two superpowers of the global system, became members of
the European society of states in the 18th century. Russia was Europeanised and
its tsar accepted as a member of the grande république.458 According to Stent,
Germany has represented technological development and intellectual inspiration
to Russia - from Peter the Great (1689 to 1725) to Vladimir Putin. Peter the
Great was Russia’s first great moderniser who brought German immigrants to
the country in order to develop the economy. Under his successor Catherine the
Great, a German princess, a great German colony developed along the Volga to
develop the agrarian sector. The German nobility moreover had governmental
positions in the Russian Empire.459 Germany was of course not the sole source of
inspiration, and Peter the Great preferred to learn military techniques from Rus-
sia’s principal enemy Sweden and the other mechanical and technical aspects of
westernisation from the most advanced states of his days, Holland and England.
Peter the Great abandoned Moscow for hiw new western city of St Petersburg,
built to be the capital of modernized Russia and also a great port on the Baltic,
a new Amsterdam. With the help of Russia’s westernised elite Peter erected a
European stato on the backs of the uncomprehending and often resentful Rus-
sian people. However, while the Americans inherited the European pattern of
a grande république divided into several states, the Russians were heirs of the
limitless, monocentric authority of Byzentium and the Tartars. By the middle of
the eighteenth century the Romanov dynasty was accepted into the sovereigns’
club, and conformed to its rules. From then on Russia has played a major part
in shaping the destinies of Europe and the world.460
Three central elements of the German-Russian relations are noticeable accord-
456 Stent (2007), p. 436.
457 Stent (2007), p. 437.
458 Watson (1993), pp. 224-225.
459 Stent (2007), pp. 436-437.
460 Watson (1993), pp. 225-226.
- 328 - III.2. Case Studies
ing to Stent. The first element is Germany’s decisive importance for Russian
developments both in the domestic and foreign policies. Russia has indeed also
played an important role for Germany’s development, but in a historic perspective
Germany has been more important for the Russian development than the other
way araound. The second factor refers to the cooperation between both states.
German-Russian cooperation has until now had a positive effect on both Russia
and its neighbouring states. Germany has had a key role in the modernisation of
Russia as Berlin has had a moderating influence on Russian policy and has tried
to integrate Russia in Europe. On the other hand there is also the heritage of a
damaging kind of cooperation, e.g. the secret military cooperation in the inter-
war period, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the Soviet cooperation with the
GDR. Finally, the third factor is the German-Russian antagonism which led to
two world wars in the twentieth century and the division of Europe.461 Although
Europe has changed after the end of the East-West conflict, two factors are still
given: The pivotal importance of the German-Russian relations for Europe’s de-
velopment as well as the importance of German-Russian cooperation for Russia’s
integration in Europe and the European security and stability.462
The institutional basis for Germany’s relations with Russia and the normative
foundation of Germany’s Russia-policy are exposed in the chapters 1.2 and 1.1 of
this part. The integration of the German-Russian relations in a larger European
context is seen as a possibility to resolve the historical perception of a Sonderweg
in the relations with Russia, which triggers doubts in the neighbouring coun-
tries. Hence, Germany has tried to multilateralise its relations with Russia as
far as possible, and in the phrame of the EU in particular.463 The developments
in the German-Russian relationship of the early 1990s have also been evaluated
in chapter 2.2.1 in the case study on the Baltic Sea Region. Chancellor Kohl
stressed geopolitical considerations in order not to disturb the good German-
Russian relations. Russia’s importance to the completion of the German unity
was a decisive factor. Accordingly, anything which could distract the cooper-
ation with the Russian leadership, should be omitted. This also included the
declared sphere of influence, of which Germany should keep away from. Kohl’s
461 Stent (2007), p. 438.
462 Stent (2007), p. 438.
463 Stent (2007), p. 440.
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personal relations to Boris Jeltsin were a main factor in the developing German-
Russian relations. Despite Jeltsin’s limited democratic leadership qualities, Kohl
unreservedly supported him as the alternative was a return to the communists.
Despite the military intervention in Chechnya, criticism in regards to the fairness
of the election campaign and rumours of corruption towards the inner circle of
Jeltin’s leadership, Germany supported Jeltin’s second candidacy of presidency
in 1996. Kohl supported Jeltsin stronger and more explicit than any other head
of government in the western world. As the behaviour of the Russian president
became increasingly unpredictable, the public criticism of Kohl’s policy increased.
Kohl recognised the asymmetry of the German-Russian relationship: Germany
was far more important to the transition process taking place in Russia than the
other way around.464 Germany supported Russia with 40,25 billion US dollars
from 1990 to 1993 and was Russia’s largest donor country both in regards to the
overall and population figure .465
Germany’s relationship with Russia is more complex than France’s, “combin-
ing economic calculations with the legacies of the Second World War and of
Soviet domination of communist East Germany.”466 In 2003, German chancel-
lor Schröder praised the German-Russian relations as “could hardly be better”
(“kaum verbesserbar”). At this time, the German-Russian economic relations
were extended and strengthened, and the intentions of a German-Russian gas
pipeline through the Baltic Sea became public. During the consultations of the
German-Russian governments in Jekaterinburg in October 2003, several economic
projects, especially in the energy sector, and investments amounting to 1,5 billion
Euro were agreed to.467 In regards to Russia’s importance to Germany due to its
energy power, Schröder’s statements illustrate the situation:
“The German economy is Russia’s preferred partner, especially in the
energy sector. This becomes more important as other parts of the world
464 Stent (2007), pp. 442-443.
465 Kempe (2007), p. 243.
466 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 32.
467 Süddeutsche Zeitung (2003). The German-Russian “strategic partnership” also in-
cluded the expansion of research cooperation. In February 2005, three concrete research coop-
erations in the polar and ocean research, the laser technology and the information and com-
munication technology were agreed on in addition to plans of enhanced cooperation in health
research, engineer education and further education. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
(2005a).
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are, or become, more unstable. (...) It is our long-term interest, not just to
receive gas but to participate in the exploration and the distribution.”468
Schröder thus created possibilities for an economic cooperation without compar-
ison. Since 1997, Germany has been Russia’s most important trade partner. In
2008 the German imports from Russia amounted to 35 908,9 million Euro469, the
exports from Germany to Russia amounted to 32 341,1 million Euro.470 Russia
furthermore supplies 42 per cent of German gas needs, which makes Germany
Russia’s most important gas market.471 From January to October 2008, crude
oil and natural gas amounting to 22,5 billion Euro was imported from Russia to
Germany. Russia’s contingent among the suppliers of crude oil and natural gas
was thus 32,5 per cent of total imports, with Norway following thereafter with
21,9 per cent.472 Figure III.3473 describes the development of Germany’s gas im-
ports. It shows that Russia’s contingent has been quite stable since 1991, whereas
Norway has increased and the Netherlands decreased their roles as natural gas
suppliers to Germany.
Today, Schröder is chair of the Nord Stream pipeline project’s management com-
mittee. German energy companies are central to the Russian-German strategic
partnership. A representative of Germany’s E.ON is e.g. the only foreigner on
Gazprom’s board of directors.474 The foundation for the German-Russian re-
lations in the Schröder era was the personal friendship between the chancellor
and the president. Schröder promoted understanding for the ‘difficult process of
democratisation’ in Russia. One argument was that too much criticism of the
political grievances in Russia would rather provoke the opposite of intended re-
sults. The period 2000-2005 was a period of deepening in the German-Russian
relationship. Another important aspect are by way of example the contractual
based town twinning between Russian and German communities of which there
468Cited in Kilz/ Prantl/ Schäfer (2004). Author’s translation.
469Thereof were 73,8 per cent imports of crude oil and natural gas.
470Statistisches Bundesamt (2009) Außenhandel. Rangfolge der Handelspartner im Außen-
handel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2008. Wiesbaden.
471 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 32.
472Statistisches Bundesamt (2009): “Russland ist Deutschlands wichtigster Energielieferant”,
Zahl der Woche Nr. 002, 13 January.
473Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (2009) Zahlen und Fakten. En-
ergiedaten. Nationale und Internationale Entwicklung, http://www.bmwi.de/Navigation/ Tech-
nologie-und-Energie/Energiepolitik/energiedaten.html
474 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 32.
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Figure III.3.: Germany’s natural gas imports from 1991 to 2008 in petajoul.
(Data source: bmwi.de)
are over 70 (1999).475 A strengthening of the ties between the civil societies of
Germany and Russia were initiated with the Petersburg Dialogue, a discussion fo-
rum for civil societies, starting in 2001. Annual meetings have brought together
leaders from political, economic, media, cultural, religious and NGO circles to
adress different issues. This is a part of the so called German-Russian “mod-
ernisation partnership” and a formal statement on this purpose was made in the
presence of chancellor Merkel and president Medvedev in 2008. In 2003, Germany
joined an “alliance” with France and Russia opposing the US-led invasion of Iraq
of March/April 2003. The German-Russian transit agreement of 9 October 2003
moreover allowed Germany as the first NATO member ever the transportation
of military equipment and personnel over Russian territory to Afghanistan.476
In September 2005, Germany and Russia proposed the construction of the Nord
Stream pipeline bypassing the Baltic states and Poland.
Chancellor Merkel visited Warsaw befor Moscow and her inaugural visit in
Moscow in January 2006 was used to criticise the democratic deficits of Rus-
sia, which provoked some irritation. Instead of a “German-Russian friendship”,
475 Timmerman (1999b), p. 3.
476Auswärtiges Amt: “Truppenstationierung. Zweiseitiges Abkommen” at http://aus
waertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/InternatRecht/Truppenstationierungsrecht_node.html
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that had been Schröder’s term to describe the relationship, Merkel chose the
more sober term “strategic partnership”. The term was also fixed in the coalition
agreement of 2005.477
“The feat of the chancellor was on the one hand to show distance to
Russia, who is moving further and further away from democracy, while
at the same time seeking closeness to Russia, whose gas and oil Germany
needs, and whose help is needed to solve the nuclear conflict with Iran.”478
Nevertheless, the German-Russian relations were still not suffering and FM Stein-
meier, former Head of the Federal chancellery under Schröder, was well-known
in the Kremlin and claimed a leading role in the German Russia policy. FM
Steinmeier has critisised chancellor Merkel for pursuing a Russia policy aiming at
impressing the German public. He advocated to adhere to the strategic partner-
ship even if times are getting harsh. Russia is too important for the stability on
the Balkan and in the Middle East, in addition to its importance for European
energy security and arms control.479
In October 2007 during the consultations of both governments in Wiesbaden,
Merkel continued to stress the economic relations as the “heart” of the German-
Russian strategic partnership. The trade between the two countries had grown
with 35 per cent compared to the year before, and the economic relations would
not be limited to the energy sector but also include e.g. the automobile and air-
craft industries.480 During the German-Russian consultations in Oberschließheim
in July 2009, the Nabucco-pipeline481 planned by the EU states was the only
topic that caused some dissonance between president Medvedev and chancellor
Merkel.482
Altogether, Germany’s relations with Russia are largely characterised by Ger-
477See the coalition accord Gemeinsam für Deutschland. Mit Mut und Menschlichkeit. Koali-
tionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD für die 16. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages
at http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdf/05_11_11_Koalitionsvertrag_Navigierbar.pdf
478 Brössler(2006). Author’s translation.
479Cited in Krüger (2007).
480 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2007). Russia was according to president Putin
also interested in close cooperation with Germany as regards high technology and further in-
vestments and mentioned the takeover of the Russian power plant company OGK-4 by the Eon
AG with 69 per cent of the shares.
481The planned pipeline from Turkey to Austria will supposedly supply the EU with gas from
the Caspian region. The start of construction is probably 2011.
482 Brössler (2009).
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many being Russia’s largest trading partner, most important market for Russian
gas, fifth biggest investor in Russia in 2006 (55 billion Euro) and by a strong
political partnership and credibility in Moscow.483 Moreover, 342,575 Russians
visited Germany in 2006, Germany is the leading advocate of integration with
Russia, opposes full ownership unbundling of EU energy companies, has a Russia-
first policy on the Eastern neighbourhood, and Merkel’s more critical approach
to Russia has been restrained by the coalition with the SPD and by building
the Nord Stream pipeline.484 However, as Leonard and Popescu remark, Russia’s
“strategic partners” are suffering as well because of the EU’s failing ability to use
its most powerful tool for dealing with Russia, i.e. its unity. The strategic part-
ners are not big enough on their own to negotiate a relationship of symmetrical
interdependence with Russia, and whereas the decision to support and develop
the Nord Stream pipeline has not yet enhanced Germany’s energy security, it
has cost a lot of political capital, i.e. soft power within the EU.485 However,
it is questionable if Germany is not big enough for a relationship of symmetri-
cal interdependence with Russia, as it makes up about 60 per cent of Russia’s
population486 and has a much stronger economy487.
Merkel’s explicit more distant relationship to then president Putin contributed to
improve the relations with the Central European states, and Poland in particular.
Schröder to a larger extent ignored the EU’s small member states. This, however,
does not mean that Merkel is automatically prepared to take the side of Russia’s
smaller neighbours.
“Angela Merkel, the chancellor from the East, enjoys much more confi-
dence among the neigbouring states than Schröder and even Kohl. And
yet her charm is not sufficient to debilitate the fear of a German Sonder-
weg. The German criticism of the mounting of the US anti-missile shield
in Poland and the Czech Republic, and of course also those voices of the
Bundestag who insist on equidistance in the relationship with Washing-
ton and Moscow, are registered with much attention in Eastern Central
Europe. Those who believe, these fears can be downplayed as rhetoric out-
flow of Eastern European resentments, are wrong. As long as the basic
483 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 33.
484 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 33.
485 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 55.
486Germany has a population of approximately 82 million inhabitants, whereas Russia has a
population of around 142 million inhabitants (2008/2009).
487Russia’s share of the international commodity trading is only about 2 per cent, not even
one third of Germany’s share.
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sentiment in Germany is neutral in its tone, the old Zwischeneuropa has
reasons to be worried. From this the [Central European] strategy to use
the Atlantic Alliance as a counterbalance to a German-French dominated
EU is derived, and works as a prevention against possible German-Russian
Sonderwege.”488
2.3.1.2.2. EU policy on Russia Russia’s integration in international organisa-
tions has been a manifested aim of German policy on Russia in order to promote
the process of democratisation, to neutralise Russia’s international role and to
integrate its claims towards the Baltic states in an international frame. As shown,
German politics of the 1990s was convinced that European stability could only
be achieved with and not without or even against Russia. This attitude has also
characterised German preferences for EU policy on Russia. In the early 1990s, the
EU was considered by the Russian elites to be Russia’s most important transfor-
mation and modernisation partner. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
(PCA) of 1994 was casually even characterised as the largest success of Russian
foreign policy in the post-soviet period.489 Germany also showed a strong com-
mitment when this treaty was elaborated and urged successfully for concessions
to Moscow as for example the further deregulation for Russian products and the
perspective of a free trade area between the contracting parties.490 When the
First Chechen war started in late 1994, Germany nevertheless acted through its
EU chairmanship and achieved the paraphing of the first PCA between the EU
and Russia in December this year. Germany also pursued the integration of Rus-
sia in the G7 from 1991 onwards,491 and Russia’s membership in the European
Council, which was accomplished in 1996. The accession to the European Council
was decided on despite the butchery in the Caucasus because of the perspective
of a peace agreement. In the commendatory letter of the judiciary committee
it was apparent that Russia practically did not conform to any of the admit-
tance criteria (respect of human rights, free democracy, rule of law, free press
and a human penal system). These were apparently not regarded to be as impor-
tant as the symbolic affiliation with democratic Europe. The reason for Russia’s
admission was thus the hope of convergence with European norms which a mem-
488 Schwarz (2007). Author’s translation.
489 Baranovskij (1998), p. 241.
490 Timmerman (1996).
491Since the 1998 Birmingham Summit, Russia is a G8 member.
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bership could provoke as opposed to an isolation of Russia.492 The former Russia
correspondent of the Neue Züricher Zeitung, Ulrich Schmid, had the following
comment:
“The West’s belief that it can advocate the quality of the Russian judi-
ciary with Moscow’s admittance to the Council is not exactly an evidence
of sweeping knowledge of the Eurasian giant empire but of a rather foolish
and abhorrent Eurocentric overestimation of one’s own capabilities.”493
The PCA created the basis for Russia’s trade and economic relations with the EU,
defined the tangible cooperation and made a regular political dialogue possible.
It did not contain any membership perspective for Russia but the EU had thus
announced a relationship sui generis which substantially exceeds an association
but nevertheless stays below the option of accession.494
With the EU’s “Common strategy on Russia” (CSR), resolved upon at the Cologne
summit of 1999 at the end of the German EU chairmanship, it was aimed for a
coordination of political questions between Russia and the EU. Germany was deci-
sively involved in this strategy from the beginning, and the initial drafting was to
a large degree framed by the core group consisting of France, Finland, Germany,
and the UK.495 The CSR suggests to further develop an EU-Russia partnership
in the frame of a permanent political and security political dialogue, to approach
the mutual interests and search for common answers which also applies to voting
in international bodies as the UN and the OSCE. The possibility should thus be
verified of creating a permanent mechanism for the political and security political
dialogue between the EU and Russia. This exceeds the ambitions of the PCA and
includes several fields of cooperation as for example the elaboration of a European
security charter, the inclusion of Russia in EU/WEU missions in the frame of the
Petersberg tasks, common initiatives of conflict prevention and crisis management
e.g. in Russia’s neighbouring areas. As an amendment, the cooperation is en-
couraged to be intensified in regional organisations as the CBSS and the Barents
Council and in the cross-border cooperation, a focal point of the EUND.496 The
492 Garbe (2002), pp. 130-131.
493Cited in Garbe (2002), p. 131. Author’s translation.
494 Timmerman (1999a), p. 997.
495 Haukkala (2000), p. 25.
496 Timmerman (1999b), p. 5.
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EU also increasingly emphasises the importance of civil society developments for
the democratisation of Russia. Thus bottom-up partnerships should be aided,
for example between cities, professional associations, universities, trade unions,
enterprises and youth organisations.497
Chancellor Schröder declared Germany and Russia vital strategic partners while
at the same time the second Chechen war was in full force and the Feira Eu-
ropean council in June 2000 had not yet decided on the formal dismantling of
the sanctions against Russia. The official EU line remained much harder than
some individual member states’ and demanded immediate cease-fire, political di-
alogue with representatives of Chechnya and secured access for aid agencies and
other NGOs to give humanitarian assistance on the ground.498 In 2001 Schröder
pointed out his policy on Russia in Die Zeit. Although he stressed the commit-
ment to avoid a German Sonderweg, he emphasised the German understanding of
being an initiator in the EU’s policy on Russia. He endorsed broad cooperation
and dialogue, deepening economic ties and a European security structure with
Russia. Schröder underlined that Russia is a strategic partner of Germany and
Europe.499
Following the CSR, Germany and France boosted the creation of the Four Com-
mon Spaces with Russia in 2003 which include close cooperation in the fields of
the economy, freedom, security and justice, external security as well as research,
education and culture. According to statements from 2007 made by the German
Minister of State, Gernot Erler, a
“future-oriented cooperation with Russia should not be restricted to en-
ergy. During the German EU Presidency we intend to consider the entire
spectrum of EU-Russian relations. We are particularly eager to drive for-
ward the implementation of the four Common Spaces agreed between the
EU and Russia. (...) The common space of external security will be a par-
ticularly important aspect, specifically encompassing cooperation between
Russia and the EU to stabilize their common neighbourhood. Despite reti-
cence on the Russian side, we must keep this issue on the agenda. We must
intensify dialogue particularly on how to move frozen conflicts forward.
That will be a litmus test for the possibilities of closer cooperation.”500
497 Timmerman (1999b), p. 3.
498 Haukkala (2000), pp. 38-39.
499 Schröder (2001b).
500 Erler (2007), p. 4.
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According to the authors of the ECFR working paper frequently referred to,
German FM Steinmeier has been the “most eloquent advocate”501 of creeping in-
tegration with Russia502 as he has introduced the principle of “Annäherung durch
Verflechtung”, i.e. approximation by increased interdependence, closely related
to the social democratic tradition of Ostpolitik and Egon Bahr’s concept of “Wan-
del durch Annäherung”. Referring to president Medvedev’s wish for a renewed
partnership between the EU and Russia, Steinmeier favoured such an option and
proposed four necessary steps in this regard: (1) An open dialogue on security
issues; (2) new negotiations for a new PCA; (3) strengthening the EU-Russia
dialogue on global challenges; and (4) new impulses to deal with the past.503 The
negotiations for a new PCA should have started during the German 2007 pres-
idency but was delayed due to Polish and Lithuanian objections. Although the
EU and Russia have declared their bilateral relations to be a “strategic partner-
ship”, irritations remain over many topics. As Finland prepared to take over the
EU presidency in June 2005, ‘to improve the EU’s relationship with Russia’ was
the top priority. Half a year later, the German presidency inherited the problems
related to Russia: the Russian imports ban on Polish meat, the Estonian govern-
ment’s decision to move the Soviet monument and the Russian reactions to the
moving, the US plans of an antimissile defence in Poland and the Czech Republic,
Russia’s wish to become member in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), Russia’s use of oil and gas deliveries as a political in-
strument and the future of Kosovo. Finland and Germany are the two EU states
with the best relations with Russia, but the situation did not really improve un-
der their chairmanships. The EU and Russia have not managed to renegotiate
a new PCA although egotiations were launched at the Khanty-Mansyisk summit
of June 2008 and started in July 2008.
501 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 52.
502Advocates of this policy line e.g. argue that cut-offs of gas supply in EU member states
would become less likely if Russia was allowed to buy downstream assets in the energy market
as Russian companies would loose money as a result of such cut-offs. Leonard/ Popescu
(2007), p. 52.
503Auswärtiges Amt: Rede von Bundesminister Steinmeier anlässlich der Podiums-
diskussion bei der Willy-Brandt-Stiftung, 4 March 2008 at http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/diplo/de/infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080304-BM-Ostpolitik.html (accessed 9 Jan-
uary 2009).
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On the face of it, Germany’s Russia-policy is nicely embedded in a multilateral
frame, stresses dialogue and has realised Russia’s great importance to European
security. However, as Leonard and Popescu argue, interdependence does not lead
to stability unless both parties respect common rules and norms without being
able to revise them unilaterally.504 The “creeping integrationists” do not have
an answer to the Russian strategy toward the EU, i.e. “bilateralising relations
with EU member states, strengthening Russian influence in the post-Soviet space,
revising the political, legal and economic basis of relations with the Union, and
promoting asymmetric interdependence with a divided EU.”505 Germany is on the
other hand not completely ignoring the importance of a solidarist devlopment of
the Russian society either. When Steinmeier as the first Western statesman vis-
ited the new Russian president Medvedev in Yekaterinburg, he held an important
speech on 13 May 2008 in which he proposed the German-Russian Partnership
for Modernisation and stated the following:
“The future is there for countries and societies that vigorously modernize,
are innovative and courageously tackle structural change. It is my firm
conviction that open societies are best able to do so. We are therefore
well-advised to perceive openness and plurality of our societies not as a
threat but as an opportunity and a sine qua non for peace and growing
prosperity. As in the case of Germany, modernization in Russia cannot
be shouldered by the state alone. This would exceed its capabilities. It is
precisely for this reason that Russia needs a lively civil society and a lively
entrepreneurial culture. A public arena in which different opinions freely
vie with one another and reliable rule-of-law structures will likewise not
harm but instead promote modernization of your country.”506
The catchword is definitely dialogue. Germany is cautious not to put pressure
on Russia except by dialogue, and discussing them through e.g. the Petersburg
Diaologue is the German way to adress domestic developments in Russia. The
big EU powers have concentrated on economic cooperation and bilateral dia-
logues with Russia, ignoring other concerns to the EU such as negative domestic
developments in Russia and the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood. Except of Spain,
all Russia’s “strategic partners” in the EU have furthermore blocked Commission
504 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 53.
505 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 13.
506Federal Foreign Office of Germany: Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal Minister for Foreign
Affairs, at the Department of International Relations of the Urals State University in Yekaterin-
burg 13 May at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080513-
BM-Russland.html
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plans for energy liberalisation.507
“The Union’s energy vulnerability does not stem from the fact that Russia
is such an important gas supplier, but from its own inability to achieve an
integrated and flexible gas market. (...) The ultimate goal should be open
competition, respect for the rule of law, and an integrated and flexible gas
market.”508
Chancellor Merkel agreed to be Russia’s “special energy partner in Europe” and
thus delivered an important contribution to Putin’s game with the EU: The EU
does not speak with one voice, despite its superiority in regards to both soft and
hard power indicators.509
In order not to irritate the great neighbour to the east, France and Germany
in particular, both essential for any coherent EU policy on Russia, have been
cautious engaging in the cases of the Ukraine or Georgia. The uprisings in Georgia
(2003) and the Ukraine (2004) show a new dynamic in Eastern Europe connected
to an orientation towards democratic values combined with the replacement of
the ties with Russia. This challenged the EU in a new way, and Germany as the
traditional advocate of Ostpolitik had to react to new claims of EU memberships.
Combining its policy of good relations with the Kremlin on the one hand and
being the advocate of Eastern-Central Europe on the other hand, the question
was whether Germany would continue to promote an Ostpolitik. Even before
the neighbourhood policy was on the European agenda, German analysts and
members of the political planning departments were discussing the effects of the
EU’s eastern enlargement on the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. The aim was to
keep the division lines and asymmetries as low as possible to allow for security
and stability on the other side of the EU border. Kaliningrad was a topic of its
own.510 The planning departments of the German and Polish foreign ministries
set up a common working group which resulted in a concept for the creation of a
European Union with 25 and more member states. Part of this approach was also
the idea of a European neighbourhood policy, and the paper defines the Ukraine,
Moldovia, Belarus and Russia as neighbouring states. Subject to the respective
507 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 36.
508 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 62.
509 Leonard/ Popescu (2007), p. 8.
510 Kempe (2007), p. 244.
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stage of development of their transformation, these states were offered a broad
range of functional cooperation, also the instrument of the EEA.511
The Bundestag debated the elections in the Ukraine and Belarus and released
resolutions. Here, the importance was stressed to hold elections of a European
standard. The parliamentarians moreover pointed to the options of the European
neighbourhood policy to give direction to a European perspective for the trans-
formation countries. Mechanisms of a strengthening of the democtratic actors
were also debated. In a debate on how to consolidate democracy in the Ukraine,
then chancellor Schröder underlined Russia’s importance in regards to the cri-
sis management in the Ukraine. Before, he had used several phone calls with
president Putin to resolve the situation in the Ukraine.512
“Schröder’s stance exemplified Germany’s ambivalent position between
the German-Russian special relationship and the interest to strengthen the
democratic movement in the neighbouring states. The Kremlin tried to (...)
dominate the post-soviet space and to prohibit its integration in European
structures. Although this policy is contrary to European interests, Russia
is indispensable to the stability of the region. Schröder underlined this role
of Russia and thus put up with possible deficits of democracy.”513
One of Russia’s most prominent politicians in Russia’s political opposition and
long lasting leader of the party Jabloko, Grigory Yavlinsky, has also stated that
Russia is far too important to be ignored, and that it has to find its way to
democracy on its own. However, there is a lot Europe can do to contribute,
which besides setting good examples would be to do something for the Ukraine.
That democracy survives in the Ukraine would be of inestimable importance to
Russia.514 The crucial point is that, notwithstanding the neighbourhood pol-
icy, as long as these states are excluded from the institutional cooperation, the
EU’s possible course of action is limited when it comes to democratisation.515
In regards to the Ukraine, Poland has had a far more progressive attitude than
Germany.
511 Kempe (2007), p. 244.
512 Kempe (2007), p. 245.
513 Kempe (2007), p. 245.
514Cited in Tjønn (2009b).
515 Kempe (2007), p. 257.
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The tensions between solidarist and pluralistic views are thus also very present in
regards to Europe’s dealings with Russia. Disagreements about the government’s
policies on Russia between chancellor Merkel and FM Steinmeier have occurred
but are still minor compared to the EU’s difficulties agreeing on a proper Eu-
ropean policy on EU-Russian relations. Russia seems to be the most devisive
issue in the EU today. What is the pivotal strategy, to focus on human rights
or a continuing dialouge? The disagreement on Russia after the war in Georgia
was apparent within the EU, as it was in NATO despite a common statement.
Germany, Italy and France did not want to isolate Russia, whereas Great Britain,
Sweden, Poland and the Baltic states - among others - wanted to do so. Both
Steinmeier and Merkel were deeply worried and expressed their criticism to the
Russian side. Steinmeier nevertheless stated that it is not possible to solve re-
gional problems of Georgia and Caucasus without Russia and valued dialogue
with Russia almost regardless of the circumstances. As he stated, it stays “the
classical task of foreign policy not to lose the thread” (Gesprächsfaden).516
2.3.1.3. Independent variables and policy assessment
As the analysis above shows, Germany is stressing the continuing “dialogue”
with Russia almost regardless of domestic Russian developments or disagreements
within the EU or even NATO as opposed to the recommended medicine517 for
Europe’s relations with Russia is a common EU approach on Russia ending the
current situation between the incompatible strategies of integration and contain-
ment. The German-Russian relationship seems unshakeable, however, and thus
makes Germany decisive for the future relations between Russia and the West.
The question is if German policy should be improved and move in a solidarist di-
rection. Among the pluralist principles, principle 8 should be discussed. It states
that “because of their unique military capabilities, the great powers should assume
special responsibilities which are determined by mutual consent for preserving in-
ternational order.” Russia still has unique military capabilities, despite neglecting
its military for over a decade, and takes a special place in international society
as a cooperation partner needed by e.g. the US, the EU and China. Its energy
516Cited in Brössler (2008) Author’s translation.
517 Leonard/ Popescu (2007).
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power also gives Russia other special responsibilities and power. Finding mutual
consent for preserving international order is difficult, however, because it is not
given what this international order involves. As the German policy on Russia
shows, the preservation of order has been highly weighted. However, the develop-
ments in the post-Soviet space show diverging conceptions of what the new order
should be. Russia still sees this as its “near abroad” with special “responsibilities”,
whereas the Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and even Belarus strive for more distance
to and less dependence on Russia but are driven back to the latter as the door to
European institutions is closed. Germany wants to please everyone but is in fact
not promoting democratisation in Eastern Europe because Russia is perceived to
be even more important as a stabilising factor of the region. Germany thus also
contributes to keeping e.g. the Ukraine and Georgia out of organisations like the
EU and NATO and indirectly contributes to preserving order and strengthening
the plualist way. From a solidarist point of view, however, this is problematic as
more could be done to promote democratisation in Eastern Europe, which might
be important to the democratisation of Russia as well.
Not provoking Russia is of course of great importance to European peace and
stability, and preventing war should be the most important policy making factor
regardless of how implausible it seems to be in Europe today. The question is
if progress should be neglected in order not to provoke, or if there is room for a
broader consensual legitimacy. The first solidarist principle enlisted in chapter
2.2.2 of part II which seems relevant here is principle 7, stating that “sovereignty
does not entitle states to bee free from ’the legitimate appraisal of their peers’
with respect to human rights.” As argued in part II, it is vitally important to
small states and to Norway and Sweden in equal measure that international law
and cosmopolitan values are valid principles of the international society of states
in order to protect them in their relations with great powers. This underlines
the importance that also Russia implements the proper norms and follows them.
In order to achieve this, it is not sufficient merely to preserving order. As Ger-
many must be considered to be a very suitable peer of Russia, it is therefore very
sensational if Russia is almost fully free from Germany’s legitimate appraisal
with respect to human rights, which several examples from the previous chapter
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show.518 German aloofness when it comes to domestic Russian developments e.g.
in the Caucasus also points to principle 10 of the solidarist principles, i.e. “regard
for human rights requires respect for non-sovereign communities and requires the
society of states to protect minority nations and indigenous peoples from unnec-
essary suffering.”
Arriving at the universally applicable principles of good international citizen-
ship519, principle 7 is of great relevance: “obligations to protect the vulnerable
require the establishment of global political structures - involving close coopera-
tion with international governmental and non-governmental organizations that
institutionalize the universal right to be able to protest against actual or potential
harm.” Applying this principle in the case of German policy on Russia, the role
of the EU is the key to the improvement of German policy. As the references to
Leaonard and Popescu’s working paper point up, the EU’s unity is the key to
moving Russia in a solidarist direction. European political structures must be
the initial point when improving European matters. The EU is not capable of
moving any further in regards to Russia and its neighbours as long as the EU
member states can not unite in a common approach. This is thus the factor
where Germany’s importance to the foreign policies of (not only) Norway and
Sweden could be greater: Not giving up on European unity which includes Rus-
sia as well. Germany’s policy on Russia should concentrate on developing the
EU-Russian relationship from the least common denominator to a policy which
challenges Russia to a greater extent in regards to cosmopolitan values and hu-
man rights. This requires the capability of integrating Russia in Europe as well.
Germany should continue to be an important friend of Russia and counterbalance
countries like the Baltic states and Poland but should put more effort into uniting
EU countries on a common stance and downplaying bilateral solo attempts. In
this case as well, the conclusion of the assessment is that German policy should
move somewhat in a solidarist direction.
518The picture would surely be moderated if other foreign policy actors such as the media,
churches, NGOs and political foundations were included in the analysis.
519See chapter 2.2.3 of part II,
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2.4. Conclusions and further considerations
Here, the overall picture of the case studies, i.e. German policy on Northern
Europe, will be assessed. The policy assessments in the different cases made a
consideration of whether German policy should move in a solidarist or pluralist
direction. The evaluation of the case studies shows that in some cases (1 and 3),
German policy has not yet been shaped, whereas in others (2, 4 and 5) Germany
should promote a policy of a more solidarist character. Here, the focus on princi-
ples will be complemented by the mechanisms prevalent in German and European
politics which lead to Germany’s policy on northern Europe as analysed above.
First, European structures are important in regards to what Germany is, can
be, and what role it plays in northern Europe. If all responsibility for European
matters is allocated to the Germans due to their economic power, by other na-
tions or the Germans themselves, this also implies that all power is transferred
to Germany. Populous states have a larger economic capacity than smaller ones,
and the power follows the money. This is thus a natural power basis of Germany.
However, power is also created by the responsibility given and taken. When it is
claimed that Germany for the first time is the leader of Europe and as a leader
of a community to a larger extent needs to consider how to use this power, i.e.
also consider what is best for the community, the whole idea about one nation
leading others in a community is dubious. It is a question of definitions. A
community should have a collective leadership. It thus has to be clear when Ger-
many - and others - is acting on its own behalf, and when it is acting on behalf
of the community. Germany is not only the EU, but also the sovereign state.
An important European problem is that the important topics are pulverised. An
alternative would be to agree on the the essential and leave the details to the dif-
ferent countries instead of the European bureaucracy. The stated necessity of a
united EU policy on Russia is a good example. Here, topics should be ranked due
to importance, the important topics should be evaluated, and thus an agreement
should be reached on the principal issues. This would be the initial point as the
bilateral European relations with Russia are concerned. Germany and the other
EU member states need to define what they want to cooperate on, and further
they have to relate to both the EU and their own independence.
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Another example is Kaliningrad. Germany does not have any policy on Kalin-
ingrad but still gets negative reactions from time to time. This case in particular
shows how Germany needs the EU. The EU’s value is that it gives Germany team
players which it needs in order not to take the responsibility alone. This shows
that also Germany needs the small states and not just the other way around. The
reason why this is not functioning particularly well is simply again because the
EU does not have a common platform. The basis has to be clear before the mem-
bers agree on something or deepen the integration. The basic principles have to
be clear in order to define the power. The simple fact that there are many states
participating in European integration is not the same as giving away power. It is
the basic principles which decide the power structures, and in order to cooperate
well together, power has to be defined. The EU does have legal principles but
not a foundation based on values. In order to build such a foundation, the aim
of the community has to be clear, and the development can not be decided by
two major players alone. If the smaller members just do as the large ones say,
they are giving them the whole power, which is easy because they do not have to
take any responsibility themselves. If the smaller EU states had a larger say, Ger-
many would actually have benefited from it. Whether Germany can play a role
in the Baltic Sea Region thus depends on the EU’s ability to develop a common
policy. But in order to do so, the basic principles must be found because they
decide the power relations. Limits have to be set which defines the core areas
of cooperation, unless everything is confusing. Unfortunately, confusion is what
characterises international politics.
The balance between solidarist and pluralistic principles is the other point. The
basis of cooperation is that you can agree on something. This is a harder task
when it comes to e.g. Russia. When certain principles are not applicable to
all states, Germany’s policy has to make a choice in this regard and take the
consequences. It is however important that its policy rests on principles, otherwise
policy is just “acting by accident”.
Consequently, if Nordic foreign policy makers should try to influence their German
colleagues, the following recommendations can be given:
1. Have high ambitions of what Germany can accomplish. The past has shown
- 346 - III.2. Case Studies
that this is possible, but continuity is not always the answer to new chal-
lenges.
2. Germany’s relationship with other actors mirrors its fears and limits. Its
more or less close partners, allies and neighbours can not give Germany
more confidence if Germany itself does not allow for it. The EU is the key
to create the team players Germany needs in order to play a greater role.
3. Contribute to the balance between order and justice but do not take the
responsibility which is not yours.
4. Create a new political culture which allows to address disagreements and
problematic aspects.
5. Make an evaluation of the policy instead of simply adapting to new situa-
tions. Be prepared to reconsider also things which have worked well in the
past. Have a clear strategy on your aims and be willing to risk something
in order to improve, and be prepared to take the consequences.
6. Make efforts to reform the EU by defining the power structures and the
basic principles.
Germany could thus to a larger extent use its preconditioned importance to North-
ern Europe if it would stop giving Russia more power than it actually has, and
start applying the same principles on all states. Furthermore, it must contribute
to a development which enables the EU to concentrate on core issues which has
a mandate in common principles. The easiest way out is not to take the fights.
What is needed of Germany is rather to contribute to mutual respect in the
international society of Northern Europe.
Conclusions
Why is Germany important - and how important is Germany - to the strategic
challenges and opportunities facing the foreign policies of Norway and Sweden?
What limitations exist in regards to Germany’s role in Northern Europe? These
are the questions this thesis has aimed at answering. The answers are at the same
time an assessment of German foreign policy.
The power triangle surrounding the Nordic region today consists of Russia, the
EU and the US. The general conditions of Nordic security are also characterised
by the increasing importance of the Arctic, not only to the traditional players
in the High North but also to other global actors such as China, and a Baltic
Sea Region where Russia meets Europe. Russia is a challenge to both the US
and Europe. Whereas energy relations to a large extent exemplify the European-
Russian challenges, the core challenge in Western-Russian relations is NATO.
Russia can be both a partner and a threat, but the Russian challenge to the West
is the most essential factor to Nordic security. If power is defined as “the ability
to achieve objectives rather than as the resources a country commends”, Russia
is in the better position, using its power to weaken the EU because it is able to
split it. If the idea of rebuilding NATO to an efficient European security system
including Russia can be realised, a common transatlantic exposure to Russia and
a more united EU are the prerequisites.
The initial point of the thesis was a working paper which suggested Germany
as Norway’s strategic partner in Europe. Germany and Norway have excellent
bilateral relations, and Germany is Norway’s most important cooperation part-
ner in Europe. However, the term strategic partnership is not suitable because
Norwegian politicians are not using the term. The relationship can rather be
characterised as an energy partnership, which importance to both countries must
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be stressed and which also comprises difficulties. Political, economic as well as
military cooperation are important areas of mutual interest but do not indicate
why Germany is of particular importance to the strategic challenges and opportu-
nities facing the foreign policy of Norway. It is thus not obvious that the bilateral
relations are very important when it comes to Germany’s importance to Nordic
security. A comparison with Sweden will thus be added in order to identify the
factors that are decisive for the assessment of Germany’s importance. Do Nor-
way’s challenges differ from Sweden’s and do they necessitate other solutions? Do
the different institutional contexts of their foreign policies contribute to different
needs in international relations? Do the different regional frames of their foreign
policies make a difference in regards to German importance to their strategic
challenges and opportunities? The answers to these questions were elaborated
through an analysis of both countries’ foreign policies as well as their foreign
political challenges and opportunities. First some comments on their foreign
policies:
Lines can be drawn from the Second World War to current Scandinavian policies.
Neither Norway nor Sweden seem to have evaluated the past but rather follow
their traditions without really reflecting on them. In security policy, Norway
follows the Atlantic line anchored during and after the Second World War and
has made a choice in regards to its affiliation. The Norwegians are however
dancing to the tune of others and the US in particular. The Norwegians have an
enormous wealth of maintenance but have a hard time bearing it because they are
not investing in their own country. Norway is not capable of making any choices
in regards to trade policy, i.e. the EU. It does not dare to stay inside, and does
not dare to stay outside. The EEA seems like a well-functioning agreement in
many ways but contributes to undermine democracy. It would thus be better to
stay completely out of the EU and take the consequences, or to join the EU and
take the consequences. Not to choose is the worst possible solution because those
consequences are of a more substantial nature. Sweden has taken this choice, and
has become a well-integrated, successful EU-member. However, as the Swedish
Euro debate shows, their motives of joining or not joining the monetary union
are dubious. Sweden is cautious in its approach to Europe and rather joins in
when the coast is clear. When the circumstances change, Sweden probably goes
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with the tide. It is a simple calculation of economic and political interests. What
is the quality of European cooperation if every member state thinks similarly?
How is it possible for small countries to have a say in the EU? For both Norway
and Sweden it is important to see the whole picture, and not only what they
want to see, in order to make the right choices. That however also applies to the
EU by itself. In regards to security policy, Sweden has made itself anonymous
by trying to compromise with everyone. This started at the latest during the
Second World War. Between June 1940 and August 1943 approximately 2 140
000 German soldiers on-leave were permitted to cross through neutral Sweden
travelling to and from Norway and Finland. Germans were even allowed to mine
the Sound on the Swedish side. The concession policy ceased as the war took a
new turn.1 Today Sweden is still non-aligned but cooperates closely with NATO
and has participated in e.g. Afghanistan just as Norway and Germany have.
Sweden needs to take a choice in regards to defence policy. As the situation is
now, it is hard to assess where the country stands, as opposed to Finland. This
is also mirrored in Sweden’s damaged relations with Russia.
By comparing issues of great importance to Norwegian and Swedish foreign poli-
cies respectively, focus has been on the differences facing the two countries. The
differences are the regions of pivotal importance (the BSR and the Barents Sea
Region), the institutional frames of the EU and NATO, the foreign policy tradi-
tions, foreign trade and the nature of the challenges and opportunities themselves.
Norway’s challenges and opportunities are found in the High North and in regards
to its role as a very important energy supplier to Europe in particular. Norway
seems to have a positive relationship with Russia, having being able solve the
difficult dispute on the delineation of the Barents Sea. Norway and Russia have
many interests in common as major energy producers, but the European energy
market (the British and German in particular) is decisive for Norway’s future pos-
sibilities and European energy policy is thus accordingly important. The EU has
moreover increasing interests in the Arctic which are sometimes conflictive when
compared to Norwegian interests. However, there are different European interests
in this regard. This is also the case with Svalbard, Norway’s most important and
most difficult strategic challenge.
1 Arter (1999), p. 272.
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Sweden is, as opposed to the energy exporter Norway, rather vulnerable in regards
to its energy situation and is cautious not to get too dependent on Russia as an
energy supplier. Sweden’s challenges and opportunities are for the major part
found in the BSR and the political situation here. Russia, which representatives
sometimes even adds Finland to its “sphere of interest”, is the neighbour with
which it is difficult to cooperate with also on the regional level. Since the end
of the Second World War, the main reason for Swedish neutrality/non-alignment
has been not to provoke Russia. Sweden however spoke its mind e.g. during the
conflict in Georgia and was reluctant to the Nord Stream pipeline for a long time,
and this seemed to provoke Russia enough to worsen the relationship. Norway
has rather been cautious not to provoke Russia whereas its NATO membership
has become the most natural thing in the world. The BSR is also the region where
the EU meets Russia and all the challenges this implies. In the BSR, NATO is
still the most important factor in regards to security policy because there is no
formal European guarantee for the security of the EU members. US presence in
northern Europe is still a necessary counterbalance to Russia.
Notwithstanding the differences, the similarities of both countries’ challenges and
opportunities are more important. The common denominators are Russia, inter-
national law, regional cooperation and US presence in Europe. The question if
not both countries are dependent on the same factors in order to achieve a positive
development in regards to the challenges and opportunities facing their foreign
policies can thus be answered with yes. Both Norway and Sweden have tried to
contribute to the creation of an international order increasingly based on inter-
national law, engaging in a more legal based international order since the days
of the League of Nations. Small countries with open economies are particularly
dependent on predictability and protection in questions concerning war, peace,
environmental survival, trade and economic capitalisation of natural resources.
The most important factor which can be derived from the analysis above is in-
ternational law. One can for example only try to imagine where Norway would
have been today without the UNCLOS.
The analysis thus had to move beyond pure power politics, and the theory suit-
able to guide the empirical analysis of part III was derived from the English
Conclusions - 351 -
School, the advocate of a theory of international society which recovered an older
European stream of thinking which recognised the habit of cooperation and the
importance of law in the practice of international relations. Principles of a good
international citizenship based on English School writings2 were thus the the-
oretical basis for the case studies of part III on Germany’s northern European
policies. Because the analysis of part I also showed that it is not only a matter
of principles, some reflections on the mechanisms prevalent in the international
society of states however needed to be added to the concept of good interna-
tional citizenship, by which consensus and legitimacy are the key terms. It is
thus Norway’s and Sweden’s common strategic challenge to question the right of
the strongest because principles should be based on legitimacy and not power.
The question is at what price consensus can be achieved. Is it better that states
pretend to agree when they actually disagree instead of taking a dispute at an
early stage? Do large states get more powerful simply because they are allowed
to? Principles should be equally applied to all states regardless of their status.
This is the point where it is the hardest to apply a “sound consensual legitimacy”.
To avoid disputes with great powers at almost any price just gives them increased
power. This however also implies that the West does not have the legitimacy to
say “this is the way things should be”. If there are disagreements between states,
this should still imply that the views of the opponent are respected. If problems
with great powers are brushed under the carpet, the international society of states
is letting them do whatever they like. A policy which allows for disagreements
but still respects the opponents would allow for more foreseeability and less power
games. If the power is given away, somebody else will take it. If a significant
actor is allowed to break international law without significant reactions, then you
really got a significant problem in the end. Consensus and legitimacy are thus
terms that should be complemented by independence. States, and alliances, need
to have strategies and cannot solely lean on international law or multilateralism.
There is thus no definite conclusion on what a good international citizenship
should comprise, because the preconditions are always changing and because of
this, a policy or a principle also need to be reconsidered. The risks must thus
always be considered when a solidarist position is taken instead of a pluralist,
2 Linklater/ Suganami (2006).
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but the most important part must be conscious policies, i.e. that the aim is
clear and the risks as well. Developments can not always be predicted, but if
the policy is not reconsidered, the problems will return because no improvement
has taken place. What might prevent such reconsiderations are rather the power
structures as such, and that is why they are so dangerous. It must be possible to
take a position which on the other hand can be changed at a later point of time.
This also implies that a solidarist policy direction in one case might be the right
decision at one point of time and the wrong position at a a later point of time.
From this theoretical basis part III finally examines Germany’s foreign policy in
order to assess its importance to challenges and opportunities of Nordic foreign
policies.
Germany is important to northern Europe simply because of its geographical
proximity, its size and population, its economic power, and its increasingly dis-
tinct role in the EU. In order to further assess the prerequisites of a significant
German role in northern Europe, German foreign policy and its principles, struc-
tures, norms, institutions and actors were analysed. Germany has come to term
with its militant past and had a very successful foreign policy during the Cold
War. In the end it regained its full sovereignty, had good relations with all its
neighbours, and was integrated in Europe and the transatlantic alliance. If the
Cold War period would be reconsidered in the same way as Germany’s militant
past, the logical conclusion would be that it is time to trust the Germans again
because they have proven to be trustworthy. But the Germans would not have
been the Germans if they thought that things were that easy, and they have ap-
parently not yet forgiven themselves. This of course also has its consequences.
Europeanisation is a decisive process which structures German policy. However,
the European project and German European policy have never been questioned
by German politics. Instead, the importance of continuity is stressed without
further reflexions. From the mid-1990s however, a “creeping change of paradigm”
has been visible up to a more independent German foreign policy. When the
change is creeping and not a result of substantial evaluation, German policy is
condemned to overlook the policy lines which need to change due to new times.
The “easiest” way is simply to adjust to new circumstances without having an
aim of its policy. Meantime Germany again stands alone in Europe as a negative
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power factor. This time it is only a war fought with money. Germany appar-
ently gets the power whether it wants it or not, despite being in a union with
several other states. Is it then not time to question the union? The problem is
the superior forms of cooperation: it is not defined how Europe must cooperate.
There is no structure in the EU on the distribution of power and thus there is
no tool for governing the European integration. The lacking ability to create a
common platform, which is a consequence of the fact that the balance has not
been drawn, now culminates in the European debt crisis. To simply invent new
governing instruments for the economic and monetary cooperation would be to
take the symptoms as initial point for a new strategy. A reconsideration of the
whole philosophy of European integration is necessary.
If Germany’s importance to Norway and Sweden should move beyond its simple
power potential, German policy makers must stop misunderstanding the defini-
tion of power because it is all about how one uses its power. Germany can no
longer play the game of adapting to others. Germany has to choose and then
take the consequences instead of refurbishing the world to others. In order not to
stay a negative power factor in Europe because of its economic power, Germany
has to handle the disputes and cut through in order to establish a new, sensi-
ble and comprehensible European order. The German federal and institutional
distraction of power also leads to the question who is taking the responsibility
for German foreign policy. The least what must be expected is that Germany
takes responsibility for itself. If everyone is just defending their own role, how is
it possible not reconsider anything at all? Another important point is that Ger-
many should not take the responsibility for everything that goes wrong in Europe
and the mistakes others are making. If the responsibility is left to Germany, the
power is also given to Germany. Who does not want it.
Case studies were moreover conducted in order to assess Germany’s policies on
northern Europe, i.e. Germany’s policy on the Arctic (Arctic sustainable devel-
opment), the Baltic Sea Region (the Baltic states, Kaliningrad, regional cooper-
ation), and Russia (Russia’s integration in Europe). The evaluation of the case
studies showed that in some cases (1 and 3), German policy has not yet been
shaped, whereas in others (2, 4 and 5) Germany should promote a policy of a
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more solidarist character. The balance between solidarist and pluralistic princi-
ples is important. The basis of cooperation is that you can agree on something.
This is a harder task when it comes to e.g. Russia. When certain principles
are not applicable to all states, Germany’s policy has to make a choice in this
regard and take the consequences. It is however important that its policy rests
on principles, otherwise it is just “acting by accident”.
The case studies give a picture of German policy on a great power on the one
hand (which is given priority) and small states on the other (which are prioritised
when there is consensus). The case studies moreover show how Germany needs
the EU in order to become a legitimate player. This shows that also Germany
needs the small states, and not just the other way around, to be able to use its
power. The EU on the other hand fails to play a decisive role in the Arctic and
in the BSR. The lacking of the necessary unity on Russia is a good example.
Here, topics should be ranked due to importance, the important topics should be
evaluated, and thus an agreement should be reached on the principal issues. This
would be the initial point as the bilateral European relations with Russia are
concerned. Germany and the other EU member states need to define what they
want to cooperate on, and further they have to relate to both the EU and their
own independence. Another example is Kaliningrad. Germany does not have any
policy on Kaliningrad but still gets negative reactions from time to time. This
case in particular shows how Germany needs the EU. The EU’s value is that it
gives Germany team players which it needs in order not to take the responsibility
alone. Again, it is the basic principles which decide the power structures, and
in order to cooperate well together, power has to be defined. The EU does have
legal principles but not a foundation based on values. In order to have a such, the
aim of the community has to be clear, and the development can not be decided
by two major players (e.g. France and Germany) alone. If the smaller members
just do as the large ones say, they are giving them the whole power, which is
easy because they do not have to take any responsibility themselves. Whether
Germany can play a role in the Baltic Sea Region and in the European High North
thus depends on the EU’s ability to develop a common policy. Limits have to be
set which define the core areas of cooperation, otherwise everything is confusing.
Unfortunately, confusion is what characterises international politics.
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In an attempt to generalise the conclusions of chapter 2.4 of part III even more,
the following challenges can be presented to German foreign policy makers in
order to increase its importance to northern Europe:
1. Examine whether you are doing the same thing over and over while expect-
ing a different result;
2. what others want may not be what is best for you;
3. find the substance;
4. focus on the future and leave obsessive thinking and addictions behind;
5. make sure you are in full bloom and do not resign yourself to unweeding
the garden.
Finally, the thesis concludes that power is based on mistakes but should rather be
based on experiences. The power position of an actor can be the decisive factor,
but it is up to every state as well as the international society of states to decide
how much power a state should be given. Respect is missing in the “northern
European society of states”, and relations are based on fear.
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